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2Abstract
This thesis examines the conditions under which ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts can be 
resolved successfully. Ethno-territorial cross-border conflict is a type of ethnic conflict in which 
competing territorial and ethnic claims of distinct state and group actors occur; and this 
manifests itself primarily on three interrelated levels -  inter-group conflict, conflict between the 
external minority and the institutions of its host-state, and the (territorial) conflict between host- 
and kin-state.
An initial theoretical exploration of the subject establishes the framework of the 
subsequent study of individual cases, examining why the similar conflicts in Alsace, the 
Saarland, South Tyrol, and Northern Ireland required fundamentally different solutions. In 
addition to this, the condominia of Andorra and the New Hebrides are analysed, providing the 
basis upon which the concept of a condominium-style settlement for ethno-territorial cross- 
border conflicts is explored. By looking at the workings of integration, traditional consociation 
and consociation with permanent institutionalised kin-state involvement, secession, and 
condominium, the complexity of factors is studied that influence the development of ethno- 
territorial cross-border conflict, including inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic dimensions and the 
policies of the host and kin-state in relation to the conflict and each other. Thus refined, the 
analytical framework allows determining the conditions that must be fulfilled to provide lasting 
stability to a negotiated settlement. This set of stability criteria creates a paradigm that has
relevance as an analytical tool beyond the case studies conducted in this thesis. It can be used to
:
design case-specific solutions to actual ethnic conflicts and it can serve as an instrument to 
recognise instabilities in, and potential breakdowns of, existing settlements sufficiently early to 
respond to them constructively and to avoid a re-escalation of an already settled conflict.
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8Preface
On hearing that John Hume and he had been awarded the 1998 Kobe! Peace Price, Ulster 
Unionist Leader David Trimble rioted that he hoped this was not a premature decision. Peace 
deals had been made in Northern Ireland before -  and broken down. Yet, when after thirty years 
and the death of more than three thousand people, representatives of political parties from both 
communities in Norihem Ireland arid of the govemirients of the United Kingdom and the. 
Republic of Irelarid agreed a Comprehensive peace deal, international enthusiasm was 
unanimous. Brokered after intense negotiations under international mediation, the 1998 Good.. 
Friday Agreement was hailed as a breakthrough to permanent peace in the troubled region. A 
subsequent referendum endorsed the agreement north and south of the border, and elections to 
the new Northern Ireland Assembly returned a majority of pro-agreement politicians.
Was Trimble’s scepticism mere political rhetoric? Hardly. The strains that the Good 
Friday Agreement has had to endure so far have been enormous — the Omagh bombing in 
August, 1998, the Garvaghy Road siege in Portadown that began during the Protestant Orange . 
Order marching season arid, after several months, has still not being called off, the delay in 
setting up an Executive for Northern Ireland, the pending police reform, and most critical of all 
thus far, the question Of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. Nevertheless, the 
agreement holds.
Six years earlier and one and a half thousand miles away from Northern Ireland; another' 
conflict had been formally ended when Austria and Italy jput their decade-long dispute over 
South Tyrol and its German-speaking minority to rest and deposited respective declarations, 
with the United Nations. It had taken twenty-three years to implement an agreement that the 
Italian government and the South Tyrolese People’s Party concluded in 1969. After fifty years 
of failed policies of assimilation, resettleriient, arid expulsion on the part of successive Italian. 
governments and shattered South Tyrolese hopes of secession and reunion with Austria, the 
conflicting parties agreed upon a consociational settlement that has since proven remarkably 
stable. Why was this possible in 1969 in South Tyrol but not in Northern Ireland in 1973?
9Geographically situated between Northern Ireland and South Tyrol, Alsace and the 
Saarland faced similar conflicts, yet the solutions adopted for each were fundamentally different 
and lie on opposite sides of a dichotomy of democratic settlements of ethnic conflicts. The 
German-speaking community of Alsace has been politically integrated and culturally 
assimilated into French society. The population of the Saarland twice rejected anything less than 
reunification with Germany. Despite their different outcomes, neither of the two conflicts 
hindered Franco-German reconciliation after 1945, nor have they, once resolved, been further 
sources of instability in this part of Europe. A paradox or an important lesson to learn?
These questions would be less intriguing if it were not for the fact that all the conflicts 
mentioned show great similarities in a number of striking ways. The stakes in all of them are 
ethnic as well as territorial. The conflicting parties involved are ethnic groups and the states 
linked to them through common nationality.
Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, Alsace, and the Saarland are more or less classic 
examples of this kind of ethnic conflict, which I will refer to as ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflict, indicating both the dimensions of ethnicity and territory as well as the potential for 
internationalisation. Given European history, it is not surprising that this type of conflict is very 
common. The rise and demise of empires, border changes, especially after the First and Second 
World Wars, and migration created incompatible political and ethnic frontiers in Europe. The 
conflicts that resulted from this incompatibility played an important role in the collapse of the 
Versailles order imposed on Europe. After 1945 and during the Cold War they were less 
prominent in Soviet controlled Central and Eastern Europe, yet the re-emergence of internal and 
external minority and majority nationalisms after 1989 is ample proof that they had been 
suppressed rather than resolved. In Western Europe as well, conflicts that had been sidelined, 
such as the various Greek-Turkish territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea, intensified again, and 
for a short time in 1991 an Italian-Slovenian border dispute seemed likely.
All this highlights that ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts are, unfortunately, not a 
matter of the past. Europe will have to confront them in the future as well. While this is not the
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bright future European and world leaders had in mind when they enthusiastically welcomed the 
changes in the Eastern Bloc after 1989, the prospects are not too bleak either given that 
democratic societies in Western Europe can look back at a tradition of successful conflict 
settlement over the past decades.
To date there has been no European comparative analysis that has examined the 
conditions under which a variety of possible solutions have proven stable in reality, so that the 
lessons learned from them may be applied to other conflicts. This is what I set out to accomplish 
in this study.
This is not to say that there is a single ultimate solution for ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts, but rather that a variety of solutions are potentially qualified to be adopted for an 
ethno-territorial cross-border conflict, and that the specific contextual circumstances of each 
individual conflict determines which of them will provide a stable institutional framework for 
the accommodation of competing claims in the long-term. Thus, my main focus will not be on 
how a particular settlement was achieved, but instead on the conditions that are necessary to 
ensure its long-term stability. However, in order to do so it is necessary to study both the 
conflicts themselves as well as the processes of negotiating and implementing a settlement. This 
will help to illustrate which circumstances are indicative of continued accommodation and 
conciliation or of potential breakdown. Analysing settlements to assess their stability identifies 
the criteria that are conducive to stable settlements.
The choice of cases to accomplish this task has been deliberate. Each offers a distinct 
solution covering the whole range of democratically possible approaches to ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts -  integration in Alsace, secession in the Saarland, consociation in South 
Tyrol, and a consociation with permanent institutional involvement of the external minority’s 
kin-state in Northern Ireland. Each of the four cases also offers the opportunity to study 
different policies pursued by the parties involved. Ethnic group politics as well as state policies 
will be discussed at length and analysed concerning their impact on the conflict and its 
settlement. In contrast to most of the existing literature in the field, I will also focus specifically
on the bilateral relations between the two states involved, whose different agendas considerably 
influenced the eventual structure of the each settlement. Although I am not attempting to 
develop a comprehensive theory of what Brubaker1 calls “homeland nationalism”, this widely 
neglected aspect of conflict settlement will be afforded significant attention to contribute to the 
understanding of conflict resolution and settlement stability. A further question that I will 
explore is whether an alternative model settlement can be developed based upon the concept of 
what O’Leary has referred to as a democratised condominium. As I will argue in the context of 
two further case studies -  Andorra and the New Hebrides -  adopting and adapting a 
condominium-style settlement for ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts may be the only 
possible, although not problem-free, solution in cases of severe inter-ethnic, and possibly inter­
state, conflict with incompatible claims of national belonging being at stake.
All case studies are embedded in a theoretical framework in which I develop a set of 
analytical tools for assessing the stability of distinct model solutions for ethno-territorial cross- 
border conflicts. In the chapter preceding the case studies, I examine all of the different factors 
that one can reasonably assume to have an impact on the development and settlement of an 
ethno-territorial cross-border conflict. These factors are then used to undertake a detailed 
analysis of each single case, thus supplying the necessary data in identical categories. Using 
these data subsequently on a more abstract level outside the context of each specific case study 
provides the basis upon which general stability criteria for each model solution can be extracted.
In 1946, the Italian Chief Negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference, Nicola Carandmi, 
wrote about the Austro-Italian Paris Agreement, “If this agreement proves functional, which 
will include a mutual sacrificing of Italian sovereignty and Austrian territorial claims, it will be 
first of all due to the spirit of goodwill from which the parties proceeded and in which they 
signed the agreement.”2 Identifying the conditions under which this good will prevails through
1 Cf. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
2 Quoted in Autonome Provinz Bozen—SUdtirol (ed.), Ein Weg fur das Miteinander. 20 Jahre Neue Autonomie in 
Stidtirol (Bolzano/Bozen: Amt fUr Pressewesen und Offentlichkeitsarbeit, 1992), p. 6.
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the implementation and operation of a negotiated settlement is the task I have set out to 
accomplish in this study.
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PART ONE 
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF 
ETHNO-TERRITORIAL CROSS-BORDER 
CONFLICTS AND THEIR SETTLEMENTS
I. Conceptual Clarification:
External Minorities and Disputed Territories
16
Developments in international law since the end of the Second World War have resulted in a 
general advancement in human rights law and in the development of certain standards of 
minority protection. However, they have failed to produce a universally agreed definition of the 
term ‘minority’. This failure has its source in a much deeper problem, namely the understanding 
of the concepts of ethnic group and nation, or of ethnic and national identity. The wide variety 
of conceptual approaches to either has not helped to forge consensus among scholars or 
practitioners on the issue.3 In order to understand what an external minority is, to what issues its 
existence gives rise, and how it is linked to the notion of a disputed territory, a number of 
aspects need to be investigated more thoroughly. Naturally, these include ‘external’ and 
‘minority’, and in relation to them ‘kin-state’, ‘host-state’, and ‘disputed territory’.
By external minority, I mean an ethnic group that, while residing in one state (the host- 
state) is related through shared cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics, which it wishes to 
preserve, and through kinship to the titular nation of another, often neighbouring, state (the kin- 
state). A disputed territory is an area which two or more states claim should be rightfully 
incorporated into their respective borders. Such claims are often justified with recourse to 
geographic boundaries, economic and social development, historical events, and/or ethnic 
kinship with the resident population.4
Yet, the full complexity of the two concepts ‘external minority’ and ‘disputed territory’ 
and of their relationship to one another can not be understood unless the very foundation of the 
relationships between the external minority, kin-state and host-state has been examined as well; 
and this foundation is best described in terms of ‘nation*, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘territory*.
The relationship between external minority and host-state is one of distinct ethnicity 
within the boundaries of a civic or territorial nation. In contrast, the relationship between
3 These have been thoroughly analysed by Walker Connor in his Ethnonationalism. The Quest fo r  Understanding 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)
4 In the words of Margaret Moore, claims to land are commonly justified by oner or more of the following: 
indigenousness, historic entitlement, divine rights, and superior culture. Cf. Margaret Moore, 'Hie Territorial 
Dimension of Self-Determination’, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 134-158, here pp. 142-149.
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external minority and kin-state is characterised by common ethnicity and the ethnic, yet 
territorially divided nation.
Ethnicity and Nation
According to Walker Connor, ‘ethnicity (the identity with one’s ethnic group) ... is derived 
from Ethnos, the Greek word for nation in the latter’s pristine sense of a group characterised by 
common descent.’5 In contemporary scholarship, definitions of ethnicity vary greatly. A basic 
distinction can be made between a primordial school, which holds that ‘ethnicity is so deeply 
rooted in historical experience that it should properly be treated as a given in human relations’, 
and an instrumentalist school, which argues that ‘ethnicity is not a historical given at all, but in 
fact a highly adaptive and malleable phenomenon’ or that ‘ethnicity is primarily a practical 
resource that individuals and groups deploy opportunistically to promote their more 
fundamental security and economic interests and that they may even discard when alternative 
affiliations promise a better return.’6 While the tangible aspects of ethnicity, such as customs, 
traditions, language or religion, and their social and political implications that are emphasised 
by instrumentalists are important components of an individual’s or group’s ethnic identity as 
they allow more easily to draw boundaries between in-group and out-group, they can not fully 
explain the phenomenon in relation to the intense emotions that ‘ethnic issues’ generate.
Anthony Smith has described an ethnic group as ‘a type of cultural collectivity, one that 
emphasises the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognised by one 
or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language, or institutions.*7 As a self-defined 
community, ethnic groups are distinguishable by a collective proper name, a myth of common 
ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, 
the association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the 
population.8 Similarly, Horowitz has advocated for an inclusive conception of ethnicity that
5 Ibid., p. 100.
6 Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaka, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 10-11.
7 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 20.
8 Ibid., p. 21.
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‘embraces differences identified by colour, language, religion, or some other attribute of 
common origin.’9 This link between tangible and intangible aspects is key to understanding the 
political implications of ethnic identity and of the formation of conflict groups based on 
ethnicity. Connor has noted that tangible characteristics are only important inasmuch as they 
‘contribute to this notion or sense of a group’s self-identity and uniqueness.*10 In turn, then, a 
threat to, or opportunity for, these tangibles, real or perceived, is considered as a threat to, or 
opportunity for, self-identity and uniqueness. Confronting this threat or taking this opportunity 
leads to ethnicity being politicised, that is, to the ethnic group becoming a political actor by 
virtue of its shared ethnic identity. As such, ethnic identity ‘can be located on a spectrum 
between primordial historic continuities and instrumental opportunistic adaptations.’11
This will become very obvious from the following case studies. Among Alsatians, there 
has always been a sense of historic community that has prevailed over the centuries regardless 
whether Alsace as a territory was united or split, ruled from Paris or Berlin. This sense of 
community was most closely related to two other aspects of Alsatian identity. Historically, the 
older of these two aspects is the Alsatian dialect, an Alemannic variety of which no written form 
exists, but which is regarded as a central component of Alsatian identity. The other aspect which 
gained prominence as a factor of politicising Alsatian ethnicity for the first time during the 
Bismarckian Kulturkampf period after 1871 is the special religious status of Alsace manifest in 
the Napoleonic concordat and the confessional schools system both of which continue to exist 
until today, even though they have lost much of their social relevance as society in Alsace 
became more urban and more secular. Dialect and religious structure are both considered part of 
Alsatians’ ancient rights, their Heimatrechte. They are a factor of regional distinctiveness and 
remain a focal point of Alsatian identity.
While Alsatians have always insisted on their distinctiveness from both French and 
Germans, matters were rather different in the Saar, where a powerful irredentist/secessionist
9 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p. 41.
10 Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 104.
11 Esman, Ethnic Politics, p. 15.
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movement succeeded twice in this century to reunite the territory with Germany after it had 
been occuppied by France. In the Saar, the prominent and politically impactful aspect of ethnic 
identity was the question of national belonging. Unquestionably German in their culture and 
language, the very foundation of the Saar population’s identity and of the conditions of its 
preservation, expression, and development have, for an ever increasing majority in the years 
leading up to the referenda of 1935 and 1955, been linked to the social, political, and economic 
integration of their historic homeland into the boundaries of Germany.
This notion of territorial national belonging has played a similarly essential role for the 
distinct identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland. For Nationalists, the unification 
of Ireland has been the overarching goal that has united the different political wings of 
nationalism and has instilled the community as a whole with a sense of commonality relating to 
the fact that they regard themselves above all as Irish, are of common Irish origin and share the 
aspirations for a future in a united Ireland. For the Unionist community, their British identity 
has been manifest in its members focussing on the United Kingdom and the maintenance of all 
social, political, economic, cultural, and institutional links. While religion, for many in both 
communities is an additional marker roughly coinciding with the boundaries indicated by 
different conceptions of national belonging, the perceived threat to their religious freedom and 
traditional way of life potentially resulting from concessions to Nationalists or Irish unification 
has added to the sense of community among Unionists, who are predominantly Protestant. 
Likewise, shared memories of religious oppression prolonged by the (continuing) experience of 
discrimination has increased feelings of solidarity among Nationalists, who are of 
predominantly Catholic confession.
For a number of different factors that will be explored in greater detail below, national 
belonging, in its territorial sense, has not been the predominant aspect of ethnic identity in South 
Tyrol. The ethnicity of the German population there never being in doubt, focal points of their 
identity have been aspects related to the historically ethnic character of the territory, which has 
always been regarded as the foundation of South Tyrolese ethnic identity; and the preservation
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of this character was and is non-negotiable for the majority of South Tyrolese Germans as they 
see it as the essential condition for the survival of their distinct identity, including their 
language, special brand of Catholicism, traditions, and customs all of which give them a sense 
of community and have created a very rare example of intra-communal solidarity, namely the 
persistence of an almost exclusive one-party system for the representation of their interests in 
the political arena.
The difference in focal points of ethnic identity leads to different political agendas that 
groups develop in order to achieve conditions that they deem conducive to the preservation, 
expression, and development of these identities.
Table 1: Focal Points of Ethnic Identity and Political Agendas
Group Foci of Identity Political Agenda
Alsatians • Language, religious status • Preservation of cultural distinctiveness
Saarlanders • National belonging • Unification with Germany .
German South Tyrolese
• Ethnic character of homeland, 
language, religion, customs, 
and traditions
• Gaining sufficient 
autonomous powers to 
preserve ethnic character of 
homeland
Nationalists in Northern 
Ireland
• Irishness, shared memories 
and experience of oppression 
and discrimination under 
British/Unionist rule
• Unification with Ireland
Unionists in Northern Ireland
• Britishness, feared 
consequences of concessions 
to Nationalists and Irish 
unification
• Maintaining integration with 
the United Kingdom
Conflict and Patronage
In their attempts to preserve, express, and develop their respective ethnic identities, all the 
above groups perceive threats and opportunities. The more deeply felt these perceptions are, the 
more they will be linked to the very survival of the group and the more intense will the conflict 
be that they can potentially generate. This links the issues of ethnicity and nation to the notion 
of power, that is, to ‘the opportunity to enforce one’s will against resistance, regardless of what
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created the opportunity.’12 The political implication of this connection between ethnicity/nation 
and power is that any ethno-national group that is conscious of its uniqueness and wishes to 
preserve it is involved in a struggle for political power -  either retaining the measure of political 
power is possesses or striving to acquire the amount of power that it deems necessary to 
preserve its uniqueness as a distinct ethno-national group, that is, to defeat the threats and seize 
the opportunities it faces. This desire to gain political power for an ethnic group is expressed in 
the concept of nationalism; according to Smith ‘an ideological movement aiming to attain or 
maintain autonomy, unity and identity for a social group which is deemed to constitute a 
nation.’13 Informed by the principle of self-determination, which goes back to Kant’s concept of 
the autonomy of the individual, ethno-national movements make claims on behalf of people, yet 
the implications of these claims are very often of a territorial nature -  on one end of the 
spectrum, demands are raised for local or regional autonomy (internal self-determination), and 
on the other, secessionist movements become active or irredentist policies are pursued (external 
self-determination).
Conflicting doctrines of ethno-nationalisms are at the centre of the relationship between 
external minority and host-state, and it is in this context that opportunity and threat have 
various, yet concretely identifiable meanings. In general, opportunities and threats are positively 
and negatively related to the preservation, expression, and development of a group’s ethnic 
identity and to the ability of the host-state to preserve the integrity of the territorial or civic 
nation. For the external minority, opportunities will manifest themselves, for example, in rights, 
self-administration, or self-government, and they can be realised in local, regional, or federal 
frameworks within the host-state; alternatively, opportunities may also arise in the separation 
from the host-state leading either to independent statehood or to unification with the kin-state. 
Threats generally occur when state institutions deny an ethnic group access to the resources that 
are essential for the preservation, expression, and development of a group’s identity -  access to 
linguistic, educational, or religious facilities as well as to positions of power in the institutions
12 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 28.
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of the state. Threats can become manifest in policies of unwanted assimilation, in 
discrimination, and deprivation. At their most extreme, they take the form of ethnic cleansing 
and genocide.
It is in these most extreme cases that the relationship between external minority and 
host-state coincides with that between external minority and host -nation, that is, the titular 
nation of the state (in Weber’s sense of an organised system of rule within clearly defined 
territorial boundaries14) has monopolised the institutions of this state. Although recent history 
has provided a number of examples of this kind -  Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, and 
Rwanda -  this is, nevertheless not the rule. Yet, even in its less extreme forms, the relationship 
between external minority and host-nation is often characterised by inter-ethnic tension, 
resulting from different ethnic identities and claims for the establishment of conditions 
conducive to their preservation, expression, and development. Responses to such claims made 
by the respectively other ethnic group are then perceived as threats (which often, but not 
exclusively result from resource competition) and/or opportunities (which often, but not 
exclusively result from policies of accommodation).
Thus, the relationships of an external minority with its host-state and host-nation bear 
potential for conflict in abundance. In general, the term conflict describes a situation of social 
tension in which two or more actors who interact with each other pursue incompatible goals, are 
aware of this incompatibility, and claim to be justified in the pursuit of their particular course of 
action to realise their goals. Ethnic conflicts are one particular form of such social conflict, 
namely that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic 
terms and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. 
Whatever the concrete issues over which conflict erupts (e.g., language, religious, or cultural 
rights and/or corresponding claims to conditions conducive to their realisation), at least one of 
the conflict parties wili explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms, i.e., will claim that its distinct 
ethnicity, and lack of recognition thereof and/or equality of opportunity to preserve, express,
^  Smith, National Identity, p. 51.
and develop it, is the reason why its members can not realise their interests, why they do not 
have the same rights, or why their claims are not satisfied. Thus, ethnic conflicts are a form of 
group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and 
potential settlements along an existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide. In other words, 
ethnic conflict is a type of group conflict in which at least one party to the conflict is a group 
actor whose primary focus of identity is ethnicity. In relation to external minorities, ethnic 
conflict can either occur as state-group conflict, i.e., conflict between the external minority and 
the institutions of its host-state, or as inter-ethnic conflict, i.e., between the external minority 
and its host-nation. The two may, but need not, occur simultaneously or coincide. In addition, as 
ethnic conflicts are rooted in the perception of threats and the policies formulated to counter 
them, an external minority situation may also lead to conflict between host-nation and host-state 
-  as a result of an actual or perceived ‘over-accommodation* of the interests of the external 
minority, which the host-nation may regard as being detrimental to its own interests. This is 
very often, but not necessarily, the case where accommodation of external minority interests is 
pursued territorially, yet the territory contains a significant portion of members of the host- 
nation as well. To varying degrees, both Northern Ireland and South Tyrol have seen a limited 
amount of such conflict, which is always accompanied by simultaneous inter-ethnic conflict. 
This simultaneous occurrence of inter-ethnic conflict is another potential reason for conflict 
between host-state and host-nation. As inter-ethnic conflict threatens the societal integrity of the 
host-state, actions of the host-nation may be perceived as one source of this threat and be 
countered accordingly. This, in turn, can be perceived by the host-nation, or at least by some 
sections within it, as denying an opportunity to defend, or establish, conditions conducive to the 
preservation, expression, and development of its ethnic identity. While Northern Ireland is one 
case in point here, a similar pattern of conflict can be observed in relation to xenophobic or 
racist movements directed at immigrants and refugees in Western Europe and elsewhere.
** Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 29.
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Table 2: Perceived Threats as Sources of Ethnic Conflict
In contrast, the relationship between external minority and kin-state, as it is based on 
common ethnicity and a territorially divided ethnic nation, is normally not one of ethnic 
conflict, but rather one of patronage. Patronage results from one of two aspects, and often from 
a combination of the two -  national sentiment and national interest. Popular sentiment 
concerning the fate of members of the nation living in another state and the desire to unite the 
national territory and bring together in it all the members of the ethnic nation finds its 
expression in irredentist or pan-nationalism.16 German irredentism during the inter-war period is 
probably the best-documented example, but by no means the only one. Hungary, which suffered 
a fate of territorial dismemberment in the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 similar to that of Germany 
(and Austria) harboured, with moderate success in 1938 and between 1940 and 1944, some 
irredentism towards Transylvania, the Vojvodina, and southern part of today’s Slovak Republic. 
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagomo Karabakh can be described as 
irredentist on part of Armenia, and the Albanian question in the Balkans has had, since 1913, an 
irredentist dimension of fluctuating prominence. Other examples of irredentist nationalisms
15 Threats perceived by external minorities comprise all of the features in both boxes. Depending on the specificity of 
the situation it is not always possible for the external minority (or the outside observer) to determine the source of the
treat with absolute accuracy. In particular, in situations where the host-nation has complete control over the 
institutions of the state and uses them against the external minority, distinctions between host-state and host-nation 
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exist in Africa and Asia.17 As national sentiment is not always expressed in irredentist 
nationalism, so is the relationship between external minority and kin-state not always about the 
secession of the territory inhabited by the kin-group and its subsequent unification with the kin- 
state. Informed by domestic and foreign national interests, territorial unification may not be 
desirable for either kin-state or external minority or it may not be possible given geo-political or 
regional interest and opportunity structures.18 Alternatively then, the relationship between 
external minority and kin-state can be one of ‘repatriation’ as with West Germany and German 
minorities in Central and Eastern Europe in the post-1950, and especially the post-1989 period, 
or it can be one of aiming at establishing conditions in the host-state conducive to the 
preservation, expression, and development of the ethnic identity of the external minority. With 
varying degrees of success, the numerous bilateral treaties concluded between the states of 
Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 testify to this.19
A conflictual relationship between external minority and kin-state is then likely to 
develop when their respective political agendas are mutually incompatible. This can either be 
the case if the irredentist nationalism in the kin-state is not reciprocated by the external 
minority, for which Alsace in the inter-war period and during Nazi occupation is a good 
example, or vice versa if the ‘irredentism’ of the external minority is not welcomed by the kin- 
state or when, as in the case of Northern Ireland, some of its manifestations are perceived as a 
threat to the kin-state’s security and relationship with the host-state. A rather peculiar example 
of conflict between kin-state and external minority developed in South Tyrol. In order to forge 
an alliance with fascist Italy, Germany, after 1933, actively discouraged South Tyrolese 
irredentism, and instead advocated either resettlement to the Third Reich or complete
1(* Strath, National Identity, p.83.
17 Cf. Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law’, in Moore, National Self- 
Determination, pp. 181-214.
18 On various occasions, Horowitz has emphasised the variety of factors that make successful, or even desirable, 
irredentas very unlikely. Cf. especially, Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 229-288* and shorter, Donald L. 
Horowitz, ‘Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections’ in Irredentism and 
International Politics, ed. by Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 9-22.
19 Concerning Germany and her minorities, I have examined this form of the relationship between external minority 
and kin-state in Stefan Wolff, ‘Changing Priorities or Changing Opportunities? German External Minority Policy,
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Itaiianisation. Neither of these options were appealing to many ethnic Germans in South Tyrol, 
many of whom either opted to stay in the hope of being able to preserve their group and identity 
despite Itaiianisation, or initially opted to leave, but eventually defied the resettlement orders.
Territory
Regardless of the form that the relationship between the external minority and its host- and kin- 
states takes, the very existence of an external minority also establishes a relationship between 
these two states, which shapes, and is in turn shaped by, the relationship each of them has to the 
external minority. However, the relationship between them is not so much one determined by 
the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, but rather One that is, at least in a historical sense, 
founded on the notion o f ‘territory’.
Of all continents, Europe has the longest tradition of state-building and with it of the 
institutionalised definition of state territories. For states, territory possesses certain values in and 
of itself. These include natural resources, such as water, iron, coal, oil, or gas, they extend to the 
goods and services produced by the population living in this territory, and they can comprise 
military or strategic advantages in terms of natural boundaries, access to the open sea, and 
control over transport routes and waterways. Thus, throughout European history many wars 
have been fought over territories, territories have changed hands as a result of wars, and new 
wars have arisen as a consequence of that. All of that took place largely without consideration 
of the people living in these territories, and it was only with the advent of nationalism as ‘a 
political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its centre*20 that the issues of state, nation, and 
territory became linked.
Disputed territories are primarily a phenomenon of inter-state relations, and 
occasionally, as in the case of Kosovo, one of inter-ethnic relations. As neither, they are 
necessarily linked to the existence of external minorities. Conversely, however, it requires 
specific conditions and/or mechanisms to detach conflicts involving external minorities from
1919-1998’, in German Minorities In Europe. Ethnic Identity and National Belonging ed. by Stefan Wolff (Oxford 
and Providence, RI: Berghahn, 2000 -  forthcoming)
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their territorial dimension. In the four conflicts that will subsequently serve as major case 
studies the ethnic conflict and the territorial conflict have, at least during certain periods in the 
development of the conflict, been interlinked. In the case of Alsace, the territorial conflict, 
although it never fully broke out, always had a latent presence because of the multiple times 
sovereignty over Alsace had shifted back and forth between France and Germany. The strategic 
importance of the territory of Alsace for French security and the perception as a threat to French 
control over Alsace of the Alsatian ethno-national movement and its aims and of German policy 
towards France and Alsace intensified the conflict between Alsatians and the French state in the 
inter-war period. However, the case of Alsace, among others, also emphasises that territorial 
issues are not only a matter , of inter-state relationships, but can as well characterise intra-state 
relationships between external minority and host-state. Since 1945, the conflict in Alsace has 
lacked the territorial dimension at the inter-state level, yet increasingly from the late 1960s 
onwards, it has gained an internal territorial aspect in the course of regionalisation in France. 
For Italy, South Tyrol was important in solidifying the country’s natural borders after World 
War One, and as an economic, strategic, and emotional factor after 1945. For Austria, South 
Tyrol had, for centuries, been part of the core of the national territory. Its loss after the First 
World War and the confirmation of the 1919 boundaries in 1945/46 each time sparked 
irredentist sentiment on both sides of the Austro-Italian border. With the conclusion of the Paris 
Agreement between the two states in 1946, and again in the 1955 State Treaty, Austria 
renounced all territorial claims to South Tyrol, and based its relationship with Italy solely on the 
premise that a settlement of the South Tyrol conflict would only be possible if the relationship 
between the two states was characterised by co-operation and compromise. The territorial 
dimension of the conflict, however, persisted nevertheless, yet, similar to Alsace since the late 
1960s, on an internal level. The strong territorial foundation of South Tyrolese ethnic identity 
has led to numerous confrontations between South Tyrolese and Italians and the Italian state. 
The conflict over the Saar was probably of all four conflicts that will be examined here the one 
that matches most closely the irredentist/secessionist continuum: strong ties of kinship linking
Smith, National Identity, p. 74.
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the populations in the Saar and Germany resulted in complementary irredentist and secessionist 
movements that came to a climax in the referendum over the future status of the Saar in 1955 
and led to the reunification of the Saar with Germany. In Northern Ireland, the territorial 
dimension of the conflict is multifaceted. Until quite recently, the constitution of the Republic 
of Ireland included two articles amounting to a territorial claim to the whole of the island. 
Although this was never pursued as an active policy by any Irish government, the very existence 
of such a claim was always perceived as a threat by the Unionist community in Northern Ireland 
whose identity was crucially founded on the link to the United Kingdom, while the Nationalist 
community perceived the same claim as a glimmer of hope in its quest for the unification of 
Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.
Ethnic and Territorial Claims
The complexity of various linked and detached territorial claims in the context of conflicts 
involving external minorities makes it necessary to distinguish between the nature and the level 
of territorial claim.
Table 3: The Nature and Level of Territorial Claims
Nature of the Territorial Claim Level of the Territorial Claim
• irredentist/secessionist • inter-state and group-state: linked
□ Saar
□ South Tyrol (1919 and 1945/46)
□ Northern Ireland
• irredentist/non-secessionist/internal-regionalist • inter-state and group-state: detached 
□ Alsace (1919-1940)
• non-irredentist/non-secessionist/intemal-regionalist • group-state
□ post-1946 South Tyrol
□ post-1968 Alsace
Similarly, a distinction can be made between the nature and the level of the ethnic 
claim. As discussed earlier, ethnic conflicts are a type of group conflict in which at least one 
party to the conflict has its primary focus of identity in distinct ethnicity. At the levels of inter- 
group relations and of group-state relations, claims are then made, and tried to realise, that are 
generally related to one or more of three closely intertwined areas -  self-determination; 
linguistic, religious, and cultural rights; and access to resources/equality of opportunity.
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Table 4: The Nature and Level of Ethnic Claims





□ Alsatians vs. the French state
□ Germans in South Tyrol vs. the Italian state
□ Unionists in Northern Ireland vs. the British 
state
□ pro-German population in the Saar vs. the 
French state and the Saar government
□ Nationalists in Northern Ireland vs. the British 
state
• Linguistic, religious, and/or cultural rights • group-state
□ Alsatians vs. the French state
□ Germans, Italians, and Ladins in South Tyrol vs. 
the Italian state
□ Nationalists and Unionists Northern Ireland vs. 
the British state
• Access to resources/equality of opportunity • group-state
□ Alsatians vs. the French state
□ Germans, Italians, and Ladins in South Tyrol vs. 
the Italian state
□ Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland 
vs. the British state
• inter-group
□ Germans vs. Italians in South Tyrol
□ Nationalists vs. Unionists in Northern Ireland
Through the multiple connections between territory, on the one side, and ethnicity and 
nation, on the other, ethnic and territorial claims are closely linked in conflicts like those in 
Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, Alsace, and the Saar. Moreover, through the various ethnic and 
territorial claims, external minority, kin-state, host-state, and host-nation are likewise linked. As 
the character and intensity of ethnic and territorial claims changes over time, so does the 
relationship between these four principal conflict parties. Because of the specificity of 
interlinked ethnic and territorial claims and of the involvement (potential or actual) of kin-state 
and host-state, external minority and host-nation, a conflict of this type is best described as 
ethno-territorial cross-border conflict.
Having thus examined the main characteristics of the particular conflict type, of Which 
the following four major case studies will be concrete manifestations, it is now necessary to 
explore what types of settlements are required for the successful management of ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts.
II. Possible Conflict Settlements 
for Ethno-Territorial Cross-Border Conflicts
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Ideally, conflict settlements would accomplish the accommodation of all ethnic and territorial 
claims at the various levels at which they occur. In reality, such total accommodation is close to 
impossible. Rather, many of the claims will have to be compromised between the conflict 
parties and occasionally, some claims will even have to be withdrawn, perhaps on a reciprocal 
basis, in order to make a settlement possible.
Summarising the analysis of the various ethnic and territorial claims that can possibly 
be made by the conflict parties in a non-colonial or post-colonial context, there are only four 
combinations of these claims that have the promise of leading to settlements of ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflict which might be stable in the long term.
The first such combination is that of compromising territorial claims both at the inter- 
and intra-state level, which will lead to a condominium-style arrangement. As ideal as such a 
double compromise might be, it is rare as the academic literature about it. To date there have 
only been very few condominia that existed long enough to study their operation. Two of them, 
Andorra and the New Hebrides, will be examined in greater detail in chapter VIII. Neither of 
these two condominia came into existence in an attempt to settle an ethnic conflict in a disputed 
territory; rather, they were set up to accommodate conflicting territorial claims by regional 
powers (as in the case of Andorra) or by colonial rivals (as in the case of the New Hebrides). 
Nevertheless, condominium-style settlements can offer a promising alternative route to the 
resolution of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts, and I will return to this issue and examine a 
choice of possible arrangements to arrive at a stable settlement of this type in chapter eight
Another combination of territorial claims that can be found more frequently is that of 
the kin-state withdrawing its claim, and the external minority and its host-state reaching a 
compromise at the intra-state level over their respectively upheld territorial claims and the 
ethnic claim by the external minority to internal self-determination. South Tyrol is an almost 
classic case in point, as is the resolution of the Finnish-Swedish dispute over the Aland Isles.
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This type of compromise usually takes the form of devolution -  either by means of a 
consociational settlement and/or territorial autonomy.
The next possible combination of claims exists in relation to the host-state withdrawing 
its territorial claim to the disputed territory. If both the kin-state and the external minority 
maintain their claim, the most likely outcome is an irredenta; if only the external minority 
maintains its claim, the possible result would be a secession. Occasionally, with both states 
withdrawing their territorial claims, or forced to do so by third-party intervention, the result 
could also be the establishment of an international protectorate as an interim solution either 
leading to independent statehood of the formerly disputed territory or to incorporation into one 
of the disputant states, most likely the kin-state. Twice in its history, the Saar has experienced 
exactly this latter kind of development, namely after the two World Wars. More recently, 
developments in Kosovo and potentially in East Timor hint at the possibility of protectorates, hi 
Kosovo the outcome is still everybody’s guess -  reincorporation into a democratised Serbia 
seems the preference of powerful international actors, most notably the European Union, while 
independent statehood or unification with Albania cannot be ruled out either, as they reflect the 
national aspirations of Albanians in Kosovo. East Timor, on the other hand, is clearly on a path 
to independence. Depending on the ethnic demography of the territory in question and the 
ethnic and or territorial claims made by distinct ethnic groups that potentially live there after the 
secession or irredenta, a post-settlement settlement might be necessary which could take either 
of the forms discussed in the preceding paragraph or could amount to the granting of cultural 
autonomy noted below.
Finally, the simultaneous withdrawal of territorial claims by both kin-state and external 
minority will lead to the external minority being integrated in its host-state socially, politically, 
and economically, but normally retaining some measure of cultural distinctiveness. Post-1945 
Alsace is a good example, as are the cases of the German minorities in Belgium and Denmark 
and that of the Danish minority in the German state of Schleswig-Holstein. More recent 
examples of similar developments include the German Polish Treaty of 1990, in which the
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Federal Republic of Germany recognised the Oder-NeiBe line as Poland’s legitimate western 
border. Subsequently, in 1991, both countries concluded a Treaty on Good Neighbourly 
Relations and Friendly Co-operation that regulated the rights of the Polish minority in Germany 
and of the German minority in Poland in the spirit of the 1990 Copenhagen Document of the 
CSCE. In a similar vein, many bilateral treaties have been concluded by the states of Central 
and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism in 1989/90. In an attempt to prevent the 
resurgence of intra-state ethnic and inter-state territorial conflicts, these treaties included 
provisions for the recognition of existing borders, the protection of minorities, and the 
possibility for external minorities to engage in cross-border co-operation and contact with their 
kin-state.21 While it would go too far to examine the conditions of failure or success of such 
arrangements, a commitment of the two states and the minorities involved to find mutually 
acceptable and workable compromises within a democratic constitutional framework can 
reasonably be assumed to be among the vital conditions of success.22
Other combinations of claims are unlikely to produce stable settlements. If territorial 
claims are not compromised, or alternatively withdrawn, an inclusive settlement agreed to by all 
conflict parties -  kin-state, host-state, external minority, and host-nation -  is impossible. The 
persistence of an irredentist movement always has the capability to undermine an internally 
reached settlement based on either the compromise or withdrawal by the external minority of 
territorial claims. Likewise, unresolved territorial claims at the intra-state level, even if they do 
not coincide with an irredentist agenda on part of the kin-state, are hardly conducive to the 
settlement of an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict. Developments in the former Yugoslavia 
are ample evidence for that. Finally, even the settling of territorial claims through compromise 
or withdrawal will not be sufficient if ethnic claims are not simultaneously accommodated or
21 Examples of such treaties include Hungary’s treaties with, among others, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, and 
Slovenia, the Polish-Lithuanian treaty, and a number of agreements concluded between Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
These, and numerous other treaties and agreements of similar kind, have been implemented with varying degrees of 
success and not always managed to satisfy external minorities or to prevent inter-ethnic and inter-state tensions.
22 An analysis of the agreements concluded between Germany and the Central and East European states that host 
German minorities is Hans-Joachim Heintze, “The Status of Minorities in Bilateral Agreements of the Federal 
Republic of Germany”, in Stefan Wolff (ed.), German Minorities in Europe. Ethnic Identity and Cultural Belonging 
(Oxford and Providence: Berghahn, 2000 -  forthcoming).
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compromised as well. The gradually escalating situation in South Tyrol between 1946 and 1961 
testifies to this, as do more recent developments in Transylvania (between ethnic Romanians 
and ethnic Hungarians) or in southern Slovakia (between ethnic Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians, 
and between the latter and the Slovak state) prior to the 1998 election into office of a less 
xenophobic government.
With an eye to the following case studies of Alsace, the Saar, South Tyrol and Northern 
Ireland, I will examine more closely three potential settlements of ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts: integration, secession/irredenta, and consociation.
Integrationist Techniques of Conflict Settlement
Integration of ethnic minorities into their host-society generally aims at making ethnic 
differences less salient and less important in the day-to-day life of an ethnically plural state. As 
public policies, they can aim at socio-cultural, economic, and/or political integration. Policies 
aiming at socio-cultural integration find their expression very often in the creation of a unified 
education system, a lingua franca, and public housing policies preventing ethnic segregation. 
Economic integration seeks to establish a non-discriminatory labour market in terms of pay, 
access to employment, and career opportunities, thus avoiding a cultural division of labour, all 
of which can normally be achieved through labour legislation, but sometimes also requires 
specific investment and taxation policies to tackle overcome structural shortcomings of 
underdeveloped areas inhabited disproportionately by members of an ethnic minority. In the 
case of a cross-border minority situation, this can often be achieved in co-operation with the 
kin-state, not only through encouraging foreign investment by also by means of labour 
migration and the favourable regulation of matters associated with it, such as social security and 
taxation. In the context of European integration, respective regulations of that kind have had a 
positive effect on labour migration in Alsace and South Tyrol, as well as on the German- 
speaking areas of Belgium and Denmark. For Central and Eastern Europe, Brubaker has rightly 
observed that labour migration has been one of the factors preventing an escalation of one of the
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Hungarian minority problems.23 By far the largest choice of policies is available in the field of 
political integration. Widely recognised techniques facilitating political integration include 
individualist bills of rights, general liberal principles serving as guidelines for the formulation of 
a state’s (minority) policy, special anti-discrimination provisions and statutes, special electoral 
laws, special institutional arrangements to supervise the administration, judicial action and law 
enforcement to secure equality and fairness under law, executive action to ensure fair decision­
making, and parliamentary control.24 To one extent or other, most ethnically plural states have 
incorporated some of these principles into their constitutional or simple legislation. Legal 
provisions by themselves, however, are not a sufficient guarantee for such principles of 
integration to be applied and enforced effectively in practice, as the history of minority 
protection in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the collapse of communism, and on occasion 
thereafter, illustrates.
Despite the wide choice of policies available to achieve integration, a strategy to settle 
ethnic conflicts through integration very often finds its limits in the determination of ethnic 
minorities either not to be integrated at all or not to the extent the majority wishes it.25 Thus, 
apart from the fact that neither kin-state nor external minority must uphold their territorial 
claims, for integration to work the external minority also needs to ‘scale down* its ethnic claims 
to a level of claims for equality and, at most, the preservation of distinct cultural aspects of its 
identity. However, even where this has happened, the best-crafted integration policy would still 
fail if a (dominant) majority rejects the integration of a minority. In either case, the continued 
pursuit of integration is more likely to cause conflict, than to prevent or settle it. Thus, 
successful integration depends upon both constitutional craftsmanship to provide an adequate
23 Cf. Rogers Brubaker, ‘Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism’, in Moore, National Self- 
Determination, pp. 233-265, here p. 242.
24 For listings and discussions of assimilationist techniques, cf. for example, Claire Palley, Constitutional Law and 
Minorities, MRG Report 36 (London: MRG, 1978), pp. 7-8, and Pierre L. van den Berghe, “Protection of Ethnic 
Minorities: A Critical Appraisal”, in Robert G. Wirsing (ed.), Protection o f Ethnic Minorities. Comparative 
Perspectives (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 343-355.
25 Cf. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Introduction. The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict’, in The 
Politics o f Ethnic Conflict Regulation, eds. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (London: Routlegde, 1993), pp. 1- 
40, here p. 19.
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institutional framework and the willingness of the ethnic groups concerned to carry through 
with this process.
The degree of integration of minorities varies from case to case. A successful 
integration process, with success measured in terms of levels of ethnic conflict, normally 
encompasses political and economic integration to the extent that members of the ethnic 
minority have achieved full equality in their host-society. A different matter is the degree of 
socio-cultural integration, especially of cultural assimilation. While there are certain 
requirements of modernity that make the cultural assimilation of ethnic minorities, at least to 
some extent, more likely, the complete cultural assimilation of an ethnic group leading to the 
cession of its existence as a distinct ethno-cultural group is by no means a requirement for 
successful integration. Ethnic Germans in Poland and Hungary are now well integrated into the 
political system and economic life of their host-countries, yet they have preserved distinct 
cultural and other features of their ethnic identity, including their language, traditions, and 
customs. The same can be said for Alsatians in France, Danes, Lusatian Sorbs, and Frisians in 
Germany, and Slovenians and Croatians in Italy and Austria. However, cultural assimilation, as 
long as it does not run counter to the aspirations of the ethnic group concerned, can also very 
well be a part of the integration process, to which the case of Poles in Germany and in the Czech 
part of Silesia testifies. If minority cultures have been suppressed rather than assimilated, 
changes in the political climate can lead to a resurgence of public and private cultural 
manifestations of ethnic groups, whose existence, at least in public live, had almost been 
forgotten. Among the numerous examples of such developments in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Slovaks in Hungary and Ruthenians in Slovakia are good cases in point here. Such a resurfacing 
of distinct ethno-cultural identities can often be prompted, exaggerated, or manipulated, for 
political reasons. Especially in the case of cross-border minority situations it is a likely feature 
of inter-state rather than intra-state ethnic politics, and is often not even welcome among the 
(external) minorities who suddenly find themselves in the centre of public attention as 
‘beneficiaries’ of either or both their host- and kin-states rediscovered sense of duty. Remaining
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members of the ethnic German community in the Czech Republic, for example, did not 
appreciate German involvement, especially that of radical sections of the Sudeten German 
expellee community, after 1990, fearing, rightly, that it would trigger anti-German feelings 
within their host-nation.
The success of integration as a strategy to settle or prevent ethnic conflicts, thus, 
depends on a variety of factors, most notably a common understanding between the ethnic 
groups concerned about the nature and the extent of the integration process. It also requires the 
availability and commitment of resources to carry through with the integration process -  a well- 
intended strategy of integration can backfire if it does not deliver the goods it has promised. In 
the case of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts, the role of the kin-state in such a process of 
integration in terms of the contribution it can make to its success, or, alternatively the damage it 
can cause to well-minded integration efforts, must not be neglected either. In the best of all 
worlds, kin-state and host-state would join forces in facilitating the integration process of the 
external minority, ensuring its protection as an ethno-culturally distinct group and its political 
and economic equality with all other citizens in the host-state. For a variety of reasons that will 
be explored in greater depth in the case study of Alsace such an ideal-typically smooth 
integration process, however, is unlikely to occur in the real world of ethno-territorial cross- 
border conflicts.
Secession/Irredenta as Settlement Mechanism
The Nature of Secessions and Irredentas
Secession is a process at the end of which a population group inhabiting a defined territory 
within an existing state has succeeded in detaching itself and its territory from this state and has 
established an independent state of its own. Quite often, but not exclusively, secessionist 
movements define themselves in ethnic terms. Examples of ethnically motivated secessions 
outside the colonial context, i.e., the secession of colonial territories from their ‘mother 
countries’ and their subsequent consolidation into independent states, are only few. There have 
been three such cases in the period between 1945 and the break-up of the multinational states in
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Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, early 1990s -  the secession 
Of Senegal from the Mali federation in 1960, the secession of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, 
and the creation of Bangladesh after the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan in 1971.26 
After 1990, a number of new states came into existence either through secession or through the 
dissolution of existing multi-national federations. Into the first category belong the three Baltic 
states Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, who seceded from the then still existing Soviet Union in 
1991. Cases in the second category are the eleven successor states of the Soviet Union and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics. More difficult is the assessment of the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia. While Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly seceded from 
Yugoslavia, it is still disputed whether they, together with Serbia/Montenegro, are successor 
states that came into being after the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, a view taken by the 
United Nations and the EU Arbitration Commission in 1992, or whether the FRY continues to 
exist in a truncated way in the form of Serbia and Montenegro. Outside the context of post­
communist state and nation re-buiiding, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and of East 
Timor from Indonesia must be noted. A, so far unsuccessful, example of a non-ethnic 
secessionist movement is that of the Lega Nord in Italy. Motivated by economic gain, i.e., the 
economic prosperity of the northern regions of Italy and the perceived waste of their resources 
on the poorer regions of the south, the Lega has tried to attract a following of supporters across 
the spectrum of ethnic communities in northern Italy -  Italians, Germans, French, and Ladins.
Irredentism, in contrast, is a state-based, but not necessarily government-backed, 
movement that seeks to retrieve an external minority together with the territory the latter 
inhabits across an existing border, i.e., to add territory as well as population to an existing state. 
Irredentism has been particularly frequent and disastrous in its consequences in inter-war 
Europe. German irredentism vis-^-vis the Czech Sudetenland was one of the causes leading to 
the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1938/39, an opportunity also seized by Hungary to satisfy
26 West Pakistan and East Pakistan were two territorially separate units of the state of Pakistan created in 1947 after 
the independence of what had been British India. The successful secession was partly due to the military involvement 
of India.
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some of its irredentist desires towards the subsequently established ‘independent* Slovak state. 
The resurgence of ethnic nationalism after the collapse of communism in 1989/90 and the 
subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has also led to the revival of old and 
the creation of new irredentisms in Central and Eastern Europe -  Greek and Bulgarian claims to 
Macedonia and Albanian claims to Kosovo are examples for old irredentisms revived, while 
Russian claims to Transdniestria and to the Crimea, and the multiple claims the Yugoslav 
successor states have against each other are examples of new irredentisms.
In the case of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts, irredentist and secessionist 
movements often coincide, at least for some time. In other words, it is likely in such conflicts 
that both the kin-state and the external minority uphold their territorial claims vis-^-vis the host- 
state. This has particularly been the case in the Saar, the only example among the following four 
case studies where a secession/irredenta has produced a successful conflict settlement. In South 
Tyrol, secessionism and irredentism coincided for a brief period in 1945/46, thereafter Austria 
withdrew its territorial claims, and the German-speakers in South Tyrol compromised their 
territorial demands vis-&-vis the Italian state. In Northern Ireland, secessionism is still 
prominent among Nationalists and Republicans, while Irish irredentism has, for decades, not 
extended beyond political rhetoric. While these two constellations have made two particular 
consociational settlements possible, the absence of both secessionist and irredentist claims in 
Alsace has allowed for an mtegrationist solution of the conflict. This gives rise to the question 
under what conditions secessionism and irredentism arise, what factors influence their 
development and outcome, and, most importantly, in which context secession/irredenta can 
provide a stable settlement for an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict.
Self-Determination and the Viability of Secessionist/Irredentist Claims
In its ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co­
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,* the General 
Assembly declared in 1970 that the ‘establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the free 
association or integration with an independent state, or the emergence into any other political
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status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self- 
determination by that people.’27 However, in the same context it was stressed that this right to 
self-determination must not be abused to ‘dismember or impair, in total or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity’ of a sovereign state.28
Although the right to self-determination of peoples is a basic principle within the 
Charter of the United Nations, UN practice does not recognise a right of secession as an 
automatic consequence of self-determination, not least as this would potentially be in conflict 
with other fundamental UN principles, such as the principles of territorial integrity, sovereign 
equality, non-intervention, and non-use of force in international relations.29 However, the 
existence of a right to secession is not denied either, but it is limited to exceptional 
circumstances, in which there is no other way to preserve a people than its territorial 
secession.30 Despite these ‘legal’ limitations, the idea of self-determination has driven, and will 
continue to drive, ethno-nationalist aspirations of minorities either to create their own state or to 
(re-) unite with a kin-state and the irredentist policies of states with (ethno-) territorial claims 
against those of their neighbours that are hosts of an external minority.31
The essence of self-determination is to allow the population of a distinct territory a 
choice about their political status and development. As a political doctrine, it emerged during 
and after the First World War and has since then been heavily influenced by nationalism. With 
the standard claim of nationalist ideology being that each nation have its own state, calls for 
self-determination have often been equated with calls for the break-up of multi-national empires
27 GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October 1970.
28 Ibid.
29 Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (Hie Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1982), p. 43.
30 See for example, Dietrich Murswiek, “The Issue of a Right of Secession -  Reconsidered”, in Christian Tomuschat 
(ed.), Modem Law o f Self-Determination (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), pp. 21-39.
31 The non-existence of a common border does not preclude irredentist aspirations. In the case of Russian claims vis- 
si-vis the Transdniester region of Moldova, the existence of a precedent in the form of the extra-territorial Russian 
enclave around Kaliningrad makes the justification of such claims easier, but does not necessarily ensure their 
success.
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and the dismemberment poly-ethnic states.32 This has been particularly obvious in recent 
European history -  from the Munich Agreement in 1938 to the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czechoslovakia, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia and its violent 
aftermath.
In international law theory and practice, legal-political distinctions between internal 
(selection of an appropriate form of government) and external self-determination (choice of 
international status),33 or between offensive (right of the minority to decide whether or not to 
secede) and defensive (right of the majority of the population to decide whether or not to 
prevent secession) self-determination,34 are more than just an attempt to disguise the fact that a 
population was denied the right to express their choice of political status in a free vote. It is well 
worth looking for alternatives to, not substitutes of, (complete) self-determination. One such 
alternative is this distinction between external and internal self-determination, which, in its 
essence, aims at internal compensation for a denied secession. There is a wide range of such 
internal compensations. One of them is federalism, such as in the cases of Belgium or Spain, or 
as enshrined in the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 or in the Soviet constitution of 1977, for 
example, both of which included a clearly defined right to secede. Another form of internal 
compensation are special territorial autonomy arrangements, as they can be found in five of the 
nineteen provinces of Italy or in Corsica in France. And finally, there is a wide variety of 
minority rights, reaching from specific electoral regulations to ensure minority representation at 
regional level, such as in the German states of Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony, and Brandenburg, 
or at national level as in Romania or Poland, to arrangements that delegate competences in the 
fields of culture and education to special bodies representing members of a distinct minority, 
such as in Estonia or Hungary.
32 Cf., for example, Lee C. Buchheit, Secession. The Legitimacy o f Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1978), p. 4 and Wayne Norman, ‘The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics', in Moore, 
National Self-Determination and Secession, pp. 34-61, here p. 35.
33 See, for example, Pomerance, Self-determination, and Allan Rosas, “Internal Self-Determination”, in Tomuschat, 
Modem Law of Self-Determination, pp. 225-252, and Buchheit, Secession, p. 14-16.
34 This distinction was introduced by Dietrich Murswiek, “Offensives und defensives Selbstbestimmungsrecht. Zum 
Subjekt des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Vblker”, in Der Stoat 24 (1984), p. 523.
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Similarly, a defensive right to self-determination might well supersede the exercise of 
its offensive counter-part when the potentially seceding territory is of particular cultural 
significance to the titular nation of the host-state. The conflict in and over Kosovo, regarded by 
many Serbs as the cradle of their nation, is one potential case in point, as is the status of 
Jerusalem, to which followers of three religions lay claim. In addition to such cultural 
considerations, economic ones can weigh similarly heavily when the secession of a particular 
territory would have an unjustifiably strong adverse economic impact on the country concerned 
and its population, such as the secession of northern Italy would have on the Italian state. In 
such cases, it is particularly unlikely that secession/irredenta will provide stable settlements in 
the long term, as the emergence of a potent irredentist movement in the former host-state that 
will try to recover ‘sacred* ground or economic assets is more than a merely theoretical 
possibility.
The extreme complexity of the issue of self-determination has a variety of sources. One 
is the question of who the ‘self is that is to determine its political status. Closely related to this 
issue is the question of what the territorial reference point for self-determination is -  is it only 
the territory inhabited by the self that is relevant, or is there need to consider the entire state that 
would be dismembered, or in the case of a secession/irredenta also the territory of the state with 
which the secessionists want to unite? The case of Northern Ireland exemplifies this point and 
the fact that it is very often calculations about the likelihood of a particular outcome that inform 
respective arguments -  Unionists advocate that only the residents of Northern Ireland should be 
considered, while Republicans argue that the right to self-determination be granted to the entire 
population of the island of Ireland, i.e., including the citizens of the Republic of Ireland.
Another critical point is the choice of options that are made available to a population in 
a referendum on self-determination and the question of who determines the choice. In the first 
Saar referendum in 1935, participants in the plebiscite could choose between retaining the status 
quo, unification with Germany and unification with France. In the second referendum in 1955, 
the choice was only between Yes and No to a statute for the Saar negotiated between the French
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and German governments. Finally, many of the referenda after the end of the First World War to 
demarcate international boundaries in ethnically mixed areas, such as at the German-Danish or 
German-Polish borders, offered the participants a choice between belonging to one state or 
another.
A third issue are the estimated consequences of self-determination for the further 
existence of a state and for international peace and security. Thus, the secession of Slovenia and 
Croatia from Yugoslavia ended the existence of the Yugoslav state, as it triggered the further 
secessions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. It also led to war, international intervention, 
and the presence of an international peacekeeping force. The general instability of the Balkan 
region, although not necessarily caused by the secession, was certainly and foreseeably 
aggravated by it. Nevertheless, the international community chose to recognise Slovenia and 
Croatia, but has, since then, refused to recognise or endorse a secession of Kosovo, but instead 
opted for some sort of international protectorate.
The examples above indicate that it is not only abstract legal and political 
considerations that influence the outcome of a secessionist/irredentist movement, but a variety 
of contextual factors as well. Among them are the geographic and demographic situation of the 
external minority, the strategic, economic, and political importance of the territory that would 
secede, and domestic and international policy considerations of the (two) states involved.35
As regards the likelihood of success of a secessionist movement, a dispersed ethnic 
group is rather unlikely to be in a position to make successful secessionist claims historically or 
territorially. Compact ethnic groups who live in a territory adjacent to another, potentially co­
ethnic, state are in a different position, even if they share their traditional homeland with another 
ethnic group as a result of their host state’s internal migration/settlement policy. Economic 
aspects of secession need to be taken into account as well. The more important the disputed
35 Smith determines eight different factors that influence the likelihood of secessionist ambitions among an ethnic 
group: economic loss and gain, group anxiety in terms of identity preservation, the degree of political repression, 
opportunities for cultural/political mobilisation, presence of an intelligentsia, presence of a usable ethnic past, 
existence of ethnic antagonisms, determination and capability of the state to prevent secession. Cf. Smith, National 
Identity, p. 134f.
territory (in natural resources, industrial output, agricultural production, access to major ports 
and lines of transportation and communication), the less likely is it that secession will be a 
mutually acceptable solution. Similarly, strategic importance in terms of access to the open sea, 
natural defence borders, and/or frontier lines with other states could make the territory worth 
fighting for.
Finally, political considerations have domestic and international dimensions. 
Domestically, it is the assumption that granting the right of secession will have certain effects 
on the government in power that will influence its decision as well as the consequences of such 
a secession for the aspirations of other ethnic groups on the state’s territory. Internationally, the 
brutal repression of a secessionist movement can backfire and result in international 
intervention, as has recently been the case with Serbia and Kosovo. Allowing a secession may 
be ill-received by other countries who see a dangerous precedent being created, especially in 
cases that involve transnational minorities, such as the Kurds.
Similar considerations will have to be made by the kin-state. The decision on whether 
and how it becomes involved, depends primarily upon its interest structure and availability and 
commitment of resources. Any number of different motivations might drive a kin-state:
• the intention to improve the situation of its kin-group,
• a preference for one particular (political) section within its external minority,
• the desire to prevent a conflict from spreading into its own polity or to other states in the 
region,
• the preservation or establishment of good relations with the host-state(s) of its external 
minority,
• exercising influence on the domestic political process of the host-state through encouraging 
a particular voting behaviour of the kin-group in presidential elections,36
• the maintenance of its domestic power base,
• favourable foreign relations in general,
• territorial gains,
• repatriation of its kin-group,
• an exchange of populations and or territories.
36 The success of such a strategy depends both on the number of those members of the minority group who are 
eligible for voting and on their preparedness to ‘follow directions’. Of all the states in Europe with external 
minorities, Russia is probably in the best position to use this lever, and, as recent exchanges with Ukraine indicate, 
also likely at least to raise the issue as a possible course of action. Cf. RFE/RL Newsline, 22 July 1999.
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In formulating policies to realise these interests, a kin-state has to take into account a 
variety of factors. Considering the nature of the ‘affinity link’,37 repercussions for the domestic 
political process are almost inevitable.38 The conflict is likely to be instrumentalised by political 
parties in the kin-state in their struggle for power, and if the kin-state is itself ethnically 
heterogeneous a change of the ethnic balance may not be welcomed by all the groups that 
constitute this state. International consequences weigh similarly heavy. Involvement can trigger 
hostile reactions not only from the (neighbouring) state that hosts the external minority, but also 
from other states that face similar minority situations. They might form powerful regional 
alliances and exert pressure to the short and long-term detriment of the kin-state.39 Within the 
external minority, warring factions might exist so that the support of only one of them by the 
kin-state could cause resentment among the other one. This could have implications for a future 
settlement of minority rights and territorial claims, e.g., blocking a particular solution proposed 
by a competing party, undermining potential mediation efforts by the kin-state, etc. In addition, 
not all sections within an external minority may actually be in favour of being incorporated into 
their kin-state, for economic, political, or other reasons.40 Furthermore, the kin-state has to 
consider not only the reaction of the host-state, but also that of the other ethnic group(s) sharing 
the disputed territory. They could engage in retaliatory policies against the external minority 
and/or its kin-state trying to counter what they perceive as undue interference to their 
detriment.41
37 For this term, cf. Ralph R. Premdas, “The Internationalisation of Ethnic Conflict: Some Theoretical Explorations”, 
in K. M. de Silva and R. J. May (eds.), Internationalisation o f Ethnic Conflict (London: Pinter, 1991), pp. 10-25, here
p. 12.
38 Horowitz goes so far to argue that it is “the domestic rather than the international consequences that constitute the 
principal disincentive to irredentism.” (Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1985, p. 282).
39 Examples for such a scenario can be found with at least three states in Europe -  Germany, Hungary, and the 
Russian Federation, all of which have large external minorities that are, or have been, a major issue in their foreign 
policy. Similarly, the case of the Albanian minority in the Balkans could be cited.
40 The cases of Alsace and South Tyrol illustrate this point. For other examples, see Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict, p. 285f. A more theoretical examination of this issue can be found in Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, pp. 181-184.
41 Northern Irish Loyalists, for example, attacked targets in the Republic of Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Successive Irish governments since the late 1980s have paid closer attention to the interests of Unionists, and the 
Good Friday Agreement of 1998 includes a double protection mechanism for both groups (Nationalists and 
Unionists) regardless of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status.
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The policy options thus available to a kin-state in pursuit of its external minority policy 
can be relatively clearly distinguished within two strategies -  co-operational and confrontational 
vis-l-vis the host-state. Preference for either is determined by the motivations behind the kin- 
state’s external minority policy as well as by the opportunities to achieve them, both of which 
may change over time. Among the co-operational policy choices are attempts to come to a 
settlement with the kin-state on the basis of compromising or withdrawing territorial claims. 
This can happen in direct negotiations and through appeal to international organisations for 
mediation. Co-operational policies also comprise the exercise of a moderating influence on the 
external minority, the strengthening of its non-radical sections, the commitment of resources to 
improve its living conditions, or, alternatively to facilitate (labour or permanent) migration of 
members of the external minority.
Confrontational policies include the support of a secessionist movement within the 
external minority through the donation of aid, supply of arms, and provision of safe havens, and 
the subsequent de jure recognition of the seceded state followed by ‘negotiations’ over 
unification. Confrontational policies can also take the form of military intervention, or at least 
of threats thereof, including the holding of manoeuvres close to the disputed territory and/or 
border with the host-state. Declarations of intent to engage into a more active external minority 
policy or the public international condemnation of particular actions and/or policies taken by the 
host-state form another set of confrontational policies. While such policies can occasionally lead 
to some sort of a settlement, such as in the cases of Turkey’s intervention in North Cyprus or, 
more recently, in that of the multi-national intervention in Kosovo, they are unlikely to solve an 
ethno-territorial conflict in the long term, they rather contain or suppress it, which on some 
occasions may be legitimate, and on others not.
While the kin-state thus has a range of options available in pursuit of its external 
minority policy, the outcome of any particular intervention policy depends on the circumstances 
in which it is employed. Identical goals can have fundamentally different outcomes given varied 
conditions under which they are pursued. For example, an attempt to mediate between a kin-
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group and its host-state can result in a quick and satisfactory settlement, but also in prolongation 
or exacerbation of an ongoing conflict if one of the sides perceives this intervention as 
increasing its chances to accomplish victory or, alternatively, as preventing the other side from 
achieving victory. An effort by the kin-state to make territorial gains may sideline or escalate a 
domestic ethnic conflict in the host-state. A desire, including a mere declaration of intent, to 
protect one’s kin-group in another state, even if the means employed would be exclusively 
peaceful, may be taken as a welcome opportunity by the government of the host-state to crush 
internal challengers to its power. At the same time, the kin-state* s assumption of a patron role 
could just as well be an event triggering the outbreak of conflict by inciting the external 
minority, or its opponents, in the hope, or fear, of external support, to seek a violent solution to 
their differences.42 Similarly, inaction or failure on part of the kin-state to intervene on behalf of 
its external minority can lead to latter’s radicalisation.
International support for or against a secession/irredenta will depend upon a variety of 
different, at times conflicting, factors, such as the danger of armed conflict arising from the 
secession or its denial, the human rights records of both states involved43 and their international 
influence, strategic interests of regional and world powers in the area,44 the potential creation of 
a new minority problem in the seceding territory and its consequences for regional and global 
stability, the strength of support and enthusiasm which the kin-state lends to the secessionist 
aspirations of the co-ethnic group, and the means with which secession and its prevention are 
being sought.
To achieve a secession/irredenta is possible either by superior force of the secessionist 
movement and its supporters, or by consent between host- and kin-state. In either case, the 
likelihood of it succeeding in providing a stable long-term settlement to an ethno-territorial
42 Cf. Ashley J. Tellis et al., Anticipating Ethnic Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997).
43 In 1991 the EC published its “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union”, which included, among others, the requirement of “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups 
and minorities in accordance with the commitment subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE.” EC-BulIetin 
12/1992, p. 119.
44 These include refugee migration, interruption in the trade of goods and services, escalation of the conflict to an 
international level.
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cross-border conflict will depend on a variety of factors in the disputed territory, in the host and 
kin-states, but also in the wider regional and international arena. The major potential source of 
instability in the seceding territory is that of one or more ‘trapped minorities’,45 or ‘orphans of 
secession’,46 that is, population groups who do not belong to the (formerly) external minority 
and fear ethnic discrimination,47 become the basis of a new secessionist movement or the source 
of irredentism in their kin-state. Appropriate post-secession/irredenta settlements (territorial 
consociation, cultural autonomy, special political representation of the ‘trapped minority’ at 
local, regional, and nation level, or migration options) can diminish this potential danger for the 
stability of a secessionist/irredentist settlement, but only if the conditions in the kin-state allow 
for this kind of post-secession/irredenta settlement
Factors that influence the stability of the settlement in the former host-state from which 
the disputed territory has been detached include economic, political, and security consequences 
of the secession/irredenta. Economically, the loss of a particular territory may deprive this state 
of essential sources of industrial or agricultural production. Politically, irredentist movements 
may emerge that do not accept the loss of territory for economic or cultural reasons and/or the 
fact that some of their ethnic kins have to live in a different country now, as is the case with 
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, and, to a lesser extent, with the millions of Russians who found 
themselves in a different and often hostile state after the secession of the Baltic Republics and 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Potentially harmful effects on the security situation of the 
former host-state include the strengthening of other secessionist and irredentist forces with 
claims against its territory, a phenomenon experienced by Serbia in the case of Kosovo and by 
Russia in the case of Chechnya. All of these factors can lead to the instability of the former 
host-state and thus to its vulnerability to political radicalisation and a policy of active
45 This is a term used by Buchheit in his analysis of the case against secession. Cf. Buchheit, Secession, p. 29.
46 This is the title of an article by John McGarry relating to the same phenomenon that Buchheit describes. Cf. John 
McGarry, "Orphans of Secession”: National Pluralism in Secessionist Regions and Post-Secession States’, in Moor?, 
National Self-Determination, pp. 215-232.
47 Horowitz has made a convincing case that secession, by simplifying inter-ethnic relations in the seceding territory, 
very often worsens them. Cf. Donald L. Horowitz, 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law’, in Moore, 
National Self-Determination and Secession, pp. 181-214, here p. 191. The secession of Croatia and the quasi­
secession of Kosovo illustrate his point graphically.
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revisionism undermining the stability of the secessionist/irredentist settlement adopted in an 
attempt to resolve an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict.
International conditions conducive to the stability of a secessionist-irredentist settlement 
include the preservation of regional stability after the boundary change, i.e., that no succession 
of further secessionist/irredentist movements is triggered, and the absence of any great power or 
regional power rivalry over the seceded territory.
In the context of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts, secessions/irredentas are thus 
not necessarily the most likely candidate of a settlement. Given the complexity of the issues 
involved, this is not surprising. The following case studies will show that it is only one of a 
number of options available, and given the right conditions, it is more likely that the right of 
self-determination is used as a bargaining chip to negotiate the highest possible amount of 
internal compensations. However, as the study of the Saar conflict will illustrate, a 
secession/irredenta may well be able to produce a stable settlement for an ethno-territorial cross- 
border conflict and should therefore not be ruled out on principle. As Allen Buchanan has put it, 
the availability of alternatives to secession depends on whether ‘the boundaries of a political 
unit... contain, for the most part, individuals who have enough in common to be able to engage 
in meaningful participation in rational, principled political decision-making.’48 If such a 
minimum of common political culture is missing, alternatives to internal settlements must be 
sought; and in this context, secession may well be worth considering. From the point of view of 
settling ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts, and other types of ethnic conflicts for that matter 
as well, it is therefore not normative considerations about whether a secession/irredenta is 
justified or not, but the more pragmatic issues of whether it is a useful mechanism to provide a 
solution that can be reasonably expected to be stable in the long term.
48 Allen Buchanan, ‘Democracy and Secession’, in Moore, National Self-Determination, pp. 14-33, here p. 23.
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Consociations and Their Applicability to Ethno-Territorial 
Cross-Border Conflicts
The Theory of Consociationalism
The term ‘consociational democracy’49 is most closely associated with the work of Arend 
Lijphart and was examined by him as a type of democratic system in greater detail for the first 
time in the late 1960s, when making reference to the political systems of Scandinavian countries 
and of the Netherlands and Belgium.50 Lijphart followed up with further studies of political 
stability in cases of severely socially fragmented societies, eventually leading to his 
fundamental work Democracy in Plural Societies.51
The phenomenon Lijphart was describing, however, was not new. As a pattern of social 
structure, characterising a society fragmented by religious, linguistic, ideological, or other 
cultural segmentation, it had existed long before the 1960s. These structural aspects, studied, 
among others, by Lorwin,52 were not the primary concern of Lijphart, who was more interested 
in why, despite their fragmentation, such societies maintained a stable political process, and 
recognised its main source in the agency of political elites. Furthermore, Lijphart identified four 
features shared by consociational systems -  a grand coalition government (between parties from 
different segments of society), segmental autonomy (in the cultural sector), proportionality (in 
the voting system and in public sector employment) and minority veto.53 These characteristics, 
more or less prominently, were exhibited by all the classic examples of consociationalism: 
Lebanon, Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Fiji, and Malaysia.
With some of these consociations having succeeded in the long run, such as in 
Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and others having failed, like Lebanon,
49 The phrase itself was actually not coined by Lijphart himself, who makes reference to Althusius’s consociatio and 
acknowledges the use of the term ‘consociational’ by David E. Apter in a study on Uganda. Cf. Arend Lijphart, 
‘Consociational Democracy’, World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 207-225, note 14.
50 Arend Lijphart, ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 1, April 1968, pp. 3-44.
51 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). Earlier works 
include The Politics o f Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (University of California 
Press, 1968) and ‘Consociational Democracy’.
52 Cf., for example, Val R. Lorwin, ‘Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the
Smaller European Democracies’, Comparative Politics, vol. 3, no. 2 (January 1971), pp. 141-175.
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Cyprus, Fiji, and Malaysia, Lijphart also established conditions conducive to consociational 
democracy. These included overarching, i.e., territorial, loyalties, a small number of political 
parties in each segment, about equal size of the different segments, and the existence of some 
cross-cutting cleavages with otherwise segmental isolation. The small size of the territory to 
which a consociational structure is applied and its direct and indirect internal and external 
effects as well as a tradition of compromise among political elites are also emphasised by 
Lijphart as conditions enhancing the stability of the consociational settlement.54
Consociational Settlements of Ethno-Territorial Cross-Border Conflicts
For consociational settlements to work for ethnic conflicts, three fundamental conditions are 
required, as McGarry and O’Leary have emphasised.55 Integration or assimilation of the 
respective other group must not be on the agenda of either of the ethnic groups in conflict with 
each other in the short or medium term. Successive elites must be motivated to work for the 
preservation of the consociational settlement, and they themselves must enjoy a sufficient 
degree of autonomy within their communities enabling them to make compromises and 
concessions without having to fear outbidding and outflanking by ethno-centric radicals.
Apart from their dependence upon elites and the factors determining their political 
agency, the history of consociational settlements has shown them also to be particularly 
vulnerable to outside interference -  the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus and the 
involvement of Syria and Israel in the breakdown of the Lebanese consociation are just two 
examples for this. The reason for this vulnerability is that outside intervention dramatically 
alters the carefully preserved balances of power within a consociational process -  in reality, as 
in the cases of Cyprus and Lebanon, or in the perception of one of the communities that is part 
of the consociation, as it has been the case in the brief period of Northern Irish 
consociationalism in 1973/4. Yet, as the case of South Tyrol demonstrates, some degree of
55 Lijphart, Democracy, pp. 25-52.
54 Lijphart, Democracy, pp. 53-103.
55 McGarry and O’Leary, ‘Introduction’, p. 36f.
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involvement of an outside agent may in fact prove helpful in persuading one of the groups, in 
this case, the external minority of German-speakers, that a consociational settlement is its best 
bet, now and in the future. Furthermore, the case of Northern Ireland shows that a cross-border 
dimension, i.e., the involvement of some kind or other of the kin-state in the consociational 
settlement beyond the negotiation stage, might be required by the external minority to accept a 
settlement along consociational lines at all, especially if its original aspiration was for 
unification with its kin-state.
In other words, the very nature of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts introduces an 
additional agent to the consociational process not foreseen in Lijphart* s exploration of the 
concept. This gives rise to two questions. How far are consociational settlements useful 
mechanisms to deal with ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts? What modifications of the 
consociational process will occur because of the altered structure of agents involved, and in how 
far will these influence and change the conditions conducive to the stability of consociational 
settlements?
Given the structure of ethnic and territorial claims most likely leading to a 
consociational settlement, namely the kin-state withdrawing its territorial claims, but external 
minority and host-state upholding them and ethnic claims for internal self-determination 
persisting, consociations are in principle worthwhile ventures to settle ethno-territorial cross- 
border conflicts. In their claims for wide-ranging segmental autonomy -  territorial as well as 
non-territorial -  many ethno-territorial cross-border situations resemble patterns in 
consociational societies even though the nature of these claims is not always related to ethnicity 
in the strict sense, but can be ideological, as in Austria, or ideological and religious, as in the 
Netherlands. Switzerland and Belgium, of course, are examples of consociational democracies 
where ethnic claims play a significant role. However, an important distinction has to be made in 
relation to the territorial scale of the arrangement. In the four classic examples of consociational 
democracies in Europe, the arrangements extend to the entire territory of each society. In 
instances of ethno-territorial cross-border conflict, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, it is
rather unlikely as the disputed areas normally only form a small proportion of the host-states’ 
territories. Thus, as is the case with South Tyrol and Northern Ireland, it is more likely that 
consociational arrangements encompass only the disputed territory and the ethnic groups living 
there. Depending on the political system of the host-state as a whole a consociation can be 
established in one federal unit or one region without affecting the political structure of other 
territorial entities in the host-state. For example, the region Trentino-Siidtirol has a special 
statute, allowing for the specific consociational arrangements in one of its two provinces, 
namely South Tyrol.
Two further critical issues that deserve attention are related to the overarching loyalty 
uniting the consociational society as a whole, which Lijphart cites as one of the favourable 
conditions for consociational democracy,56 and to the principle of proportionality, one of the 
four key features of any consociation. Concerning overarching loyalty, this may indeed be 
found in a consociational society, yet it will develop, if at all, only over time and only if there 
are strong incentives. South Tyrol is an example for this process. Despite the fact that the ethnic 
and national identities of both the German and the Italian populations in the province and the 
region are significantly different, a territorial loyalty has gradually developed over many issues 
where Germans and Italians share the same interests, yet are unable to realise them individually, 
but need to act in concert at regional, national, or European level. However, this is not an 
automatic process, and in some conflicts, it might prove impossible to create such an 
overarching loyalty bridging the fundamental cleavages between the groups. Northern Ireland 
may be one such case, and then the question is whether consociationalism can work as a 
mechanism of conflict settlement in such deeply divided societies at all.57 The existence of 
competing national options or alternatives makes consociational settlements of ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts particularly vulnerable, especially if national sentiments run deep in the 
host-nation, the kin-nation, and the external minority.
56 Lijphart, Democracy, pp. 81-83.
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A danger of a different kind to the success of consociationalism is posed by the 
principle of proportionality. Once numerical proportions between the consociation partners 
change, so, too, do their shares in government, civil service, funding, etc. The group losing out 
in the process may see this as unacceptable. Anticipating such a development, there was no 
census held in Lebanon after the 1930s (on which proportional allocations had been based), 
despite the obvious alteration in the numerical balance between the communities. However, this 
strategy of denial did not only not prevent the eventual breakdown of the arrangement; rather, it 
was one of the factors contributing to it. The situation in ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts 
is such that changing numerical proportions are very likely, because they are not only 
influenced by natural factors of population growth, such as birth and death rates, but are also 
susceptible to migration. Normally , both the external minority and the section of the host-nation 
sharing the disputed territory have the option of emigration -  members of the external minority 
are most likely to go to the kin-state, an option frequently exercised by ethnic Hungarians and 
ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe, while members of the host-nation are most 
likely to leave for other parts of the host-state.58 hi addition, immigration, for reasons of 
citizenship most likely by members of the host-nation, is another factor can lead to altered 
numerical balances in the consociation. Especially if migration exceeds natural levels and is 
perceived as a deliberate policy of one ethnic group to gain advantages, destabilising effects are 
likely to occur that can potentially lead to the collapse of the consociational arrangement For 
that reason, one of the essential demands made by South Tyrolese Germans throughout the 
1950s and 1960s was to gain some measure of control over immigration to the province. On the 
other hand, increased emigration of Italians in the 1970s led to fears within the Italian segment 
of the population triggering a swing towards radical ethno-centric parties in the early 1980s.
In conclusion, then, in absence of viable alternatives because of the specific structure of 
ethnic and territorial claims, consociations have a fair chance to work as settlements for ethno-
57 Horowitz’s answer to this question is no, as he sees consociational arrangements only workable in moderately
divided societies. Cf. Donald i l  Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 
1985), pp. 571f.
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territorial cross-border conflicts. However, they will often require substantial modifications and 
complex institutional designs to accommodate the interests of all parties involved.
Emigration to third countries is another option, but does not normally occur in figures comparable to the other two.
III. Conclusion of Part One:
Which Factors Influence Ethno-Territorial Cross-Border 
Conflicts and the Stability of Their Settlements?
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, a durable institutional settlement of any ethno- 
territorial cross-border conflict in a liberal democratic environment needs to fulfil a number of 
conditions. Primarily, the conflicting interests of all parties involved in the conflict must be 
accommodated to the highest possible degree. When compromises have to be made, a party that 
makes concessions in one area should be compensated in another, and there should not be a 
major imbalance in terms of the number and substance of concessions the parties are required to 
make. The settlement as a whole should be carried by a broad consensus not only among the co­
operating elites, but also among their respective electorates. While flexibility is required within 
the settlement provisions to accommodate new developments, any agreement reached should be 
stable enough to prevent major future changes to the decisive disadvantage of one party.
These requirements are of a very general nature. It is the concrete political and social 
context of each conflict that will determine how they are realised in practice. Preliminarily, 
these contextual factors can be found on four distinct, yet interrelated levels, namely (1) in the 
disputed territory, (2) in the host-state, (3) in the kin-state, and (4) in the international context.
On the first level -  the ethnic situation in the disputed territory -  three different 
dimensions must be distinguished. These are social, intra-ethnic, and inter-ethnic in their nature 
and have distinct, but sometimes overlapping variables.
On the social level, factors that influence ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts are the 
ethnic stratification of the society (domination vs. segmentation) and the resulting power 
differential; the role of the state institutions in the conflict; and the institutional set-up of the 
social and political system. Important variables on the intra-ethnic level are group identity; the 
level of group awareness and group solidarity; the existence of, and policies pursued by, 
different political parties/movements and their varying influence on the ethnic group as a whole; 
and the basis for and degree of mobilisation. On the inter-ethnic level, a distinction must be 
made between three different relationships: the relationship between the ethnic groups; the 
relationship between individual group members; and the relationship between representatives of 
these groups. Further important factors are the disparity in identity-related aspirations and the
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degree to which this disparity matters and is interpreted politically; and the differences in ethno­
cultural markers and traits and the degree of their codification in distinct models of mutual 
perception. Factors that determine the character of the inter-ethnic situation also include the 
policies the individual ethnic groups and leaders of these groups pursue to ensure a high degree 
of mobilisation and solidarity in their respective group; the policy agendas of the .individual 
ethnic groups and their mutual perception, e.g., challenging the domination of one ethnic group; 
challenging the state because of its neglect of ethnic demands; defending its position of 
domination in a given society; competing, with other ethnic groups of equal social rank, for 
scarce resources distributed by the state etc.; and the means with which they try to realise their 
goals. In addition to this, an ethnic situation is also determined by the way in which other ethnic 
groups under the jurisdiction of either of the two states perceive the conflict, its roots, and 
possible consequences for them. This is important inasmuch as the host-state might under 
certain conditions trigger further ethnic conflicts in its own society, whereas the kin-state may 
provoke harsh reactions among other ethnic groups on its territory when the potential accession 
of members of one ethnic group is expected to change the existing balance of power.
Table 5/1: Contextual Factors of Conflict Development and Settlement -  Conditions in the 
Disputed Territory
Social
•  Ethnic stratification
•  Power differential
. •  Role of state institutions in the conflict
•  Institutional set-up o f  the social and political system
Intra-ethnic
•  Group identity
•  Group awareness/solidarity
•  Party-political homogeneity
•  Basis for and degree o f mobilisation
•  Policy agendas and policies and their mutual perception
Inter-ethnic
•  Relationship between ethnic groups
•  Relationship between individual group members
•  Relationship between group representatives/elites
•  Influence o f identity-related aspects
•  Perceptions o f other ethnic groups
With regard to the second level of factors -  the situation in the host-state -  the 
following conditions significantly influence the development and outcome of any ethno- 
territorial cross-border conflict: the policy aims and constraints of the institutions of the host-
59
state and the policies pursued in relation to the state’s role in the conflict in general, e.g., 
impartial mediator, challenged by one ethnic group, facing the conflict between two ethnic 
groups, representing the interests of one ethnic group that is itself involved in the conflict, etc. 
Apart from these domestic dimensions, the policy approach taken by the host-state vis-a-vis the 
kin-state and the pressures levelled against it by actors in the international context are of no 
lesser importance for the development and outcome of any ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflict.
Table 5/2: Contextual Factors of Conflict Development and Settlement -  Conditions in the Host- 
State
• Policy aims
•  Means by which aims are sought to realise
• Position in the conflict
• Approach vis-i-vis the kin-state
•  Domestic and international policy constraints___________
Similar factors influence the agenda and policy of the kin-state: Does the kin-state 
mainly pursue a course of action that can be described as pro-irredentist, consisting of open 
threats of military intervention, material and political support for irredentists (peaceful or 
violent), and fuelling inter-ethnic hatred? Or does its concept of intervention imply an approach 
that is primarily interested in an improvement of the situation of its exterbnal minority thereby 
accepting the givens of the territorial situation? This choice will be determined by the perceived 
opportunity structure for the kin-state, which is shaped by domestic and international conditions 
similar to those of the host-state.
Table 5/3: Contextual Factors of Conflict Development and Settlement -  Conditions in the Kin- 
State
•  Policy aims
•  Means by which aims are sought to realise
• Position in the conflict
•  Approach vis-k-vis the host-state
•  Domestic and international policy constraints______ .
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In terms of the international context, it is primarily the third-party involvement of 
individual states and/or regional or international governmental and non-governmental 
organisations that influence the development and outcome of any particular ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflict. The direction of this influence will depend upon the motivation behind the 
involvement, e.g., arbitration or mediation between the conflict parties, strengthening the 
position of one particular party, or pursuing an agenda of its own self-interest The strength of 
the influence is dependent upon the availability and commitment of resources by third parties 
and upon the skill and determination with which they pursue their intervention.
Table 5/4: Contextual Factors of Conflict Development and Settlement -  International Context
Regional or international 
governmental or non-governmental 
organisations or individual states
•  Motivation behind the involvement
•  Availability and commitment of 
resources
•  Skill and determination of intervention
The examination of these factors will be at the centre of the following case studies. The 
aim of this is not to produce a universal approach to the settlement of ethno-territorial cross- 
border conflicts. Rather, my aim is more limited, namely to demonstrate the variety of possible 
settlements and to examine why a particular solution could work in a particular case. On this 
basis, a cautious generalisation of ‘success conditions’, or stability criteria, for each particular 
































































Edicts of Villers-CotterSts determine the use of French as official language (Art 111).
Alsace does not exist as a unified political entity.
France acquires Alsace through the Peace Treaty of Westphalia.
French integration attempts do not progress very far.
French Revolution.
Emperorship of Napoleon.
Restoration period -  integration is successful among urban bourgeoisie and rural aristocracy. 
Second French Republic.
Second Empire.
Political integration generates widespread loyalty among Alsatians.
Franco-German wan Alsace and Lorraine are occupied by Germany. Their separation from France 
is confirmed by the Frankfurt Peace Treaty of May 1871.
The unification law is passed.
Period of dictatorship by the Emperor.
First parliamentary elections in Alsace.
Establishment of a consultative assembly for Alsace (and Lorraine)
New constitution improves autonomy status of Alsace.
Protest vote of Alsatians expresses strong sentiments for France.
German national parties begin to expand to Alsace.
Gradually, civil and political liberties are granted to Alsace.
New constitution gives Alsace almost full autonomy within the German federal framework. 
Tensions between military forces in Alsace and the local population increase simultaneously to 
those between France and Germany.
First World War and military rule in Alsace.
Peace Treaty of Versailles returns Alsace to France.
Initial institutional arrangement of the Commissariat General is abolished, Alsace is fully 
integrated into the French unitary state system.
The religious concordat and the confessional school system are confirmed by legislation.
Rebellion of the clergy against attempts to end the special religious status of Alsace.
Germany recognises its borders with France in the Treaty of Locarno.
Foundation of the Heimatbund.
Realignment of the party-political systems over the issue of Alsatian particularism.
Bloody Sunday in Colmar clashes between French nationalists and Alsatian particularists. 
Break-up of the Heimatbund.
Dissolution of the town council of Hagenau by the French government 
Elections in Hagenau -  particularists win all 23 seats.
Trial against particularist leaders ends in acquittals and short-term prison sentences for those 
defendants present The convicted particularists are released from prison in July and August 1928. 
Parliamentary debate on Alsace. A resolution is passed that expresses confidence about the future 
development in Alsace.
Relaxation of French integration policy vis-k-vis Alsace.
Crisis of the Bench parliamentary system.
A general pardon reinstates all convicted particularists in their citizenship rights.
A linguistic census establishes that ninety per cent of the population of Alsace speak German
and/or Alsatian dialect
Hitler comes to power in Germany.
Goman annexation of Austria.
Munich agreement.
German occupation of the CSR.
Beginning of the Second World War.
Arrest and trial of particularist leaders, one death sentence is pronounced and executed in 1940. 
Parts of the Alsatian civilian population are evacuated from Alsace to Southern France.
German occupation of Alsace and aggressive Germanisation policy.
Return of Alsace to France.
Concessions are made for limited German language teaching in Alsatian schools. Pupils can elect 
German as a subject in the last two years of their elementary school.
Bordeaux trial of those responsible for the massacre in Oradour, including twelve Alsatians. 
Division of France into 22 regions.
Creation of the Council of Regional Economic Development 
Creation of regional Councils.
After a two-year trial period, German becomes obligatory in Alsace in third and fourth grade. 
Ecological revival of particularism/regionalism in Alsace.
Beginning of the first Mitterand presidency and the regionalisation process in France.
Signing of a cultural charter for Alsace by the region and the Ministry of Culture.
A number of regionalisation laws are passed.
For the first time after 1945 permission for the publication of monolingual non-French newspapers 
and magazines is given.
The system for elections to regional councils is changed to proportional representation with the 
departments of each region as constituencies.
Cultural particularism becomes a widespread popular movement in Alsace.
The National Council for Regional Languages and Cultures is founded. Representatives of Alsace 
participate.
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Alsace is a border region between France and Germany, which owes its boundaries both to 
nature and politics. Its natural boundaries are the Vosges mountains in the west and the river 
Rhine in the east. The river Lauter was adopted as its northern border after Napoleon’s defeat at 
Waterloo in 1815. In the south its borders were established after the Franco-German war in 
1871. Today Alsace consists of two administrative departments -  Bas-Rhin, with Strasbourg as 
its capital, and Haut-Rhin, where Mulhouse is the capital. The territory of Alsace is 8,280 sq. 
km, its population slightly more than 1.6 million.
As a border country and disputed territory between Germany and France, Alsace has a 
long and complex history. After Germanic tribes settled in the area in the fifth century AD, 
Alsace had been part of the German Holy Roman Empire between 870 and 1648, when Louis 
XIV managed to gain control over the territory in the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. Since then, 
sovereignty over the territory has shifted five times between France and Germany, each of these 
shifts resulting in integration attempts of different degrees of strength all of which were met by 
the Alsatians with the one or another form resistance.
Today, there is little resistance to integration into France. Alsace has experienced 
economic prosperity and faced French governments that had drawn their lessons from past 
mistakes and made a number of concessions in cultural matters, rather than insiting on complete 
integration, including cultural assimilation. Alsatian particularism, an ideology that had 
captured the hearts and minds of Alsatians and mobilised them for political action in defence of 
their ancient rights and religious and linguistic distinctiveness, especially during the period of 
German rule from 1871 to 1918 and during the inter-war period, is no longer a significant 
political movement, only culturally has it retained its social importance. A strong regional 
movement in Alsace is only partly based on claims that have their roots in the non-French origin 
of most Alsatians, and on economic, ecological, and in the widest sense cultural demands. For 
the most part, Alsatian regionalism does not differ from similar movements in other French 
regions. Thus, despite its complicated history full of ethnic tensions and territorial conflicts, 
Alsace has become a ‘normal’ French region with a degree of cultural distinctiveness.
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Developments before 1870
First Alemanic settlements date back to the fifth and sixth centuries A. D., and it was around the 
year 660 that the term Alesaciones was used for the first time. The population of the area 
remained relatively homogeneous in its culture until the seventeenth century. However, a 
common administrative or political framework did not develop because the region was divided 
into a number of territories which were ruled either by the church, such as Strasbourg, or 
directly by the emperor, or were, as, for example, Mulhouse, part of the Swiss confederation.59 
Until the Thirty Years War, the principal linguistic border between French and German were the 
Vosges mountains in the west rather than the river Rhine in the east. Nevertheless, French 
cultural and linguistic influence was significant, especially after Huguenot settlements in 
Alsace.60
The acquisition of Alsace by France through the settlement of the Pax Westfalica in 
1648 initiated a process of integration of Alsatians into French culture and society.61 While this 
had very little effect on the rural population for whom the Alemanic dialect remained an 
essential part of their Germanic culture and traditions, the aristocratic and bourgeois Alsatian 
upper classes, similar to those in the Saar after 1789, felt some affection for French culture and 
language and did not resist the modest integration attempts of the time.
After 1789, because of the revolutionary government’s obsessive association of 
language and nationhood, all regional languages were suppressed on grounds of the assumption 
that the “language of a free people ought to be the same for everyone.”62 Several pieces of 
legislation to that effect were introduced in 1794, one of them specifically banning the use of
59 Cf. William R. Beer, The Unexpected Rebellion. Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France (New York and 
London: New York University Press, 1980), p. 7-8.
60 Among other things, the Huguenots established schools in Alsace in which French was taught and used as 
language of instruction. These schools were open to Alsatians and the Alsatian aristocracy and bourgeoisie, being 
attracted by French culture, frequently sent their children there. Cf. Bernard Trouillet, Das Elsafi -  Grenzland in 
Europa (Cologne: BOhlau, 1997), p. 74.
61 French civil servants were sent to the new territory, garrisons were established, and French was introduced as the 
official language according to Article 111 of the Edicts of Villers-Cotterets of 1539. Cf. Dennis Ager, Language 
Policy in France and Britain (London: Cassel, 1996), p. 40f.
62 Declaration by Barre before the Convent on 27 January 1794. Quoted in Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p.78.
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German in Alsace.63 Although the revolution was warmly welcomed in Alsace, its subsequent 
language policies were not.64 Frenchification and integration continued under Napoleon (1799- 
1814) and during the restoration period (1814-1839). Although less forceful, it had far greater 
success as most Alsatians began to think of themselves as French citizens. Part of the reason for 
this success were the economic and administrative reforms that strengthened ties between 
Alsace and the interior of France. Particular attention was also paid to education: by the 1830s, 
French had attained parity as the language of business and culture, by mid-century, it had 
become the everyday language for most bourgeois families and an essential pre-condition for 
upward social mobility. As such, it was also accepted among the petite bourgeoisie. 
Economically, the tariff border, which had existed between Alsace and France, but not between 
Alsace, Switzerland, the Netherlands and neighbouring German territories, between 1680 and 
1790, was dismantled and closer economic integration fostered with France interieure.
German nationalism with its continuing emphasis on the cultural essence of the nation, 
and increasing attempts to incorporate all German-speaking people and territories into one 
polity, forced French governments to pursue integration more eagerly during the second 
Republic (1848-1851) and the Second Empire (1851-1870).65 These attempts were politically 
rather successful,66 as a majority of Alsatians did not have any difficulties in seeing themselves 
(politically) as French citizens,67 although about eighty per cent of Alsatian peasants, artisans, 
and urban workers continued to use the Alemanic dialect and to see themselves as Alsatians and 
not as French in broader cultural terms.
63 One of the rationales for this was the rather pragmatic insight that revolutionary ideology could only be spread on 
the basis of a common language. Cf. Ager, Language Policy, p. 41.
64 There were a number of direct and indirect consequences of the new language policy. One was that French became 
the only language in state-supported secondary and higher education. Another was that, because of the enlistment of 
men from all regions to the revolutionary army, the belief in the usefulness of one common language was widely 
spread and accepted. This, however, did not automatically cany with it a preparedness to give up one’s regional 
mother tongue. Because of a lack of time, money, and qualified teachers, assimilation efforts in the immediate post­
revolutionary period proved unsuccessful beyond managing to establish the French language as the carrier of 
progressive ideas and humanist values. Cf. Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 81.
65 Part of this was the introduction of French in primary schools in 1850. Cf. Michael Essig, Das Elsafi aufder Suche 
nach seiner Identitdt (Munich: Ebeihard, 1994), p. 119.
66 Cf. Uliane M. Vassberg, Alsatian Acts o f Identity (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1993).
67 Beer, The Unexpected Rebellion, p. 15.
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The ‘Reichsland’ Period, 1870/71 -  1919
On 1 March 1871, the French National Assembly in Bordeaux voted 546 to 171 in favour of the 
ratification of the preliminary peace treaty with Germany of 26 February 1871, against a 
declaration of protest from representatives of the departments of Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, and 
Moselle, that is of Alsace and Lorraine.68 Ironically, at the time when the three departments 
proved their long disputed loyalty to the French nation, underlining the German origin of the 
population but also their unwillingness to be integrated in the German Reich,69 the very same 
nation abandoned them. The acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany became part of the 
Frankfurt Peace Treaty between France and Germany in May 1871, and with it a new period in 
Alsatian history began.70
From the Frankfurt Peace Treaty to the Introduction of the German Constitution, 
1871-1874
Apart from political changes, this new period was also characterised by demographic changes 
with long-term consequences. Paragraph One of Article Two of the Frankfurt Peace Treaty 
granted all inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine the right to opt for French or German citizenship. 
In the case of opting for French citizenship, people had to move their permanent residence to 
France but they could retain ownership of property in Alsace or Lorraine. About 160,000, or ten 
per cent, of the inhabitants exercised this right. However, only 50,000 of them had left by the 
end of the option period in 1872, those remaining were considered to have waived their
68 A similar protest declaration was read by some of the first elected members to the German federal diet from 
Alsace and Lorraine in 1874. On this occasion, a plebiscite was demanded on the status of the three former French 
departments. Cf. Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969) vol. 
IV, p. 450, and Theodor Schieder, Nationalismus und Nationalstaat (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), p. 
202.
60 Rehm makes the distinction between deutschstammig (of ethnic German origin) and deutschwillig (willing to be 
German in a political as well as narrower cultural sense). Cf. Max Rehm, Reichsland Elsafi-Lothringen (Bad Neustadt 
a.d.S.: Pfaehler, 1991), p. 13.
70 Annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, although one of the major strategic war aims of the military leadership, was 
politically not undisputed and not without risk. Apart from the foreign-political dimension of permanent tensions in 
Franco-German relationships, there were also a number of potential domestic problems that could be worsened 
through the annexation. Among them were the foreseeable difficulties in terms of the integration of the new 
territories and their population, but also problems that lay at the heart of the German unification process itself, such as 
the constitutional set-up, including the question of the voting system, the status of minorities, and the issue of what a 
German national identity should consist of. The eventual decision in favour of the annexation seems to have been 
made because of security concerns. The line of argument that prevailed in the end was that reconciliation between 
France and Germany seemed unlikely no matter how generous the peace conditions were, and that, in this case, 
Alsace and Lorraine were of strategic importance for Germany’s defence capabilities in the west Cf. Lothar Gall,
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respective rights and henceforth treated as German citizens. With a further 150,000 people 
leaving after the end of the option period, and more than 300,000 people bom in Alsace or 
Lorraine but having relocated before or during the war, the actual loss of population amounted 
to about 500,000.71
The unification law of 9 June 1871, determined that Alsace and Lorraine become the 
Reichsland Elsafi-Lothringen, that is, a territory under the direct rule of the central institutions 
of the Reich.12 One of the major reasons for this decision were iteic/i-intemal rivalries between 
Bavaria and WUrttemberg over the distribution of Alsace and Lorraine, and between the 
southern German states as a whole and Prussia over influence within federal institutions.73
Becoming a territory under the direct rule of the central institutions of the Reich meant 
that all executive powers were vested in the Kaiser, who, with the approval of the federal 
council,74 also exercised all legislative powers, thus effectively excluding the federal diet from 
all matters concerning the Reichsland except the granting of loans.75 The chancellor of the 
Reich was at the same time the minister president of Elsafi-Lothringen. According to an 
administrative law of December 1871, a governor was appointed who was to handle most of the 
executive affairs concerning Elsafi-Lothringen and who reported directly to the chancellor. His 
competence extended to all French laws and regulations which, formerly being the 
responsibility of the French central government, continued to be in force in the Reichsland. This
“Das Problem ElsaB-Lothringen”, in Theodor Schieder and Ernst Deuerlein, Reichsgriindung 1870/71 (Stuttgart: 
Seewald, 1970), pp. 366-385, here p. 366.
71 All figures from Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 442-443. There are a number of other estimates: 
Stoeckicht, for example, gives a loss of about 460,000 people and a gain of 400,000. Cf. Otto Stoeckicht, Sprache, 
Landscha.fi und Geschichte des Elsafi (Maiburg: Elwert, 1942), p. 37. Essig, in contrast, notes 50,000 emigrations 
from, and 400,000 immigrations to Alsace and Lorraine. Cf. Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 124.
72 Three other options had been developed as well. One was the distribution of the territories to the neighbouring 
German states of WUrttemberg and Bavaria. Another one was incorporation into Prussian territory. A further 
possibility was the appointment of one of the German princes to hereditary rule over Alsace and Lorraine.
73 This was particularly due for the federal council where the number of votes of each state was determined 
according to its population. In this context, JanBen draws attention to a memorandum of the Bavarian government Of 
1 August 1917(0, in which a possible incorporation of the Reichsland territory into Prussia is rejected as being in 
breach of the federal principles of the Reich's constitution, whereas incorporation into the Bavarian state is desired as 
a counter-balance to Prussian domination. Cf. Karl-Heinz JanBen, Macht und Verblendung (Gottingen: 
Musterschmidt, 1963).
74 The federal council was, and still is, one of Germany’s constitutional legislative organs. Being composed of 
delegates from the state governments, it provides a balance to the directly elected members of the federal diet in 
Germany’s federal political system.
75 Cf. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), p. 25.
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first step towards decentralisation was complemented at local level -  three departmental and 
twenty-two district governors were appointed to administer local affairs.
Part of this decentralisation process was the so-called dictatorship Article. In its tenth 
provision, the administrative law of December 1871 granted the governor of Elsafi-Lothringen 
far-reaching emergency powers to be exercised at his own discretion without the necessity of 
prior consultation with the federal diet, federal council, or federal chancellor. The powers listed 
in this paragraph were widely exercised in the early years of German rule over Alsace and 
Lorraine, particularly in attempts to deal with the protest movement, which was organised in the 
Ligue d‘Alsace and which, in contrast to the autonomist movement that developed after 1873, 
refused any co-operation with the German administration. Leading figures of the protest 
movement were exiled, cultural and political organisations suspected of anti-German activities 
were prohibited, or serious restrictions imposed on their activities. Newspapers were banned, 
elected mayors and local councils suspended and provisional local authorities installed.76 
Mutually intensifying protests and measures of repression led to ever increasing tensions 
between the local population and the German administration.
As a result of these tensions, the extension of the German constitution to Elsafi* 
Lothringent which had been envisaged in the unification law for 1 January 1873, was postponed 
for an entire year. Only in 1874 were the inhabitants of the Reichsland, unless they were 
migrants from other German states, granted full citizenship rights, including the right to elect 
their own representatives to the federal diet. Being represented by fifteen elected members in 
the federal diet meant that the population now had at least some modest indirect influence on 
legislation concerning the Reichsland. The first elections to the federal diet, however, indicated 
clearly how little support there was among the population of the Reichsland for integration into 
Germany. The candidates of the protest movement won an overwhelming victory. They had 
fought their campaign primarily based upon one of the central components of Alsatian identity -  
Catholicism -  and managed to mobilise significant electoral support among all sections of the
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Alsatian population, who, for the first, but by no means last, time after 1871 acted jointly on the 
basis of a sense of (religious) community distinguishing them from their rulers. This protest 
movement, which had its stronghold among the rural Catholic Alsatian population and was led 
by the clergy, rejected the Protestant-dominated Reich, and the Protestant Prussian 
administrators sent to the Reichsland, who refused to co-operate with the Catholic church.
The Formation of the Autonomist Movement and Its Absorption into the Protest 
Movement
Apart from protest on confessional grounds in the context of the Kulturkampf, there was also a 
French nationalism-inspired stream of resistance against the annexation. For quite different 
reasons, the urban bourgeoisie rejected the authoritarian and monarchist German system. They 
favoured France as the culturally and politically more advanced nation, with which they had so 
visibly identified for more than half a century, resulting in a widely shared sense of community 
based above all on shared political memories, ‘to which every walk through the museum of 
Kolmar testifies, which is full reliquia (... especially from the revolution) that may appear 
trivial to the outsider, but are cherished by the Alsatians/77 Initially, Alsatians also had 
reservations about the economic consequences of the political change of boundaries.78
With the elections to the federal diet in 1874, changes in the legislative process in the 
Reichsland occurred: all legislative powers were transferred from the emperor to the federal diet 
and the federal council. By decree of the emperor of October 1874, an assembly, composed of 
appointees by the emperor, corporate delegates and delegates from elected local councils, was 
established in Elsafi-Lothringen and granted consultative powers regarding legislative 
proposals.79 These powers were extended in 1877 when the consultation of this assembly and its
76 The investiture of provisional local councils was regulated by a special law of 24 February 1872. Cf. Huber, 
Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 441f.
77 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tubingen: Moor, 1972), p. 243.
78 Cf. Hermann Hiery* Reichstagswahlen im Reichsland (DUsseldorf: Droste, 1986), p. 435.
79 Cf. Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 445.
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approval of laws became necessary prerequisites for the introduction of new legislation in the 
Reichsland.80
Originating among the Protestants in the Reichsland, in particular in Lothringen, the 
autonomist movement, which developed after 1873, was initially equated with the Protestant 
milieu in general and was therefore not very popular among the Catholics, who regarded 
Catholicism as an essential and non-negotiable component of their distinct identity. 
Acknowledging the territorial and political incorporation of Alsace and Lorraine into the 
Wilhelmine Empire, the activists of the movement argued for an autonomous status of the 
Reichsland with the prospect of it eventually becoming a federal state. Its initial demands 
concerned the transfer of the Reichsland government from Berlin to Strasbourg and the 
upgrading of the assembly to an elected diet. After winning five of the fifteen seats to the 
federal diet in the 1879 elections, most of their demands were fulfilled, when the Reichsland 
was given a new constitution and with it an improved form of autonomy on 4 July 1879.81 As a 
consequence, the original autonomist movement disintegrated rapidly. Its ideas, however, were 
picked up by the, mainly Catholic, protest movement, which, in the light of the secularisation of 
the French state and the Dreyfus affair, came to realise that co-operation with the German 
authorities within the institutional framework established in 1879 brought certain advantages for 
the Reichsland. As a result of the fusion between parts of both movements the Elsafi-Lothringer 
Partei (ELP) came into being which was prepared to co-operate with the German authorities, 
although a small radical wing within the party maintained its resistance against German 
integration attempts until after 1890.
However, three major restrictions to Elsafi-Lothringen*s autonomy remained: the 
Federal Council was still involved in the legislative process, the federal diet had subsidiary 
competences for the Reichslandy and there was only consultative representation in the federal
80 Ibid., p. 453.
81 Instead of the dual executive arrangements of chancellor and governor, a new office of a representative of the 
emperor was created, located in Strasbourg. All competences of the chancellor and governor concerning Elsafi- 
Lothringen were transferred to this representative. The incumbent of the position was directly responsible to die 
emperor, rather than to the chancellor. To perform his function successfully, the representative was at the same time
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council.82 This alone caused considerable dissatisfaction within the ELP, but the main target of 
protest remained the dictatorship paragraph, the powers of which had simply been transferred to 
the emperor’s representative, who exercised them widely between 1881 and 1884, for example, 
in an attempt to reduce the propagandists efforts of the ELP by banning four newspapers.83 
Nevertheless, successive representatives of the emperor until 1907 were determined to find an 
arrangement with the pro-French upper class and were helped in this by the rapidly advancing 
economic integration.84 Similarly, a number of concessions made in relation to French cultural 
and language matters eased relations between the French-speaking part of the population and 
the German authorities.85
The Increasing Success of German Integration Policy
The promotion of German language and culture generally fostered the integration process.86 
Decisions to make German the only official language in the administration and in court as early 
as 1871, and to found a German-speaking university in Strasbourg87 were welcomed by the 
predominantly German-speaking population and had made German rule more acceptable by the 
turn of the century.88 This process had begun as early as the 1870s among the Protestant
head of a ministry exclusively concerned with Reichsland affairs, which was located in Strasbourg as well. The 
assembly was granted the right to initiate legislation.
82 Wehler, Krisenherde, p. 31.
83 Cf. Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 459.
84 Wehler, Krisenherde, p. 33f. On the economic aspects of integration cf. also, Hermann Schreiber, Das Elsafi und 
seine Geschichte (Gemsbach: Katz, 1988), p. 325f., and Solange Gras, “Regionalism and Autonomy in Alsace since 
1918”, in Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, The Politics o f Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism 
(London: Sage, 1982), pp. 309-354, here p. 311,
85 In 1872, French had been banned from the curriculum except for children who had started school before 1871. (Cf. 
Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 91.) In 1875 special provisions were made for native speakers of French, allowing the 
language to be taught at school in initially 385 local communities and was extended to 435 by 1882. (Cf. Wehler, 
Krisenherde, p. 5 Iff.) This, however, should not be taken as indicator of a generally liberal cultural policy in terms of 
the integration process. A more clearly assimilationist background can be assumed to have guided the decision to 
introduce German as an obligatory subject at school in the predominantly French-speaking areas in 1874. Cf. 
Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 91.
86 There were more than ninety-five per cent German-speakers in lower Alsace, almost eighty per cent in upper 
Alsace, and more than fifty per cent in Lorraine, to which could be added about thirty per cent bilinguals. Ibid., p. 90.
87 The foundation of a German-speaking university in Strasbourg had been among the twenty-two demands made by 
an assembly of Alsatian notables in April 1871 as precondition of Alsatian acceptance of German rule. Cf. Max 
Rehm, Reichsland, pp. 17 and 19.
88 Cf. Vassberg, Alsatian Acts, p. 17f.
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population, especially of East Lorraine, but it took until the 1890s for the Catholic population to 
feel similarly pro-German.89
The conciliatory policies towards the French-speaking upper class on the part of the 
emperor’s representatives were accompanied by a simultaneous neglect of the working class and 
the rural population and of the necessity to include them in the integration efforts. Initially, this 
resulted, in combination with a number of other factors, in a strongly pro-French election in 
1887. hi the long term, however, the favouring of the upper classes meant the break-up of the 
previous pro-French nationalist interest coalition that had cut across class boundaries in the 
Reichsland. This resulted in developments that eventually worked in favour of the integration 
process as the class and ideology-based German party system could more easily expand to 
Elsafi-Lothringen, most notably the SPD, which advanced to become the second strongest party 
in the Reichsland and became the most consequential advocate of democratic reforms in the 
constitutional status of Elsafi-Lothringen. From the 1890s onwards, particularism as an 
influential political movement lost its electoral appeal, and a new period of liberalisation 
began.90 Apart from some anti-German feeling being triggered by the 1905 German-French 
Morocco crisis and repressive measures against pro-French agitation,91 the first decade of the 
twentieth century strengthened the ties between Elsafi-Lothringen and the rest of the German 
Reich. With the constitutional reform of 1911, the integration process of Elsafi-Lothringen into 
the Reich progressed further. Even though Alsace-Lorraine did not achieve full equality with 
other states in the federal structure of the Reich, the improvements in the 1911 constitution were 
significant. The new electoral regulations gave voting rights to all male inhabitants of the 
Reichsland over twenty-five years of age, irrespective of whether they had the citizenship of 
Alsace-Lorraine. A three-year minimum period of residence was required -  except for civil 
servants, teachers and members of the clergy, who gained voting rights after a minimum of one
89 Cf. Rehm, Reichsland, p. 36.
90 In 1898, the liberal press law, which had been in force in the rest of Germany since 1874, became valid in Elsafi- 
Lothringen as well, the dictatorship paragraph was abandoned in 1902, the same year saw the establishment of a 
Catholic faculty at the University of Strasbourg, and in 1905 and 1908 laws were passed which governed the 
establishment and conduct of political and cultural organisations in the Reichsland.
91 Cf. Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 466.
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year’s residence. Furthermore, a two-chamber diet was established in the Reichsland. While the 
members of the first chamber received their mandate through holding a specific office, through 
election by a corporate body, or through appointment by the emperor, those of the second 
chamber were directly elected by the population of Alsace and Lorraine. Election results after 
1911 showed hardly any differences in comparison to other federal states of a similar 
confessional and social stratification, such as Bavaria, and indicated that the party political 
integration had, after more than thirty years, be completed as is shown below, with Liberals, 
Catholic Centre Party, and SPD dominating.92 After 1912 tensions between the Reichsland and 
the Reich began to increase again. The legal status of Elsafi-Lothringen was only insufficiently 
secured and there were no constitutional provisions to guarantee its position as a de facto federal 
state.93 In addition, the military began to interfere more and more in matters of civilian 
administration and displayed a general mistrust and dislike of the local population. The 
beginning alienation between the Reichsland and Germany proper was then further aggravated 
by the conscription of men from Elsafi-Lothringen after 1914, by the fact that the nine French- 
speaking communities had to use German in their administrative business, and by the beginning 
Germanisation of family and place names, none of which was justified by the course of the war, 
or understood by the population. In addition, Alsace and Lorraine carried a heavy burden of 
civilian casualties and collateral damage throughout the war. Thus, it was not surprising that 
with the last German soldier leaving the Reichsland in 1918, the apparent success of the 
integration process, facilitated by the federal structure of the German polity, seemed to have 
been an illusion.
92 Other parties competing in Alsace-Lorraine were the Deutsche Reichspartei arid the Deutsche Konservative Partei 
(both alter 1890) and the Lothringischer Bund after 1898. The Liberals, committed to moderate autonomism, formed 
a united party only after 1903.
93 Cf. Wehler, Krisenherde, p. 48ff. and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Sozialdemokratie und Nationalstaat (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), p. 78.
Figure 1: Reichstag Election Results in Alsace-Lorraine, 1874-1912 (Plurality Voting System)
40 -  —
1874 1877 1878 1881 1884 1887 1890 1893 1898 1903 1907 1912
32.2 35.7 31.9 54.1 55.6 59.9 10.4H Protest Party
37.3 28.3 31.9 22.7 35.3 14.5El Conservatives
26.3 23.7 11.3 8.5 15.4□  Autonomists
8.6□  Social Democrats 19.3 22.7 24.2 23.7 31.7
11.5 10.1 14.1 15.9 17.2 19.5■  Liberals
35.27.8 24.3 25.9 28.5■  Centre Party of Alsace and Lorraine
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Summary: The Success of German Integration Policy, 1871 -  1912
The Reichsland period was a period of conflict mainly between German authorities and 
a wide spectrum of Alsatian activists opposing the separation from France. Opposition against 
Germany and German policies was not united. United in their desire to have Alsace and 
Lorraine treated with respect to a historically grown distinctiveness, partictilarist demands 
manifested themselves in various ways and for different reasons: pro-French protesters who 
refused any kind of co-operation with the German Empire; the Catholic church and, to a lesser 
extent, the Protestant church, both of which rejected Prussian dominance and the Kulturkampf 
initiated by Bismarck which threatened their influential position in social and political life; and 
an initially small, yet eventually successful, group of autonomists who accepted German rule in 
general but demanded a political status for Alsace and Lorraine identical with that of any other 
state in the German federation, so as to provide an institutional framework within which the 
Alsatians and Lorrainians in the Reichsland could administer their own affairs and preserve, 
express, and develop their distinct identity.
While economic and infrastructural integration happened rather fast and smoothly and 
were more or less completed within the first decade of German rule, political integration 
progressed significantly only after the early 1890s with more and more national German parties 
expanding to Alsace or founding or supporting local parties. Election results in Alsace began to 
show decreasing differences between Alsace and the rest of the German empire.
The federal structure of the German state in general influenced the development 
towards Alsatian autonomy positively and brought about results well beyond the capabilities Of 
the autonomist stream within the particularist movement in Alsace and Lorraine. Federalism in 
Germany left sufficient room for the cultural distinctiveness of the region, and showed, if only 
implicitly, a certain respect for the identity of its population. At the same time, however, the 
rivalries existing within the German Empire limited the degree of autonomy Alsace and 
Lorraine were granted.
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Table 6: Conditions Accounting for the Success of German Integration Policy between 1871 and
1912
• In France:
□ Relatively low public interest in Alsace and Lorraine
□ Absence of a powerful lobby of emigrants from Alsace and Lorraine influencing 
French government policy
□ Secularisation running counter to long-established traditions in Alsace and Lorraine
• In Germany:
□ Preservation of traditional laws and customs
□ Policy of gradual devolution of powers to the Reichsland
□ Expansion of the German party-political system into Alsace and Lorraine
□ Federal structure of the German Reich eventually facilitating a significant measure 
of autonomy
□ Decreasing tensions between Alsatians and Germans
□ Investment in industrial and infrastructural development and economic integration 
into the German market
• In Alsace and Lorraine:
□ Non-violent opposition against German annexation
□ Particularist movement sought to achieve autonomy within, rather than 
independence from Germany
□ Gradual decline of regional parties and simultaneous acceptance of established 
German parties as legitimate representatives of Reichsland interests
□ Perception of developments in France, especially of secularisation, as 
disadvantageous for the preservation of the distinct identity of people in Alsace and 
Lorraine
□ Economic and infrastructural advantages of integration with Germany
The Inter-War Period, 1919-1940*
Recovering Alsace and Lorraine was an undisputed war aim across the political spectrum in 
France.95 The only dissent emerged over the way how to achieve it.96 None of France’s allies 
strongly objected to these plans and the mood in the Reichsland seemed in favour Of reunion,
94 The return to France marked the administrative disintegration of the former Reichsland. Alsace and Lorraine 
became separate entities and took different developments. Although there are undeniable similarities, the analysis 
from now on will focus on Alsace.
95 The French war aims regarding Alsace and Lorraine were informed by various considerations. The ambitious 
economic goals of leading French politicians to transform the republic into a modem industrial state after the end of 
the First World War were obviously only achievable through territorial gains of economic significance. In addition to 
that, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine as a result of the Franco-German war in 1870/71 had remained a painful memory 
for the French national consciousness.
96 The left within the Socialist Party demanded a plebiscite, the government and the right wing of the socialists 
envisaged a peace treaty. In any case and mostly for economic reasons, a return of Alsace and Lorraine was 
demanded according to the borders of 1814, that is, including the Saar basin with its important coal resources.
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even though hopes for reunification with France were not equally shared among all parts of the 
population.
The revolutionary atmosphere in Germany had a deterring effect on the Alsatian 
bourgeoisie, which soon opted for a return to France. The developing widespread enthusiasm 
over a possible return to France was further encouraged by assurances from leading French 
politicians, like Jofffe and Poincare, to respect Alsatian rights, traditions, customs, and religious 
beliefs. This apparent recognition of the distinct Alsatian identity and the promise to establish 
appropriate conditions to facilitate its preservation, expression, and development seemed to take 
account of the achievements of the particularist movement during the Reichsland period. In its 
political intention to lower the resistance of the population against a change in sovereignty, it 
resembled similar developments in South Tyrol in 1919 and in the Saar in 1944/45. This 
apparent accord between France and Alsace, however, was built on a double illusion. Each had 
an almost mythically idealistic image of the respective other based on the pre-1870 common 
development and history. This disappeared rapidly under the mounting pressure of the 
inevitable reintegration problems. The French authorities were not prepared to make any 
political or administrative concessions to the Alsatians* desires to retain what they had earned 
from the Germans in their struggle for full autonomy and equality as a federal state, mostly 
because they underestimated the significance of the quasi-autonomy Alsatians had achieved 
through the 1911 constitution and their willingness to preserve as much of it as possible.97
Centralisation, Purification, and Assimilation: French Policy, 1919-1924
After the re-introduction of the departmental structure to Alsace and Lorraine had initially failed
in 1919, a High Commission for Alsace and Lorraine was set up instead as part of the French
centralisation effort vis-a-vis the former Reichsland. This status was changed in 1920 by
relocating the administrative offices of the High Commission to the respective central ministries
in Paris. By 1924 the introduction of a centralised bureaucracy which exercised an exceptional
97 Kurt Hochstuhl, Zwischen Friedert und Krieg (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1984), p. 2.
degree of control over Alsatian affairs had been completed and the Commissariat General was 
eventually abolished in 1924 and replaced by a Direction Genirale for Alsace and Lorraine 
under the direct authority of the Prime Minister which had local offices in Strasbourg dealing 
with educational, religious, and social affairs.98 Instead of the former two-chamber assembly a 
bureaucratic board with only consultative powers was established. All these measures made it 
clear that nothing would remain of the initial promises of 1919." Instead, the subsequent 
restoration of the three departments of Moselle (Lorraine), Bas-Rhin (Lower Alsace), and Haut- 
Rhin (Upper Alsace) made the former Reichsland a part of the centralised French state just like 
any other area.
One of the first measures of ‘purification* was the classification of the population 
according to their supposed attachment to France into four categories: indigenous people, mixed 
marriages and their descendants, immigrants from neutral states, and immigrants from the 
former German Reich. Based on this classification, all those suspected of pro-German feelings 
were expelled; all together between 120,000 and 150,000 people left some of them being forced 
out, the others leaving voluntarily.100 In addition to this, a number of teachers and civil servants, 
particularly those with an insufficient command of French, were dismissed from their offices 
and their jobs, particularly the higher ranking positions, were taken by French migrants to 
Alsace.
Although French was introduced as an official language in public life, education, and 
administration, the integration process did not proceed rapidly in every part of Alsatian society. 
For example, local civil laws, including the Napoleonic concordat101 and the laws governing the
98 Cf. Lothar Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik im Elsa.fi (Stuttgart: DVA, 1973), p. 14.
99 Gras, Regionalism, p. 321.
100 Rothenberger gives a figure of 150,000 emigrants. Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und 
Autonomiebewegung zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1975), p. 36ff. The estimate of 
Essig is slightly lower, he speaks of only 120,000 people being expelled or leaving. Cf. Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 133.
101 According to the concordat, members of the clergy were trained at the expense of, and paid by, the state.
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status of the confessional school system distinguishing between Catholic and Protestant schools 
and providing religious education as part of the curriculum, were legally recognised in 1924.102
With their linguistic distinctiveness being an essential feature of most Alsatians’ 
identity, the failure of successive French governments to create appropriate facilities to account 
for these linguistic differences grew to be the source for severe grievances and a major focal 
point of the particularist movement in the following years. Three issues were of particular 
concern. French was used as the official language in the administration, the only exception 
being tax demands which were sent out both in French and German, which did not contribute 
significantly to the psycho-social integration process. With French being the only language 
allowed in court, certain principles of the rule of law became significantly violated, most of all 
those of defendants in criminal trials. The abrupt introduction of French as teaching language 
caused a drop in pupils’ performances at school.103 The abolition of German as a properly 
taught subject at school and its abandonment as a teaching language have had their 
repercussions until the present. While initially there was a real loss of communicative ability 
reducing it to proficiency only in a spoken dialect of which no written form existed,104 the 
linguistic situation in Alsace was, and still is today* one of triglossia (standard French, high 
German, and local dialect), which has complicated efforts to maintain a cultural tradition.105 
This triglossia, however, is also a unique feature of Alsatian identity, distinguishing Alsatains 
from both French and Germans: ‘The fact that they speak French distinguishes Alsatians from 
Germans, the fact that they speak German distingusihes them from the French, and the fact that 
they speak dialect distinguishes them from both.’106 In general, cultural problems, however, 
were beginning to dominate Alsatian politics as early as the 1920s since they touched upon two 
central issues of Alsatian identity -  its Volkstum, l.e., its traditions, customs, and language, and
102 Because of its separation from France between 1871 and 1918, Alsace and Lorraine had not been subjected to the 
secularisation laws of 190S that determined a clear distinction between the roles of the state and the chinch. Cf. Essig, 
Das Elsafi, p. 135.
103 Between 1921 and 1927, between fifty-three and fifty-nine per cent of all candidates for the baccalaureat failed 
their exams. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 5Iff.
104 Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 53.
105 Cf. more detailed below. Also Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 24.
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the ideal of Alsace bridging the cultural and political gap between France and Germany. The 
desire to preserve these particularities of Alsatian identity clashed with the French intention not 
only to integrate Alsatians politically and economically, but also to assimilate them culturally.
A first major setback to this policy occurred in the economic sector.107 Because of the 
strong degree of centralisation and control, there were immediate political repercussions of the 
economic misery in which Alsatians found themselves inasmuch as the French government was 
held completely responsible for everything. Consequently, the 1919 and 1920 general strikes in 
Alsace also had, apart from the economic dimension, a strongly pro-Alsatian aspect.108 This 
became most obvious in the defence of the ancient rights of the Alsatian people, the so-called 
Heimatrechte, which came to play a central role in the political and cultural life of the whole 
period from 1919 to 1939/40 and which were the major focal point of the re-emerging 
particularist movement.109 The slogan ‘Alsace for Alsatians’ was first used against the looting 
of Alsatian resources by French companies.110 Soon, the growing particularist movement 
encompassed a wide spectrum of political parties, including the communists.
The Alsatian Response: Rebellion of the Clergy, 1924-1926
Clearly, not all Alsatians were unconditionally in favour of complete integration, including 
cultural assimilation, but its opponents were by no means a homogeneous force. What united 
the population was the aim of defending ancient Alsatian rights. What divided them was how
106 Eugene Phillips, Schicksal Elsafi. Krise einer Kultur und einer Sprache (Karlsruhe: Mtiller, 1980), p. 37.
107 Economic integration required an almost complete restructuring of the Alsatian economy because France was hot 
able to absorb the same products as Germany. Integration in economic terms was furthermore hindered by the fact 
that Alsace was poorly linked with the rest of France in terms of its infrastructure. The agricultural sector suffered 
from overproduction of cereals and a decline in dairy farming and viticulture. While engineering and brewing 
managed to survive comfortably, the textiles industry declined rapidly and the banking sector was badly affected by 
French competition and the withdrawal of German capital from the now French territory. The generally difficult 
situation of the world economy only increased the existing problems. Further problems existed in terms of the 
different social security and tax systems in France and Germany. Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- 
und Autonomiebewegung, p. 46-47. A more positive account of the economic development until 1925 is given by 
Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 8ff.
108 The 1919/1920 general strikes were the first mass symptoms of the Alsatian malaise reflecting the strong sense 
for regional aspects of the problems encountered by workers and employees in Alsace.
109 Initially, specific demands centred around the treatment and promotion of Alsatian civil servants, especially the 
policy of their exclusion from senior positions in the civil service, which were given to immigrants from France 
intirieure, who also received a bonus on their salary comparable only to that in the colonies; the maintaining of the 
social insurance and pension systems from the period of German rule. Cf. Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 
4f.
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the future of the region should be secured — in France, in Germany, or in an independent state. 
Thus, the emerging particularist movement, even though it was rooted in a widely shared sense 
of community among Alsatians based on their cultural distinctiveness from both France and 
Germany, was everything but homogeneous. Neutralists argued for a separation of Alsace from 
France, but not to reunite with Germany. Rather, their idea was to create a state of their Own, 
modelled on the ancient Lotharingian state established after the split-up of the empire of Charles 
the Great.111 Francophile integrationists only wanted to reserve the right for maintaining the 
concordat and the confessional school system in Alsace.112 By far the strongest and most 
consistent wing were the autonomist groups, among which there was always a small pro- 
German group.113
The 1924 parliamentary elections in France resulted in the formation of a left-wing 
government which made a renewed attempt at ending the special confessional status of Alsace. 
In contrast to the national trend towards the left, Alsatian right-wing parties, despite losses, 
continued to dominate politics.
The resistance movement against the secularisation policies of the French government 
benefited significantly from these election results. The Catholic clergy, who had filled the 
vacuum of the elite who had left after 1871 and had proved to be a strong supporter of the 
Heimatrechtsbewegung under German rule,114 were able to mobilise the region against 
government policies aiming at the abolition of the concordat and the confessional school system 
in conjunction with the UPR and the Catholic League.115 For a long time, religion had occupied
110 Gras, Regionalism, p. 319.
111 Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 58.
112 Ibid., p. 59.
113 Those supporters were initially writers fearing loss of their public, civil servants fearing loss of jobs, and 
employers fearing loss of contracts and markets. Later on, however, this part within the autonomist movement 
became dominated increasingly by pro-nazi elements that contributed to die discrediting of the movement as a whole. 
Gras, Regionalism, p. 313f.
114 Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 2.
115 In this context, a new line of argument based on the natural rights tradition began to dominate the political 
thinking of clerical as well as liberal particularists. According to this argumentation, both clergy and population were 
only obliged to loyalty vis-i-vis the French state as long as the latter maintained its earlier commitment to leave the 
concordat and confessional school system untouched. In addition to this, the question was raised under what 
conditions Alsatians would be allowed to approach the League of Nations direcdy claiming an infringement of their
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a central place in Alsatian life and identity, bearing a similar mark of distinctiveness as it did 
(and does) in Northern Ireland and South Tyrol. The church provided stable institutions and a 
socially privileged cadre which filled a gap at the political and administrative level. Due to the 
frequent changes of citizenship, Alsatians had found their identity in religion rather than in 
social and political trappings.116 Thus, a threat to confessional arrangements hit right at the heart 
of Alsatian identity and concerned all strata of Alsatian society. The middle class was most 
concerned about secularisation policy because of its political as well as religious commitments, 
which was true just as much for the rural milieu where peasants were particularly loyal to their 
faith.117 Thus the religious question became the springboard for the growing particularist 
movement because it obliged all political parties to take a stance on French integration policy in 
Alsace. Eventually, it was the religious question which bridged the gap between the pro-French 
and the pro-German particularists, at least in the critical defence of the concordat in 1925/26.
Although a 1925 decision by the French state council decided that the concordat would 
remain in effect, this did not mean the end of the secularisation policy in Alsace. Rather, the 
French state now concentrated all its efforts on the abolition of the confessional school system. 
Yet there was a similarly fierce response by the population and the clergy, including a school 
strike and a referendum organised by the clergy against any changes in the education system.118 
Only the dismissal of the Herriot government in April 1925 put a momentary end to these 
policies.
The successful defence of religious rights proved to be important in three wkys* It 
showed that a massive popular movement could prevent French integration policies from 
succeeding in Alsace. Furthermore, it had demonstrated that an alliance between all major 
players in Alsace cutting across ideological boundaries was possible and able to succeed.
rights as a minority. (Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heijnat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 86.) The fact that 
Alsatians had not been officially recognised as a minority by either the French government or the League of Nations 
did not prevent this question from emerging then or in future years.
116 Ibid., p. 321.
117 Ibid., p. 32.
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Eventually, it initiated a realignment of the whole Alsatian party system because all parties now 
had to position themselves on whether and how to defend ancient Alsatian rights. This 
realignment process first affected the parties internally and brought to the fore the long existing 
division in almost all parties active in Alsace between pro-integrationist forces, i.e., those who 
advocated for complete integration, including cultural assimilation, and pro-particularist forces, 
i.e., those who, although in favour of political and economic integration, preferred that their 
distinct identity as Alsatians be preserved and a certain degree of self-administration be granted 
to them in order to accomplish this goal. The most important psycho-social development in this 
context of the beginning realignment of the party system was the emergence of a geistiges 
Elsassertum, an intellectual Alsatianism, which after initially dominating more radical and 
intellectual autonomist circles began to develop into something similar to an Alsatian national 
consciousness centring around four core demands -  preservation of the religious status quo, 
self-administration of Alsace, improvement of the status of local civil servants, and equality of 
the German language in public life, education, administration, and in courts. Widely publicised 
in particularist organs such as Zukunft, Wahrheit, and Volksstimme, these demands, as they 
emphasised non-negotiable aspects of Alsatian identity were to become the basis upon which 
the particularist movement would re-emerge as a powerful cross-party political actor in the 
second half of the 1920s. Although the period of German rule was reassessed more positively 
and the question of an Alsatian minority status re-emerged as well, no serious demands were 
made for a separation from France.119
The Impact on the Alsatian Party System 
General Developments
The social and economic problems resulting from French policies vis-^-vis Alsace had 
considerable repercussions for the party-political system. On the one hand, the party system was
118 Kettenacker writes of 600,000 signatures supporting the motion of the referendum against the abolition of the 
confessional school system. Cf. Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik, p. IS.
^ 9 Cf., for example, Die Zuhmft, 6 March 1926, p. If.
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divided between a particularist and an integrationist movement. The dominant party in the 
former was the Alsatian Republican People’s Party (UPR). The party demanded the 
preservation of concordat and confessional school system, of the autonomy of local 
communities, and of the German welfare legislation. With respect to the language question, its 
objective was to achieve an equal status for German alongside French in administration, 
education, and in court. Political demands were made for regionalisation of the French state as a 
whole and the establishing of an elected assembly with budgetary powers. A similar party with 
an almost identical programme existed in Lorraine.120 The UPR, thus, expressed nothing but the 
traditional demands of Alsatian particularism for conditions under which it would be possible to 
preserve, express, and develop the distinct Alsatian identity that had developed over the 
centuries and gave Alsatians a sense of community and feeling of solidarity beyond class and 
ideological borders.
Apart from this region-based party, the Socialist Party of France (SFIO), although 
generally uncompromisingly pro-integrationist, supported regionalist demands in its left wing 
between 1919 and 1922.121 As the SFIO was prepared to give up the concordat and the 
confessional school system,122 and came from the opposite side of the political spectrum, the 
UPR did not seek a coalition with it. The third among the particularist parties was the 
Communist Party of France (PCF). Integrationism was represented by two parties -  the 
Republican Democratic Party (PRD)123 and the Radical-Socialist Party (PRS).124 Symptomatic 
for them was the internal divide between a strictly nationalist or integrationist wing and one that 
was more sensitive to the Alsatian situation and considered the preservation of certain ancient 
rights as acceptable. Thus, Alsatian particularism in the early 1920s was represented in three
120 Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 6If.
121 The first socialist party in France was created in 1905. It split in 1920 to two parties, one of them becoming the 
Communist Party. After 1922, the left wing of the SFIO joined the newly founded Communist Party of France. Cf. 
Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 5.
122 Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 62.
123 The PRD had its stronghold among the Alsatian and for the most part Protestant bourgeoisie. Its aims were a 
rapid assimilation and centralisation, but its demands for a secularisation of Alsatian society became less forceful 
after the party entered an election coalition with the UPR.
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different ideological streams — a dominant right-wing clerical one, and the two less prominent 
radical and communist ones. The lack of success of the particularist movement in this period 
had also to do with the fact that the ideological gap between these three streams could not be 
bridged in the early years of the particularist movement. This weakened the forces who insisted 
on an Alsatian special status within France in all political parties and among the population125 
and partly accounts for the domination of the pro-integration wings in the political parties in 
Alsace in early 1920s.
Right-wing parties dominated throughout the period and at all electoral levels. The clear 
left-right divide in Alsatian politics extended also to particularism -  the right suspected it of 
anti-national sentiments, the left saw it as a bulwark of the clerical forces.
Nevertheless, from the early 1920s onwards, the political parties in Alsace became 
increasingly sensitive to the fact that a political stance in favour of particularism would increase 
electoral success. Here, the most radical stance was adopted by the French Communists, who 
explicitly spoke out in favour of a resolution by the Interparliamentary Conference of European 
Communists in 1925. This resolution demanded that the right of self-determination be granted 
to the Alsatians and that the French military and civil administrations be withdrawn from Alsace 
until a referendum had decided on the future of the area.126 The PRD, since 1919 the coalition 
partner of the UPR in the Bloc national, made more general demands for a special status for 
Alsace, while the UPR passed a number of pro-particularist resolutions with concrete demands 
concerning the equal status of the German language, the preservation of the confessional school 
system and the concordat, and a regional self-administration and the establishment of an elected 
body with its own executive and legislative powers, except for the national budget and foreign
124 The radical socialists, representing die liberal petite bourgeoisie, were strongly anti-clerical and pro- 
assimilationist.
125 That the implicit autonomism in particularist political demands, at the time, was not a very successful or 
attractive concept became obvious in the fate of the Alsatian Party. Founded in 1922, its major programmatic issue 
was opposition to French policy in Alsace. Although the party raised similar demands as all the others, it had 
committed itself to the ambitious aim of overcoming the ideological divide within the Alsatian particularist 
movement by appealing to an ideologically indifferent geistiges ElsUssertum. The disintegration of the party in the 
same year showed the little support this concept was able to generate in the early 1920s.
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and defence policy. The party also renewed its demands for the regiorialisation of the French 
Republic as a whole. The radical socialists limited their particularism to the language issue. The 
SFIO took the most radically pro-integrationist stance. With the exception of the 1929 Senate 
elections,127 the UPR was the dominating Alsatian party and its ties with the Catholic clergy 
made it the most powerful political player. The UPR had descended from the German Catholic 
Zentrum and was committed to Christian socialism. Thus being at the right of the French 
political spectrum, its opposition against French integration was not so much a matter of 
national belonging, but rather a form of political opposition against the secular French state and 
especially the French left.128 The churches, on the other hand, had two essential preoccupations. 
One of them -  the fight against the secular and left-wing regime in France interieure -  met with 
the intentions of the UPR. In addition to that, the protection of the faith against the presumed 
pernicious influences from beyond the Vosges were, although closely related to the first aim, 
also a matter of preserving a traditional cultural distinctiveness for Alsace. While both aims 
were being guaranteed success only through the preservation of the German language and the 
Catholic religion, the latter aim made the Catholic clergy an obvious partner for the particularist 
movement.
Party-political support in Alsace is summarised in the two tables below, which give the 
seats won by the parties in all parliamentary elections in Lower and Upper Alsace between 1919 
and 1936.
Table 7/1: Seats Won in Elections to the Lower Chamber of the French Parliament, 1919-1936 
(Majoritarian Double Ballot Voting System)
UPR1 PRD2 APNA3 SFIO4 PCF5 KP-O6 ELFP7 Indep.
1919 9 7
1924 8 5 2 1
1928 7 1 3 2 1 1
1932 9 2 1 1 1 1 1
1936, 9 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 Alsatian People’* Party;
2 Republican Democratic Party,
3 National Party of Alsace;
4 Socialist Party of Ranee;
5 French Commnmst Party; 
‘ Comnmist Party (Opposition); 
7 Progressive Party of Alsace-
Lorraine
126 The resolution covered Lorraine as well. Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und 
Autonomiebewegung, p. 92.
127 Cf. below.
128 Gras, Regionalism, p. 320.
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Table 7/2: Seats won in Elections to the French Senate, 1920-1935 
(Plurality Voting System)
APNA - National Party of Alsace 
UPR - Alsatian People’s Party 
PRD- Republican Democratic 
Party
Percentage results are only available for the first three elections and only for the parties 
as listed below. The picture that they reveal is one of an increasing number of Alsatians 
supporting particularism until the end of the 1920s. By the 1932 elections, however, the share of 
the pro-assimilationist parties increased overall to above forty per cent, while that of the more 
particularist orientated ones dropped to under forty per cent.129
Table 7/3: Results of Elections to the Lower Chamber of the French Parliament (Percentages), 
1919-1928
(Majoritarian Double Ballot Voting System, average figures from Lower and Upper Alsace )
Bloc National SFIO PRS PCF PAAL
1919 57.7 36.7 9.4+
1924 48.5 29.1 8.6 10.7
1928 45.0 20.0 3.8 16.5 8.5
+Lower Alsace only.
Bloc National - PRD (Republican Democratic Party) and UPR (Alsatian People’s Party)
PAAL - Autonomist Party of Alsace-Lorraine 
PCF-French Communist Party 
PRS -  Radical Socialist Party 
SFIO-Socialist Party of France
The <Heimatbund>
The success of the clerical rebellion in 1925/26 was only limited as it did not bring about a 
general policy shift on the part of the French government. Nevertheless, it had made apparent a 
strong Alsatian ‘we-feeling’, a sense of community and solidarity, and had generated more open 
identification with the particularist cause. Efforts were now made to transform the co-operation 




1929 1 3 5
1935 5 2 1
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efforts, the Heimatbundt the homeland league, was founded in 1926 despite disagreements 
about organisational structure (party or party coalition or loose co-operation network) and 
certain programmatic issues (concordat, confessional school system).130 The overwhelming 
consensus within the particularist movement centred on two core demands -  cultural autonomy 
and self-administration.131 However, it was in particular the demand for cultural autonomy in 
the wider sense, including the religious status of Alsace, that was supported by the majority of 
Alsatians.
Programmatically, the Heimatbund retained a number of ideas that had emerged in 
earlier years. The realisation that Alsace, because of its political, linguistic, cultural, and social 
traditions, was not only distinct from France interieure and Germany proper, but did actually 
incorporate features of both cultures, led to a revival of the concept of bridging the gap between 
the two cultures.132 While this was a line of thought particularly prominent among Alsatian 
liberals, it also became increasingly attractive to other streams within the Heimatbund. Thus, 
moving beyond the narrow provincial aspect of the Alsatian question, the particularist 
movement gained European dimensions, which persisted until the eve of World War II and 
became increasingly pacifist, distinguishing clearly between the political ideal of an 
independent Alsace and a political reality in which this ideal could only be approximated by 
autonomy arrangements within the French polity.133
12^ Cf. Bernard Vogler, Histoire Politique de VAlsace, Strasbourg, La Nu6e Bleue, 1995, p. 235.1 will come back to 
this shift and its reasons below in the section “The Decline of the Particularist Movement, 1930-1940”,
130 Its foundation manifesto was signed by some one hundred public figures from Alsace and Lorraine. The 
membership strongholds of the Heimatbund were among the rural Christian milieu, the UPR, and the professional 
middle class of varying ideological orientations: civil servants, teachers, farmers, merchants, and industrialists, all of 
whom had suffered losses of some kind due to the reunification with France. Secessionism, despite allegations to the 
contrary, did not play a significant role in the political discussions in the Heimatbund. This became particularly 
obvious in the warm welcome the Locarno treaty received among Alsatians, who realised that with a German 
guarantee for the French borders in the east one major argument in support of the aeeressive assimilation policy had 
become dysfunctional. Further demands of the Heimatbund manifesto were for a popularly elected legislative with 
budgetary powers and an executive, for safeguards of ancient Alsatian rights, for the maintenance of the confessional 
statute, for the preservation of the German language alongside French. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische 
Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 106ff. and Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik, p. 16.
131 Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 18.
132 Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 105f. Anthony Smith makes a 
similar point, stating that Alsatians belong to those ethnic communities that form a nation out of their ethnic even 
without independent statehood. Cf. Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 129.
133 Cf. Elsdsser, 21 June 1926.
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The front of the particularist movement was broadened by the co-operation of Alsatian 
communists and radical socialists with the Heimatbund. Much like most other parties, the 
communists, who were initially more engaged in economic and social struggle, realised the 
importance of religion and language for their electoral success in Alsace. In 1926 the Alsatian 
section of the French communist party decided upon a ‘policy of joint action* with the 
Heimatbund which bore fruit in the elections in 1928 and 1929. Alsatian radicals had initially 
been anti-clerical and in favour of a rapid integration of Alsace by France. Descending from the 
German liberal tradition, however, the party paid a lot of attention to Alsatian problems in the 
economy, public sector employment, and the preservation of the dialect. Support for radicalism 
came primarily from the urban middle classes, Protestants, and Jews. Although the profile of the 
party in general was ‘moderately autonomist’ and ‘secularly moderate*,134 there were two 
different streams within the party, one of them being more assiimlationist, the other more 
committed to Alsatian particularism.
The French Response to the ‘Heimatbund’
All these developments indicated an increasing appeal of particularism among the Alsatian 
population in general and demonstrated the failure of French policies aimed at the cultural 
assimilation of Alsatians. The connection made by French politicians between cultural 
assimilation and economic and political integration severely hampered the success of the latter, 
as Alsatians made the same connection, and their cultural particularism began to show signs of 
increasing politicisation. From a French perspective, this failure was unacceptable. Although 
there was no question of secession from France, French nationalists felt threatened by what they 
perceived to be a potential break-up of the republic. What was seen as particularly threatening 
was the self-perception of Alsatians as a ‘national minority* based upon the criteria of the 
League of Nations, a concept for which there is even today only limited space in the French 
constitution. What made this notion of a ‘national minority’ especially troublesome for France
134 Gras, Regionalism, p. 324.
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was, on the one hand, the fact that there were other latent minority conflicts, such as in Corsica, 
Brittany, and the Basque country, which created a situation in which concessions to one such 
potential minority would have had large-scale repercussions for French domestic politics. On 
the other hand, not only was the insistence on Alsatian difference perceived as a threat to the 
unity of the republic, it also had a number of very pragmatic aspects. Considering that what the 
Alsatian particularist movement demanded above all, namely the preservation of its economic 
and cultural achievements and of the political institutions and status from the Reichslandzeit, the 
main deficit in the French analysis was the failure to see that particularism could only arise and 
become a political concept of significant appeal among the Alsatian population because of 
French attempts to destroy the very foundations of what distinguished Alsace from France, 
regardless of the fact that, despite this distinctiveness, Alsatians were loyal citizens of the 
French Republic. The same way in which successive French governments equated 
particularism, and especially its autonomist wing with secessionism, it had been ‘common 
knowledge*, essentially since 1789, that integration was only possible by means of assimilation, 
not realising that the aggressive assimilation attempts put Alsatian loyalty to the test.
Nevertheless, the response of the French central government to the Heimatbund was 
initially rather moderate. Eleven civil servants were dismissed because of their membership in 
the organisation, and there were a number of sanctions against the lower clergy, doctors, and 
lawyers on the same grounds, but the general inclination of the government was to come to a 
quiet solution of the problem, not least because there was no paragraph in French law under 
which autonomist activities could have been prosecuted. While the government, thus, officially 
restrained itself from overreaction, French nationalist mobs were encouraged to ‘protect the 
nation.’135 The eventual break-up of the cross-party alliance of the Heimatbund was achieved by 
the central government, after it had managed, in addition to a press campaign directed at the
135 On Bloody Sunday (22 August 1926), nationalists from neighbouring, mostly non-Alsatian towns, attacked a 
demonstration of the Heimatbund.
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intimidation of the pro-particularist section of the Alsatian population,136 to win over the higher 
clergy for its fight against the particularist front. Members of the lower clergy who were 
particularly committed to the particularist cause were sent to other communities or prohibited 
from engaging in any political or journalistic activity. The inevitable consequence was that the 
UPR, fearing that it might be outlawed, distanced itself from the Heimatbund, thus withdrawing 
general Catholic support.
The Heimatbund ceased to exist when the remaining activists decided to form their own 
party with more solid organisational structures than the loose co-operational network of the 
Heimatbund. hi September 1927 they founded the Autonomist Party of Alsace-Lorraine 
(PAAL). The PAAL demanded a federalised France and a federalised Europe with Alsace as a 
mediator between France and Germany.137 Within France, the PAAL participated in the 
‘Central Committee of the National Minorities in France’, through which Alsatian autonomist 
particularism could bear more heavily on the French state by co-ordinating its demands and 
activities with those of other minority movements in the country.138 In the same year however, 
the PAAL aligned itself with the count Zorn of Bulach and his paper Die Wahrheit which led to 
the creation of a new party-political organisation, the Independent Regional Party (PRI), which 
surpassed the PAAL by building its party programme on demands for the granting of the right 
to self-determination for Alsace and Lorraine. This, however, did not imply separation from 
France, at least not in the short term.139
Cross party co-operation within the structures of the Heimatbund had been a difficult 
issue for all parties involved because they were all internally split between pro-autonomist and 
pro-assimilationist wings. The first party to be affected seriously by these internal splits were 
the radical socialists, where tensions between the two factions rose in 1926 to the point where 
pro-particularist members left the PRS and founded the Progressive Party with a clear
136 Cf. here in particular Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik, p. 17ff.
137 Details of the party programme can be found ibid., p. 18.
138 Gras, Regionalism, p. 329.
139 Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 130.
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autonomist tendency aiming at a constitutional status of Alsace similar to that granted to the 
Reichsland, in 1911 under German rule. The Progressive Party and the PRI established a joint 
working committee after 1928 and worked closely together in local and district elections.
The wave of arrests in 1927 and the subsequent French nationalist press campaign were 
not able to stop the increasing radicalisation of the particularist movement. Further steps of the 
central government revitalised the traditional Alsatian anti-government attitude in the face of a 
perceived threat to their identity and solidarity with the arrested leaders of the particularist 
movement.140 The increasingly political dimension of the ‘Alsatian problem’ was even admitted 
by pro-assimilationist forces within the UPR who, despite committing themselves publicly to 
the fight against separatism, made it clear that a solution of the problem could only be achieved 
if Paris was willing to accept necessary changes to its policy of cultural assimilation, especially 
in education and language policies, but also in the administrative sector at large. However, no 
signs of compromise were visible on the part of the French government. Further measures were 
taken, such as the dissolving of the Hagenau town council in January 1928.
The hardening of positions between nationalists and particularists reached wide into the 
Alsatian party-political system as well, and occasionally it took very bizarre forms. For 
example, during the re-election of the Hagenau town council in February 1928, the nationalist 
wing of the UPR formed the so-called liste de concorde Rationale with the SFIO, royalists, and 
radical socialists against particularist candidates from within its own ranks. Not surprisingly, 
this strategy was ill received by the citizens of Hagenau, and the pro-assimilationist candidates 
lost their eleven seats, while particularists won all 23 seats in the council.141
The UPR recognised the ‘electoral* threat arising from its vague commitment to 
particularism and responded quickly. In the run-up to the April 1928 parliamentary elections, 
the Upper Alsatian section of the party ended its coalition with the pro-assimilationist PRD, and 
particularists were allowed to stand as candidates on the UPR lists both in Lower and Upper
140 Ibid., p. 154.
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Alsace, resulting in an overwhelming victory.142 Within four years and as a result of the 
increased assimilation pressure exercised by the central government, the political situation in 
Alsace had changed fundamentally with particularism becoming the dominating issue on the 
political agenda.143
In this situation of growing resentment, the trial of the twenty-two arrested leaders of 
the particularist movement could do nothing but increase alienation between the majority of 
Alsatians and the central government Even though the trial ended with eleven of the fifteen 
present defendants being acquitted and the remaining four sentenced to only one year 
imprisonment (and released from prison within months after the trial), it demonstrated the gap 
between the Alsatian and the French interpretation of the situation in general.144 The farce of the 
trial shed a bad light on the French judicial system, but what was much more important was the 
fact that it proved to be politically counter-productive, comparable only to the 1924 attempt to 
secularise Alsatian society. The creation of martyrs and the strengthening of a particularist 
identity in Alsace as a whole were two results of the trial. More importantly, a new basis began 
to emerge on which co-operation between Catholic, liberal, and communist particularists 
seemed to be possible.145
To ease the situation and improve its own position vis-a-vis the closed ranks of 
Alsatians, the French government made a number of concessions, for example in the education
141 Figures from Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 155.
142 Cf. Table 4/1 above.
143 Eleven of the fifteen seats were occupied by particularist candidates (five of them moderate, six radical), three, 
seats had been won by unconditional assimilationists, and two by politicians who were in favour of assimilation, but 
requested a special status for Alsace in terms of concordat and confessional school system. Figures from 
Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 155.
144 The charge against the particularist activists of conspiracy to break up. the French nation-state as such was 
extremely dubious. Not only had the defendants not tried to hide their aspirations, they had also made it clear that it 
was possible for their demands to be accommodated within the French polity. One other major point of the 
accusations was the formation of the so-called Schut&ruppe, a paramilitary force of the Heimatbund formed after the 
Bloody Sunday of Colmar in 1926, which, however, never really took off because of a lack of commitment on the 
part of the Alsatians. With only 40 members, it was anyway no match for similar organisations of the royalists or 
communists.
145 As a first sign of these, Rothenberger mentions two mass demonstrations in Strasbourg on 24 May and 25 July 
1928, at which speakers from all three camps appear together. Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und 
Autonomiebewegung, p. 165.
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: sector.146 It acknowledged the preservation of the concordat in June 1928 -  a move that the high 
clergy welcomed almost enthusiastically.147 The lower clergy as well as the particularist parties 
and party wings did not consider the concessions as sufficient, and the subsequent elections to 
the Conseil General in Alsace, in which half of all the mandates were renewed, demonstrated 
that the Alsatian population was not yet satisfied with French policies either.148
The Realignment of the Party System
By the end of the 1920s, an inner-Alsatian process, which had begun in 1926, came to a 
conclusion -  the realignment of the party system. After the split of the radical socialists in 1926, 
it was now the UPR, which could not maintain the organisational unity of its particularist and 
assimilationist wings. Although the party’s emphasis in general was on religious defence, the 
ways and means of this defence were a matter of party-internal debate. One wing in the party 
sought to defend the concordat and the confessional status by securing a regional autonomy for 
Alsace, another wing aimed at the complete political and economic integration and cultural 
assimilation into France, simply retaining the concordat and the confessional school system. Not 
surprisingly, after the 1928 elections the three pro-assimilationist deputies of the UPR149 
decided to leave the party and form a new one, because they did not agree with the general UPR 
policy to place regional Alsatian interests higher than the interests of the republic as a whole.150 
Thus, the APNA (Action Nationale Populaire d'Alsace) was formed, which was joined by four 
of the six UPR senators and eighteen of the thirty-four district councillors.151 The APNA was 
particularly successful in the 1929 Senate elections, when the UPR had become discredited
146 A government memorandum allowed for three hours of German per week in all primary schools. From 24 
January to 9 February 1929, eleven consecutive parliamentary sessions debated the issue, without achieving more 
than a very general and vaguely worded resolution in which trust in Alsace was expressed. In addition, the four 
convicts of the trial against autonomists were released on 17 and 23 July 1928 and, by a general pardon in 1931, 
reinstated in their civil rights.
147 Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 167.
148 The political balance in the Conseil Geniral, however, was only partially affected as the previous elections in 
1923 had resulted in a majority of pro-assimilationists. Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und 
Autonomiebewegung, p. 170.
149 Of the other seven members of parliament, one was moderately particularist, the other six were strongly 
autonomist
150 Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 21.
151 Gras, Regionalism, p. 326.
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because of its co-operation with the communists,152 and in the 1931 Conseil General elections 
in Alsace. After the split, the UPR revised its programme in accordance with that of other 
French regionalist parties, its core demands being the preservation of Alsatian distinctiveness, 
self-administration, the maintaining of the religious status of Alsace, and the equality of German 
as a language at school, in the administration, and in courts.
The third of the parties supporting the particularist movement that split was the Alsatian 
section of the Communist Party of France. The mayor of Strasbourg, Charles Hueber, and his 
autonomist supporters were forced out of the party in 1929 and formed the Kommunistische 
Partei-Opposition (KP-O).153 After being excluded from the International Union of Communist 
Opposition in 1934, they formed the Alsatian Workers’ and Peasants’ Party, which adhered to 
the Popular Front in 1936 and won two seats.154 Just as for the other parties, it paid off for the 
former communists to commit themselves to a clear stance in favour of an autonomous status of 
Alsace. As a consequence, the party adopted a more flexible position towards the concordat and 
the confessional school system to make co-operation with other particularist parties easier.
Thus, over the issue of how and how much of its cultural distinctiveness Alsace would 
preserve, a transformation of Alsatian political life occurred, and it took the form of a left-right 
convergence providing the basis for a new attempt of cross-party co-operation over the issue of 
particularism and encompassing parties ideologically as opposed as the UPR and the Alsatian 
KP-O. Yet this co-operation attempt was similarly short-lived and did not achieve much beyond 
some electoral success and a strengthening of Alsatian identity. With the exception of 
preserving Alsace’s religious status, further cultural assimilation could not be stopped, let alone 
be reversed. By 1929 the Alsatian party system thus encompassed three groups -  the PDR, the 
SFIO, and the PRS as representatives of the assimilationist forces; the moderately particularist 
UPR; and the radically particularist stream which included the PAAL and the KP-O.
152 Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 21.
153 The party was modelled after, and inspired by, the ideas of Brandler and Thalheim in Germany.
154 Gras, Regionalism, p. 328.
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The Decline of the Particularist Movement, 1930-1940
In 1929, a major shift in French policies vis-a-vis Alsace took place after the resignation of the 
government of Poincare and the subsequent election of a more moderate government Under 
Briand. Among the first steps taken were a general amnesty for all particularists involved in the 
Colmar trial, the replacement of the two prefects of both Alsatian departments, and improved 
funding for the Strasbourg radio station, allowing it to include programmes in Alsatian dialect 
and standard German. However, no substantive concessions were made in terms of self- 
administration and the status of the German language.
By the early 1930s, a new generation of Alsatians had become active in politics, 
advocating an opening of Alsace to French culture.155 However, this did not mean that demands 
for the recognition of Alsatian distinctiveness were dropped. Rather, it must be seen in the 
context of a revival of the concept of Alsace being a mediator between France and Germany, 
especially in the wake of Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. This led to a temporary rise of 
moderate integrationism, as it became apparent in the 1931 elections to the Conseil General 
which saw the APNA becoming the strongest party and eighteen of the thirty mandates up for 
renewal going to the assimilationists, and only twelve seats being won by particularists. The 
opening to French culture, however, was countered by a simultaneous radicalisation in other 
parts of the particularist movement, which argued for a narrowing of the concept of Alsatian 
culture to emphasise its German aspects.156 And it was this issue which dominated the 1932 
parliamentary elections in which more particularist candidates won seats than in the protest 
elections of 1928.157 This continuously low level of political integration of Alsace into France 
became also manifest in the fact that a significant drive to the left in France interieure occurred 
in these 1932 elections, while more than seventy per cent of all votes in Alsace went to right-of- 
centre parties.
155 Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 188.
156 Ibid., p. 189.
157 Nine of the sixteen seats were won by the UPR, two by the PRD, and one respectively by the KP-O, the 
Progressive Party, the SFIO, the APNA, and by an independent candidate. Not only the UPR had defended and
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Although the new national left-wing government had initially agreed to respect Alsatian 
requests for special treatment, one of the core demands not only of the particularist movement, 
namely the issue of linguistic equality for standard German and the Alsatian dialect, remained 
unsatisfied.158 The resulting anti-parliamentary and anti-democratic feelings in Alsace were 
encouraged by a general political and economic crisis of the French Republic: between July 
1929 and January 1934, there were thirteen changes of government. The effects of the world 
economic crisis reached France in the early thirties and became manifest in a rapid decline of 
the economy. On this basis, some Alsatian groups adopted a style and ideology close to the 
Nazis, especially the Jungmannschaft (Youth League), which was modelled after the NSDAP 
and tried to attract especially young Alsatians. Demands were made concerning ethnic security 
and the exclusion of all foreigners from Alsace. This combined with a strong anti-Marxism, 
anti-capitalism, and anti-pluralist ideology. Apart from the Jungmannschaft, two other 
organisations had close ideological links with Nazism -  the National Labour Front (FNT) and 
the Alsatian Peasant Union (UPA), but none of them had much popular support. Their 
autonomist propaganda in combination with their openly pro-Nazist positions, however, had a 
significant impact on other, non-Nazist autonomist organisations. With the autonomist wing in 
the particularist movement becoming increasingly equated with Nazism, the 1934 elections to 
the Conseil GSneral as well as the 1935 parliamentary elections saw particularist candidates 
generally defeated because of their alleged identification with Hitler’s Germany.159
One of the main reasons, apart from the Nazism issue, for this defeat was the shift in 
UPR policy. The election strategy of the UPR until 1932 had been to back simultaneously 
particularist and nationalist candidates which allowed the party to preserve its dominant role in
extended its leading position in Alsatian politics, but so had the particularist movement in general -  eleven of the 
Alsatian members of parliament were particularist, only five of them assimilationist. Cf. table above.
158 When the so-called Sprachenzahlung, a census establishing the size of linguistic communities, found in 1931 that 
more than ninety per cent of the Alsatian population spoke German, the unsatisfactory linguistic situation in Alsace 
gave rise to a new wave of particularism encompassing once again demands for autonomy. A side effect of this 
development was that a number of groups within the particularist movement felt a certain attraction towards the ideas 
of national socialism, and consequently tensions among the particularists began to grow, especially from 1933
onwards, when the dominating issue for all parties in Alsace became their position vis-k-vis the development in 
Germany after the rise to power of the Nazi movement. Cf. Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik, 21- 
29.
Alsatian politics and, representing the core of Alsatian interests, to maintain an almost constant 
electoral basis.160 With the declining electoral appeal of particularism because of its alleged ties 
with Nazism, the party orientated itself more clearly towards nationalism and the PRD, its 
former partner in the Bloc national, and left all particularist election coalitions. With the 
declining influence of particularism as a unifying concept, old ideological divisions came to the 
fore again. While particularism was perceived by the clergy to be a threat to French 
Catholicism, Radicals and Socialists believed demands for autonomy to be a play of the clerical 
right, and the coalition of the particularist movement with communism was taken as an offence 
by the Alsatian clergy.
After 1935, Alsatian political life was dominated by two issues -  the continuing 
economic crisis and the growing fear of a new war. It was in particular the latter issue which led 
to a rediscovery of Alsatian particularism and its close connections with a number of wider 
political issues, such as peace, disarmament, and Franco-German reconciliation, not least 
because Alsace had experienced the costs of military conflict in Europe at first hand in a number 
of wars from the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth, to the Napoleonic wars and the Franco 
German wars in the nineteenth, and to the First World War in the twentieth century. While 
simultaneously affirming its commitment to remaining a part of the French polity, it was 
essential for the particularist movement to accomplish its aims of fostering reconciliation 
between France and Germany that its distinct cultural features be respected and preserved. Only 
with this conception in mind is it possible to understand why at a time when Alsatians voiced 
their political loyalty to France stronger than ever after 1919, the parliamentary elections in 
1936 saw twelve particularists and only four assimilationists winning seats.161
The rejection of Nazi ideology by Alsatians was equally strong as the emphasis on their 
cultural distinctiveness. Although this did not imply a lack of loyalty to France, the new leffc-
15^  Gras, Regionalism, p. 331.
160 Hochstuhl, Zwischen Frieden und Krieg, p. 22.
161 Figures from Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 224 These elections 
also saw a continuation of the left-right divide between Alsace and France intirieure. Cf. ibid., p. 225
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wing French government interpreted it, wrongly, exactly as such. A new attack on the 
confessional education system was made putting Alsatians in a situation where they had to 
choose between abandoning their traditional school system or extending the obligatory period of 
schooling by one year. Alsatian solidarity across confessional and ideological boundaries 
occurred in defence of ancient rights, similar to 1925 and 1928, and once again, French policy 
was partly defeated. Thereafter, particularism as a social movement declined,162 as the majority 
of the particularists hesitated to demonstrate against French policy in the increasingly tense 
international situation.163
Although the Alsatians had secured a number of concessions in religious and linguistic 
education, the French government had not met another of the core demands of the particularist 
movement in the inter-war period, namely administrative or political autonomy. Judging from 
its achievements, Alsatian particularism was primarily a cultural and linguistic movement. 
Popular support for particularism was strongest whenever French assimilationism aimed at the 
confessional school system and the concordat. From this perspective, and very significant for 
Alsatian post war-developments, the popular particularist movement was indeed one which was 
politically rather unambitious and more concerned with cultural, religious, and linguistic matters 
of Alsatianism, or in other words, with an apolitical concept of Heimat as the basis of its 
identity. This, however, did make the situation for the French government rather difficult, as the 
rise of Nazism in Germany and the aggressive foreign policy of Hitler in the east, put it under 
increasing pressure as regarded its policy towards Alsace. The dilemma it faced was that 
concessions to Alsatian demands could have been interpreted by Germany as a recognition of 
the minority status of Alsatians and could then have been exploited similar to the Sudeten 
problem, while continued attempts at forced assimilation might have increased Alsatian 
separatism, which eventually would have worked in favour of Hitler as well. That this was very
162 This decline, however, did not prevent its former leaders from being arrested after the outbreak of the war in 1939 
and one of them being tried for espionage and executed in 1940. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische Heimat- und 
Autonomiebewegung, p. 239ff.
163 Gras, Regionalism, p. 333f.
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much a home-made dilemma, resulting from the wrong analysis of the situation in Alsace after 
1919, was not recognised at the time. Only Alsatian political loyalty and the fact that strongly
pro-Nazist organisations were banned prevented an escalation of the problem before the war.
\
Alsace and Germany, 1919-1939
The relationship between Alsace and Germany in the inter-war period was complex and has to 
be analysed from two different angles -  Alsace as an object in German foreign policy 
considerations164 and the commitment of the two Alsatian emigre organisations in Germany -  
the Hilfsbund der Elsafi-Lothinger (aid organisation of refugees from Alsace and Lorraine) and 
the Alt-Elsafi-Lothringische Vereinigung (association of former residents of Alsace and 
Lorraine) -  to the preservation of German culture in Alsace.165
Between 1919 and 1922, Germany had tried to turn the question of Alsace and Lorraine 
into a precedent for the right to self-determination to which not only defeated states , but also 
the victorious powers had to bow. This was seen in terms of wider considerations of the 
situation of German minorities living in particular in states in Eastern Europe, parts of which 
had previously belonged to the German empire. This was not a very successful policy; however, 
it did not change a German determination to utilise Alsace and Lorraine for its revisionist policy 
in the east later on.
After this rather firm pro-self-determination stance of 1919, the German foreign office 
came soon to realise that the difficulties which existed in Alsace and Lorraine were an internal 
affair of the French Republic. Consequently, a 1922 analysis of the situation acknowledged that 
Alsace and Lorraine did not qualify as a minority problem in the strict sense of the concept 
since the population did not insist on its different ethnicity {Fremdstandigkeit), let alone on their
164 A useful analysis of this aspect of the Alsatian problem can be found in H. ROBler, Locarno und die Weltpolitik 
(Gbttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969).
165 The most comprehensive study to date is Irmgard Grttnewald, Die Elsafi-Lothringer im Reich 1918-1933 
(Franklurt am Main: Lang, 1984).
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German origin.166 Although this assessment was accurate for the early 1920s, it had to be 
changed later, when Alsatians began to see themselves as a minority, in the way the League of 
Nations167 defined the term, and increasingly insisted on their distinctiveness, if not in terms of 
ethnicity, then certainly in terms of culture, language, and tradition. The rediscovery of their 
German roots and the recognition of the German element in Alsatian culture, in turn, led the 
Foreign Office to support cultural efforts in Alsace in addition to more serious political 
considerations and a policy of funding political parties there.
These more serious political calculations began with the assessment that border 
revisions were only possible in the east and that they were only possible there with the consent 
of the western powers. The role which Alsace and Lorraine came to play in this respect was 
twofold. While realising that regaining the former Reichsland was impossible, a formal 
abandoning of all territorial claims could assure the French government of the security of its 
eastern borders with Germany. At the same time, continuing problems in Alsace and Lorraine 
would weaken French resistance against desired border changes in the ‘German East*. While the 
former was achieved with the Locarno treaty in 1925, the latter policy was pursued from the 
second half of the 1920s onwards, mostly through funding of cultural activities, but also 
supporting, especially between 1927 and 1929, particularist political propaganda.168 Because of 
necessary secrecy, funds were channelled through the private organisations of the Alsatian 
6migr6s. As this connection began to emerge during the Colmar trial in 1928, and the 
uncovering of the true source became increasingly likely, the sponsoring of political propaganda 
was abandoned. In 1930/31 cultural funding continued at a reduced level, and even after Hitler’s 
take-over in 1933 it was not abandoned. Similar to Austria’s South Tyrol policy after 1945, but 
with very different long-term intentions, the objective of German support was not to encourage
166 Internal policy document of the German Foreign Office, 1922. Cited in Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische 
Heimat- und Autonomiebewegung, p. 74.
167 A resolution adopted by the League of Nations in September 1922 obliged all states to protect minorities under
their jurisdiction regardless of whether the post-1919 peace treaties had made specific demands vis-i-vis these states. 
Thus, the victorious states were as obliged to protect minorities in their boundaries as were defeated ones.
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Alsatian secessionism, but rather to make France more willing to concede border revisions in 
the east.169
Among all these foreign political considerations, the organisations of the Reichsland 
emigres played a central part, as it was they who were to channel financial support to Alsace 
and were responsible for its uses. While they were generally less willing to accept that there 
would be no border revision, the two emigre organisations’ and the foreign office’s aims met in 
one crucial point -  the attempt to minimise the impact of French assimilation policies in 
Alsace.170 With financial support from the foreign office decreasing after 1930, the collapse of 
the Alt-Elsaft-Lothringische Vereinigung was prevented by a fusion with the Hilfsbund in 1933. 
Leading members of the organisation increasingly identified with Nazism which alienated them 
from significant parts of the particularist movement in Alsace. After 1940, some of them held 
important functions within the German administration in Alsace and Lorraine.
Summary: Mixed Results -  French Integration Policy in the Inter-War Period
The period between 1919 and 1940 saw the fiercest confrontation between the French state and
the particularist movement in Alsace. However, with the exception of occasional rioting and 
clashes between French nationalists and Alsatian particularists in the mid and late 1920s, there 
was no violent escalation of this conflict, a factor which can mainly be attributed to the 
influence of the churches.
1651 Rothenberger gives the following figures of financial support: 141,247 Reichsmark, in 1925/26; 548,331 
Reichsmark in 1926/27; and 840,000 Reichsmark between 1927 and 1929. Cf. Rothenberger, Die elsafi-lothringische 
Heimat- und Autonomiebewegimg, pp. 138-151.
169 In the case of Hitler, however, two differences need to be mentioned. While he, too, saw the abandoning of 
territorial claims primarily from a tactical point of view, he considered the status of Alsatians as ‘racially 
questionable’. On the other hand, this did not make him lose sight of the strategic value of the territory of the former 
Reichsland in terms of the cohesion of the ‘German heartland’. Cf. Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische 
Volkstumspolitik, p. 101 ff.
170 However, the aims of the two 6migr6 organisations were not identical. The Hilfsbund was primarily concerned 
with the integration of 6migr6s in German society and their compensation for the losses they had suffered. In the 
course of time, its importance diminished simply because of its success in facilitating the integration process. This is 
obvious in terms of the membership figures: in 1920, there were 33,000 members, in 1925 20,000, and in 1933 only 
7,000. The Alt-Elsafi-Lothringische Vereinigung, in contrast was foremost a cultural and scholarly organisation with 
its own institute at the University of Frankfurt/Main. By supporting the particularist movement in Alsace with the 
help of the foreign office, the Alt-Elsafi-Lothringische Vereinigung contributed significantly to the rise of Alsatian 
particularism despite the fact that its aim (self-determination) was not identical with that of most particularists (some 
degree of autonomy within the French polity). Cf. Irmgard Grfinewald, Die Das Elsafi-Lothringer im Reich, pp. 185- 
190.
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After the initial euphoria about the reunion with France, problems soon arose. There 
were mainly three sources -  the underestimated differences that had developed between Alsace 
and France interieure during the separation between 1871 and 1919; the positive experience 
Alsatians had had with the autonomy granted to them in the 1911 constitution in Germany; and 
the aggressive assimilation policies pursued by French governments.
Major issues over which the conflict developed were closely related to essential aspects 
of Alsatian identity, thus generating a significant depth of feeling and intensity of the conflict -  
the concordat, the confessional school system in Alsace, linguistic rights, and the persistent 
demands Alsatian activists made for some measure of autonomy for their area that would enable 
them to establish conditions conducive to the preservation, expression, and development of 
these and other aspects of their distinct identity.
While Alsatians managed to defend their religious status, they failed to obtain any 
concessions in terms of autonomy. The reasons for this are manifold. The defence of the 
religious status was possible primarily because it was an issue that mobilised almost the entire 
population independent of their ideological orientation and party-political affiliation. Under the 
leadership of the churches, which had grown to become, over the centuries, the only stable 
institution in the course of the frequent changes of sovereignty and exercised a tremendous 
social and political influence, the alliance to defend Alsace's religious status also profited from 
the fact that the variety of parties which co-operated in the particularist movement included 
some which, although being anti-clerical in their orientation, made concessions on the 
confessional issue not to endanger the particularist front Eventually, it also has to be considered 
that, from the point of view of the French government, the confessional issue was not as vital as 
the question of autonomy.
The failure of the particularist movement to obtain autonomy can be attributed to 
mainly three reasons. On the one hand, there was a divide within Alsace over the issue -  
particularists were opposed by French nationalists who favoured rapid political integration and
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cultural assimilation. On the other hand, the particularist movement was split. Pro-German 
forces, which rejected any form of integration into the French polity, were only a small minority 
compared to those that were politically loyal to France, but they discredited the particularist 
movement increasingly after 1930, especially after Hitler had risen to power. The heterogeneous 
composition of the particularist movement, including among others communists, liberals, and 
clergymen, did not always allow for concerted action. A major realignment of the party-political 
system in Alsace over the issue of particularism after the late 1920s eased inner-movement 
tensions for some time, but with the rise of Hitler in Germany the political divide in Alsace 
shifted to one between pro-German and pro-French forces, which ended the particularist 
alliance.
The split within the Alsatian population over the issue of particularism certainly made 
the firm anti-autonomist stand of French governments easier. However, it was primarily caused 
by the nature of Franco-German relations, which had never been at ease after 1919. Not only did 
the official German foreign policy use the issue of Alsace as a bargaining chip in its struggle for 
a revision of its eastern borders, and was therefore interested in a certain degree of instability in 
Alsace and pursued policies to this effect, especially in the mid till late 1920s. In addition, 
private organisations of German expellees from Alsace after 1919 engaged in various forms of 
support for the particularist movement. Both aspects were perceived by respective French 
governments as implicit revisionist territorial claims of Germany vis-^-vis the sovereign French 
state. In the context of increasing tensions in Europe and the German policies of territorial 
revisionism, any concession to Alsatian demands for autonomy were interpreted as facilitating 
separatism and endangering French military security.
While, from a French perspective, political and economic integration combined with 
cultural assimilation seemed a natural course of action, it did not have much realistic hope for 
complete success. More than forty years of separation of Alsace from France had left their 
mark. Overall, Alsatian identity as distinct from both Germany and France had been 
strengthened and the Alsatian sense of community across class and ideological boundaries had
106
been reinforced. The achievements of the particularist movement of the Reichslandzeit in terms 
of the degree of autonomy secured were increasingly remembered positively. Under these 
conditions, the aggressive cultural assimilation policies of successive French government were 
perceived as a direct challenge and threat to Alsatian identity, and as such bore significant 
mobilisation and conflict potential in them. On several occasions, French attempts to abandon 
the concordat or to alter the confessional school system met with fierce resistance on part of the 
Alsatian population, reinforcing, rather than weakening their sense of community and solidarity. 
Despite the organisational weaknesses of the particularist movement, French assimilationism 
could not succeed as it did clearly not coincide with a desire of the Alsatians to be completely 
assimilated. On the other hand, even among the overwhelming majority of particularists, there 
has never been a question as to where Alsace belonged nationally and where the political 
loyalties of Alsatians lay. As Max Weber observed, ‘the German-speaking Alsatians feel 
themselves ... to be part of the French nation, but not to the same extent as the French-speaking 
Frenchman.’ To him the specificity of Alsatian identity was one characterised by ‘partial 
cultural community and shared political memory.’171 Thus, what seemed like a contradiction to 
the French ideology of the one and indivisible nation was only natural to Alsatians -  to retain 
the few aspects of their culture that were particular to their identity and distinguished them from 
France, while at the same time being unquestionably loyal to the French state.
171 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 243.
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Table 8: Conditions Accounting for the Mixed Results of Alsatian Particularism and French 
Integration Policy between 1871 and 1912 in the Inter-War Period
• In France:
□ French policy approach underestimating the differences that had developed between 1871 
and 1919
□ Aggressive assimilation policies of successive French governments not considering the 
positive Alsatian experience with their improving autonomy status in Germany
□ Frequent inter-ethnic tensions between Alsatians and French, especially in the mid to late 
1920s
□ ‘Carrot-and-stick’ policy enabling French governments to break up the front of particularism
□ Importance of the territory and native population of Alsace as a security issue for France
□ Political instability in France and growing preoccupation with die possibility of another war
• In Germany:
□ Influential lobby of emigrants from the former Reichsland rendering covert support to 
various sections of the particularist movement and being funded and otherwise supported by 
the German foreign office
□ Instrumentalisation of the Alsatian issue in Germany’s policy of territorial revisions of the 
post-war peace settlements
□ Rise of Nazism and its attraction of a small section of Alsatian activists
□ Secularisation and racist policies after 1933 rejected by the majority of Alsatians across the 
political spectrum
• In Alsace and Lorraine:
□ Largely non-violent protests against assimilation
□ Underestimation of die differences that had developed during the Reichsland period
□ Positive memories of the degree of autonomy eventually achieved in the German Reich
□ Ability to mobilise large sections of the population to stand up for what they perceived as 
non-negotiable aspects of ancient Alsatian rights and traditions under the committed 
leadership of the churches
□ Insistence on loyalty to the French state and simultaneously on the Alsatian right to be 
different
□ Fractured party system
□ Heterogeneity of the particularist movement, only punctual ability of political parties to co­
operate in pursuit of particularist aims
□ Rejection of German claims to Alsace
□ Rejection of political and social developments in Germany after 1933
□ Pro-German links of a small section of Alsatian activists even after 1933 who increasingly 
discredited the particularist cause
□ Difficulties in the economic integration of Alsace into the French market
• International Context
□ State of Franco-German relations making compromises for the French government difficult 
as they are perceived as threatening the country’s security
□ Unresolved minority and border issues across Central and Eastern Europe
□ Aggressive German irredentism and lack of resolve among Western powers to stop it
□ Growing danger of renewed war
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Alsae after 1945
The Impact of German Occupation, 1940-1945
Had the population already not been very enthusiastic in 1870/71, its desire to be integrated in 
the German Reich was even lower in 1940, not least because Alsatians had watched the 
developments in the Third Reich carefully before the outbreak of the war. Despite the attraction 
national socialism had exercised on a small proportion of the population, the political loyalty of 
the overwhelming majority of Alsatians lay with France.
After the German victory over France in 1940, the third Reich had initially promised to 
respect French territory. However, Hitler annexed Alsace and Lorraine and began an immediate 
integration and assimilation process: French civilians and especially civil servants were 
expropriated and expatriated.172 The latter were replaced with Nazi officials from the 
neighbouring Gau Baden, into which Alsace and Lorraine were integrated. German laws were 
introduced progressively, and many Alsatians received German citizenship173 and initially 
benefited from preferential treatment174 Although prominent autonomists were given important 
posts in the administration, hopes for autonomy disappeared quickly, and brutal Germanisation 
and repression of particularism were the two major Nazi policies to be carried out during the 
occupation. The introduction of an obligatory six-month labour service in May 1941 and of 
conscription in August 1942, the separation of church and state, the banning of religious 
education in school, and plans for the dissolution of abbeys were just some obvious examples.. 
Integration policy was multifaceted, and occasionally bizarre. Not only did German become the 
only permitted language and were street, place, and family names Germanised, the occupation
172 Cf. Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 143.
173 This was not a generous gesture on the part of the NS state showing its appreciation of the fact that the lost 
territories were reunited with the Reich, but it meant that Alsatians would be subject to German laws, including 
conscription.
174 POWs were released quickly and enabled to return to their families, Alsatians who had been evacuated to the 
South of France could return, and many Alsatians accepted posts in the German administration of the territory which 
had become vacant due to the departure of French civil servants. According to official German statistics, sixty-three 
per cent of the population joined Nazi organisations within months after the annexation. Cf. Gras, Regionalism, p. 
335.
109
authorities also prohibited the wearing of ‘French* berets.175 Consequently, relationships with 
the Nazis began to deteriorate and Alsatian resistance against Germanisation was not broken but 
rather reinforced. Although this rather passive cultural resistance did not, and could not, take the 
forms it had taken in 1925/26 and 1934, it became more and more obvious that cultural 
assimilation through ‘education’, and especially the attempt to exterminate the Alsatian 
dialect,176 did not bear the expected fruit. The NS-administration then turned to increasingly 
violent means to enforce Germanisation in Alsace, including deportations, concentration camps, 
and death sentences,177 but only reinforced the Alsatian consciousness about their cultural 
distinctiveness from Germany.
Active Alsatian resistance to Nazi occupation was restricted to facilitating escapes and 
gathering intelligence, while actual sabotage of the German war effort was rare. While most 
resisters came from traditionally nationalist, i.e. pro-French and pro-assimilation circles, there 
were also a number of collaborators, not exclusively, but predominantly from within the ranks 
of the former separatist wing of the particularist movement.
The Situation after the War
While the experience of Nazi occupation shaped the Alsatian perception of Germany and the 
Germans, the French perception of the situation in Alsace during the occupation was similarly 
important for the future. The French view of Alsace under Nazi rule and the actual experience 
Alsatians had were two very distinct matters, yet combined they shaped the post-war 
developments in the region.
With the liberation in 1945 came the reprisals -  about 40,000 people were interned, 
8,000 sentences were pronounced after trials, but the majority of the convicted were pardoned 
later on. The leading particularists who had collaborated with the Nazi occupation force were
175 Cf. Lothar Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in Elsafi-Lothringen (Stuttgart: DVA, 1973), pp. 
163-174.
176 Cf. Essig, Das Elsafi,, p. 145.
177 Cf. Lothar Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in Elsafi-Lothringen (Stuttgart: DVA, 1973), pp. 
240-269.
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sentenced to death. Although there was no popular revenge against collaborators, the 
particularist cause was discredited for a long time. This manifested itself in three developments. 
After the 1953 Bordeaux trial of the twelve Alsatians involved in the Oradour massacre, a 
public silence about the period of German occupation between 1940 and 1945 became the rule. 
Despite the internments, trials, and a renewed French assimilation policy in Alsace, the reunion 
with France after the war did not generate any resistance, so heavily weighed the traumatic 
experiences of the Nazi years on the Alsatians that assimilation was welcomed, and exaggerated 
patriotism was thought to be the means to accomplish integration as soon and as smoothly as 
possible. Thus, Alsace abandoned, for the time being, its particularist perspective and the claim 
to be distinct from both its neighbours in east and west.
The fact that Alsace had been detached from France and had become an administrative 
and political part of the Third Reich after 1940 contributed to the impression of many French 
that Alsatians were generally pro-German and therefore collaborators and accomplices of the 
Nazi regime. Simultaneously, the only limited amount of sympathy for ethno-regionalist 
movements in general, which had existed among some French socialists in the inter-war period, 
declined sharply because of the involvement of some of the regionalist leaders in Alsace, 
Brittany and the Flemish region with Nazism, but also because of the more pressing concerns of 
reconstructing France politically and economically.178 Being thus put in the unfortunate position 
of having to prove their loyalty to the French Republic harder than most other minorities, 
Alsatians did not revive their particularism, and did not insist on their status as an ethnic 
minority, unlike people in Brittany or Corsica.179
Thus, two Alsatian desires, which had existed long before the war, merged into one and 
provided the basis upon which, under the specific circumstances of France after 1945, Alsatian 
regionalism would eventually occur as a distinctly modified version of the pre-war
178 Cf. William Safran, “The French State and Ethnic Minority Cultures: Policy Dimensions and Problems”, in 
Joseph R. Rudolf, Jr. and Robert J. Thompson, Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, and the Western World (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 115-157, here p. 118.
179 Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 164.
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particularism. These two Alsatian desires were the clear separation from anything German, 
historically, politically and culturally, and the desire to continue the development of a 
specifically Alsatian concept of Heimat and patriotism which would prove the unquestionable 
loyalty to France and allow Alsace to be associated with an internationally recognised state 
capable of protecting Alsace from a renewed attempt of Germanisation.180 That this would 
involve concessions on the part of the Alsatians with respect to the use of their language, the 
concordat, and the confessional school system was generally accepted and provided the ground 
for smooth political and economic integration and increasingly successful cultural assimilation.
Alsace Today: From Particularism to Regionalism?
In the light of the situation in Alsace in 1945 and because of the subsequently adopted policies 
of regionalisation by France, it is not surprising that Alsace has changed tremendously since the 
end of World War Two. The changes occurred gradually and must be seen in light of a complex 
network of factors of influence. The four most important factors in this context were French 
regionalisation, the development of the post-war party-political system in Alsace and the failure 
of political autonomism within it, the economic and political consequences of European 
integration and Franco-German reconciliation, and a cultural and ecological renaissance of 
Alsatianism.
With the introduction of regionalisation policies as early as 1951, the French central 
government put itself in a position, in which the pre-war mistakes of equating political 
integration and cultural assimilation were avoided. The most important steps towards 
regionalisation were the setting-up of a network of regions in 1955 and that of regional councils 
with limited powers in 1972. With the 1982 reforms, the importance of regions has increased 
further, which had favourable consequences for the integration of Alsace into the national 
political and economic life.181
180 TrouiUet, Das Elsa.fi, p. 34.
181 Regionalisation proper began in 1959/60 when a number of decrees were passed according to which the French 
Metropolitan territory was divided into 22 regional administrative areas. Gradually most state institutions were
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At the same time, regionalisation offered the opportunity to the government to make 
concessions to the Alsatians in terms of the concordat and the religious statute, both of which 
have been retained. The importance of regionalisation in this respect is that without granting 
Alsace a special administrative or even constitutional status, certain allowances could and can 
be made within the clearly defined territory of one region which need not apply to other regions 
and vice versa and without affecting France’s limited interpretation of minority rights.182
The Alsatian party political system does not include any significant autonomist or 
particularist parties, and the election results in Alsace after 1945 confirm the relatively high 
degree of popular satisfaction with the situation in Alsace in general. As is shown in the table 
below, the French national parties clearly dominate.183
reorganised to fit this new framework, especially those responsible for regional planning. The establishing of a 
committee for regional economic development in 1964 and the creation of regional councils in July 1972 were major 
steps on this way. The period between 1972 and 1982 saw the regions’ powers and functions limited to those of other 
public authorities, i.e., they only played an advisory role and were not entrusted with any direct management 
responsibilities. The first Mitterrand presidency changed the pattern of power distribution within the French political 
system resulting in an improvement of the status of the regions. The Defferre law of 1981, although maintaining the 
authority of the central government over the education system at large, specifically delegated to regional assemblies 
the power to preserve the cultural identity of the region. A supplementary decentralisation law of July 1983 specified 
the Defferre law by transferring concrete cultural competences to regions, departments, and communes -  libraries, 
museums, schools for the visual and performing arts, architectural preservation and departmental archives. The 
decision to allocate money and fund cultural initiatives has always been based on considerations of cultural worth as 
well as ‘political correctness.’ While avoiding to put a lot of stress on trivial folklorist elements of ethnic culture, 
projects had to be based on a broad consensus within the ethno-regional community and were not to facilitate the 
restoration of separatist sentiments among the population in question.
182 Rights of ethnic and/or linguistic minorities are a very sensitive area in French politics. The Ffench constitution 
determines that France be an indivisible republic in which all citizens regardless of their religion, race, or origin enjoy 
the same rights and status. Since the French Revolution, this has served as an interpretative instrument to deny the 
existence of minorities in France. With respect to international treaties and conventions, as far as France has signed 
them, successive French governments have refused to implement any clauses that would contradict this interpretation 
of Article 2 of the constitution. This applies to the 1966 UN Declaration on Minority Rights, Article 27 (preservation 
of minority cultures and languages) of which was declared irrelevant for France. It also applies to documents of the 
CSCE/OSCE of 1975, 1990, 1993, all of which were signed by France, yet the regulations in them concerning 
minority languages were annulled by reservations to the effect that French by virtue of being the national language 
was at the same time the mother tongue of all French citizens. A similar policy has been adopted in relation to 
initiatives for the protection of minorities that originated in the European Parliament or the Council of Europe.
183 MRP-UDF - Republican Democratic Front (1945-present, pro-assimilatipnist, moderately particularist), SFIO/PS 
- Socialist Party (pro-assimilationist, moderately particularist), CPF -  Communist Party of France (pro- 
assimilationist, moderately particularist), FN -  Front nationale (aggressively xenophobic).
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Table 9: Party Support in Alsace, 1945-1997(per cent of vote in first ballot of parliamentary 
elections)
MRP-UDF Gaullists SFIO/PS PC Ecologists* FN
1945 47.5 16.8 21.1 10.8
1946 June 51.2 10.0 17.7 12.4
1946 Nov 45.3 26.6 14.7 13.3
1951 37.2 33.9 10.2 10.9
1956 41.9 10.0 12.0 11.7
1958 42.9 31.0 10.9 7.0
1962 28.7 53.4 6.8 6.8
1967 32.1 49.5 8.7 9.1
1968 17.1 65.0 9.0 7.2
1973 29.4 46.2 12.3 7.9 0.2
1978 27.5 33.6 19.2 6.6 6.0
1981 60.6 30.8 3.2 4.0
1986 25.5 21.2 23.1 1.7 3.6 13.6
1988 48.3 30.8 2.3 0.8 14.9
1993 23.4 22.8 11.4 2.2 12.7 14.6
1997* 38.4 25.5 14.0 21.0
Ecologistes, and independent candidates.
* Categories for 1997 election results were only available as “Droite” (various centre and right-of-centre parties, 
including MRP-UDF and Gaullists) and “Gauche” (various left-of-centre parties, including PS and PC), 
Ecologists, and FN. (Source: http://www.ifop.fr/ifop/election/index.htm)
The major political parties in Alsace were aware of the powerful attraction of 
particularist demands and their connection to electoral success. Therefore all of them supported 
cultural, and particularly linguistic demands, while they strongly condemned all demands for 
political autonomy, and thus reflected and shaped simultaneously the political orientation in 
Alsace. This was particularly obvious during the presidential election campaign of 1981, in
which both left- and right-wing political parties tried to out-perform one another in terms of
«.
concessions to regional languages and cultures. Although regionalisation was sped up during the 
first Mitterrand presidency, major changes in the French approach to the unitary nation did not 
occur in Alsace.184
184 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 31. One significant concession was made to Corsica, which has had its own linguistic 
statute since 1991. Cf. Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 207.
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The political spectrum until the late 1970s had been dominated by four political 
groupings: the Gaullists, the UDF,185 the Socialist Party; and the French Communists. Although 
they all incorporated regionalist demands, they differed in the degree and level of commitment 
to particularism. While the Gaullists generally did and do not go beyond demands for 
decentralisation of the French polity as such, and thus add no particular Alsatian component to 
their regionalisation policy as a whole, the UDF, the heir of the pre-war UPR, was and is in 
favour of regional development and Alsatian distinctiveness. The Socialist Party, which 
emerged in the course of a major re-shuffle of the French party-political system after 1968 is 
very outspoken about its commitment to decentralisation and further extension of regional 
powers. Similar to the French Communist Party, the Socialist Party recognises that there is a 
distinct Alsatian identity and asserts the right for Alsatians to be different, especially with 
respect to bilingualism in primary schools, culture, the preservation of local laws and the 
modified secular system which has been adopted for the region. The communists, in addition to 
this, pay also particular attention to minority and socio-economic problems, but they are 
strongly against any form of autonomy.186 Despite the similarity of regionalist demands, 
conservative parties have always been much stronger in Alsace than their left-wing opponents. 
With the single exception of the March 1989 local elections,187 conservative candidates have 
consistently scored higher results in Alsace than in the rest of France in elections at all levels.
Since 1973, the Ecologists have competed in elections in Alsace as well, and they have 
done so with growing success at all levels. Their appeal was partly based on specific regional 
demands and concerns for environmental protection. With the environmental dimension 
dominating in the Greens* policies, they can not really be classed as a party with a strong 
regional dimension, and in contrast to the other national parties, they did not instrumentalise 
Alsatian particularism. Rather, Alsatian particularists supported the Greens and their demands
185 The party came into being after the merger of the Republican Party, the Democratic Centre, and the Radical Party 
in 1978.
186 Gras, Regionalism, p. 344ff.
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for environmental protection because ecological issues were recognised as having a growing 
mobilisation effect since the 1970s.
Since 1986, the right-wing extremist National Front has taken part in elections in Alsace 
at all levels, polling from the outset more than thirteen per cent of the total vote in Alsace and 
becoming the fourth strongest party before the PCF. The reason for this is that ethnic 
distinctiveness is emphasised in Alsace by some segments of the population, as in other parts Of 
France, not in the context of Alsace versus France interieure, but in separating French citizens 
from immigrants and asylum seekers. This part of the Alsatian population sees its representative 
not in regionalist parties of whatever political orientation, but in the National Front.188
The linguistic revival and literary renaissance, which began in 1968 with the founding 
of the Rene Schickele circle, could have triggered developments towards the establishing of 
successful autonomist political movements and parties, but it did not generate wide-spread 
popular interest or political support. Rather, it was confined to a small number of intellectuals, 
on the one side, and right-wing and left-wing political militants, on the other. Especially the 
connection with political extremism of whatever ideological orientation had made it difficult for 
linguistic particularism to establish some credibility until the mid to late eighties because the 
vast majority of Alsatians traditionally leaned towards moderate, centre-right politics and did 
not recognise their identity represented in any form of political extremism. Greater success of 
the revival of a particularist movement focussed primarily on linguistic issues was, at the time, 
also prevented by a lack of press coverage and persistent allegations linking particularism to 
autonomism and to pro-Nazi and pro-German sentiments. The general failure of political 
autonomism must also be seen in the context of ideological differences between the different 
wings of political autonomism which prevented the establishment of a common political basis 
and strategy. Thus between 1968 and 1974 a number of organisations were founded in Alsace,
187 In these elections, the Socialist Party won the majority in seven larger town councils, including Strasbourg and 
Mulhouse.
188 14.6% of the voters did so in the legislative elections in 1993. Bernard Vogler, Histoire politique, p. 371.
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all of them professing some kind of particularism or autonomism, but all from different 
ideological backgrounds and with diverse objectives.189
The politically organised activities of Alsatian particularism had already begun in 1953 
in the context of the trial against those responsible for the massacre in Oradour, among them 
twelve Alsatians. A magazine, called La Voix d ’Alsace was founded in 1953 uniting pro- 
Alsatian and pro-German activists, but a split occurred in 1958 resulting in the pro-Alsatian 
element in the movement publishing its own bimonthly, the Voix d’Alsace-Lorraine -  Die 
europaische Stimme Elsafi-Lothringens which advocated, in the tradition of part of the inter-war 
particularist movement, linguistic equality and a federalised France and Europe.190
The Regionalist Movement of Alsace-Lorraine was founded in 1970. Initially, the 
movement seemed to engage in traditional particularist agitation -  demands for the 
federalisation of France and Europe were made together with those for a regional two-chamber 
parliament in Alsace and an elected executive. Cultural demands were widely mainstream The 
organ of the movement, Elsat founded by students in Strasbourg in 1969, had begun in 1972 to 
advocate a purification of Alsace and East Lorraine of elements of non-German origin. The 
movement itself adopted a similarly right-wing, pro-German nationalist course in its Manifesto 
of Strasbourg in 1972. After 1974 it must be considered openly right-wing extremist: a 
members* congress supported the demands of the Manifesto of Strasbourg and added racist, 
anti-Communist, and corporatist-fascist demands. In 1977, the movement dissolved itself, in 
1978 it was founded again under a new name -  Rassemblement des Alsace-Lorrains -  and since 
1980 it has existed under the name Parti Alsacien.
When these right-wing tendencies in the Regionalist Movement of Alsace-Lorraine 
became obvious in 1971, the movement split, and the European Federalist Party of Alsace-
189 Beer lists for this period the foundation of three cultural, two extreme left, one far-left autonomist, two federalist, 
and one conservative regionalist organisation. Cf. Beer, The Unexpected Rebellion, pp. 117-119. A survey of more 
right-wing conservative groups can be found in Henning Eichberg and Heinz-Dieter Hansen, 
“Autonomiebestrebungen in ElsaB-Lothringen”, Junges Forum, 1975, pp. 16-24.
190 With only around 6,000 copies, the magazine was not extremely popular. Changing its political affiliation twice 
between 1970 and 1975, the publication ceased eventually in 1975.
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Lorraine was founded, which made moderate demands for regionalisation and the preservation 
of Alsatian culture and traditions. Through its co-operation with the European Federalist 
Movement, the party was not exclusively concerned with Alsace alone but put its regionalism in 
a wider context. The 1974 members* congress of the Regionalist Movement of Alsace-Lorraine 
resulted in a further split, facilitating the founding of the Autonomist Front for the Liberation of 
Alsace-Lorraine. Demands for Alsatian autonomism were based on a simultaneous rejection of 
centralism and separatism; the ethnic arguments for Alsatian particularism were supported by an 
application of the theory of internal colonialism to Alsace. Its self-concept as a movement, 
rather than as a party, allowed the front to co-operate with a variety of other political forces, 
mostly ecologists and socialists. In 1978, the Autonomist Front for the Liberation of Alsace- 
Lorraine split and a group named The New Autonomists was founded, which based its 
particularism primarily on demands for regionalisation and protection of the environment.
The diversification of purely regionalist-autonomist-particularist movements and parties 
occurred along a traditional left-right divide. None of the parties or movements managed to 
achieve any significant electoral successes,191 not least because the established parties pursued 
regionalist policies and interests in a much more effective way by co-operating with the central 
government on issues essential for the development of the region. While the issues of 
industrialisation and improvement of the infrastructure dominated the agenda until the 1970s, 
ecological and cultural aspects of regional development have come to play a more important 
role in the 1980s and 1990s in the course of French regionalisation in general, and in Alsace in 
particular.192
The churches, which had been the third major political player in Alsace alongside with 
political parties and cultural organisations both during the Reichsland and the inter-war period, 
have become more discrete, and their influence has decreased. Part of the reason for this Was
191 Beer gives the average support figures for autonomist parties in the 1970s at between 3.5% and 4.5%. Cf. Beer, 
The Unexpected Rebellion, p. 25. This trend has continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
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increasing urbanisation, but also the fact that neither concordat nor confessional status of 
schools have been seriously threatened after 1945. Although with effect from July 1946 
religious instruction and church services in German were prohibited,193 both churches assumed 
that a policy of co-operation with the central government was the safest insurance that the state 
did not interfere in religious affairs.194
For both churches and parties alike, the affirmation of the commitment to Alsatian 
distinctiveness reflects their concern for maintaining a large community of faithful followers 
and voters, respectively.195 With Paris remaining the political, economic, social, and cultural 
centre of France, regional elites, however, also tend to orientate themselves towards the French 
capital.196 This tendency towards a partial neglect of regional interests, although to a certain 
extent working in favour of integration, is the flip-side of the lack of a successful regional party. 
A worsening of the situation in Alsace in general because of increased regional competition at 
the national level or the politicisation of, for example, cultural claims, could give rise to a more 
radical autonomism with consequences similar to the inter-war period, yet at the moment there 
is no evidence for this.
Parallel to the so far successful political integration,197 incorporation into France 
interieure has also worked out favourably for the state of the Alsatian economy. Living 
standards increased as a consequence of industrialisation and the successful attraction of foreign 
capital, especially from Switzerland and Germany, but also from the USA. With the increasing 
transfer of economic decision-making powers to the regions, allegations of French looting of 
Alsatian resources have no basis left. On the contrary, since the end of the 1950s the Alsatian
192 There have been a number of parties, especially in the 1980s, which tried to muster electoral support on the basis 
of ‘Alsatianism’ and/or included Alsace in their party’s name, such as Alsace d ’abord and Femmes d ’Alsace, none of 
which was electorally very successful. Cf. Vogler, Histoire politique, p. 315f.
193 Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 170.
194 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 129.
195 Gras, Regionalism, p. 346f.
196 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 39.
197 This is also obvious in the six presidential elections in France between 1965 and 1995. Turnout is almost identical 
with French average. Alsace has persistently favoured more right-wing candidates, which demonstrates a certain 
consistency in voting behaviour throughout Alsatian electoral history after 1871.
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economy has profited from a variety of factors -  its central position in Europe and relatively 
well-developed infrastructure; the easy and comparatively cheap access to energy; a framework 
of political conditions encouraging industrialisation until the mid-seventies; a mostly bilingual 
and highly qualified workforce; until the mid-seventies a low degree of trade union 
membership; wide-spread political conservatism among the workforce; and access to the French 
market. In addition, Alsace has also profited from the fact that Strasbourg hosts the European 
Parliament, as the French state has made considerable investments -  both materially and 
politically -  to drive home its message that Strasbourg is the European capital rather than 
Brussels. Although Alsace with only two departments, 1.6 million inhabitants, and 3.9% of all 
employees in the French industrial sector is a relatively small region, the development of the 
service sector helped Alsace to establish itself by the end of the 1980s as the region with the 
second largest GDP and the lowest unemployment rate. 198
While this internationalisation and industrialisation process contributed to the relative 
wealth of Alsace as a region in France, it also had a number of side effects. One of them is that 
agriculture plays a less dominant role. While in 1949 thirty-one per cent of the population were 
active in this sector, their number had decreased to a mere five per cent at the beginning of the 
1980s. The figures for Alsace as such are not different from those of most other industrial 
societies, but their impact on social and political developments in the context of particularism 
has been very significant. Industrialisation, and in connection with it urbanisation, resulted in a 
decline of the Catholic rural population, formerly one of the strongholds of Alsatian 
particularism. Simultaneously, the fact that Alsace has also benefited economically from the 
‘Europeanisation* of Strasbourg, and has, thus, eventually come to play the role of mediator 
within the process of European integration, made political integration into the French polity
198 The low Alsatian unemployment rate is partly due to the fact that there is a high number of cross-border 
commuters who work in either Germany or Switzerland but live in Alsace.
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easier.199 At the same time, European integration has made the question of national political 
integration less important.
In the long run, Alsatian culture has profited from it being grouped, together with the 
Catalan and Flemish cultures, into those of Christian rather than Muslim descent.200 The more 
relaxed approach taken by successive French governments towards Alsace has also had its 
reasons in the fact that political threats from Alsatian particularism do no longer pose a serious 
threat because of European integration, in German-French reconciliation, and in the actual 
political developments in Alsace after 1945. To some extent, Alsace also benefited from the 
signing of a cultural charter in 1981 by the region and the ministry of culture. Although 
touching upon issues like broadcasting and special educational programmes, it did not involve 
the relevant ministries, could only authorise programmes of a limited nature, and was not 
completely satisfactory from the viewpoint of some ethno-cultural activists in the region.201 
Cultural policy in France has always been linked to language policy, especially where ethno- 
regional cultures were and are concerned. Since its foundation in August 1985, the National 
Council for Regional Languages and Cultures has had Alsatian members. The role of the 
council, which has met only very few times since its creation, has not been a very significant 
one in the context of minority issues in France, hi Alsace, language policy faced a political and 
linguistic problem at the same time -  historically the links with Germany had caused much 
political unrest; linguistically a decision had to be made about whether to promote the use of 
standard German or Alsatian dialect. Despite reaffirmation of the dominant status of French202 
and the refusal of successive French governments to sign the European Charter for Regional 
Languages, policy towards regional languages in France has become generally more relaxed. 
German, however, is not considered to be a regional language, and therefore the language laws
199 Gras, Regionalism, p. 345.
200 Safran, The French State, p. 144.
201 Cf. Safran, The French State, p. 128.
202 In 1992, in the course of constitutional changes and amendments necessary because of France’s signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, the clause “The language of the Republic is French.” was added to the 
constitution. In 1994, the so-called Toubon Law was passed, which determines that French be the exclusive language
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of 1951 and 1975 did not apply to the Alsatian dialect. Yet because German was no longer 
perceived to be a threat, the central government made a number of concessions as early as 1952 
and 1953, allowing for limited German language teaching in Alsatian schools. Pupils could elect 
German as a subject in the last two years of their elementary school. Despite this favourable 
legal situation and despite the fact that eighty-four per cent of parents supported German 
language teaching at school, the national elementary school teachers’ union tried to obstruct the 
introduction of the new subject and did so successfully until the early 1970s.203 The struggle 
between, on the one side, cultural activists and regional politicians, who adopted the popular 
demands for German language teaching at schools because of the electoral gains they 
foresaw,204 and the central government, on the other, over the introduction of German as a 
compulsory subject in primary schools had been going on since 1950, and it was only after 
decades of delays at the administrative level and a test period in 1972 and 1973 that German 
became obligatory for all Alsatian pupils in third and fourth grade.205 Lacking native German 
teaching staff, this remains very often on the level of foreign language teaching.206
Simultaneously, the schools provided the most successful tool for linguistic and cultural 
assimilation as well as political integration of the war and post-war generations. Introducing all 
pupils in France to the same political and cultural value system was part of the overall education 
policy of subsequent French governments after 1945. In Alsace, the linguistic component was of 
particular importance for assimilation, and this challenge was managed -  knowledge of French 
among the total of the Alsatian population jumped from 66.4% in 1946 to 80.5% in 1962,207 not 
least because of a successful popularity campaign on behalf of the French language. Today only
in the following five areas: consumer protection, employment, education, audio-visual communication, and public 
service.
203 Safran, The French State, p. 120f.
204 Safran quotes from public opinion surveys that show eighty to ninety per cent of Alsatian households in favour of 
German language teaching. Cf. Safran, The French State, p. 121.
205 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 132ff.
206 Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 178. This, once again, brings to the fore the importance of the triglossic situation in Alsace. 
There were attempts as early as 1950 to introduce regional language teaching via the dialect in Alsace, and these have
continued until today, leaving the issue of dialect teaching in the hands of regional language policy makers. The 
teaching of German as a secondary language, however, has removed this issue from the regional agenda with little 
opportunities for the region to make an impact on the conduct of the respective language classes and curricula.
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a small minority of the population in Alsace does not speak French at least as a second 
language. In parallel, the status of French has increased because of urbanisation and because of 
considerations that knowledge of French is considered an essential condition for upward social 
mobility. Demands for instruction in German and for teaching of German as a foreign language 
(it has to compete with English) have not been a priority for many Alsatians, on the contrary, 
many parents insist on proper instruction in French for their children. The declining interest in 
German language and culture and in the dialect, especially in the seventies and eighties, was 
apparent from the decrease in numbers of circulated copies of the bilingual Alsatian News from
317,000 in 1949 to 144,000 in 1977 and to 118,000 in 1984, despite the fact that the Alsatian 
dialect at that time had still been the native tongue of most inhabitants of the region. Since the 
eighties this decline has also become manifest in a decreasing number of people able to speak 
Alsatian dialect, particularly among the younger generation; a loss in linguistic quality despite 
attempts to establish a standardised written form of the dialect; and a lack of information about 
German affairs in the local print and electronic media. Especially the latter have proved 
insufficient in contributing to the linguistic revival because of their being centrally 
administered.208
In the context of increasing efforts to revive German and the Alsatian dialect, a petition 
was sent by Alsatian intellectuals in 1984 to President Mitterrand asking for a comprehensive 
funding and promotion policy of German language teaching in Alsace from pre-school to 
university level. The Ministry of Education supported the establishment of university courses in 
which students could study for a degree in a regional language, appointed professors and other 
teaching staff, and supported the circulation of appropriate teaching material.209 Efforts in this 
respect continued and in combination with similar demands from other regions, such as Brittany 
and Corsica, a law was introduced in 1989 allowing for, but not requiring, classes in regional
207 Vassberg, Alsatian Acts, p. 23.
208 Cf. Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 171. On the status of German in greater detail, Judith Broadbridge, “The Ethnolinguistic 
Vitality of German according to Status”, in Wolff, German Minorities in Europe.
209 Cf. Safran, The French State, p. 133.
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language and culture at all levels of the education system. By 1997, this had not been 
implemented in Alsace, mainly because of the imbalance between national interests and 
regional particularism.210 Part of the wider context here is the fact that in 1976 cultural 
autonomy was granted to all regions. This, however, excluded education, where the curriculum 
has remained a matter reserved to central government policy, thus leaving no room for regional 
initiatives in this area.
A certain revival of Alsatian linguistic consciousness has occurred in the early 1990s. A 
survey conducted before the 1992 regional elections in France established that eighty per cent of 
voters expected the Regional Council and the Counseils generaux of the departments to provide 
a legal guarantee for bilingual school education. About seventy-two per cent of the interviewees 
stated that a linguistic statute, as achieved by Corsica, would be the ideal form of such a 
guarantee.211 Despite this apparent commitment to bilingualism and despite successful private 
and state-sponsored initiatives for bilingual education in nursery and pre-schools, the number of 
Alsatians who still speak dialect and/of German of a native or near-native quality is constantly 
decreasing.212 Nevertheless, the number of pupils in elementary and secondary school enrolling 
for German (not dialect) is still impressive and significantly higher than in other areas with 
regional languages. In 1992, more than 82,000 students at elementary level and more than
66,000 at secondary level took German classes as part of their curriculum.213 Part of the French 
language policy, however, had been to take legal precautions that no newspaper or magazine 
could be published which did not include sections of it written in French. From September 1945 
to October 1984, bilingual newspapers were only permitted with their title and at least twenty-
210 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, pp. 149-150 and 257-270.
211 Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 182.
212 Exact figures, as far as they can be established, are given by Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p.239. Cf. also Essig, Das 
Elsafi, pp. 181,185ff. and 211.
213 Cf. Ager, Language Policy, p. 69. At elementary level, German is compulsory in third and fourth grade. Trouillet, 
Das Elsafi, p. 132.
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five per cent of the text in French.214 Since then, monolingual publications in German have 
again been permitted,21.5 and German daily and weekly papers circulate freely.
The other dimension of Alsatian particularism today is related to the consequences and 
prevention of environmental destruction. In the course of the seventies and eighties in particular, 
protests216 against nuclear power stations and the building of industrial plants in the area 
acquired an increasingly regional dimension, not least because of the increase in economic 
quarrels between regional and central authorities. From an electoral point of view, the Green 
Party did significantly better in Alsace than in the rest of France, especially at the European 
level.217 When the environmental dimension of regional particularism stretched across the 
whole of the Alemannic language community218 into Switzerland and Germany, Alsatian 
particularism became increasingly transnational in the 1980s.219 This development Of a 
transnational regional identity has increased since the eighties as a consequence of European 
regionalisation policies, which created regions independent of national borders,220 and the 
cultural exploitation of this process in a transnational Alemannic cultural network.221 In the case 
of Alsace, European regionalisation meant the creation of the Euroregion Saar-Lor-Lux, 
reinforcing also the consciousness of a distinct regional identity within the French polity. The 
strength of this regional identity, however, is far greater than in most other regions of France. 
Alsatian resistance against regionalisation was the lowest in all of France with only eighteen per 
cent (the same figure as for Brittany). Similarly, almost half of the population in Alsace 
demanded the strengthening of regional powers. Although the turnout in European elections has 
been lower in Alsace than the French average in all such elections since 1979, Alsace delivered
214 Gras, Regionalism, p. 346.
215 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 130.
216 Part of the ecological protests was a bombing in Marckolsheim in which allegedly leftist autonomist groups were 
involved. Cf. Beer, The Unexpected Rebellion, p. 25.
217 Cf. Vogler, Histoire politique, p. 340.
218 Alemannic is part of the family of the Germanic languages, but took a slightly different development than other 
upper German dialects. Standard German and Alemannic speakers can normally understand each other despite 
differences in grammar and vocabulary.
219 Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 176.
220 On the effects of this process on ethno-regional movements cf. also Safran, Hie French State, p. 119.
221 Essig, Das Elsafi, p. 176.
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a clear vote in favour of the Maastricht Treaty (fifty-six per cent Yes-votes), which 
demonstrates the Alsatians’ commitment to regionalisation at a European level.222
A politicisation of the cultural and ecological revival of Alsatian particularism has not 
occurred as of yet, because French policy after 1945 has allowed for the preservation of some 
regional distinctiveness in laws and traditions, for the opportunity to live the native culture, and 
for relative wealth.223 Regional identity is mostly derived from the high living standard 
Alsatians experience and the privileged position and attention they receive within the 
framework of European integration. Regionalism, therefore, is mainly confined to those policies 
which threaten this status. Crises, be they economical or political, are often blamed on 
insufficient subsidies and excessive taxation by the central government. If regional claims are 
made, they are only secondarily attached to Alsatian distinctiveness, and mostly result from 
competition with other regions in France or from difficulties Alsatians experience in their 
dealings with central authorities. The political component of Alsatian particularism has been 
transformed into a form of political and economic regionalism as it can be found in other 
regions across France, or indeed Europe, as a whole.
Alsatian cultural particularism does not imply any political claims to separation, 
autonomy, or transnational political and economic integration with neighbouring regions 
populated by members of the Alemannic language community. Rather it symbolises the so far 
not completely satisfied demands for conditions facilitating the preservation, expression, and 
development of a specific culture, language, and collective memory, i.e., the old concept of an 
Alsatianism related to, yet in the end independent of, both German and French culture.224 Since 
the end of the Second World War, this has not resulted in any revival of loyalty conflicts, 
discrimination policies, or social segregation.225 As long as the specific cultural dilemma of 
Alsatianism as a not officially recognised minority culture is not resolved, the potential for
222 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 36.
223 Gras, Regionalism, p. 352.
224 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 29f. On this issue cf. also Essig, Das Elsafi, esp. pp. 137-139.
225 Trouillet, Das Elsafi, p. 19.
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conflict remains, but as Alsatian history does not provide examples of violent escalation under 
even more serious conditions, the potential dangers of renewed conflict can be considered rather 
low.
Summary: The Eventual Success of Integration after 1945
Today, political and economic integration have been completed, and cultural 
assimilation has progressed very far. Politically, particularism does not play a significant role 
anymore. Parties founded with a purely regionalist, particularist, or even autonomist basis have 
had no significant electoral success after 1945. This had partly to do with the right-wing 
extremist, pro-German nationalist connections some of them had, and partly with the fact that 
the national parties who have dominated the political spectrum in Alsace after 1945 adopted 
moderate particularist demands, most of which, especially in terms of local laws and the 
religious statute have been fulfilled by the French state.
While the influence of the churches has declined and political particularism has lost, 
due to industrialisation and urbanisation, its formerly major stronghold in the rural population, 
the agenda of particularism has changed. It has shifted from autonomist demands to cultural 
issues, and successive French governments have, in the context of regionalisation, made 
concessions to the cultural demands raised. Being initially confined to a small number of 
intellectuals, cultural particularism has become more widespread in the late eighties and early 
nineties. The lack of satisfaction with what has been achieved is no longer being interpreted in 
terms of specific Alsatian-French conflict, but is more or less attributed to the lack of powers 
the regions in general have in the area of culture. Thus, this conflict is not between two cultures, 
but rather between two cultural policies -  the one of the unitary French state and that of ethno­
cultural activists. The fact that there still remains a significant cultural movement advocating the 
promotion of Alsatian culture, language, and traditions, and pointing to the oftentimes 
unsatisfactory situation of the regional culture in Alsace, underlines that the cultural ‘conflict* is 
far from over. One aspect of Alsatian political life that has politically been connected to
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particularism was the ecological movement, which began in the mid-seventies. In contrast to the 
other national political parties active in Alsace, the ecologists have not instramentalised regional 
demands for their electoral gain, but their commitment to prevent environmental destruction has 
mobilised a variety of political groups and Alsatians and forged a regional interest coalition. 
This coalition, however, was not based on ‘ethnic’ distinctiveness, but rather on ecological 
concerns and had a territorial dimension spreading across the regional and national borders.
Eventually, Franco-German reconciliation and the process of European integration have 
had an impact on the development in Alsace. With Germany no longer being perceived as a 
threat and German interference into French-Alsatian relations not occurring after 1945 anymore, 
the perspective of an Alsatian local culture based on Alemannic traditions was no longer 
interpreted as a threat to French territorial sovereignty either. This allowed successive French 
governments to make concessions to cultural demands within their self-imposed limits of 
regionalisation. European integration, on the other hand, has privileged Alsace not only 
economically, but also in terms of the confidence Alsatians have in their place in France and 
Europe and has eliminated the pre-war insecurity in this respect.
This combination of political and economic integration and of leaving some space for 
cultural distinctiveness has proved to be a successful policy of ethnic conflict management, not 
least because it satisfied the interests of all conflicting parties involved to a sufficiently high 
degree to provide the basis for adopting co-operational rather than confrontational policies.
Table 10: Conditions Accounting for the Eventual Success of the French Integration Policy in 
Alsace
• In France:
□ Preparedness of successive French governments to compromise on a limited number 
of ancient Alsatian rights and traditions
□ Regionalisation in France
□ No inter-ethnic tensions between Alsatians and French
• In Germany:
□ No influential lobby of emigrants from Alsace to put pressure on the German 
government
□ Policy of strict non-interference at federal level
______ □ Virtually no public interest in Alsace______________________________ ______
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• In Alsace and Lorraine:
□ War experience of Alsatians
□ Desire to prove unconditional loyalty to the French state
□ Dominance of French national parties, who adopted a moderately particularist 
agenda
□ Ethnically defined particularism giving way to regionalism with a component of 
cultural traditionalism
□ Recognition of assimilation as essential condition for upward social mobility
• International Context
□ Franco-German reconciliation
□ European integration with its opportunities for regional cross-border co-operation
V. The Saarland
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The Saar area is under the firm control of the German Holy Roman Empire.
The Saar is ruled by the French Counts of Lorraine.
The Saar is ruled by the German Counts of Nassau-Saarbrtlcken.
Henri m  recaptures the Saar.
The Counts of Nassau-Saarbrticken are reinstated in their rights over the Saar.
French revolutionary troops occupy Saarbrttcken.
Treaty of Luneville: French occupation of the Saar is recognised.
Allied troops recapture the Saar.
Congress of Vienna: The Saar and other left-Rhenish principalities are annexed to Prussia.
Peace Treaty: France looses its border with the Saar as Germany gains Alsace and Lorraine. 
Armistice at the end of World War One: French troops occupy the Saar.
Treaty of Versailles: Only a temporary settlement over the Saar is reached.
International administration of the Saar.
Inauguration of the Landesrat, an elected body with a consultative role.
French Franc becomes the only legal tender in the Saar.
Referendum: An overwhelming majority speaks out in favour of reunion with Germany.
Limited left-wing and Catholic resistance to the Nazi regime.
General de Gaulle claims the entire left bank of the Rhine as French security zone.
After Allied resistance to permanent French annexation o the Saar, France opts for economic 
integration of the Saar and presents detailed proposals to that effect -
Four political parties have received a licence -  die Christian People’s Party, the Social Democratic 
Party of the Saar, the Communist Party of the Saar, and the Democratic Party of the Saar.
A Constitutional Commission for the Saar is appointed.
A draft of the Saar constitution is published.
First Landtag elections in the Saar.
Landtag approves constitution.
The French and Saar governments sign a number of conventions to legalise their economic union. 
Berlin Agreement of the Western Allies: Recognition of the status of the Saar as a French 
‘economic possession.’
Fbundation of the West German state.
Growing anti-French/pro-German opposition in the Saar.
Negotiations between the French and Saar governments lead to new conventions and agreements. 
German government memorandum on the Saar affirms German claims to the territory.
Growing economic co-operation between the Saar and Germany. Official German political support 
of the pro-German opposition in the Saar begins.
Ban of the Democratic Party of the Saar by die Saar government
Paris Conference: Germany achieves a formal French acknowledgement that signing the ECSC 
treaty does not imply recognition of the status of the Saar.
France opens an embassy in the Saar replacing the office of the High Commissioner.
Germany announces in a letter to the Council of Europe that it would bring the issue of civil rights 
violations in the Saar before the Council’s next session.
Decision to form a CDU and an SPD in the Saar.
After Allied encouragement, France and Germany begin negotiations over the Saar.
Franco-German negotiations break down.
Landtag elections in the Saar. Pro-German opposition parties (CDU, SPD) were not allowed to 
contend the elections, blank and invalid votes amount to 24.5% of the total of votes cast 
Saar government launches a six-point plan for the Europeanisation of the Saar.
Franco-German negotiations are reopened, but end without conclusion.
Changes and amendments to the existing Franco-Saar conventions are approved by the French and 
Saar governments after brief negotiations.
New Franco-German negotiations begin.
Fall of Dien Bien Phu and publication of the Council of Europe’s recommendations on the 
setdement of die Saar question (Van der Goes van Naters Plan).
German Bundestag reaffirms unanimously an earlier resolution of July 2, 1953 that the Saar 
remains German territory.
Government crisis in the Saar.
France and Germany reach agreement over the status of the Saar until the conclusion of a peace 
treaty, including the holding of a referendum in the Saar.
The German and French parliaments ratify the agreement
Referendum in the Saar A majority of voters (67.5%) rejects the proposed setdement 
Landtag elections: The pro-German parties win an overwhelming victory.
Coalition government of pro-German parties is established.
The new Landtag votes in favour of a resolution declaring an end to Saar separation from 
Germany.
Bilateral Franco-German talks establish modus operandi for reunification of the Saar with 
Germany.
Saar becomes part of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Transitional period with interim regulations concerning the international status of the Saar.
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The Saar is an area of about 700 square miles west of the river Rhine between France and 
Germany. Historically, the value of the territory stemmed from its strategic position covering 
the road into the centre of France. Later on, its natural wealth in coal and the successful local 
iron and steel industries complemented its strategic value. Thus, it was not surprising that 
France and Germany struggled over the Saar for centuries. France gained and lost sovereignty 
over the area several times as a result of various wars, but always maintained its claim to the 
territory. Twice in the history of the Saar provisional international agreements were achieved -  
after World Wars One and Two -  both of which resulted in referenda in which the 
predominantly German population expressed its desire to be part of Germany. An eventual 
settlement between France and Germany, which determined the status of the Saar as part of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, was brought about in the Franco-German Treaties of 1956.
Historical Background
Saar History until 1919
The earliest settlers in the area were presumably members of a Gallic tribe known as 
Mediomartici. Germanic settlement started around the fifth century AD and the territoiy had 
come under the firm control of the (German) Holy Roman Empire by the end of the first 
millennium. In 999, the German emperor Otto HI signed a decree that passed the Saar to the 
Bishop of Metz. This decree has formed the basis of all French legal claims to the territory.226 
Between 1235 and 1381, the Saar was ruled by the French counts of Lorraine, thereafter by the 
German counts of Nassau-Saarbriicken. Recaptured by Henri HI in 1552, the Saar and some of 
its small neighbouring counties had become completely dependent upon France by the middle 
of the seventeenth century so that French rule over the area was eventually accepted as a matter 
of political reality in 1680. However, eight years later, after the war between France and the 
League of Augsburg, the Saar was released from French occupation and the counts of Nassau- 
Saarbriicken regained full sovereignty.
226 Laing Gray Cowan, France and the Saar, 1618-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 18.
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The French Revolution in 1789 sparked a number of peasant uprisings resulting in the 
then count granting a number of rights to the popular movement. In 1793, French revolutionary 
troops occupied Saarbnicken, and again a period of French administration of the Saar began, 
which was officially recognised in the Treaty of Luneville in 1801. A referendum in the same 
year, however, showed only very limited support for an annexation of the Saar to France as only 
twenty-five per cent of the eligible voters signed a petition in favour of such a development.227 
Similar to Alsace and Lorraine, the numerically small upper strata of society felt particularly 
attracted to French culture (as the South Tyrolese upper class felt attracted to Italian culture), 
while the similarly small middle class exhibited a certain liking of the political achievements of 
the French Revolution. The recapture of Saarbnicken by Allied troops in January 1814 was 
consequently welcomed by the majority of the population. The settlement of the Saar 
boundaries by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, however, was met with less enthusiasm, because 
it annexed the Saar as well as other left-Rhenish principalities to Protestant Prussia -  a rather 
unwelcome prospect for the mainly Catholic population.
Until 1860, France was preoccupied with border alterations in the South, but when these 
were eventually achieved through the annexation of Savoyen, its attention turned towards the 
east and north east.228 The active Rhine policy pursued by France included plans for annexation 
as well as territorial exchanges at a European level and had to be modified several times because 
of geo-political changes. An envisaged Franco-Austrian coalition against Prussia became 
pointless after the Austrian defeat in the war against Prussia in 1865/66.229 Direct advances to 
Prussia to achieve some sort of territorial settlement proved unsuccessful.230 The Frankfurt 
peace treaty between France and Germany after the 1870/71 war put an immediate end to 
French ambitions to regain the Saar not only because of its defeat but also because France,
227 Ibid., p. 38.
228 Fritz Hellwig, Der Kampf um die Saar 1860-1870 (Leipzig: Noske, 1934), pp. 53-68.
229 A draft of a treaty for an alliance between France and Austria included arrangements according to which France 
would regain the Saar, and Austria would gain Silesia in case of Prussian defeat. Cf. Gowan, France and the Saar, p. 
95.
230 Gowan, France and the Saar, p. 9 Iff. Also, Hellwig, Der Kampf, pp. 75-83.
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through the German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine had lost its common border with the 
Saar. This situation remained unchanged until the armistice of 11 November 1918, which led to 
the renewed French occupation of the Saar.
Between France and Germany: The Status of the Saar, 1919 -  1935
On 24 January 1919, France placed the Saar under military government and pursued a policy of
separating it from Germany, of promoting its union with France, and of long-term integration
into the French Republic.231 As a first sign of the integration efforts, the military government
introduced French as a compulsory subject in Saar schools on 15 February 1919,232 despite the
strong resistance of the Saar population, official protests from the German National Assembly
in Weimar, and opposition from the French socialists. Similarly, the industrial sector was
subjected to strict regulation by the French military authorities. Simultaneously, economic links
between the Saar and France were established.
Nevertheless, France had to settle for a provisional status of fifteen years international 
administration of the Saar, whose final status was to be subject to a referendum at the end of this 
period. The implementation of this Saar statute233 was supervised by a commission appointed 
by the League of Nations. With the appointment of this commission the Saar was given a 
government with exceptionally strong powers, which was not accountable to an elected 
parliament. This and the fact that the commission was strongly pro-French234 did not increase 
the willingness of the Saar population to co-operate. From 1922 onwards, a so-called Advisory 
Council or Landesrat existed. Its thirty members were elected by universal suffrage for three-
231 Russian approval of the French Saar annexation had been secured as early as 1918, and the resistance of the 
British and Americans was overcome during 1919.
232 According to Hirsch, regular French classes (four hours per week from fifth grade onwards) were introduced in 
1922. Cf. Helmut Hirsch, Die Saar von Genf (Bonn: Rohrscheid, 1954), p. 25.
233 Cf. the detailed analysis of the statute in Helmut Hirsch, Die Saar in Versailles (Bonn: Rohrscheid, 1952), pp. 47- 
56.
234 Cf. Gowan, France and the Saar, p. 120.
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year turns, but they had no power and their responsibilities were limited to advising the 
commission on matters of legislation.235
With the introduction of the French Franc as the only valid currency in the Saar on 1 
June 1923, economic ties between France and the Saar were strengthened considerably and the 
territory became an important market for French goods. This was part of a more general French 
policy in the Saar, which sought to strengthen French influence and to develop Saar autonomy. 
Until 1926/27, both of these goals were balanced against one another. Afterwards, however, 
greater emphasis was placed on the realisation of French interests in the Saar. Consequently, 
tensions between population and government of the Saar grew and a movement began to form 
that demanded the reunion of the Saar with Germany before the 1935 referendum.236
In the meantime, the Saarverein, which had been founded in Germany in the early 
1920s, co-ordinated the efforts of the Saar emigrants in Germany to achieve a speedy return of 
the Saar. Although economic integration into France made progress, the political situation in the 
Saar became increasingly anti-French and pro-German. The NSDAP, while rising to political 
power in Germany, competed for the first time in elections to the Saar Landesrat in 1932 but 
gained only two seats in the Advisory Council which was dominated by the Catholic Centre 
(fourteen seats), the Communists (eight) and the Social Democrats (three), all of which were 
opposed to a pro-German plebiscite.237 This constellation began to change in the course of 
1933. In July, the smaller right-wing pro-German parties (German National People’s Party, 
Peasant’s Party, Saar German People’s Party, Saar Economic Party) formed the German Front 
to co-ordinate their efforts in support of a pro-German referendum. The Catholic Centre joined 
the Front in October 1933 and the NSDAP in March 1934. The two parties opposing this 
development -  Social Democrats and Communists -  aligned their forces with the Saar 
Economic Association and a small number of Catholics led by Johannes Hoffmann who did not
235 The formation of a local police force began only in 1922, and French troops remained in the Saar until 1927 and 
were used for police purposes as well.
236 Ulrich Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage und die Alliierten 1942-1948 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1992), p. 25.
237 The Saar Economic Party (1) and the Saar German People’s Party (2) held the remaining seats.
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support the Catholic Centre’s policy and formed the Saar Freedom Front, later renamed Antir 
Fascist Unity Front. However, they were less well organised and far less powerful. With 
religion being an important part of the Saar population’s identity, and the Catholic clergy, 
similar to Alsace, South Tyrol, and Northern Ireland, thus playing a major role in the social and 
political life of the Saar, the chances for the opponents of reunification with Germany to gain a 
significant part of the vote were completely shattered when the Bishop of Trier encouraged the 
population to vote for the return to Germany.
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the SA and SS had been banned in the Saar since 
1928, clashes between the two movements increased significantly throughout 1933 and 1934. 
The Saar commission faced the problem that the administration in the Saar was, at least 
numerically, dominated by Germans. Although they did not occupy the top positions in 
ministries and departments, their influence on the day-to-day running of Saar affairs could not 
be underestimated, as their generally pro-German attitude did not support the commission’s 
efforts to secure fair conditions for the plebiscite.238 The commission called in 3,300 foreign 
troops from Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden to supervise and secure the 
referendum, which took place on 13 January 1935. Of the 528,105 votes cast, 477,119 were in 
favour of a return of the Saar to Germany, 46,613 for the status quot and only 2,124 for union 
with France.239 This was a clear manifestation of the Saar population’s ethnic identity as 
German and of its desire to see this identity develop in a German national environment rather 
than in a situation of uncertain national affiliation and dominated by a state with as 
homogenising an approach to the question of nationhood as France.
238 Albert H. V. Kraus, Die Saarfrage (1945-1955) im Spiegel der Publizistik (Saarbrtlcken: Verlag Die Mitte, 1988), 
p. 37.
239 Voters were given a choice of three options: (1) Do you want the Saar territory to become part of Germany? (2) 
Do you want the Saar territory to become part of France? (3) Do you want the status quo being preserved?
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The Saar as Part of the Third Reich240
The official date of the restoration of German sovereignty over the Saar was 1 March 
1935, when a representative of the League of Nations handed over power to the German 
minister of the interior. The German Reich had decided to leave the Saar as ian administrative 
entity of its own (instead of dividing it between Bavaria and Prussia according to the pre-1919 
situation), but had it administered as part of the Palatine G a m .241 The Law on the Provisional 
Military Administration of the Saar of 30 January 1935 had determined the name of the territory 
to be Saarland. France and Germany had already settled the matter of French ownership of the 
coal mines, railways and other property in the Saar in the Treaties of Rome,242 which also 
provided some initial protection for opponents to the Nazi regime by granting a limited 
immunity from prosecution in matters related to the referendum.243
However, the restoration of German sovereignty over the Saar meant that all German 
legal regulations were applied in the Saar as well, which included all the emergency provisions 
that had been enacted on 28 February 1933. They were the basis upon which the German state 
organised the prosecution and elimination of political opponents and of what the Nazis regarded 
as ‘inferior’ people -  Jews,244 Gypsies, Homosexuals, and disabled people.245
Some leftist and Catholic circles resisted the Nazis actively before 1938. In 1936/37, the 
Catholic population protested against the abolition of the confessional school system, and in 
1937/38, miners refused to work on Sundays. This form of opposition, rooted in the strong 
religious component of Saar identity, is similar to developments in Alsace in the mid-1920s and
240 Two good general overviews of this period are Albert Marx, Die Geschichte der Juden im Saarland: vom Ancien 
rigime bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Saarbrtlcken: Verlag Die Mitte, 1992) and Abteilung Presse und Information, 
Kurzer Abriss der Geschichte des Saarlandes (Saarbrtlcken: Staatskanzlei des Saarlandes, Abteilung Presse und 
Information, 1982).
24* Cf. Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, p. 26.
242 Die deal agreed upon meant that Germany had to pay 300,000,000 Francs in cash and 600,000,000 Francs in 
goods. Cf. Gowan, France and the Saar, p. 172.
243 The League of Nations supervised the adherence to the Treaties of Rome. A similar mechanism was established 
after the 1955 referendum. Cf. below.
244 The last 134 of formerly 6,400 Jews were deported from the Saar in 1940.
245 Until 1938, about 6,000 people had fled the Saar, some of whom fought in the International Brigades in the 
Spanish Civil War, in the French resistance movement, or the National Committee Free Germany. Others who did not 
escape were imprisoned or sent to concentration camps.
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again in the 1930s. It also highlights the differences in the French and German political 
environment -  while Alsatian particularism had at least some limited success in defending its 
religious status, initial opposition in the Saar failed, and from 1938 onwards, organised political 
resistance ceased to exist at all, partly because of the economic recovery of the Saar, partly 
because of the effective control exercised by Gestapo and SS. In addition, the racist and 
nationalist ideology of the Nazis conquered the minds of many people in the Saar and led them 
to tolerate if not actively endorse the new regime. After 1942, the Saar became a target of Allied 
air raids. As a result of these, thousands of civilians died and almost the entire infrastructure and 
more than half of all houses and public buildings were destroyed. From 6 December 1944, the 
former border region between the Saar and France was declared a military operation zone and 
the civilian population was forced to move out of the area. At the end of the war, the Saar 
population found itself in a widely destroyed country and disillusioned with Germany.
The Re-emergence of the Saar Conflict after 1945
Prelude to the Conflict
The failure of the Peace Treaty of Versailles to ensure peace and stability in Europe and
the consequences of this failure influenced the way in which the World War II allies approached 
the question of a post-war settlement. However, this was not the only factor of influence. Soviet 
territorial expansion in the east and the subsequent compensation of Poland resulted in severe 
alterations of Germany’s eastern borders. The postponement of a peace treaty gave all 
arrangements the taste of temporality. In contrast to the development after the First World War, 
the allied military occupation and the different zones of occupation effectively removed 
Germany as a player from the political arena until the foundation of the two German states in 
1949. German partition and the outbreak of the Cold War changed the geo-political interest 
structure in Europe and led to the inclusion of West. Germany into the beginning process of 
European and Western integration.
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French Saar Policy until 1947
France, which had suffered greatly and incurred tremendous losses during the war, had
three basic demands at the end of the war -  security, reparations, and participation in the 
occupation of German territory. Common to all three demands was that they gave rise, once 
again, to territorial and border questions. At a press conference on 25 January 1945, General de 
Gaulle claimed the Rhine as a natural border which, in its whole length, represented French and 
world-wide security interests.246 The need for plans concerning the special treatment of the 
Saar, Ruhr, and Rhineland was, initially, not very well received among the Allies nor in France 
itself as territorial gains at the cost of Germany were potentially seen as giving rise to renewed 
German nationalism.
Such objections, however, did not stop France from pursuing its distinct interests with 
respect to the Saar; rather, these early objections helped France to formulate a successful long­
term policy with respect to the Saar. First of all, it was necessary to dissociate the Saar question 
from the Rhineland and the Ruhr. This was not too difficult, as the Saar, in contrast to the other 
two territories, had historically been under French influence for considerable periods and even 
belonged to the French state for some time (1681-1697 and 1792-1814/15). In addition, it had 
already served once as compensation for French war losses, namely between 1919/20 and 1935. 
A problem that remained, and had existed in a similar way in 1919, was the fact that the 
population of the Saar had a very strong German identity, and had demonstrated its desire to be 
German and belong to Germany rather than to France in the 1935 referendum. This argument, 
however, could at least be weakened by pointing to Nazi influence at the time.
A French mission, which was sent to the Saar in summer 1945 after France had 
formally become the Allied occupation power in the Saar,247 strengthened the French argument
246 Cf. Jacques Freymond, The Saar Conflict, 1945-55 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1960), p. 5.
247 According to the Yalta Agreement between Britain, the USA, and the Soviet Union, France was to become the 
fourth member of the Allied Control Commission. The European Advisory Commission of the Allies designated the 
Saar, Baden, Wtirttemberg, and Rhineland-Palatine as the territory of French occupation. This settlement was signed 
on 26 July 1945, and ratified by the four powers between 29 July and 13 August The Saar territory had been 
liberated by American troops on 21 March 1945, which remained there until they were substituted by French troops 
on 10 July 1945.
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by concluding that the Saar had been a disputed territory between France and Germany for 
almost 300 years and that it had strategic importance for France because of its defence value, 
industries, and natural resources. The solution proposed by the mission formed the basis of 
French policy in the years to follow -  economic integration of the Saar into France while giving 
it a politically autonomous status within a framework of monetary and customs union. This 
meant the political and economic detachment of the Saar from Germany. Immediately, the 
French Military administration took a first step into this direction by creating five separate 
administrative entities in its zone of occupation, one of them being the Saar.248
In early 1946, the French government made a proposal for the future status of the Saar, 
which marked the abandonment of the earlier annexation plans in favour of economic union.249 
Economically, the Saar was to be incorporated into France and the French customs area, French 
rights to the Saar coal mines were to be recognised by the Allies, and the German mark was 
immediately to be substituted by the French Franc. Politically, France envisaged the 
establishment of a central administrative body for the Saar, the so-called High Commission, the 
delegation of responsibility for Saar foreign and defence policy to France, and the permanent 
deployment of French troops in the area.250
The French decision to press for such an arrangement had been informed by the 
consideration of a number of factors, not all of which were to the advantage of France. On the
248 This policy was based on a memorandum of 1944 in which a former French consular to the Saar had outlined the 
French interests in the Saar and ways to their realisation. Based on the approach that the military security of France 
depended on the strengthening of the French industrial capacity and the simultaneous weakening of that of Germany, 
the detachment of the Saar coal mines and steel production from Germany and their economic incorporation into 
France seemed to him the logical solution. Although there were other and more radical proposals as well, the great 
advantage of this one was that it fitted in with de Gaulle’s conception of French policy towards Germany which 
consisted in demands for the territorial, economic, and militaiy weakening of Germany and presented aims which 
were more reasonable and more likely to be accomplished in the general framework of (Western) Allied policy. 
However, de Gaulle’s conception of how to secure French interests in a post-war Europe was not unrivalled. Another 
suggestion to solve the German problem was the integration of Germany into a system of collective security and a 
simultaneous democratisation of German society. The further development of the Saar question would show that the 
policy based on the strength-weakness approach would be successful until the late 1940s but inevitably lead to 
territorial conflict with Germany, while the policy change towards the establishment of a system of collective security 
would require a solution of the Saar problem which was dramatically different from the original French goals of 
1944.
249 The decision-making process which led to the French memorandum of 12 February 1946, has been documented 
in Rainer Hudemann, “Die. Saar zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland 1945-1947”, in Rainer Hudemann and 
Raymond Poidevin, Die Saar 1945-1955 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 11-24, here pp. 23ff.
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negative side was the situation in the Saar itself. Between 30,000-35,000 people had died during 
the war, more than 100,000 were prisoners of war, and there was also a high percentage of 
wounded and missing. More than half of the housing stock had been destroyed. Economic and 
social life were completely paralysed, mostly as a result of the casualties, but also because 
schools, hospitals, factories, and bridges had been destroyed. Incorporating the Saar into France, 
whatever the concrete method, meant that France had at least to take on responsibility to feed 
and house the population.251 This population, eighty-three per cent of who had been bom in the 
Saar,252 did not only have a historically grown and very strong regional sense Of identification 
with its homeland, but was generally pro-German, i.e., regarded itself and the character of its 
homeland and its identity best preserved in a German national environment. In addition, the 
small pro-French section was split between those who wanted to establish the Saar as, at least, 
politically an autonomous unit and those who favoured complete integration with France.
On the positive side were anticipated long-term economic gains and political 
advantages for France. The proposed arrangement would deprive Germany of a part of its war 
industry, would dissociate the Saar from French reparation demands, and would weaken the 
political ties between the Saar and Germany.
The implementation of the French proposal was only possible because a number of 
factors worked to France’s advantage, the most important of them being that Britain and the 
USA had so far been in favour of a special treatment for the Saar but had not developed any 
concrete plans,253 so that the French proposal of 1946 did not have to compete with other 
concrete models representing the interests of other Allied powers. Other factors were France’s 
relative strength compared to Germany, its claims as one of the victorious powers, and the 
recognition of the French right to military security and material compensation. Of no lesser 
importance was the beginning of the split between the United States and Great Britain, on the
250 Cf. Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, pp. 102-104.
251 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, p. 12.
252 Gowan, France and the Saar, p. 16.
253 Cf. Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, pp. 69-70 and 104-105.
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one side, and the Soviet Union on the other. The fact that the fonr Allied Powers were unable to 
achieve agreement on the Saar issue and the increasing emphasis that the USA and Britain 
placed on Western integration, made it easier for France to secure a settlement of the Saar 
question that met its interests.254 Thus, while the Soviet Union strongly resisted any plans to 
place the Saar under a separate regime, and remove this valuable territory from the pool of 
reparations, France obtained a conditional yes from the other two Allies in exchange for its 
support for the setting-up of a central (West) German administration.255 The two Western 
Allies’ decision to make concessions to France on the Saar issue was motivated by their firm 
intent to prevent an internationalisation of the Rhineland and Ruhr to prevent the Soviet Union 
from expanding its zone of influence further west. A pre-condition for the success of this 
strategy was to avoid at all cost Franco-Soviet co-operation in Germany, and the Saar issue was 
rightly perceived as a major asset with which French allegiance to Britain and the USA could be 
secured.256 In addition, a final settlement of the reparations question was impossible without 
establishing the future status of the Saar either as part of the general reparations pool or as 
detached from it. Eventually, the French argument vis-a-vis the (Western) Allies was also 
strengthened by the obvious geographic and economic links between the Saar and Lorraine.257
In the course of the implementation of this policy, the first measures of the French 
government were essentially economic -  the sequestration of the mines on 28 December 1945 
and their being placed under French administration on 2 January 1946. The political and 
economic dissociation of the Saar from Germany was increased on 22 December 1946, through 
the extension of the French customs barrier to the eastern frontier of the Saar.
254 A detailed account of the role the Saar issue played in Allied negotiations Over the future of Germany can be 
found in Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, pp. 97-204.
255 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 17-22.
256 Cf. the detailed exploration of the Anglo-American position on the Saar in Martin KerkhofT, “GrundzUge der 
anglo-amerikanischen Haltung zur Saarfrage 1946-1948”, in Hudemann and Poidevin, Die Saar, pp. 81-96.
257 The links were the coalfield stretching from Lorraine right into the Saar basin and the mutual importance of iron 
ore from Lorraine and coal form the Saar for the industries in both areas. Gowan, France and the Saar, pp. 210-211. 
Also, Eberhard Menzel, The Saar Problem (Hamburg: Bonner Berichte, 1952), pp. 6-10.
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While economic integration was pursued eagerly by France and encountered hardly any 
resistance,258 any moves towards further political integration of the Saar met with strong 
opposition from within three camps — internationally from the Allies, and within France from 
the SFIO259 and from Lorraine.260 This strong opposition to political integration of the Saar into 
France, however, did not mean that France would stop pursuing its policy of separating the Saar 
politically from Germany. As a permanent international settlement of the issue approved by all 
four Allied powers would clearly not be achieved in the foreseeable future, a Saar constitution 
was required which would have to compensate partly for the absence of an international statute. 
A constitutional commission was set up on 13 February 1947 and a draft constitution was 
published on 25 September 1947. The constitution was based on similar documents adopted for 
the other German states but had to observe certain French directives. Most of these regulations 
became part of the preamble to the constitution. The key points of the constitution which 
represented French interests in the Saar were the economic integration of the Saar into France 
through a monetary and customs union, Saar independence from German sovereignty, French 
responsibility for representing the external and defence interests of the Saar, the application of 
French monetary and customs legislation, and the right of the French governor in the Saar to 
issue decrees to safeguard the economic union and to execute monetary and customs 
regulations.261 The special rights which France could derive from the economic union with the 
Saar were also specified in the preamble, and their enumeration was a significant success for 
those who had argued for stronger autonomy of the Saar, as this enumeration meant that there
258 On 4 January 1947, a co-ordination mission for the economic integration of the Saar into France was created, 
whose tasks were to formulate an overall French Saar policy and to control the French military administration in the 
Saar.
259 The French Socialists objected to the policy of territorial gains in the Saar not only for ideological reasons, but 
also because of their more general rejection of de Gaulle and his policies. Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, p. I l l ;  also 
Wilfried Loth, Sozialismus und Intemationalismus. Die jranzdsischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnurig 
Europas 1940-1950 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977).
260 Resistance to political integration of the Saar in Lorraine was based on the consideration that the Saar was an 
unwanted competitor that had taken Lorraine’s traditional position as intermediary between France and Germany at 
die cost of Lorraine’s industry. Demands from Lorraine, therefore, were to postpone immediate annexation, to 
introduce a period of fifteen to twenty years of probation for the Saar, but to exploit France’s political position 
through the sequestration of the mines and the iron and steel industry, and to retain firm control over the Saar by a 
regime of occupation. Cf. Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 24-25.
261 Cf. Gowan, France and the Saar, p. 221.
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would be no subsequent interpretation disputes on French rights.262 While the constitution 
achieved the French aim to separate the Saar from Germany, it did not deliver what the pro- 
French among the political forces in the Saar had desired, namely a status of full internal self- 
government.263
Developments in the Saar
By October 1946, the French administration had licensed four political parties -  the Christian 
People’s Party (CVP, founded on 10 January 1946), the Social Democratic Party of the Saar 
(SPS, founded on 28 October 1945), the Communist Party of the Saar (KPS, founded on 10 
January 1946), and the Democratic Party of the Saar (DPS, founded on 26 October 1946).264 
The dominating political party from 1946 to 1955 was the CVP. Together with the SPS it 
strongly supported the idea of an autonomous Saar economically unified with France and 
politically detached from Germany, partly reflecting the post-1935 experience of its leadership, 
rather than the long-term interests of its electorate. While the KPS resisted the policy of 
economic union with France from the beginning, the DPS had initially accepted closer 
economic ties with France. From 1950 onwards, however, this party did not only oppose the 
economic policies of France in the Saar but the French Saar policy in general, especially the 
lack of autonomy of the Saar and the way in which the conventions signed between the Saar and 
France were implemented.265
By the time the DPS turned into an opposition party, the MRS had become a politically 
insignificant factor in Saar politics because of its increasing detachment from the political 
parties and the population in the Saar.266 Initially, its membership consisted mostly of Saar
262 Michael Sander, “Die Verfassung des Saarlandes: Politische Planung und politischer Erfolg Frankreichs”, in 
Hudemann and Poidevin, Die Saar, pp. 237-252, here p. 248.
263 Cf. Menzel, The Saar Problem, pp. 9-10.
264 A short analysis of the party political system of the Saar between 1946 and 1955 is Winfried Becker, “Die 
Entwicklung der politischen Parteien im Saarland 1945 bis 1955 nach franzOsischen Quellen”, in Hudemann and 
Poidevin, Die Saar, pp. 253-296.
265 Cf. Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, pp. 74-83.
266 In the years before, especially between 1946 and 1948, however, the MRS had played a significant role in 
securing French influence on the developments in the Saar. Originating from the Movement for the Liberation of the 
Saar, its goals were the political and economic integration of the Saar into the French polity and the complete cultural
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emigrants to France after 1935, but soon it had more than 30,000 members, thanks to an 
enormous propaganda effort and the backing of the French administration in the Saar. The 
strongest impact the MRS made on Saar politics was in connection with the drafting of the 
constitution. According to a decree issued by the French military governor, the four parties who 
nominated the delegates to the constitutional commission had to make sure that half of the 
members of the commission had to be MRS members. Since the chairman of the commission, 
CVP leader Johannes Hoffmann, was an MRS member as well and since his vote decided in 
case of a draw, no draft constitution could be passed by the commission against the MRS.267 A 
certain safeguard against abuse of this position by the MRS could be seen in the fact that the 
constitution could not be put into force by the drafting commission but only by the Landtag, 
which was subsequently elected by the Saar population.
After a short election campaign, the first post-war Landtag elections were held on 5 
October 1947. With a turnout of 95.7%, they resulted in an overall majority for the CVP 
(51.2%), with the SPS (32.8%) coming in second, followed by the KPS (8.4%) and the DPS 
(7.6%).268 The Landtag voted in favour of the constitution on 8 November and it entered into 
force after French approval on 15 December 1947. The military government was transformed 
into a High Commission on 31 December 1947. These election results can, with some caution, 
be interpreted as a vote of the population for economic integration with France: eighty-four per 
cent of the votes were in favour of the two parties (CVP, SPS) who had advocated the 
unconditional economic union with France, the DPS had done so as well after some 
hesitation,269 and only the KPS had spoken out against economic union.270 This seems to be in
assimilation of the Saar population. Cf. Robert H. Schmidt, Saarpolitik 1945-57 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959- 
1962), vol. 1, pp. 154-155.
267 The regulations of the French Military Administration are analysed in Robert Stfiber, Die Saarlandische 
Verfassung vom 15. Dezember 1947 und ihre Entstehung (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1952), pp. 2-3. 
(Robert StOber is the pseudonym for Heinrich Schneider who served as chairman of the DPS through most of the 
conflict period.)
268 Hie percentage figures in brackets refer to the overall number of valid votes. The number of invalid votes was 
just under ten per cent Cf. Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, p. 196.
269 In the original party programme, the DPS had not committed itself to a position on the issue of economic union 
and was therefore not issued with a license by the French Military Administration, alter appropriate changes were 
made, the license was issued. Hie two programmes are reprinted in Schmidt, Saarpolitik, pp. 262ff, and 593ff., 
respectively.
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contradiction with the political aspirations expressed by the Saar population some twelve years 
earlier and, in retrospect, eight years later. However, this contradiction is only superficial, as, at 
the time, there was no obvious link between economic and political developments -  Germany 
was still divided into zones of occupation, France had not joined the bizonal arrangements 
between the United Kingdom and the United States, and there was no indication that economic 
integration with France (at the time seeming a prudent choice given the economic conditions in 
Germany) would sever the ‘national’ links with Germany. As such, the election results do not 
indicate a sudden change in Saar identity.
Although official French policy was directed at the fulfilment of the autonomy status of 
the Saar, some efforts were also made in terms of integration. Some elements of French 
legislation and of the legislative system were introduced in the Saar. On 27 November 1947, the 
French Franc became the only valid currency.271 Both measures served to widen the gap 
between the Saar and Germany. In addition, attempts were made to spread French culture.272
The International Context
The tacit consent of the USA and Britain to these French integration measures was put on a 
formal legal basis with the tripartite agreement between them and France signed on 20 February 
1948 in Berlin. The agreement consisted of four individual treaties which specified that all coal 
produced in the Saar belonged to France, that the French reparations account would be reduced 
by seventy million Reichsmark,, and that the trade relations between the Saar and the British and 
American zones of occupation were henceforth regarded as foreign trade.273 This considerably
270 As early as March 1947 the KPS had criticised the policy of the CVP and SPS to negotiate for an economic union 
between the Saar and France without that the prior consent of the population had been obtained. Cf. Pohlmann, Die 
Saarfrage, pp. 82-83. Because of the pressure exercised by the strong French Communist Party, the KPS, in contrast 
to the DPS some years later, was not banned because of its opposition to economic union with France. Cf. Becker, 
Die Entwicklung, p. 291. This policy continued after the reunification of the Saar with Germany, and the party was 
eventually banned on 9 April 1957, by a decree of the Saar minister of the interior. Cf. ibid., p. 295.
271 During an interim period between 16 January and 20 November the so-called Saar-Mark was the official 
currency.
272 More details on these early French assimilation efforts can be found in Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 34-37.
273 Cf. the account of the treaties in Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, pp. 212-214.
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strengthened the French position in the Saar and vis-a-vis Germany and the Western Allies.274 
With this agreement being the only one ever concluded between the Western Allies regarding 
the Saar, Germany could later on rightly adopt a position claiming the Saar was still part of 
German territory. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the conflict between France and 
Germany over the Saar emerged from this agreement. Rather, it emerged from the different 
interpretations of it -  France took it as consent from the Western Allies to pursue its policy of 
economic integration of the Saar with all its obvious political consequences, while Germany 
insisted on the provisional status of the settlement and saw the agreement merely as a matter of 
regulating technical questions. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the agreement between the 
Western Allies marked the end of the first stage in the post-1945 Saar conflict.
The Trilateralisation of the Saar Conflict: Germany, France, and Europe 
Until the end of 1947 France was firmly in control of all developments relating to the Saar.
Germany was economically and politically weak, still governed by the Allied military
governments, and in no position to exercise political influence. In the Saar itself, there was no
significant opposition to French policy. This situation began to change gradually from 1948
onwards, hi the international arena, Germany started to recover economically and politically.
With the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, Germany became a political player again,
yet remained somewhat limited in its actions because the country had not yet regained full
sovereignty. At this stage, the Saar question was not a priority for the newly formed German
government, but rather one aspect of its overall relationship with France.275 France, on the other
hand, was weakened internally by a number of government crises, a constant lack of stable
parliamentary majorities, and externally by losing ground in North Africa and South East Asia.
274 However, as the name of the agreement suggested, it was only economic in nature -  “Economic Agreement 
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France Regarding the Saar”. Although it accepted the economic 
ties between France and the Saar, it did not recognise a change in political status of the Saar. The reason few the 
exclusively economic nature of the agreement was that it was not in die interest of the Western Allies to increase the 
East-West tensions at this critical stage of post-war German development, nor to create a precedent for other 
permanent border revisions, especially not in the Soviet zone of influence.
275 Winfried Schumacher, “Konrad Adenauer und die Saar”, in Hudemann and Poidevin, Die Saar, pp. 49-74, here p. 
49.
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German Saar Policy, 1949-1952
The two major political parties in Germany, the SPD and the CDU, rejected the separation of 
the Saar from Germany. The official response to French Saar policy, however, had to be 
restricted to protesting against the developments in the Saar because France had not yet 
recognised the German role in the conflict, let alone accepted the neighbouring country and 
former enemy as a partner in negotiations. Nevertheless, a policy to counter the French 
integration and assimilation attempts began to develop in the so-called Friedensbiiro, a non­
governmental organisation that had committed itself to achieve the return of the Saar. Its basis 
was in the state of Rhineland-Palatine and it was funded, after 1949, to a considerable degree 
from the Federal Ministry of All-German Affairs.
Despite the fact that the Saar government rejected co-operation with the German states, 
and after 1949 with the Federal Republic, German politicians up to the chancellor began to 
voice their opposition against a permanent separation of the Saar from Germany. Resistance 
began also to emerge in business circles from the Saar and Germany in late 1949. In this 
situation, the Western Allies adopted the position that nothing was final until a peace treaty with 
Germany had been signed, and urged France to act according to this position.
Even though Germany, at the time, had more pressing foreign political concerns than 
the Saar question,276 the German response to the increasing French efforts, and their success, to 
integrate the Saar more firmly into France in early 1950 came in the form of a memorandum on 
10 March 1950. This memorandum stressed the provisional character of the current set-up and 
emphasised that the Saar was part of German territory in the borders of 31 December 1937, 
which had been confirmed in an Allied Declaration of 5 June 1945. The memorandum went on 
to insist that no alteration be made to these frontiers except in a peace treaty. The lack of a 
plebiscite to give the Saar population a chance to vote on their constitution was condemned, as 
were the conventions, which Germany considered to be designed to cast in concrete the
276 One was to achieve admission to the international Ruhr authority and to stop the Allies from continuing to 
dismantle German plants as part of their reparation demands.
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separation of the Saar from Germany. Economically, the memorandum claimed that economic 
survival of the Saar was only possible if it was allowed to maintain its links with east and west. 
Concluding on a more optimistic note, Germany expressed confidence that there was a 
possibility to find a solution to the problem on a European level.277 With the official German 
recognition that there was a Saar question, the conflict became real and it became international. 
The Saar problem had turned into a territorial dispute between two states, a feature that 
distinguishes it clearly at this stage from the developments in Alsace and Northern Ireland. Only 
in the case of South Tyrol, there was a short period of time before the signing of the Paris 
Agreement when the conflict, fuelled by Austrian irrdentism, took the shape of a territorial 
dispute between Italy and Austria.
The Continuation of French Integration Policy
In order to counter, and limit the consequences of, the obviously disadvantageous shift in the 
power balance, France pursued two strategies simultaneously. It denied Germany every say in 
relation to the Saar and undertook steps to base its relationship with the Saar on a safer legal 
ground by concluding a number of agreements with the Saar government. Both strategies were 
closely linked. To this effect, a number of conventions were signed between January 1948 and 
January 1949 demonstrating the commitment of the French government to detach the Saar 
further from Germany and to integrate it more firmly and more permanently into France.278 The 
means of this integration policy were very much assimilative in character. Thus, after the 1947
277 Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bundesregierung (ed.), Denkschrift der Bundesregierung zur Saarfrage (Bonn: 
Bonner Universitatsbuchdruckerei, 1950).
278 The conventions between the Saar and France regulated fiscal and budgetary matters, the organisation of Saar 
jurisdiction, the protection of industrial rights in the Saar, and cultural affairs. The Agreement on the Fiscal and 
Budgetary Legislation of 13 January 1948, determined that the Saar budget be controlled by the French High 
Commissioner and that French commercial law and retail prices be adopted. The Convention on the Organisation of 
Jurisdiction, signed by both governments on 3 January 1948, aimed at die approximation of the Saar legal system to 
that of France. A privileged position for French trademarks, the introduction of French industrial legislation, and the. 
extension of the jurisdiction of the French patent office into the Saar were regulated by the Convention on the 
Protection of Industrial Rights of 12 December 1948. Eventually, far-reaching consequences for the further 
development of German culture in the Saar were implied in the Cultural Agreement, which was signed on 12 January 
1949. With respect to higher education, it established that the Saar university be jointly governed by France and the 
Saar, that university degrees be reciprocally recognised, and that French teaching staff be appointed in the Saar. In 
the school curricula of the Saar French became an obligatory subject from the second grade of primary school 
onwards. Furthermore, youth and sports organisations in the Saar were required to co-operate with their French
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constitution had already laid the ground for a systematic erosion of Saar autonomy, the 
independent status of the Saar was now curtailed even more.
Part of the French integration policy was the handling of the citizenship issue. This was 
dealt with separately in the Law on Citizenship of 15 July 1948, which determined that all 
citizens of the Saar would automatically loose their German citizenship. People who chose not 
to take Saar citizenship would henceforth be treated as foreigners, including all German citizens 
resident in the Saar.279 The artificial creation of a Saar citizenship indicating ever more decisive 
steps towards severing the links between the Saar and Germany, which was still seen by the 
majority of the population in the Saar as their national homeland, was perceived as a threat to 
the traditionally strong German elements in Saar identity. Consequently, opposition in the Saar 
against French policy started to grow, an additional reason being the economic recovery and 
political stability in Germany which let reunification look like a more promising prospect. 
Although the economic situation in the Saar improved slightly during 1949, voices of 
opposition, still unorganised and scattered, remained. This was mainly because of the French 
political and economic domination of Saar affairs, in particular the disappointment over the 
handling of the monetary union at the end of 1947280 and the administration of the autonomy 
status as a whole.281 The general French policy line was to make formal rather than substantive 
concessions. This became apparent in the way the Saar administration was run. The gradual 
withdrawal of French civil servants and administrative services and their subsequent 
substitution by native inhabitants of the Saar did not put an end to French domination because 
all public authorities were responsible to the High Commission.282
counterparts, which also represented them internationally. The High Commissioner controlled all broadcasting in the 
Saar. A scheme of cultural exchanges between the Saar and France was set up as well.
279 Per Fischer, Die Saar zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1959), p. 83.
2811 After an initial consumption rush possible because of the favourable exchange rate, the monetary devaluation 
became apparent.
281 Pohlmann, Die Saarfrage, pp. 86-88.
282 This became apparent in the way the Saar administration was run. The gradual withdrawal of French civil 
servants and administrative services and their subsequent substitution by native inhabitants of the Saar did not put an 
end to French domination because all public authorities were responsible to the High Commission.
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A further source of threats to the success of French policy was the beginning of the cold 
war. While European integration became increasingly important, it became increasingly 
incompatible with a French policy in the Saar that ran counter to German interests. In realising 
this, the French government adopted a new strategy aimed at a revision of the 1948/49 
conventions in a new and more comprehensive set of treaties which would return full internal 
sovereignty to the Saar with only defence and foreign policy remaining in French hands.283
After the French Foreign Minister Schuman had visited Germany in January 1950 and 
the German chancellor Adenauer had brought up the Saar issue claiming the Saar as German 
territory and pushing for a trilateral agreement between Germany, France and the Saar, the 
French government saw the need to take action to strengthen its position in the Saar.284 
Subsequent negotiations between the Saar and French governments took place in February and 
March 1950. The French proposals for a series of treaties were eventually accepted by the Saar 
government and ratified in the Landtag in April 1950. The framework of the ten conventions 
and agreements285 was set by the General Convention of 3 March 1950. It established that the 
Saar be autonomous in legislation, administration, and jurisdiction within the limits of its 
constitution and the treaties signed between France and the Saar. The more obvious the 
contradiction between the proclaimed status of, and the reality of life in, the Saar became to the 
population, the more the opposition against integration into France grew and the more attractive 
became the option of reunification with Germany. But this was a gradual process which would 
gain momentum only from 1954 onwards.
In the meantime, opposition against the new conventions formed on the ground that the 
Saar government was not seen as an independent authority, but merely as a willing instrument
283 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, p. 61.
284 Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, pp. 49-50.
285 Tbe ten conventions and agreements signed on 3 March 1950, were: Convention on the Establishment of the 
Nationalities of the Two Countries; Convention on the Implementation of the Economic Union between France and 
the Saar, Convention on the Saar Coal Mines; Convention on the Use of the Railways in the Saar, Convention on the 
Control of the Insurance Companies in the Saar; Agreement on Mutual Judicial Aid; Agreement on Inland 
Navigation; Agreement on the Regulation of Road Transport; Agreement on the Regulation of Pharmaceutic 
Interests; Agreement on the Weights and Measures and the Instruments of Measure; and the Social Agreement
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of the French government helping it to implement its Saar policy. The trade unions* resistance 
against these conventions negotiated between the Saar and French governments strengthened 
the opposition movement in the Saar. As part of the French effort to regulate the relationship of 
the Saar with other states, in particular with Germany, and to give it an internationally 
recognised independent status, the government proposed to admit the Saar to the Council of 
Europe and did indeed achieve associate membership for the Saar in 1949.286
Despite domestic crises and the loss of international credibility in relation to its 
involvement in the anti-colonial wars in North Africa and the Far East, France was still in the 
stronger position on the Saar question. The French state was physically present in the Saar and 
the 1950 conventions gave the relations between the Saar and France a legal status according to 
international law. In addition, the associate membership of the Saar in the Council of Europe 
could be interpreted as recognition of the Saar’s status in Europe, including such recognition by 
Germany. After the ratification of the conventions in October and November 1950 in the French 
parliament and Senate, the French government made an attempt to reconcile its Saar and 
European policy by proposing to admit the Saar as a full member to the ECSC.287 With the 
growing opposition in the Saar and the gradual shaping of the German policy towards the Saar 
problem, the Saar government began to press harder for admission to the ECSC as well, but 
without success. Time was working in favour of Germany from 1950 onwards -  the German 
position improved politically and economically which gave Germany greater influence and the 
means to formulate and implement a policy towards the Saar, while the status of the Saar 
remained provisional and a final settlement was subject to a peace treaty which prevented a 
consolidation of the French position in and towards the Saar.
A New Player Emerges: Europe
Increasingly , the issue of European integration began to dominate Franco-German relations, and 
thus began a period in which this integration process and the Saar conflict influenced, and
28<* Fischer, Die Saar, p. 90.
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became dependent upon, one another. While Germany recognised the need for Franco-German 
reconciliation and European integration, neither the government nor the opposition were willing 
to bow to French Saar policy. Backed by public opinion, which held that the Saar should not be 
sacrificed to European integration, Germany stressed that neither had it recognised the Saar 
government nor would it abandon its territorial claims to the Saar. The German position was 
supported by the renewing of ties between German and Saar industries and increasing co­
operation between the Industriellen-Verbande from 1950 onwards.288 This was complemented 
by the launch of the Saarbund as the association of all emigrants from the Saar in the summer of 
1951 with support from the Ministry of All-German Affairs. Both organisations reinforced 
existing ties of kinship at semi-official levels and strengthened those elements in the identity of 
the Saar population that were rooted in the commonality of descent with the population in the 
Federal Republic, in the same language and shared historical memories, i.e., that constituted the 
basis of the Saar’s claim to be German. Apart from that, the German government was more 
reluctant to engage in a full-scale political and diplomatic conflict as it considered European 
integration to take higher priority in the Cold War climate of the early 1950s. That France took 
a similar position and focused its attention likewise on bringing, about the ECSC did not mean 
that either Germany or France had abandoned their ultimate objectives with respect to the Saar. 
The eventual conflict had merely been postponed.
In the Saar itself, the European dimension was not at the top of the political agenda. The 
trade unions continued to protest against the implementation of the conventions, in particular 
because they were perceived as having a negative effect on the living conditions of the workers 
especially where a comparison with Germany was made. Thus, demands for social benefits and 
nationalist claims became linked ever closer. Simultaneously, the belief became manifest that 
social reforms to the benefit of the Saar were only possible if the French influence on Saar 
affairs was eliminated. The Catholic clergy, again taking a stance in political affairs, joined
287 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, p. 75.
288 Ibid., p. 80.
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these general protests denouncing the lack of a referendum on the implementation of the 
conventions. However, it was not until the end of 1950 that the opposition to French policy took 
a more organised form The DPS adopted a clearly pro-German policy rejecting the idea of 
gaining greater autonomy within the existing or any other framework of European co-operation, 
but demanded the return of the Saar to Germany.289 The Saar government initially only 
restricted contacts and freedom of movement between the Saar and Germany but eventually 
banned the DPS on 21 May 1951, and ordered the seizure of its assets as a political party. This 
obvious curtailment of fundamental democratic rights and freedoms proved to be counter­
productive in that it legitimised the policy and goals of the DPS and the opposition movement at 
large, 290 gave Germany valuable political ammunition to attack the existing arrangement, and 
put the French and Saar governments in a difficult position in the Council of Europe and 
eventually more and more in the defensive over the Saar issue as a whole. Within the opposition 
movement, the trade unions began to play an increasingly important role as they were 
representing the social and economic interests of the Saar population against the still French- 
dominated policy of the Saar government. A central aspect of the trade unions’ protests were the 
rising prices because of increasing inflation in France, which once again made the disadvantages 
of economic integration into France apparent. Other issues over which opposition formed and 
grew were the interference of the French High Commission in the Saar and the preferential 
treatment of French civil servants, the slowness of the administrative machinery, and the 
treatment of the Saar population as second class citizens. All of this reinforced an increasingly 
common perception in the Saar that its essential interests were better served in reunification 
with Germany. Similar to South Tyrol and Northern Ireland, and to a lesser degree also similar 
to inter-war Alsace, this process strengthened the ethnic aspects in Saar identity and
289 Ibid., p. 86.
290 Within the opposition movement, the trade unions began to play an increasingly important role as they were 
representing the social and economic interests of the Saar population against the still French-dominated policy of the 
Saar government A central aspect of the trade unions’ protests were the rising prices because of increasing inflation 
in France, which once again made the disadvantages of economic integration into France apparent. Other issues over 
which opposition formed and grew were the interference from the French High Commission in the Saar and the 
preferential treatment of French civil servants, the slowness of the administrative machinery, and the treatment of the 
Saar population as second class citizens.
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increasingly turned the relationship between the Saar population and the French (and Saar) 
government into one between an external minority and the more or less hostile government of 
its host-state. This process began to gain momentum and eventually served as a mobilisation 
force among the Saar population to demand reunification with Germany as the solution to its 
problems.
Nevertheless, French policy continued to aim at a status for the Saar according to which 
it would become an independent entity, economically integrated with France, but its foreign and 
defence political interests would be represented by a European authority. To achieve this aim, 
France suggested to include the Saar as a full member in the future European Defence 
Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC), pursuing a policy similar to the 
one which had sought to have the Saar admitted as a full member to the ECSC. This move was 
neither welcomed by the German government nor by the Saar opposition, but in the crucial final 
status of negotiations over the ECSC treaty, the German government took a cautious approach 
not to endanger the conclusion of the treaty. At the Paris conference of Foreign Ministers in 
April 1951, Germany made it clear that it was unwilling to make concessions on the Saar 
question and that the ratification of the treaty in Germany depended very much on the way in 
which the role of the Saar was presented, all the more since the opposition parties in the German 
parliament were even less willing to compromise over the Saar and because any such firm 
position had full backing in public opinion. The French government found itself in a weaker 
position. Public interest in the Saar question was only moderate in France and the support of the 
Western Allies for a French position that could potentially endanger European integration was 
not very enthusiastic.291 Eventually, the two governments reached a compromise according to 
which the signing of the treaty would be accompanied by an exchange of letters in which France
291 Ibid., p. 89.
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and Germany would state their positions regarding the Saar and in which France would 
recognise that the German signature did not imply a German acceptance of the Saar status.292
Despite the compromise reached in Paris, the German government did not soften its 
demands with respect to the Saar, nor did France undertake any steps to include Germany in any 
effort to settle the issue. An official protest of the German chancellor to the Allied High 
Commission over the status of the Saar was formulated in May 1951. The answer of the Allies 
was disappointing for Germany -  the government was told that German authority did not extend 
beyond its territorial boundaries.293 This was a clear sign that the USA arid Britain were willing 
at least to tolerate French presence in the Saar and its political and economic detachment from 
Germany.
The Saar between France and Germany
During the summer of 1951, European issues dominated the political agenda in France and 
Germany again, this time in the form of the European Defence Community and German re­
armament.
In the Saar, the banning of the DPS had not wiped out, but rather encouraged the 
opposition. By the end of 1951, the opposition had more regular contacts with Germany. 
Opposition also grew within the SPS, which became apparent in the break-up of the so far stable 
government coalition. After the banning of the DPS, the opposition movement in the Saar tried 
to organise itself in new parties before the next Landtag elections scheduled for autumn 1952. 
On 2 February 1952, the decision was made to form a CDU in the Saar, and at the beginning of 
March the same decision was made with respect to a Saar SPD. According to regulations on the 
conduct of political parties in the Saar, both had to apply for a license to the Saar ministry of the 
interior. No immediate decision was made and the issue was postponed until after the law
292 The Saar government did not have any input on these negotiations as a government crisis sparked by the 
resignation of the two SPS ministers in the CVP-SPS coalition resulted in the entire government stepping down.
293 Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, p. 53.
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regulating political parties was passed by the Saar parliament in September 1952.294 Both 
parties were supported in their efforts to obtain a license by the Saarbund, the Deutsche Aktion, 
and the Ministry of All-German Affairs in Germany, and part of the Saar clergy, especially the 
Bishop of Trier, who came out in support of the CDU, and the trade unions, especially the 
miners, who supported the SPD. Although this strengthened the two potential new parties 
economically and psychologically, it did not increase their chances to obtain the necessary 
license before the next elections. This failure, however, was attributed to the anti-German 
attitude of the Saar and French governments and reinforced perceptions of the evolving conflict 
as based on competing claims of national belonging, i.e., on the incompatible desires of one part 
of the Saar population, backed by official and semi-official organisations in the Federal 
Republic, to achieve reunification with Germany, and another part of the population, 
represented by the then Saar government and supported by the French authorities, to preserve 
the status quo. Within less than three years and caused by a variety of different factors, the 
numerical and power balance between these two sections would alter fundamentally and bring 
about the reunification of the Saar with Germany.
At the same time, a new diplomatic battle opened between France and Germany when, 
on 25 January 1952, France abolished the Office of the High Commissioner in the Saar and 
established an embassy instead in an effort to increase the attractiveness of the current status of 
the Saar among the Saar population and to give the Saar a stronger international position. 
However, the move proved to be counter-productive -  it led to a renewed escalation of the 
Franco-German conflict Leaving the personnel in the new embassy mostly unchanged, the 
positive impact of this action on the Saar population was more than limited, and the German 
response harsh. An official protest was submitted in Paris, and Germany also sought to involve 
the British and American governments. In this situation and after some Anglo-American 
pressure, the French government made an important concession, accepting the necessity of
294 According to this law, a license was dependent on the party leaders agreeing to respect the constitution of the 
Saar and giving assurances that they were not part of an association with headquarters outside the Saar.
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negotiations with Germany with the aim to achieve a permanent solution of the Saar conflict 
prior to a peace treaty.295 Eventually, France acknowledged Germany’s role in the conflict and 
with it the fact that the Saar problem had not yet been permanently resolved. Similar to the 
developments in Northern Ireland and South Tyrol, this acknowledgement marked a major step 
towards more fruitful approaches to resolve the ensuing conflict, notwithstanding the fact that 
conditions in the Saar and in France and Germany and the international environment provided 
the opportunity for a much speedier settlement of the Saar conflict.
The Settlement of the Conflict
The last act in the Saar conflict was characterised by the increasing influence of the 
process of further European integration on the Saar question, and vice versa, on the international 
level, and by the decreasing importance of economic issues in the Saar for the development of 
the conflict and their increasing politicisation. The final stage began on 29 February 1952 when 
Germany announced in a letter to the Council of Europe that it was determined to bring the 
issue of the constant violation of basic democratic rights and freedoms in the Saar before the 
Council during its next session.
German-French Relations
The German demands for the revision of the Saar status were that the autonomy of the 
politically, economically, and culturally independent Saar be placed under the supervision of the 
Council of Europe, that Saarbriicken be the seat of the organs of the ECSC; that neither France 
nor Germany influence public opinion in the Saar; that the Saar population be given the 
opportunity to express its opinion freely in new elections to the Landtag; and that part of the 
Saar territory be incorporated into the Federal Republic.296 In the same memorandum, the 
German government accused the government of the Saar of violating basic democratic rights -
295 Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, p. 53.
296 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, p. 110.
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the right to personal freedom and security -  and freedoms -  the freedom of opinion and 
association.
Despite the fact that the demands Germany raised in this memorandum were 
unacceptable to France, the two governments agreed to set up a commission to analyse the 
election conditions in the Saar in which all three conflicting parties -  France, Germany, and the 
Saar -  should be represented. This agreement increased the status of the Saar government in the 
international arena. Thus, it was not surprising that the Saar government, which favoured the 
long-term objective of Europeanisation of the Saar, welcomed the set-up of this commission. In 
Germany and France, however, optimism was less widespread.
Domestic Sources of Saar Policy
In Germany, the SPD opposition rejected the agreement as a weakening of the German position 
because it formally recognised the Saar government as an independent player in what so far had 
been a territorial dispute between two states.297 The territorial dimension was the most 
significant for Germany at the time and concerns about it were shared by all major parties. If 
Germany agreed to a revision of its 1937 western borders, before the conclusion of a peace 
treaty, this might set an unwelcome precedent and weaken the German position in terms of the 
even more vital question of the eastern borders, a position that was remarkably similar to the 
German policy approach towards Alsace in the inter-war period. As this connection was all too 
obvious, the CDU-led government did not only come under pressure from the left, but also from 
the right, i.e., from the expellee associations. In this context, the German Bundestag passed a 
resolution on 23 April 1952, in which the members of parliament re-affirmed their position that 
the Saar remained part of German territory.298 Chancellor Adenauer came also under pressure 
from within the government, particularly from the Minister of All-German Affairs, Kaiser, who
297 Cf. the article by the then opposition leader Erich Ollenhauer in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 22 March 
1952.
298 Cf. in greater detail, Fischer, Die Saar, p. 136f.
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opposed the compromises made by the chancellor,299 and from the government of one of the 
federal states, namely Rhineland-Palatine under its Minister President Altmeier. The strongest 
asset of this so-called Kaiser-Altmeier circle was the dependence of the federal government 
upon the vote of the government of Rhineland-Palatine in the upper chamber of the German 
parliament. Although not opposed to the idea of European integration, the government of 
Rhineland-Palatine had a very different perception of the Saar question compared to the federal 
government. One of the reasons for this was that the state was the only one that had a direct 
border with the Saar and therefore suffered much more directly from French policy in the Saar. 
The most provocative example in this context were the border revisions of the Saar carried out 
by France at the territorial expense of Rhineland-Palatine between July 1946 and June 1947, in 
the course of which Rhineland-Palatine lost 102 communities with about 70,000 inhabitants.300
The situation of the French government was not much better. Here, the main concern 
was the economic loss which France would incur in case of a European settlement that did not 
preserve the economic union with the Saar. Although the French government made it clear that 
its objective was to keep the status quo with the exception that the responsibility for the Saar's 
foreign affairs would be transferred to a future European organisation, the French Council of the 
Republic insisted that no agreement be signed that implied a loosening, let alone cutting, of the 
existing economic ties between France and the Saar.301
The Failure of Negotiations in 1952/53
Eventually, direct negotiations between France and Germany got under way in August 1952 in 
Paris after both the Allies and the Council of Ministers of the ECSC had urged the two 
governments to seek a bilateral solution of the Saar question. In contrast to the first rounds of 
the Austro-Italian negotiations after similar encouragement from the UN, these were initially 
more constructive, yet nevertheless they failed. The objectives of the two governments with
299 On the principal differences between Adenauer and Kaiser, cf. Kraus, Die Saarfrdge, pp. 48-51.
300 Cf. Hans-Walter Hermann and Georg Wilhelm Sante, Geschichte des Saarlandes (Wtlrzburg 1972), pp. 45-46.
301 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, p. 114.
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which they entered the negotiations were rather different.302 Germany directed its efforts at 
achieving concessions from France which would have led to the creation of a more liberal, less 
tense atmosphere in the Saar, and suggested steps such as the permission to constitute new 
political parties, an end of French sequestration, and a postponement of the elections to give 
new political parties an opportunity to establish themselves. The French position, in contrast, 
was to enter immediately into negotiations about the conditions of Europeanisation. What the 
French government envisaged, however, was to modify rather than to abandon the existing 
Franco-Saar conventions to allow the continuation of the Franco-Saar economic, financial, and 
customs union. Naturally, Germany rejected the suggested economic status as incompatible with 
a Europeanisation of the Saar and insisted that a final settlement could not be concluded before 
a peace treaty.303 As no break-through was achieved in the negotiations and the Saar question 
became more and more a serious problem for European integration as a whole, the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe decided, on 18 September 1952, to form a sub-committee to 
look into the Saar conflict and make recommendations about a solution.304
After France and Germany had officially conceded the break-down of their negotiations 
at the end of October 1952 because of the incompatibility of their positions, the Saar Landtag 
passed an electoral law on 29 October setting the date of the elections for 30 November 1952. 
The pro-German opposition parties were not granted legalisation, which increased tensions 
within the Saar as well as between France and Germany. The outcome of the election saw a 
victory of the CVP and the SPS, which together won about sixty-four per cent of the vote and 
renewed their coalition government However, as a sign of strong discontent with the situation 
in the Saar, the number of blank and invalid votes were 24.5% of the total vote cast indicating a 
gradual shift away from the approval of the political and economic status of the Saar.
302 A good account of the negotiations can be found in the article “Die Wahiheit ttber die Saarverhandlungen” (The 
Truth about the Saar Negotiations) which was published by the SaarbrUcker Zeitung on 17 November 1952.
303 Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, p. 56.
304 Other conflicts in which the Council of Europe tried mediate between the conflict parties were South Tyrol and 
Cyprus.
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This interpretation of the election result had a considerable influence on the formulation 
of the German Saar policy until 1955. It consisted of two major strategies -  the legalisation of 
opposition parties and the achieving of free elections before a referendum and the long-term 
orientation to regain the Saar in a permanent peace settlement after an interim period of 
European government of the Saar. The elections had shown that the influence of the pro- 
German parties was significant, but not yet strong enough to have taken over government 
responsibilities immediately, even if they had had the chance to do so. Their influence, 
therefore, had to be strengthened gradually. The sooner they were legalised and could begin 
campaigning for their cause and the later free elections to the Saar Landtag took place after that 
legalisation, the more likely a pro-German government could have been established in the Saar. 
At the same time, however, the German government saw the danger of the creation of an 
independent Saar state and realised that, to prevent such a development, it was necessary to 
diminish French influence in the Saar and to limit the extent of Saar self-government through 
subjecting the territory to a European status.305
On the international stage, the trend which had begun in 1950 continued. France was 
politically weakened by a sequence of unstable governments and foreign problems, such as in 
Indo-China, Tunisia, and Morocco,306 while Germany became economically stronger and 
politically even more stable when, in the elections to the Bundestag in 1953, the CDU won an 
absolute majority in parliament. In this situation, France slightly changed its tactics and 
demanded a European settlement of the Saar question as a pre-requisite for the ratification of the 
EDC treaty or of the Bonn agreements, thus playing its strongest card yet -  a possible French 
veto to permanent German political and military re-integration into the West.
305 The purpose of both policies, of course, was the same, namely to avoid a situation in which the Saar population 
might come to like independence from both Germany and France. Cf. Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, p. 61.
306 Judith Httser, “Frankreich und die Abstimmung vom 23. Oktober 1955”, in Hudemann and Poidevin, Die Saar, 
pp. 359-379, here p. 360.
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The European Dimension in the Settlement Process
On 10 April 1953, the Saar government took an unprecedented initiative of its own and 
launched a six-point plan for the Europeanisation of the Saar, which was partly based on earlier 
proposals of a similar nature. The six points were that the Saar become a European territory and 
govern itself, that France hand over responsibility for the external affairs of the Saar to a High 
Authority prior to the formation of a European government, that the French embassy be 
replaced by a consulate holding the same rights as a German consulate, and that Franco-Saar 
economic union be preserved until a European economic union comes into force. The final 
decision on the Europeanisation of the Saar, however, was to be subject to the outcome of a 
plebiscite in the Saar.307
Despite this plan and the need to come to a settlement of the Saar question before 
further German integration into the West, the reopening of negotiations between France and 
Germany in May 1953 ended without a conclusion. This standstill can be explained by the 
assumptions both governments made about the relative strength of their positions. Germany was 
still assuming that time was working in its favour, not least because there was a general interest 
to integrate Germany politically and militarily in the Western alliance. France, while being pre­
occupied with its foreign policy in North Africa and the Far East, also assumed that a delay in 
negotiations was a favourable option because this way time could be gained for a revision of the 
Franco-Saar conventions and thus a strengthening of the French position.308 Consequently, the 
French government proposed a number of changes to the existing set of conventions. These 
proposals included the creation of an arbitration authority to settle future disputes between the 
French and Saar governments; an end of the French right to veto decisions of the Saar 
government; a joint administration of the mines and of other economic and financial issues; a 
right of the Saar government to approve all international treaties affecting the Saar signed by 
France before they could be ratified and applied in the Saar; and the right of the Saar to open its
307 Cf. the summary of the plan in Saarbriicker Zeitung, 13 April 1953.
308 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 134-135.
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own embassies and consulates in Paris and in the French overseas territories and to sent its own 
staff to French embassies world-wide.309 Despite the fact that the negotiations were not as easy 
as usual for the French government, the revised conventions were close to the original proposals 
when they were signed on 20 May 1953. Once again, resistance did not only come from 
Germany and the Saar opposition, but the French government also encountered considerable 
resistance from Lorraine and Alsace, mostly because of economic anxieties based On the 
favourable status of the Saar economy between France and Germany with its special tax and 
customs laws at the detriment of Alsace and Lorraine.310
In response to the new conventions, the German Bundestag unanimously passed a 
resolution stressing once again that it considered the Saar to be German territory. At the same 
time, the resolution gave the government a mandate to negotiate for the restoration of 
democratic freedoms in the Saar and for the return of the Saar to Germany.311 Although 
different in their scope, these motions of unanimous official support for an engagement of the 
German government to resolve the Saar problem, are similar to developments in Austria (where 
a cross-party consensus on a patron role over the South Tyrolese German-speakers had been 
achieved relatively early on in the conflict) and the Republic of Ireland (where, as late as 1990, 
a High Court decision declared Irish unification a constitutional imperative). This was missing 
from the French policy approach to Alsace and Lorraine during the Reichsland period and from 
German policy towards Alsace after 1945.
In an attempt to raise the international profile of the Saar question, the German federal 
government also made its opposition to the new Franco-Saar conventions known in an official 
protest note to the three Western Allied High Commissioners for Germany. A more decisive 
course of action, however, seemed inappropriate at the time, as the German government had to 
strike a difficult balance between its European and Saar policies.
309 Cf. Fischer, Die Saar, pp. 84-90.
310 For greater details of the concerns voiced, cf. Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 137-138.
311 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 1.279/1393 Iff.
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In the Saar itself opposition against the conventions came in its most organised form 
from the trade unions. A consequential attempt of the government to break trade union 
opposition failed. The dismissal of their leader only prompted trade Unionists to re-elect him, 
and the banning of the miners’ trade union led to a broadening of the opposition movement as a 
whole. In addition, contacts between the opposition and Germany became increasingly 
sustained.312 French and Saar government policies, thus, facilitated the increasingly ethnic 
perception of the conflict, its sources, and potential solutions by an ever larger section of the 
Saar population.
In the second half of 1953, new Franco-German negotiations got under way. The main 
German strategy remained the achievement of democratic freedoms in the Saar and of equality 
between France and Germany in their economic relations with the Saar. These were, from the 
viewpoint of the German government, the two decisive conditions which would lead to a 
replacement of the current government by a pro-German one, at least in the long term. France 
accepted the German demand for democratic freedoms but insisted on a referendum before the 
new elections, in which only those parties would be allowed to participate which had accepted 
the statute approved in the prior referendum. Not expecting a victory of the pro-German parties 
in the elections, the German government agreed to such a regulation.313 However, the major 
obstacle to an agreement between France and Germany was the sequence of Europeanisation 
and resolution of the Saar conflict France continued to insist that a settlement of the Saar 
dispute had to precede any further steps towards European integration. Germany, however, did 
no longer accept this position. Instead, on 11 December 1953, the German chancellor made it 
clear to France that without the establishing of the EDC, the German government would not be 
prepared to make concessions on the Saar question, and that without further European 
integration there would be no German consent to a Europeanisation of the Saar. Inevitably, the
312 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 141-145.
313 Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, pp. 63.
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November and December meetings between representatives of the French and German 
governments did not result in any significant progress being made.
Parallel to the renewed Franco-German attempt to come to a settlement, the Council of 
Europe’s sub-committee on the Saar had begun its explorations, and on 26 April 1954 -  the day 
when the fall of Dien Bien Phu marked a further weakening of the French position as a world 
power -  its recommendations were published. The Saar was to become a European territory as 
soon as the European Political Community was constituted; until then an interim solution with a 
European commissioner, who was neither French or German nor from the Saar, was to be 
instituted. The common market between France and the Saar was to be preserved, while 
gradually similar relations between the Saar and Germany should be established. An agreement 
between France, Germany, and the Saar to preserve German culture and language in the Saar 
was to be signed. This status of the Saar was to be guaranteed by France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States until the signing of a peace treaty. The implementation of this 
new status of the Saar would be the subject of a plebiscite in the Saar.314
French opposition to the plan centred around the economic provisions of the plan and 
France presented its own proposal which modified several of the provisions of the plan 
suggested by the Council of Europe, but also made two important concessions -  a European 
statute of the Saar would be drawn up between France and Germany only, with the Saar 
government merely in an advisory role, and the procedure of licensing political parties would be 
abandoned immediately.315 Germany, however, accepted the original plan as basis for further 
discussions with France, but not the revised French proposals. On 30 April 1954 the Bundestag 
adopted a resolution reaffirming its unanimous position of 2 July 1953, that the Saar remained 
German territory and that the government was authorised to negotiate for Saar-German 
reunification. The Council of Europe plan was also favourably received by the Saar
314 See Robert H. Schmidt, Saarpolitik, vol. 2, pp. 760-775. For the English version, cf.. Council of Europe, 
Consultative Assembly (ed.), “The Future Position of the Saar”, in Council o f Europe, Consultative Assembly, 6th 
Ordinary Session, First Part, May, 1954, Documents, vol. II, doc. 225.
315 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, p. 158.
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government, which hoped to use it as an instrument to break free from the continuing French 
domination of its internal affairs. This domination was perceived as particularly harmful in 
economic terms as the need for a larger market, such as Germany, became increasingly 
evident.316 Independence from French interference and enhanced economic opportunities in the 
framework of European integration were, thus, regarded as good ‘selling points* by those 
sections within the Saar political elite who sought to preserve the continuation of a Saar status 
separate from Germany. By that time, however, the question of national belonging had become 
the primary concern of a vast majority of the population of the Saar.
Despite the differences between France and Germany on the plan, the two countries 
reached an agreement at the end of May according to which they would seek a solution of their 
dispute based on the proposed plan pending the conclusion of a final settlement in a peace 
treaty.317
Table 11: Conditions Accounting for the Failure of French Integration Policy
• In France:
□ Failure to realise the strength of national allegiance to Germany
□ Policy problems in the French colonial empire that were a matter of greater urgency
□ Lack of resolve and resources to pursue integration against German and 
European/Western interests
□ Insufficiency of the economic means available to accomplish the political goal set 
out
□ Low public interest in the Saar issue and opposition to economic integration of the 
Saar from Alsace and Lorraine
• In Germany:
□ Economic recovery and political stability equally contributing to improved 
international standing of the country
□ Clear cross-party commitment to oppose the permanent French annexation of the 
Saar
□ Influential group of politicians from within the governing coalition and the 
opposition as well as of emigrants from the Saar lobbying for reunification and 
supporting like-minded political parties in the Saar
□ Preservation and restoration of social, economic, and gradually also political ties at 
official and semi-official levels with the Saar
316 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, p. 161.
317 Ibid., p. 165.
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• la the Saar:
□ Dominance of the issue of national belonging
□ Rejection of French interference in supposedly autonomous Saar affairs
□ Saar government becoming increasingly discredited as ‘bed-fellow’ of the French 
government
□ Increasing tensions between pro-German and pro-French sections of the Saar 
population and between the pro-German sections and the French administration
□ Perception of pro-German parties as legitimate representatives of Saar interests
□ Economic attraction of West Germany
• International Context:
□ Pressure from the Western Allies and European partners on both countries to resolve 
their dispute
Reaching a Final Settlement: The Prerogative of Consolidating the Western 
Alliance
The Success of Negotiations in 1954
Although this agreement demonstrated the considerable progress made in the
negotiations, the French foreign ministry and government did not approve of what their own 
minister had achieved and instead renewed the demand for an immediate and permanent 
European status of the Saar, which, of course, was rejected by Germany. In this situation, the 
Council of Europe sub-committee on the Saar worked out a new plan for the settlement of the 
Saar question. This plan consisted of two parts, the definition of a European status of the Saar 
and regulations governing the conduct of political parties in the Saar. Although it was passed by 
the General Affairs Committee, the Council of Europe itself left the plan unmentioned in its 
resolution of 25 May 1954, in which it only expressed its hope that bilateral negotiations 
between France and Germany may soon come to a conclusion.318 However, after the proposals 
for the EDC and EPC were rejected in the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954, the 
idea to settle the conflict through the Europeanisation of the Saar territory had become 
pointless.319
318 Fischer, Die Saar, pp. 175-179.
319 On the history of the original plan and the revised version, cf. Per Fischer, “DasSaarstatut des Europarats”, in 
Hudemann and Poidevin, Die Saar, pp. 115-126.
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Four weeks after the failure of the EDC, the Western Allies reached an agreement at 
their London conference to admit Germany and Italy to NATO and to restore (West) German 
sovereignty. This meant that in terms of the Saar question the status quo ante had been restored: 
German integration into the western alliance and the regaining of its sovereignty were still 
possible, as was a French veto, the execution of which was made dependent upon the prior 
settlement of the Saar question.
However, the French government manoeuvred itself into an increasingly difficult 
position. A government crisis in the Saar led to a split in the coalition government on 7 July 
1954 over the new course of the Hoffmann government which saw closer co-operation with 
Germany as advantageous for the Saar.320 The French government tried to meet the subsequent 
weakening of French authority in the Saar with increased pressure on the Saar government 
through the French embassy, which heightened tensions between the French and Saar 
governments as well.
When France played its last trump card, the right to veto German entry to NATO and its 
right to deny Germany full sovereignty, an agreement was reached on 23 October 1954. In 
fourteen Articles the new statute321 outlined the status of the Saar in the period until the 
conclusion of a peace treaty. The Europeanisation of the Saar would involve a commissioner 
overseeing the statute and representing foreign and defence interests of the Saar, the economic 
union with France would be maintained and a similar relationship with Germany would be 
developed, and a referendum would be held in the Saar to approve this new statute with the 
possibility of a second referendum over the final settlement of the Saar problem in a peace 
treaty.322 This agreement was ratified in the French parliament on 23 December 1954, and in the 
Council of the Republic on 26 March 1955.
320 Kraus, Die Saarfrage, p. 61.
321 The full version of the statute is reprinted in Robert H. Schmidt, Saarpolitik 1945-57, vol. 3, pp. 685ff.
322 Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 170-172. Cf. as well Fischer, Die Saar, pp. 191-193.; and Schumacher, Konrad 
Adenauer, p. 66.
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The ratification of the statute agreement in the Federal Republic, in contrast, was a 
much more difficult process. The front of critics consisted of the SPD opposition and the CDU’s 
coalition partner FDP and of the so-called Kaiser-Altmeier circle within the CDU. They had 
five major objections against the statute -  the pressure France had exercised through its veto 
tight on German west integration; the insufficient choice between status quo and statute that 
was offered to the Saar population in the referendum; the non-interference clause of the statute 
which disadvantaged Germany vis-a-vis France, which held all influential positions in the Saar, 
the permanent nature of the statute until the conclusion of a peace treaty; the implication of the 
regulations of the statute which made it more or less a permanent settlement of the Saar 
problem.323 Yet the opposition faced a dilemma. They could prevent the ratification of the Saar 
statute and hope for a better deal in re-negotiations, but would have to risk, at the same time, the 
failure of German integration into Nato and of the restoration of German sovereignty. 
Alternatively, to approve the Saar statute would be a de facto acknowledgement of the loss of 
the Saar, but would make German integration into the western alliance possible. Eventually the 
agreement was ratified in Germany in the Bundestag on 27 February 1955, in the Bundesrat on 
18 March 1955. Finally, after the SPD had brought the matter before the German constitutional 
court, the latter ruled on 4 May 1955, that the agreement did not violate the Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic.
At a further Franco-German meeting on 14 January 1955, both governments jointly 
approached the Council of the WEU to appoint an international commission to observe the Saar 
referendum,324 and they agreed that all future differences be settled within the framework of the 
Western Alliance.
323 A more detailed summary of the criticisms can be found in Kraus, Die Saarfrage, pp. 82-83.
324 -pjjg commission consisted of one representative from each Belgium, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. Its constituting meeting took place on 14 June 1955.
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The Rejection of the Agreement by the Saar Population
On 3 May 1955, France and the Saar signed a convention on economic co-operation. This 
convention disadvantaged the Saar to a considerable degree, most of all because the French 
government had to approve all loans the Saar government wanted to take. Although the 
convention was not ratified in the Saar because the government had proposed to postpone this 
process until after the referendum, it confirmed the picture a majority of the Saar population had 
of the French government running Saar affairs and that of the Saar government as being the 
willing executioner of French interests in the Saar. This was all the more the case because 
important issues remained unresolved -  the powers of the future European Commissioner for 
the Saar, the freedom of action of political parties, and the freedom of speech.325
While the Saar government disintegrated increasingly over the issue of independence 
from France, the opposition became more self-confident through the obvious backing from 
Germany. The DSP, the Saar CDU, and the Saar SPD pooled their resources and forces, in 
remarkable similarity to developments in Alsace in the late 1920s, in the Deutscher 
Heimatbund, the German Homeland League.326 The pro-German parties advised the Saar 
population to reject the statute in the referendum327 and tensions in the Saar increased over the 
next months. At rallies in Saarbnicken, St. Ingbert, and Neukirchen between 13 and 18 August 
1955, clashes between no-campaigners and the police occurred, which resulted in 31 people 
injured, among them 18 policemen.
As attempts to split the front of opposition parties through a unification between CDU 
and CVP failed as well as attempts by both the French and German governments to postpone 
the referendum, the pro-German parties profited most from their ability to link the vote in the 
referendum with the political future of the CVP/SPS government. Still very much perceived as 
an instrument of the French state representing the economic and political interests of the latter in
325 Another unresolved issue was the future of the Roechling Werke that had been sequestrated by France. More 
detailed on this Freymond, The Saar Conflict, pp. 182-184. On the issue of the Roechling-Werke, cf. ibid., pp. 184- 
189; and Kraus, Die Saarfrage, pp. 151-153.
326 Cf. Htiser, Frankreich, p. 376.
171
the Saar and discredited because of its repressive policies against the pro-German opposition,328 
it was to a significant degree through the rejection of this government that the pro-German 
parties, with financial support from the Federal Ministry of All-German Affairs, managed to 
secure a sizeable majority of votes against the new statute.329 Propagated in their press 
organs,330 the other major argument of the pro-German parties against the new statute was built 
on the notion of national belonging -  a no-vote would be directed against the French Saar policy 
and would clearly indicate a desire for a return to Germany and for establishing of democratic 
freedoms.331
Difficulties for the pro-German parties arose from the fact that the German chancellor 
saw it as an imperative that the statute be approved in the referendum. On several occasions he 
spoke out in favour of a yes-vote because he assumed that a rejection of the new statute by the 
pro-German parties would make it impossible to implement his long-term strategy to recover 
the Saar for Germany, which was based on a newly elected Landtag with a strong pro-German 
component. If the pro-German parties spoke out against the statute, but a majority of the 
population approved it, then they might have been banned from participation in the elections. 
Similarly, a rejection of the statute by a majority of the Saar population would make it easier for 
the French government to maintain the status quo, again an outcome which would have been 
counter-productive from Adenauer’s point of view.332 However, pressure from within his own 
party, especially from the minister of all-German affairs, Kaiser, and from the state government 
of Rhineland-Palatine prevented Adenauer from issuing a joint statement with the French 
government calling for an approval of the statute.333 At the same time, the pro-statute parties
322 CDU-Saar (ed.), Die CDU-Saar im Abstimmungskampf (Saarlouis: Hausen, 1955), p. 50.
328 A general strike on 25 February 1955, had already indicated the degree of discontent of the population with the 
Hoffmann government. Cf. Kraus, Die Saarfrage, p. 147.
329 Cf. Jtirgen Hannig, “Separatisten -  Nationalisten?” in Hudemann and Poidevin, Die Saar, pp. 381-396, here pp. 
386-390. Chi the question of financial support, cf. Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, p. 67.
330 Opposition newspapers were published legally from the end of July onwards: the Neueste Nachrichten of the 
CDU on 26 July, the Deutsche Saar of the DPS on 28 July, and the SaarbrUcker Allgemeine Zeitung of the Saar SPD 
on 13 August.
331 Cf. Kraus, Die Saarfrage, p. 167.
332 Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer, pp. 72-73.
333 Ibid., p. 74.
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CVP and SPS suffered from the perception Of their coalition government, from the 
unwillingness of the French government to intervene in any way in the pre-referendum 
campaign,334 from the uncertain future that many of the people living in the Saar foresaw 
because of the domestic political instability and foreign political decline of France, from the 
incompatibility of the political aim (namely the integration of the Saar into the French polity) 
and the purely economic instruments (an economic, monetary and customs union) available to 
achieve it, and from the national and political allegiance of most Saar citizens to Germany rather 
than to the still vague idea of supra-national political structures in Europe.335 Through the 
continuation of its policy of repression, the Saar government also contributed significantly to its 
own downfall.336 The arguments with which the CVP and SPS nevertheless managed to win a 
share of the vote were mainly four, voting ‘yes’ meant voting against German nationalism, but 
for Europe, for the economic advantages of the statute, and for the course of the Hoffmann 
government for an independent Saar.337
The date of the plebiscite was set by the Saar Landtag for 23 October 1955 after the 
Council of the WEU had approved the according referendum law, which annulled the 1952 law 
on the licensing of political parties and established that all parties would be free to operate as of 
23 July 1955. The referendum resulted in a sixty-seven per cent rejection of the statute which 
was a clear sign of the desire of the Saar population to be German and to belong to Germany. 
This rejection of the Saar statute jointly proposed by the French and German governments 
marks the failure of a second attempt to resolve the Saar conflict, after the French integration 
policy had been similarly unsuccessful. The reasons for this failure are summarised in the table 
below.
334 Cf. Hilser, Frankreich, p. 374.
335 Hannig, Separatisten, pp. 391-392. Hannig sees the issue of national allegiance to Germany as the most important 
among the factors accounting for the no-vote in the referendum. Cf. ibid., p. 395.
336 In the middle of April a scandal-of illegally tapped telephones emerged. Cf. Kraus, Die Saarfrage, p. 153.
337 Ibid., p. 167.
173
Table 12: Conditions Accounting for the Failure of the Saar Statute Proposal
• In France:
□ Policy of keeping the Saar economically dependent on France through a variety of 
conventions and the perception of this in the Saar as undue interference and in 
contradiction of the proposed statute
□ Pressure on the French government from Alsace and Lorraine not to progress with 
economic integration
□ General incompatibility of economic means with political objectives
• In Germany:
□ Influential group of politicians from within the governing coalition and the 
opposition as well as of emigrants from the Saar lobbying for reunification and 
supporting like-minded political parties in the Saar
□ Disunity within the German government over the Saar issue
□ Pressure exercised by the state government of Rhineland-Palatine
□ Lack of resolve on part of the Federal Chancellor to come out in support of the Saar 
Statute
• In the Saar:
□ Predominance of the issue of national belonging
□ Skilful tactics of the pro-German parties to style the referendum into a vote over the 
future of the discredited Saar government
□ Recognition of the economic advantages of integration with Germany
□ Underdeveloped understanding of the concept of European integration
• International Context
______ □ Pressure was for a resolution of the conflict, rather than for this particular settlement
Implementing the Referendum Result: The Saar Returns to Germany
As a consequence of the rejection of proposed Saar statute, the Saar government
immediately resigned and a provisional one had to be formed to take care of Saar affairs until 
after new elections. France and Germany, on the other hand, assured one another that the 
outcome of the referendum would not threaten their relationship.
The elections following the referendum on 18 December 1955, saw an overwhelming 
victory of the pro-German parties and the formation of a pro-German coalition government of 
the former opposition parties on 2 January 1956. Even though the 1955 elections returned seven 
political parties to the Saar Landtag, they stood at the beginning of the streamlining of the Saar
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party system according to that of West Germany at the time, which is obvious from the 
following figure, detailing party representation in the Saar Landtag from 1947 to I970.338
On Jan 31, 1956, the new Landtag voted in favour of a resolution339 which declared an 
end to Saar separation form Germany and the wish to integrate the Saar politically and 
economically into the Federal Republic.340
France, accepting the political consequences of the referendum, demanded 
compensation for the inevitable economic losses it would suffer. These matters were settled in 
bilateral talks between March and the end of May 1956. Eventually, on 5 June 1956, a general 
agreement on the Franco-German treaties -  a conglomerate of five separate agreements -  was 
reached between the two heads of government at a meeting in Luxembourg. The treaties were 
ratified simultaneously in the German Bundestag and the French National Assembly on 27 
October 1956. According to a joint Franco-German proposal, the Council of the WEU set up ah 
international court which could be approached by anyone from the Saar who felt discriminated 
because of his attitude towards, and vote in, the referendum341
The international obstacles to reunification with Germany being removed, the Saar 
Landtag was able to make the necessary changes to the Saar constitution342 and to pass a law 
according to which the Saar would access the Federal Republic of Germany according to Article 
23 of the German Basic Law.343 As of 1 January 1957, the Saar became part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Until 1959, interim regulations were in force according to which the
338 The unification between CDU and CVP was in 1959. The SVP was founded after the unification of CVP and 
CDU by those who did oppose this move. After 1960, it only managed in the 1965 elections to overcome the five per 
cent threshold (5.2%; 2 seats). After that it became an insignificant political factor. The SPD in the Saar was legalised 
as DSP (German Social Democratic Party) on 27 July 1955. The name was changed to SPD on 19 November 1955. 
The dissolution of the SPS was decided on 18 March 1956. Abbreviations: CDU -  Christian Democratic Union; CVP 
-  Christian People’s Party; SVP -  Saar People’s Party; SPD -  Social Democratic Party of Germany; SPS -  Social 
Democratic Party of the Saar; FDP -  Liberal Democratic Party of Germany; DPS -  Democratic Party of the Saar.
339 The resolution was only rejected by two Communist members of the parliament. Cf. Fischer, Die Saar, p. 229.
340 Cf. Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 1956, p.188.
341 The court was dissolved in 1959.
342 Forty-three articles of the Saar constitution were affected, among them all those which had provided the 
framework for the special post-war relationship with France, all references to the international statute, and a Saar 
citizenship. Others affected were art. 62 on the Saar flag and Saar colours, ait. 95 on the death penalty, and art. 60 on 
the legal status of the Saar. The latter article has been changed again in 1979 and 1993 to account for the progress in 
European integration.
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application of German law was limited, French customs and monetary regulations were kept in 
operation and the French Franc remained a valid currency. In addition to a number of economic 
competences which were left with the French authorities in this interim period, France also 
continued to represent the Saar in international negotiations until 1959. Difficulties in the 
economic and political integration process of the Saar into the Federal Republic of Germany 
were gradually overcome by the early 1960s.
Subsequently, a prediction made by the two foreign ministers on the occasion of the 
signing of the Luxembourg treaties became true. The two governments saw the solution of the 
Saar question as an ‘essential precondition for the strengthening of the free world and for the 
future of Europe’ and committed themselves to ‘even stronger joint efforts for the creation of a 
new Europe.’344
Summary: The Success of Saar Secessionism
The conflict over the Saar was primarily a bilateral territorial conflict between France 
and Germany. The conditions under which it developed and was eventually resolved were 
determined by a variety of factors. The origin of the Saar conflict lay in the international 
arrangements made by the Allies for Germany between 1945 and 1947/48 and the consequences 
of these arrangements. The relative economic and political strength of the two countries, the 
stability of their governments, and the goals and policies they pursued with respect to the Saar 
were three among a number of factors that were significant for the outcome of the conflict. In 
addition, the situation in the Saar itself was of great importance because both the Western Allies 
and France and Germany had committed themselves to subject any settlement reached over the 
Saar to a referendum. All three sets of factors -  the international situation, the Franco-German 
relationship, and the situation in the Saar -  mutually influenced one another.
343 This meant that with the day of accession the Basic Law would be in force in the Saar.
344 Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 30 October 1956, no. 205, p. 1962.
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The settlement of the conflict began in 1952, when negotiations between France and 
Germany, although initially unsuccessful, began. After a number of setbacks, the two 
governments reached a settlement, which was to be subjected to a referendum in the Saar, as 
would be any final settlement in a future peace treaty. The rejection of this statute by the Saar 
population and the subsequent election of a Landtag with a pro-German majority paved the way 
for a return of the Saar to Germany.
This outcome was, at the time, rather unexpected. In retrospect, however, it can be 
explained in the context of the developments in the Saar after 1945. First of all, France had 
failed to realise the strength of Saar national allegiance to Germany that was increased rather 
than decreased through the policy of integration and domination pursued by successive French 
governments. In addition, France was pre-occupied with its emerging colonial problems and 
weakened by unstable governments through most of the time of the conflict, which made the 
prospect of ‘belonging’ to France rather than Germany less tempting for the population. 
Furthermore, the international constellation forced France to take an ambivalent position 
towards the Saar -  it had to achieve a political aim (namely the integration of the Saar into the 
French polity) with purely economic instruments (an economic, monetary and customs union).
In the Saar itself, the continuing French presence and interference in Saar affairs, the 
increasing economic attraction of West Germany, and the suppression of the pro-German 
political opposition created a situation in which the goal of social, economic, political, and 
national opposition forces was essentially the same -  reunification with Germany to address the 
specific problem which had caused them to oppose the status quo and/or its revision within a 
European framework. The political controversy about the Saar issue was conducted for the most 
part without violence. Although it was a political conflict about national belonging, the conflict 
was not between two ethnic groups. The Saar population at the time was almost entirely of 
German origin so that reunification with Germany did not transform one minority problem into 
another one. The minority dimension of the conflict was at no point a prominent one in the Saar. 
At certain times, however, the creation of a minority situation was very much in the range of
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French policy goals. Even in any of the European schemes proposed no minority situation 
would have evolved. The primary issue at stake was at all times whether or not the Saar 
population should be allowed to determine its political future by itself. That self-determination 
did not lead to the acceptance by the Saar population of a special international regime had to do 
with the attraction of the Federal Republic, primarily in economic terms, and with a lack of 
regional particularist identity. The Saar, as an artificial territorial construct, did not have a 
common political or cultural tradition. The links to the bishoprics of Trier and Speyer, to the 
Rhineland, the Palatine, to Prussia or Bavaria, and thus to Germany proper or at least the 
German cultural space, were stronger than to France, or the yet vague idea of Europe.
The decision of the French government not to resist the outcome of the referendum or 
obstruct the move of the Saar towards reunification with the Federal Republic must be seen in 
the context of the acknowledgement that Franco-German reconciliation and European 
integration were more important goals, of the fact that French public opinion in general was not 
very interested in the Saar and in particular in Alsace and Lorraine even favoured an end of the 
existing regime, and of the arrangements made between the two states to compensate France for 
its economic losses and to put interim regulations in force that would allow for a smooth 
transition period.
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Table 13: Conditions Accounting for the Successful Secession of the Saar
• In France:
□ Failure to realise the strength of national allegiance to Germany
□ Policy problems in the French colonial empire that were a matter of greater urgency
□ Lack of resolve and resources to pursue integration against German and 
European/Western interests
□ Insufficiency of the economic means available to accomplish the political goal set 
out
□ Low public interest in the Saar issue and opposition to economic integration of the 
Saar from Alsace and Lorraine
□ Acceptance of the referendum vote and co-operation with Germany on facilitating 
the transition in sovereignty
• hi Germany:
□ Economic recovery and political stability equally contributing to improved 
international standing of the country
□ Clear cross-party commitment to oppose the permanent French annexation of the 
Saar
□ Influential group of politicians from within the governing coalition and the 
opposition as well as of emigrants from the Saar lobbying for reunification and 
supporting like-minded political parties in the Saar
□ Preservation and restoration of social, economic, and gradually also political ties at 
official and semi-official levels with the Saar
□ Accommodation of French interests in the unification process and allowing for a 
lengthy transition period with interim regulations
• In the Saar:
□ Dominance of the issue of national belonging
□ Rejection of French interference in supposedly autonomous Saar affairs
□ Saar government becomes increasingly discredited as ‘bed-fellow’ of the French 
government
□ Perception of pro-German parties as legitimate representatives of Saar interests
□ Economic attraction of West Germany
□ Non-violent conflict
□ Rejection of the proposed settlement by a large majority of the population and 
simultaneous election of an overwhelmingly pro-German Landtag
□ Interim regulations guaranteeing a smooth transition period
• International Context:
□ Franco-German reconciliation
□ European and Nato integration prioritised by both countries










































Settlement of Germanic tribes (Bavarians) alongside resident Langobards begins.
Tyrol becomes a unified political entity.
The county Tyrol comes under the sovereignty of the House of Habsburg.
Napoleonic occupation and partition of Tyrol.
Unsuccessful Tyrolese rebellion under Andreas Hofer (tried mid executed in 1810).
First World War.
Secret treaty between Italy and the Entente: Italy is promised a border revision as price for its entry 
into the war on the side of the Entente.
Partition of Tyrol at the Brenner the northern part remains with Austria, the southern part becomes 
part of Italy.
Fascist dictatorship of Benito Mussolini: South Tyrol is subjected to aggressive assim ilation policies, 
rapid industrialisation, and large-scale Italian immigration.
The German foreign office and private organisations support the cultural resistance in South Tyrol 
Hitler rises to power in Germany and formally renounces all claims to South Tyrol. An alliance with 
Mussolini is forged later on.
German annexation of Austria.
Option agreement between Hitler and Mussolini: South Tyrolese Germans can migrate to the 
German Reich or remain in South Tyrol and become Italianised.
German troops occupy South Tyrol. South Tyrolese backlash at Italians. South Tyrolese opposing 
Nazification are arrested and sent to concentration camps.
The German armed forces surrender to the Italian resistance movement and advancing allied troops. 
Foundation of the South Tyrol People’s Party (SVP), a catch-all party representing South Tyrolese 
Germans’ interests.
Italian Peace Treaty leaves the 1919 borders of Italy unchanged.
After Austria fails to obtain Allied concessions in terms of a full or partial return of South Tyrol the 
Gruber-DeGasperi Agreement (Paris Agreement) is signed which provides autonomy for South 
Tyrol. The agreement becomes part of the Italian Peace Treaty.
First Autonomy Statute: South Tyrol becomes part of the region Trentino-Alto Adige, in which 
Italians are a majority.
Autonomy regulations and their implementation fall short of South Tyrolese expectations. Tensions 
between die South Tyrolese Germans and the regional and central governments rise. First terrorist 
attacks.
Austria achieves full sovereignty through the State Treaty. It has to acknowledge the Italian Peace 
treaty and the borders set out in i t
Rally at Sigmundskron: 35,000 South Tyrolese demonstrate for their separate autonomy independent 
of the Italian-dominated province of Trentino.
After the failure of bilateral negotiations between Austria and Italy, the Austrian government 
approaches the General Assembly of the UN in 1960 and 1961 and obtains two resolutions in which 
both governments are asked to setde their dispute in negotiations.
Wave of terrorist attacks in South Tyrol, carried out by the Committee for the Liberation of South 
Tyrol (BAS).
The Italian government arrests most of the terrorists. Right-wing extremists from Germany and 
Austria assume control over the BAS and conduct, until the late 1960s, a guerrilla-style campaign 
against representatives of the Italian state in South Tyrol.
The Italian government appoints the Commission of Nineteen (11 Italians, 7 German-speaking South 
Tyrolese, 1 Ladin-speaking South Tyrolese) to examine the South Tyrol problem and make 
recommendations.
The commission presents its final report
Austro-Italian negotiations achieve an agreement over the points that had remained open in the 
commission’s report. This settlement is not accepted by the German-speaking South Tyrolese. 
Negotiations between Italy and Austria and between Italy and the SVP resume.
A package solution is agreed between all three parties. It contains a set of measures aimed at an 
improvement of the situation in South Tyrol and an operational calendar according to which these 
measures are to be implemented.
The new Autonomy Statute for South Tyrol passes all parliamentary hurdles. It gives South Tyrol a 
very strong political position, decreases the powers of the regional and central government, and 
provides safeguards for the Italian minority in South Tyrol.
The new Autonomy Statute is implemented.
A new wave of terrorist attacks with an unclear political background occurs.
The dispute between Italy and Austria is formally settled.
Tensions between the centre-right government under Silvio Berlusconi and the South Tyrolese 
government over budget cuts proposed by the Italian council of ministers. The Italian parliament 
rejects these cuts.
Austria becomes member of the European Union. Cross-border co-operation between Austrian North 
Tyrol and the Italian region Trentino-South Tyrol is increased within the newly created European 
region Tyrol.
The newly elected centre-left government in Italy pursues a pro-autonomy policy and encourages the 
inner-Italian debate on a federalisation of the country.
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Italy is home to fourteen linguistic minorities, whose speakers make up seven per cent of the 
total population. Several of these languages are spoken by autochthonous minorities, others 
were absorbed from neighbouring European language areas. The Italian constitution and simple 
legislation protect linguistic minorities, and a number of them have been granted special rights 
through regional and provincial autonomy regulations giving them the status of official 
languages alongside Italian in their areas. Although Italy, according to the constitution, formally 
became a decentralised state after 1945, it took consecutive Italian governments until the late 
1970s to implement appropriate laws to establish the regions and provinces and their respective 
assemblies. Five of the nineteen regions -  those which host ethno-linguistic minorities or have 
special geographic conditions -  have been granted special autonomy status with wider 
legislative and administrative powers. In the tradition of a centralist state, however, the 
government in Rome has managed to retain considerable powers to interfere with regional 
affairs. A debate about constitutional reform towards a federalised state is still ongoing, as are 
separatist political movements in the north (Lega Nord, Lega Lombarda) and on Sardinia.
In the case of South Tyrol -  a mountainous, trilingual area in northern Italy with 
significant water power resources where speakers of German are in a two-third majority over 
about thirty per cent Italians and four per cent Ladins -  the special autonomy statute grants 
wide-ranging legislative and administrative powers to the province and the influence of the 
central government has been reduced in some crucial areas. The constitutional status of the 
province is very similar to that of a state in a federal country, allowing for the free and protected 
development of the German-speaking minority. The particular political set-up of regional and 
provincial institutions in the 1972 autonomy statute has done away with previous power 
imbalances to the disadvantage of the German ethnic group and has, in fact, made it more or 
less a politically and culturally dominant local majority. The way there, however, was 
complicated and full of, partly violent, conflict.
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Historical Background345
South Tyrolese History until 1919
In the sixth and seventh centuries, Bavarian tribes began to settle alongside Romans in the 
cisalpine part of today’s Tyrol. A linguistic frontier developed at the Gorge of Salomo, which is 
roughly identical with the present provincial border between South Tyrol and Trentino, between 
the German and Langobardian languages until the replacement of the latter by Italian in the 
eleventh century.346 Since then, and until 1919, neither part of Tyrol had ever been part of Italy 
culturally, economically, or politically.347 In 1363, the County Tyrol, because of a lack of heirs, 
came under the sovereignty of the House of Habsburg and remained part of the empire until 
1919 with a brief interruption in the early nineteenth century. Despite a number of victories 
which the House of Habsburg won against the Republic of Venice in the fifteenth century, 
German expansion to the south did not progress farther than Salomo. Simultaneously, Italian 
immigration to the border county Trentino, which had begun as early as the fourteenth century, 
continued and affected in particular the urban centres: Italian cultural influence extended as far 
north as Bolzano. After Napoleon had defeated the Andreas Hofer uprising in 1809, he 
partitioned Tyrol into three parts to be occupied by France, Italy, and Bavaria, respectively. 
Austrian troops took possession of the territory in 1814, and Emperor Francis I, under the 
influence of Prince Mettemich, united the Trentino region with Tyrol and made it a crown 
province. This was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna.348
345 Comprehensive accounts of Tyrolese and South Tyrolese history can be found, among others, in Karl 
Mittermaier, Sudtirol Geschichte, Politik und Gesellschaft (Vienna: Osteireichischer Bundesverlag, 1986); John Cole 
and Eric R. Wolf, The Hidden Frontier (New York and London: Academic Press, 1974); and Antony E. Alcock, The 
History o f the South Tyrol Question (London: Michael Joseph, 1970).
346 Cf. Wemer Wolf, Sudtirol in Osterreich. Die Stidtirolfrage in der osterreichischen Diskussion von 1945 bis 1969 
(Wtlrzburg: Holzner Verlag, 1972), p. 1.
347 In 1254, for the first time a dominium comitis Tyrolis (territory under the rule of the counts of Tyrol) was 
mentioned, which, from 1271 onwards, was referred to as comitatus Tyrolis (county Tyrol). Cf. Franz Huter, “Die 
politische Entwicklung bis 1918”, in Huter, Franz, SudtiroL Eine Frage des europaischen Gewissens (Vienna: Verlag 
ftlr Geschichte und Politik, 1965), pp. 121-132, here p. 125; and cf. also Wolf, Siidtirol in Osterreich, p. 1.
348 Cf. Huter, Die politische Entwicklung, p. 127 and Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 9.
184
The German Romantic movement with its ideology of national self-determination 
shaped both pan-German aspirations and the Italian Risorgimento,349 They were bound to 
conflict in and over South Tyrol as they were following two diametrically opposed nationalist 
strategies -  unification and secession/irredentism.350 While German historians argued for the 
Tyrol as a historical, political, cultural and geographic unit between the defiles of the rivers 
Adige and Inn,351 the last years of the Risorgimento saw a campaign for the Italian-Austrian 
border to be located at the Brenner, relying on ancient Greek historians such as Polybius, who 
had called the Brenner Italy’s natural protective wall in the north.352 Towards the end of the 
century, however, nationalist tensions increased. Cultural associations were founded by each 
ethnic community which aimed at protecting and strengthening respective cultures while 
simultaneously trying to decrease the influence of the respective other353 Italy’s situation 
improved considerably with respect to its irredentist claim to the Brenner border after the 
beginning of the First World War. Originally a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany 
and Austria, the country refused to enter the war on grounds of military unpreparedness and a 
population divided over the issue of whether or not to join the war, and rather entered into 
negotiations with the Entente. As a result of these, a treaty was signed on 26 April, 1915, 
according to which Italy was granted the whole of cisalpine Tyrol if it entered the war at the 
side of the Entente.354 The Treaty of St. Germain of 1919 in its Article 36 (i), divided the 
historical Tyrol into the transalpine Tyrol, which remained part of Austria, and the cisalpine 
Tyrol, which became part of the Republic of Italy. Similar to assurances given to Alsatians by
349 On the liberal and universalist dimensions of Risorgimento nationalism, see Andrew Vincent in “Liberal 
Nationalism: an Irresponsible Compound?”, in Political Studies 45(1997)2, pp. 275-295, here pp. 277-278.
350 The distinction between unificatory and secessionist nationalism has been made, for example, by Vincent, Liberal 
Nationalism, p. 275. Orridge argues along similar lines in A. W. Orridge, “Separatist and Autonomist Nationalisms: 
The Structure of Regional Loyalties in the Modem State”, in Williams, Colin H. (ed.), National Separatism (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 1982), pp. 43-74, here p. 44.
351 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 12.
352 This view, however, did not find widespread support outside limited circles of intellectuals: the delegates of 
Trentino to the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848 merely demanded the gorge of Salomo as the border. Cf. 
Mittermaier, SUdtirol, p. 66f. Italians within South Tyrol proper, i.e., the territory north of the gorge, had as their 
objective some degree of autonomy rather than secession from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Cf. Cole and Wolf, The 
Hidden Frontier, p. 51.
353 For a more detailed account, see Cole and Wolf, The Hidden Frontier, p. 52-54 and Alcock, The South Tyrol 
Question, p. 12-17.
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the French government at the end of the First World War, a note accompanying the treaty stated 
that “the Italian Government intended to adopt a very liberal policy towards its new subjects of 
German race as regards their language, culture and economic interests.”355
From Autonomy Promises to Resettlement: South Tyrol, 1919 and 1946
The Treaty of St. Germain in 1919 was signed by a democratic government, whose
representatives gave further assurances for the well-being of the German and Ladin-speaking 
minorities. For a brief period of time thereafter it seemed as if both minorities could become 
politically integrated into the Italian polity.356
South Tyrolese policy, between 1919 and 1922, had two major objectives -  to achieve 
an autonomy wide enough and powerful enough to “maintain the specific German ethnic 
character of the region” and not to renounce the right to self-determination.357 The insistence on 
the right to self-determination and the strong backing that it received among the German- 
speaking population was underlined by a 1921 referendum organised, without official approval, 
by the South Tyrolese themselves in which annexation to Germany was overwhelmingly 
approved. The result of this referendum, however, was vetoed by the Allies.358
A programme of rapid Italianisation was introduced immediately after the fascist take­
over of 29 October 1922. This programme extended into three main areas: culture, the economy, 
and the political and administrative sectors and aimed at the systematic destruction of the 
linguistic, religious, and demographic foundations of the ethnic German identity of the German- 
speaking South Tyrolese population 359 Italian became the official language in public life, 
including the law courts (with the exception of a small number of civil cases with both parties 
being German), and a compulsory language in schools. The use of German was prohibited; all
354 Ibid., p. 18.
355 Ibid., p. 24.
356 Cf. Cole and Wolf, The Hidden Frontier, p. 54.
357 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 27ff.
358 Cf. Cole and Wolf, The Hidden Frontier, p. 54.
359 The programme is described more detailed in Cole and Wolf, The Hidden Frontier, p. 55ff. and in Alcock, The 
South Tyrol Question, pp. 33-45.
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communities received Italian names; all public inscriptions in German, including those on 
tombstones, had to be removed and replaced with the Italianised version. Similarly, family 
names were italianised. With regard to religion, the lighting of the Heart of Jesus fires was 
prohibited, an essential ritual and symbol of the traditional Tyrolese devotion to the Sacred 
Heart of Jesus, officially recognised as early as 1796. This cult symbolically underlines the self- 
perceived role of the Tyrolese as a chosen people, which becomes manifest in the postulate of a 
special ‘covenant* between them and Christ. This concept has remained a central and vital part 
of Tyrolese identity (both north and south of the Brenner). The annual lighting of the so-called 
Heart of Jesus fires on the mountain tops on the third Friday after Pentecost has ever since 
remained a symbol of Tyrolese ethnic identity and political unity, and was used in 1961 as the 
setting for the first major outburst of terrorism.
Economic measures to destroy the conditions in which South Tyrolese identity had 
developed over the centuries included the abrogation, in 1929, of the ancient Tyrolese 
legislation guaranteeing impartiality of inheritance in land; and the forced sell-off by German 
land owners of their land to Italians. Massive industrialisation which began in 1924 encouraged 
an enormous influx of Italians to South Tyrol, as is apparent from the following chart. The 
alteration of the demographic balance of South Tyrol was a crucial element in the Italianisation 
policy of the Fascists. By the South Tyrolese, immigration has ever since been perceived as a 
state-administered attempt to change the ethnic character of their traditionally German 
homeland, and to gain control over immigration has been one of the persistent demands of 
South Tyrolese politicians after 1946. In connection with the immigration policies of the 1920s, 
a comprehensive land appropriation began in 1926 to acquire the necessary space for 
industrialisation, housing projects, and the regulation of the Adige and Isarco rivers.
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In the political and administrative sectors, South Tyrol was initially incorporated into 
the larger region of Venezia Tridentina, but soon afterwards it was given separate status as the 
province of Bolzano and placed under the direct control of Rome. The elected local government 
system was replaced by a provincial prefect, who was appointed by Rome and chose mayors 
and communal secretaries. Traditionally independent small communities were integrated into 
larger administrative units. Most German-speaking South Tyrolese officials were either 
dismissed from their offices or sent to other parts of Italy and replaced by Italians. The police 
and security forces in the area were reinforced, and German speakers excluded from them, as 
part of a set of measures according to which South Tyrol was declared a military zone of 
primary importance in which the army had extensive powers. A law of 1937 gave the Italian 
authorities the power to expropriate land for the settlement of Italian peasants; in 1939, these 
powers were extended to urban property. Italy justified Italianisation partly by emphasising that 
the Brenner border had not received the same official guarantees as other pan-German borders 
in the Treaty of Locarno in 1925.360
Others
360 This implicit classification o f borders was perceived as a considerable threat to Italy’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty which, alongside increased activities o f pan-German organisations in South Tyrol, added to the feeling 
that South Tyrol would be one o f the most vulnerable points o f Italy in case o f  another war.
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In contrast to the developments in Alsace after 1919, opposition to assimilation did not 
only come from the German South Tyrolese themselves, but also from Austria. In contrast to the 
loss of other territories, Austria had never accepted that of South Tyrol, mainly for two reasons. 
One was the feeling of betrayal by the former ally Italy who was now, in contradiction of the 
Wilson principles, rewarded for this betrayal; the other was the retention of North Tyrol under 
the sovereignty of Austria, an area inhabited by the same population who successfully exercised 
pressure on Austrian foreign policy. Austrian resistance to the separation of South Tyrol, 
however, weakened under the pressures of international developments. Successive Austrian 
chancellors recognised the importance of an alliance with Italy against German annexation plans 
and acted accordingly. In 1928 chancellor Seipel declared that South Tyrol was an internal 
Italian affair, and in 1930 a friendship treaty was signed between Italy and Austria.
South Tyrolese opposition to the Italianisation programme was initially and primarily 
cultural; it was political only through the implications of cultural resistance. With official 
political representation of the German-speaking population abolished, the rural clergy, in 
particular, and in great similarity to developments in Alsace in the 1920s and 1930s, the lower 
ranks, became an essential part of opposition to ethnic extinction -  they continued to assert their 
right to deliver sermons in German and played a major part in the preservation of the German 
language as the South Tyrolese mother tongue through the organisation of clandestine 
‘catacomb* schools and through clerical newspapers, recognising that the preservation of 
German as the native language of South Tyrolese of German descent was an essential element 
in the effort to maintain a community identity and a sense of solidarity among the oppressed 
South Tyrolese. A further aspect of South Tyrolese resistance was the hope that many South 
Tyrolese had invested in the leader of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, Adolf 
Hitler, and his pan-German aspirations. However, in the light of political developments in Italy 
and the importance of the country as an ally for Germany, Hitler made it very clear that he was 
not willing to sacrifice his global interests for the fate of 300,000 German-speaking South
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Tyrolese.361 In an attempt to solve the South Tyrol question, the so-called Option was designed. 
In 1939, the German-spealdng population in South Tyrol had to choose between remaining in 
Italy and being subjected to further Italianisation or to opt for relocation to the German Reich. 
Of the 267,265 German-speaking South Tyrolese eligible for participation 43,626 abstained. Of 
the 223,639 participants in the plebiscite, 183,365 voted to leave and 38,274 to stay.362
While Hitler tried to get rid of an obstacle to a lasting political and military alliance 
with Italy, the Italian rationale for the Option was slightly more complex. Italy aimed at a partial 
resettlement of only 60,000 to 80,000 South Tyrolese -  among them about 10,000 so-called 
Reichsdeutsche who were suspected of spearheading the South Tyrolese resistance against 
Italianisation, as well as the valley farmers and the urban craftsmen and intelligentsia, who were 
thought to be easily replaceable by Italian immigrants. This way, the Italians hoped, the 
economic prosperity of South Tyrol could be maintained and the remaining South Tyrolese, 
now in a minority position in the province, could be more easily and successfully subjected to 
Italianisation. The Italian efforts to prevent a massive exodus of the South Tyrolese agricultural 
work force, especially of mountain farmers, in addition to the unfavourable resettlement 
conditions in the German Reich, resulted in a much lower percentage of South Tyrolese actually 
leaving than had opted for resettlement. The reason for this must also be seen in the traditionally 
strong bonds between the South Tyrolese, especially the mountain farmers, and their native soil. 
For many, this bond was, and still is, a non-negotiable part of their identity. Thus, it is not 
surprising that of all those who opted for Germany, only about 70,000, or, less than forty per 
cent, actually left. The difference between urban and rural segments of the population becomes 
apparent from the following figures: sixty-seven per cent of all optants employed in handicraft 
and manufacturing left South Tyrol as part of the resettlement programme, but only nine per
361 Alfons Gruber in his Sudtirol unter dem Faschismus (Bozen: Athesia, 1974, p.171) gives the following 1922 
quote from Hitler: “Germany has to join forces with Italy, which experiences a time of national rebirth and has a great 
fiiture ahead of itself. In order to accomplish this, a clear and final renunciation of all claims to South Tyrol is 
necessary.”
362 Figures from Cole and Wolf, The Hidden Frontier, p. 57. Slightly different figures are given in Alcock, The 
South Tyrol Question, p. 45ff.
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cent of all those working in the agricultural sector.363 This difference between urban and rural 
ethnic Germans in South Tyrol is partly rooted in differences in their ethnic identity, or, more 
precisely, in differences as to what they feel are the essential components of their identity, and 
as such it is not unlike similar processes in Alsace or Northern Ireland, where this has 
manifested itself at certain periods even in the party-political system.364 For the urban 
population, and to some extent also for the valley farmers, ethnic identity was a more cultural 
notion, manifesting itself primarily in language and life style, and, due to the regular contact 
with Italians, had been more often challenged and undergone gradual change. The identity of the 
rural population segment, especially of the mountain farmers, has been much more based on 
their special brand of Catholicism, on their devotion to their native soil, and to the traditionally 
hard life they lived. While singular events in South Tyrolese history, such as the Andreas Hofer 
uprising in 1809, and traditional values, such as loyalty to Tyrol as a historic unit, are equally 
important for both the urban and the rural population, the preparedness to defend the 
foundations of their identity has always been greater among the rural sections of German- 
speaking South Tyrolese.
On 3 September 1943 Italy offered unconditional surrender to the Allies. The German 
response was swift: North and Central Italy were overrun by German troops and one week later 
divided into zones of operations. South Tyrol became the operational zone Alpenvorland with a 
committed irredentist South Tyrolese, Franz Hofer, as High Commissioner. South Tyrolese 
were conscripted into various security forces and committed numerous atrocities against the 
civilian population and members of the Italian resistance movement. The German-speaking 
rural and urban population, after the treatment they had received from the Italian fascists for two 
decades, viewed the Germans as liberators and feared that an Allied victory with Italy on the 
side of the Allies would not see the return of South Tyrol to Austria, or the creation of an
363 See Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 45ff.
364 The DUP in Norther Ireland, for example, tended to have, and to some extent still has, its stronghold among the 
Presbyterian rural population. In Alsace, for example, the so-called protest movement of the Reichsland period had its 
stronghold among the rural Catholic population, and one of the keys to the partial success of the particularist 
movement in the inter-war period was its backing by the lower ranks of the rural clergy.
191
independent Tyrolese state north and south of the Brenner. So they did not give any support to 
the Italian resistance movement. The German troops in North Italy surrendered on 29 April 
1945 without major fighting. Two years of German rule in Northern Italy, however, had 
increased inter-ethnic tensions and laid the ground for many of the post-war developments. 
Alcock points to five major factors in this context. First, the interruption of the continuity of 
government from Rome set a precedent which demonstrated that the positions of governed and 
governing could change which renewed hopes among the German-speaking population for a 
general and permanent change in the status of South Tyrol. Second, already during the German 
occupation, the opportunity of emigration to Germany, as set out under the Option agreement, 
had not been taken up anymore, and clandestine returns to South Tyrol increased despite the 
threat of Gestapo persecution, and continued after the end of the war despite the unresolved 
status of the optants. Third, ethnic Italians in South Tyrol began to fear that wide-ranging 
autonomy rights for the German population after the war could lead to a return of the kind of 
administration similar to that of the Nazis between 1943 and 1945. Fourth, the influence of Nazi 
ideology on South Tyrolese encouraged their feeling of superiority over the Italian population. 
And lastly, the German occupation of parts of Italy in 1943 strengthened Italian fears that 
despite any possible forthcoming post-war assurances, a tendency towards annexation would 
continue to exist which would fuel South Tyrolese irredentist aspirations.365
Escalation of the Conflict after 1945
The Paris Agreement of 1946
The International and Bilateral Context
The general post-war situation in Europe and the constellation of the allied and associated 
powers were the two major factors determining the allied position vis-£-vis South Tyrol.366
365 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 60-77.
366 At a 1986 conference in Trento on the 40th Anniversary of the Paris Agreement, the South Tyrol policy of the 
Allies was also related to the broader question of how best to contain Germany -  through a strong Austria (i.e., 
returning South Tyrol) or through a strong Italy (i.e., through leaving the border at the Brenner). Personal 
communication from Antony Alcock.
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Their approach to the border question between Italy and Austria was not based on concern for 
the protection of minority rights, but on strategic considerations about political influence in 
Europe. The predominant goal was to achieve a pro-Western attitude in Italy, which was 
unlikely to be realised if the peace treaty with Italy included too hard conditions. A return of 
South Tyrol to Austria was considered to be a hard economic blow for Italy and likely to 
advance communist support.367 In general, the Western Allies saw better chances for the 
establishment of pro-Western and democratic government in Italy than in Austria, and therefore 
decided to support Italy’s argument to leave the border at the Brenner.368
The main Italian objective after the end of the Second World War was to maintain its 
border with Austria at the Brenner. The arguments that had been used during and after World 
War One to achieve the border change were now reiterated and supported by new ones.369 On 
the basis of the economic development after 1919, the Italian government could prove 
convincingly that the development, even the further existence, of its industrial areas in Northern 
Italy was severely in danger without the water power generation stations in South Tyrol, an 
argument which fitted the Western Powers’ concern about the economic situation in Italy and 
the threat of a communist take-over. Similarly effective was the claim that, by opting for 
Germany, the overwhelming majority of German-speaking South Tyrolese had demonstrated 
their allegiance to national socialism. To grant them the right to self-determination was 
unthinkable not only from an Italian point of view. The Italian delegation made it also clear that 
no Italian government would sign a peace treaty that meant the secession of South Tyrol. That 
was a prospect which ran counter to the intentions of the Western Allies to integrate Italy into
367 All guarantees promised by the Austrian government for economic co-operation and the protection of the Italian 
population in South Tyrol were considered worthless as long as the country remained under Soviet occupation.
368 However, the British political leadership of the time was divided. Churchill, then leader of the opposition, stated 
in the House of Commons on 5 June 1946 that he did not know a single case in all of Europe where the Atlantic 
Charter could have been more easily applied as in the case of South Tyrol and wondered why it was not possible to 
conduct a referendum under the supervision of the Great Powers. Similarly, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary in the 
post-war Labour government, admitted that Britain had not been happy with the fact that about 200,000 German­
speaking people had to be left with Italy, but that efforts had been made to ensure Italian guarantees for their 
protection as a minority. Cf. Wolfgang v. Welsperg, Sudtirol Kampf um Recht und Volkstum (Hamburg: Hutten, 
1962), pp. 226-227.
369 These new arguments by Italy are explored in greater detail in Rolf Steininger, Los von Rom? Die Sudtirolfrage 
1945/46 und das Gruber-DeGasperi-Abkommen (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1987), p. 174ff.
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the Western world. Exploiting the western fear of communism, the Italian delegation argued 
that the Brenner was the symbol for Italy’s northern defence line against Germany, and a loss of 
this border would be a severe psychological shock easily exploitable by the communists.370 
Thus, Italy’s arguments were perfectly in line with the positions of the Allies, and out-flanked 
Austrian claims based on ethnic ties and minority rights by offering autonomy for South Tyrol 
within the Italian polity.371
Four main points were made by Austria to back its claim for a return of South Tyrol:372 
the importance of South Tyrol for the national consciousness of the Austrians; an expected 
improvement of the economic balance; the restoration of the communication and transportation 
unity of Austria; and the political stabilisation of the country through the return of an old 
Austrian peasant population with a deeply democratic conviction. In addition to this, the 
Austrian delegation in Paris tried to counter Italian arguments, by pointing out that the technical 
development of modem weapons rendered territorial frontiers pointless; that autonomy alone 
would not provide a solution to the area’s political and economic problems and that South Tyrol 
would remain a potential source of political unrest within Italy; that South Tyrol was an 
economic unit for whose agricultural produce of fruit and vine there was no demand in Italy; 
that, if Austria was to be blamed for its participation in the Nazis’ war, it should also be 
remembered that Italy had been an ally of Germany in Abyssinia, Spain, Albania, and Greece; 
and finally that it was against all statements of the Allies before the end of the war, that a 
wrong, such as the one against South Tyrol after 1919, should be maintained after 1945.373 At 
the same time, guarantees were given for economic co-operation with Italy to ensure supply of 
energy to its Northern industrial areas374 and for the protection of the Italian-speaking 
population remaining in South Tyrol. In this, Austria’s official approach, and even more so
370 Cf. Ibid., p. 57.
371 Cf. Ibid., p. 37-38.
372 Cf. Ibid., p. 59.
373 Alqock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 99-100.
374 Cf. Wolf, Sudtirol in Osterreich, p. 2. According to Wolf, part of the Austrian proposals was also that the water 
power generation stations should remain the property of Italy. Cf. ibid., p. 161-162.
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public opinion, were influenced by old anti-Italian sentiments based on the Italian ‘betrayal* in 
1915 and on the brutal Italianisation policy under Mussolini. However, Austria did not succeed. 
Gradual changes in its negotiation strategy occurred only after the Allies had made the definite 
decision not to change the Brenner border on 24 June 1946.375 The policy of maximum 
demands had three effects on the further developments: first, it diminished the chances of 
achieving greater Italian concessions on favourable autonomy regulations; second, it 
encouraged the South Tyrolese People’s Party (SVP) not to engage in any negotiations or co­
operation on autonomy-related issues with the Italian authorities; and third, it strengthened 
Italian fears that Austria would not put to rest its claims to South Tyrol and thus to an alteration 
of the Brenner border. From the end of August 1946 onwards and in recognition of the 
impossibility of achieving a return of South Tyrol, Austria pursued three aims. In a bilateral 
agreement with Italy, the solution of two issues was sought -  the return of the about 70,000 
optants to South Tyrol and free access to the communication and transport routes of South Tyrol 
formerly linking parts of Austria. Autonomy regulations for the German-speaking minority and 
their international guarantee were to be brought about by including an autonomy statute in the 
Italian peace treaty.376 Eventually, the search for an effective and mutually acceptable 
mechanism to protect the German-speaking minority became the guiding principle for both Italy 
and Austria.
Both governments had to accommodate a number of different concerns. Austria found 
itself under a variety of pressures, of which the following were the most significant. There was 
the need for good relations with Italy to solve the optants and transportation problems; there 
was also the need for reasonable demands not to put off the Allied and Associated Powers, 
whose support was needed to include the any Austro-Italian agreement in the Italian Peace
375 On this day the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers rejected Austria’s final suggestion of returning at least one 
part of South Tyrol, the Puster valley, and thereby upheld a former decision of 1 May 1946. Cf. Steininger, Los von 
Rom, pp. 63-64; and Alcock, The History o f the South Tyrol Question, pp. 8 Iff.
376 This strategy had the following rationale -  by committing Italy according to international law, the South Tyrolese 
would gain international guarantees for a fair administration of the future autonomy regulations, while Austria would 
retain the right for itself to become active in the South Tyrol question at any given time should that be necessary. Cf. 
Steininger, Los von Rom, pp. 88-89,114,142.
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Treaty; and finally, there was domestic pressure to achieve as good as possible a solution for 
their fellow countrymen in South Tyrol. This latter point in particular also highlights the 
differences between Alsace and the Saar. While there was no public or official outcry over 
French policy in Alsace after 1945, the opposite was true for the Saar. With respect to Northern 
Ireland, the situation is more complex and has changed several times since partition. 
Noteworthy, however, is the fact that the violent re-escalation of the conflict in the 1960s also 
marks the point from which on there is more sustained Irish interest in Northern Irish matters.
The Italian policy had to consider a number of different yet equally important issues. 
First of all, the border with Austria was not the only one that could be subjected to change -  
there were disputes with Yugoslavia (over Triest) and with France (over the Val d’Aosta). 
Furthermore, there were other unresolved minority issues and secessionist claims that, after 
having been repressed under Mussolini, were re-emerging as, for example, in Sicily. Thus, too 
many concessions, as appropriate and advantageous as they may have seemed for South Tyrol, 
could set an unwelcome precedent for other potential conflicts. On the other hand, recognising 
the South Tyrolese as a minority in an internationally backed agreement had one considerable 
advantage -  according to then prevalent international law such a recognition of minority status 
was dependent upon the loyalty of the respective group of people. 377
The purpose of the Paris Agreement of 1946 was “to safeguard the ethnic character and 
the cultural and economic development of the German-speaking element.”378 The areas of 
validity of the agreement were defined as personal, territorial, and substantial.379 Referring to 
‘German-speaking citizens’ as well as to the ‘German-speaking element,’ the agreement 
covered all German-speaking citizens in the province of Bolzano and in the neighbouring 
bilingual townships of the Province of Trentino. The substantial guarantees given in the Paris 
Agreement extended to the complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants.
377 Cf. Felix Ermacora, “Sudtirol als Rechtsproblem in nationaler und intemationaler Sicht”, in Huter, Sudtirol, pp. 
426-473, here p. 444.
378 Quoted in Miehsler, Das Gruber-DeGasperi-Abkommen, here p. 397-398.
379 For a more detailed elaboration, cf. Miehsler, Das Gruber-DeGasperi-Abkommen, pp. 399-400,401,412.
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The central weakness of the agreement was that it was drafted in the tradition of minority 
treaties after World War One, that is, it provided for minority protection only through rights 
granted to individual members of the group, in this case the German-speaking inhabitants of 
South Tyrol. The fundamental question that remained unanswered was: “What would happen if 
the equality of rights granted to the individual were not sufficient to preserve the separate 
economic and cultural development of the minority against the stronger assimilating forces of 
the majority?”380
Inter-Community Relations
Ethnic relations381 in South Tyrol between the German-speaking population majority and the 
Italian minority were in part determined by the experience of more than two decades of fascism 
and almost two years of German occupation. The degree of alienation between the two 
population groups in 1945/46 was significant and mutual suspicions about the objectives of the 
respective other group were strong.
The South Tyrolese People’s Party (SVP) was founded on 17 May 1945. It was 
recognised by the Allied Occupation Forces and its membership had grown to around 50,000 by 
21 September, 1945. Although being the dominating party among the German-speaking 
population in South Tyrol, it was not the only one. Apart from the vast Christian-conservative 
majority of the German ethnic group who found their political home in the SVP, there was also 
a smaller number of left-wingers who were initially represented by the Social Democratic Party 
of South Tyrol, a section of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). It Was only after the provincial 
elections in 1948, when the party received only 804 votes, that the project of a second German 
party was abandoned.382 Since then, and until the late sixties, early seventies, the SVP 
successfully managed to remain the only German party in South Tyrol, and even with the 
emergence of other ethnic German parties, it has managed to command impressive majorities of
380 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 190.
381 While the following is only an overview, a detailed account can be found in Alcock, The South Tyrol Question,
pp. 81-109.
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the electorate. This is a unique situation within the range of conflicts analysed here; as in all 
other cases there is intra-ethnic party plurality.
The Allies also gave permission for the publication of a daily and a weekly paper, the 
Dolomiten and the Volksbote. The first issue of the Dolomiten on 19 May 1945, contained the 
SVP’s three point programme concerning its policy with respect to the status of the German 
population in South Tyrol. The party, firmly rooted in the traditional self-conception of the 
German-speaking South Tyrolese as an ethnic group distinct from the Italian population in 
South Tyrol and beyond in a variety of aspects, declared its objectives as the achievement of 
cultural, linguistic, and economic rights for the German-speaking population; the securing of 
peace and order in the province; and the advancing of the South Tyrolese claim to self- 
determination. Although nothing specific was said about a return to Austria, the mentioning of 
the right to self-determination was enough to prompt an immediate Italian response in which the 
SVP was accused of separatist, and therefore anti-Italian, goals. This Italian response, on the 
other hand, confirmed many fears among the South Tyrolese that their chances to preserve, 
develop, and express their identity within an Italian, rather than Austrian, state would be 
severely limited. Thus, mutual perceptions and partial misconceptions of the respectively 
other’s agenda hinted to the continuation of the decades-old ethnic conflict rather than to its 
speedy and satisfactory solution.
On 31 May 1945 an agreement was reached between the SVP and the Provincial 
National Liberation Committee (CLN) in which both sides accepted that co-operation was 
necessary, and that it was the interest of all people living in South Tyrol “to refrain from 
demonstrations or speeches likely to disturb ethnic relations, to refrain from hindering the free 
development of new political organisations if these were undertaken on democratic lines, and to 
establish a mixed commission to carry out a quick and systematic purge in the Province of 
Nazis, fascists, and collaborators.” The latter was carried out rather effectively under the 
authority of the Allies and the Italian prefect for the province. In order to cover the now vacant
c f  Mittermaier, Sudtirol, p. 70.
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posts in the administration, a massive influx of Italians occurred which re-ignited Germans fears 
about continuing Italianisation of South Tyrol: In the light of the new wave of Italian 
immigration, Germans became even more frustrated with the slow progress the Italian 
government made in the rebuilding of the province, while the Italians generally felt very little 
sympathy towards the Germans who, in their eyes, had been actively supporting the criminal 
cause of Nazi Germany.
Another contentious issue was the remigration of those who had opted for Germany in 
1939. The official Italian opinion stressed that, while other German minorities were expelled to 
Germany, with Allied approval, from the former so-called Eastern territories of Germany in the 
Baltic, Poland and Czechoslovakia, or deported from these and other settlement areas in Central 
and Eastern Europe to labour camps in the Soviet Union, it was hard to justify that the optants 
of 1939 should now be able to return to South Tyrol to the detriment of Italian interests.383 
However, a resolution of the optants question for the South Tyrolese was inevitably connected 
to the preservation of the ethnic character of South Tyrol which seemed impossible without the 
remigration of those who had left after 1939.
Apart from the more favourable party-political structure among the German-speaking 
South Tyrolese, there was another significant difference between them and the Italian 
population. The South Tyrolese had been living in the province for centuries and developed 
their own customs and traditions and their distinct identity. The basis upon which this 
distinctiveness of the German-speaking South Tyrolese vis-a-vis the Italian population in the 
province was claimed was manifold. There were, first of all, the cultural characteristics of 
language and religion. While the linguistic differences between the two ethnic groups are 
obvious, the religious dissimilarities are less apparent, yet equally deep-rooted in customs and 
traditions. Both the Italian and the German-speaking population in the province are Catholic, 
but the devotion of the German-speaking South Tyrolese to the Heart of Jesus cult gives their 
religiosity a distinct note that forms an important part of their identity and claim to separateness.
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Second, these cultural characteristics were, and still are, reinforced by economic 
divisions, in particular in terms of employment, with a majority of the Germans being employed 
in the agricultural sector, in small business, and tourism, while Italians mostly are working in 
the industrial and public sectors. In addition to this, there is, third, a certain pattern of residential 
distinctiveness, the Italians living in more urban, the Germans live in more rural areas.384 While 
the German-speaking South Tyrolese formed a very homogeneous population and saw South 
Tyrol as their Heimat, the Italians were extremely heterogeneous, united only by the same 
language and nationality. Coming from different areas within Italy, from different social and 
political backgrounds, many of them saw South Tyrol as nothing but a place to work. Under 
these circumstances, the Italian-speaking population was not able to develop the same strong 
sense of ties within, and solidarity with, their community, let alone a distinct identity similar to 
that of the South Tyrolese German-speakers who are firmly rooted in the territory.
Interethnic relations in South Tyrol, at least since 1919, had not only been a matter of 
the relationship between the two language communities in the province itself, but also between 
the German population and the local and centra] Italian authorities. This latter dimension 
became an increasing concern to the SVP when it emerged that plans were drafted to set up a 
decentralised system of autonomous areas throughout Italy including a joint region Trentino- 
Alto Adige, i.e., that there would be no autonomy for the South Tyrolese alone, but the province 
would be put together with the neighbouring province of Trentino, where the Italians 
outnumbered the Germans by far.385 The Italian central government had primarily three reasons 
for this particular proposal. First, to contain the autonomist ambitions in the Trentino province, 
second, to avoid fuelling pan-German irredentist aspirations towards South Tyrol by granting 
autonomy to a territory in which Germans who were unhappy with their status as Italian citizens 
formed a sizeable majority, and third, to dilute the South Tyrolese claim to self-determination.
383 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 85.
384 Cf. the section “Developments after 1972” below.
383 The Italian rationale behind this regionalisation in general had to do with the pressure under which the 
government in Rome came from the secessionist attempts in Sicily, and by a number of other linguistic minorities in
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The SVP, ill-advised by the Austrian government on this issue, dismissed the autonomy 
proposal for a joint region Trentino-Alto Adige as insufficient, because its aim of preserving the 
distinct German ethnic character of the province was not considered achievable within the 
suggested autonomy framework. It was only during the summer of 1946, after the final decision 
of the Allies to leave the Brenner border unchanged, that the SVP was prepared to enter into 
direct negotiations with the Italian authorities.
From the Autonomy Statute of 1948 to the Violent Escalation in 1961 
Developments in South Tyrol
Sources o f Italian Policy
After the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Italian government was in the stronger yet more 
difficult position. Stronger, because the Paris Agreement was precise on the status of South 
Tyrol as a territory under the exclusive sovereignty of the Italian state, and at the same time 
vague enough to ensure that no autonomy regulation could be forced upon the Italian state 
which it did not consider to be in its best interest. This vagueness, however, also bore a strain of 
difficulty as it strengthened to some extent the South Tyrolese position, and that of Austria, in 
so far as it left any autonomy regulation disputable as to whether this particular form of 
autonomy meant the fulfilment of the Paris Agreement. Further difficulties arose for the Italian 
government in relation to different interest coalitions. First, there were the Italians in South 
Tyrol, among whom a real fear existed that the Italian government, in signing the Paris 
Agreement, had abandoned the Italian minority in South Tyrol to the German-speaking 
population. The latter were known to be not only bitter about the years of fascism and post-war 
development, but would also be reinforced numerically and economically by the returning 
optants.386 Another fear among Italians in the province, but also among the industrialists who 
had benefited from the industrialisation programme under Mussolini, was the possible political
Italy, such as in the Venetia region. Cf. Ermacora, Sildtirol als Rechtsproblem, p. 441-442. Ermacora also notes the 
encouragement of the Italian government to carry out regionalisation by the then French president General de Gaulle. 
38<* Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 148ff.
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elimination of the Bolzano industrial zone once autonomy was granted that gave the German 
population control not only over cultural affairs but also over the economy. In addition, 
bilingualism was seen as a severe threat, as it would enable the German-speaking South 
Tyrolese to exclude Italians from working in the public sector, in communes, hospitals, and 
schools.
The second interest coalition were the Italians in the province of Trentino. For them, co­
operation with the German-speaking South Tyrolese was vital as they could only achieve a 
favourable autonomy regulation in a joint region, Trentino-Alto Adige. However, a favourable 
autonomy regulation from the point of view of the Trentino Italians meant that most powers 
devolved to the region would remain in the regional authorities’ competence to give the 
Italians, who were in an over-all majority at the regional level, the power to determine the 
implementation of the autonomy statute to come.
Third, there were the German-speaking South Tyrolese. They saw the autonomy 
regulations as some sort of compensation for the fascist Italianisation attempt and the denial of 
the right to self-determination. They demanded that knowledge of German be made a 
requirement for public office and posts in the administration in an area with a German-speaking 
majority. In the new party programme, which the SVP had adopted in February 1947 the 
envisaged goals were to assure and promote the ethnic, economic, and cultural life of the 
German-speaking South Tyrolese within the Italian state. These were objectives that could only 
be achieved if autonomy was granted to South Tyrol.
The Italian government needed to balance the political and economic interests of the 
two ethnic groups in South Tyrol against the interests of the Italian Republic and its 
international commitments. It had to keep the Paris Agreement by granting the South Tyrolese 
autonomy and, at the same time, it had to protect the Italian population in South Tyrol, and to 
satisfy the aspirations of the inhabitants of the Trentino province. After consultations with the
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SVP in April 1947, the Constituent Assembly of the Italian Republic in Rome approved a bill in 
June according to which the region Trentino-Alto Adige was created.
South Tyrolese Resentment
With effect from 1945/46, the Italian government confirmed the institution of German 
secondary schools and the recognition of all respective diplomas, gave permission for the use of 
German in political, administrative, and judicial communication with authorities in the province 
of Bolzano and extended this to the multi-lingual communities of the province of Trentino, 
introduced language courses for officials in multi-lingual communities, and began to transfer 
mono-lingual Italian officials to other provinces. Despite these measures to improve the 
conditions for the preservation, expression, and development of the ethnic identity of the 
German-speaking population in South Tyrol, the most important South Tyrolese demand -  to be 
granted autonomy independent from that of the Trentino province -  was still not met. Therefore, 
the SVP turned to Austria and the three western Allies. Austria, in the midst of its negotiations 
with Italy on the issue of the remigration of the 1939 optants387 advised the SVP not to insist on 
separate autonomy and otherwise avoided intervening directly into the autonomy negotiations 
between the SVP and the Italian government.388 France had too little political influence at the 
time, and the United States was mostly concerned about the outcome of the next Italian 
elections and feared a communist take-over. Similarly to Austria, Great Britain advised the SVP 
to accept the Italian proposals for autonomy that were on the table.
On 17 January 1948, the South Tyrolese put forward their revised demands and were 
told by the Italian delegation that most of them could be met provided an official letter would be 
written to the effect that no further demands would be made and that the Paris agreement was 
considered fulfilled. This was accepted by the SVP, who reasoned that provincial autonomy 
would always make the South Tyrol look like irredentists and nationalists, whereas regional
387 Italy and Austria concluded their negotiations in November 1947 with the result that the overwhelming majority 
of optants was allowed back into south Tyrol and readmitted to Italian citizenship. The agreement is discussed at 
length in Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 190ff.
203
autonomy would secure the support of the Trentino Italians in some vital matters. There was, 
furthermore, considerable encouragement by the Austrian government and the British 
ambassador in Rome. Another rationale was that a new parliament might not support the 
autonomy regulations as they were proposed now.389 Finally, the suggested autonomy statute 
had improved compared to earlier drafts. It returned the predominantly German-speaking 
communities of Egno and Salomo to the Province of Bolzano. South Tyrol was to become its 
own electoral district; regulations about procedures for contesting provincial and regional laws 
had been improved as had been financial regulations; and the region was supposed to exercise 
its executive powers normally through their devolution to the provinces, municipalities and 
local public bodies.390
On 29 January 1948, the Constituent Assembly of Italy approved the Autonomy Statute 
and Trentino-Alto Adige joined those among the nineteen Italian regions that for special 
geographic or ethnic reasons were granted a special autonomy statute. This was followed by a 
press declaration of the Austrian Foreign Minister on 31 January 1948, in which he 
characterised the autonomy statute as satisfactory and asked the German-speaking South 
Tyrolese to be loyal citizens of the Italian state.391
This new autonomy statute, however, did not contribute to the final settlement Of the 
South Tyrol problem. On the contrary, similar to developments in Northern Ireland in the late 
1960s, early 1970s, and after the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement, the different 
interpretations the statute was given by the South Tyrolese and the Austrians resulted in rather 
high expectations on part of the German-speaking South Tyrolese, while the Italian 
interpretation and subsequent execution of the statute did not live up to these expectations. The 
German-speaking population’s view was that both the Paris Agreement and the 1948 autonomy
388 Victoria Stadlmayer, “Die Stidtirolpolitik Osterreichs seit Abschlufi des Pariser Abkommen”, in Huter, Siidtirol, 
pp. 474-536, here p. 477-478.
389 Cf. Karl-Heinz Ritschel, Diplomatie um Siidtirol. Politische Hintergriinde eines europdischen Versagens 
(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1966), p. 268.
390 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 176fF.
391 Stadlmayer, Die Stidtirolpolitik, p. 480.
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statute were two legal instruments that would strengthen the German position in the province of 
Bolzano in two ways -  numerically by the return of the optants, and economically and socially 
by a redistribution of employment according to ethnic proportions. In contrast, the Italian 
interpretation was that with these documents the state had eventually been equipped with two 
internationally recognised instruments, and accepted by the South Tyrolese to resist further 
German encroachment and to maintain the existing degree of Italianisation.392
The two biggest causes of South Tyrolese resentment were the insufficient transfer of 
administrative powers from the region to the province as laid down in Articles 13 and 14 of the 
autonomy statute and the remigration of the 1939 optants and Italian immigration to the 
province -  problems whose satisfactory resolution was seen as essentia] for the establishment of 
conditions in which an ethnic German identity in South Tyrol would not only continue to exist, 
but could be further developed in an ethnically German environment. The SVP considered the 
return of the around 70,000 optants as essential in its attempts to stem further Italian 
immigration. Italian enthusiasm about the remigration of people with very little allegiance to, 
and respect for, the Italian state was limited, and fears grew that German nationalism and 
irredentism would increase. Austria, as the third party, insisted on the fulfilment of the 
resettlement agreement reached with Italy in 1947. Under the pressure of North and South 
Tyrolese politicians, the Austrian government shared the SVP’s point of view that to maintain 
the ethnic German character of South Tyrol, it was necessary to reinforce the German-speaking 
population numerically.393
392 However, Italian policy was not consistently anti-German, nor did the SVP refuse co-operation with the Italians 
at regional level. The Italian government rejected SVP demands to introduce a minimum period of residence as a 
requirement for participation in regional elections in 1948 (before the return of the optants) and maintained the 
decision in 1952, now in favour of the SVP, as by then many of the optants had returned. In both elections, the SVP 
secured about two thirds of the provincial vote, and formed a coalition government with the ideologically similar 
Italian Democrazia Christiana (DC). Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 197.
393 Austria also wanted to avoid setting a precedent for other German-speaking minorities of the former Austro- 
Hungarian empire by granting all South Tyrolese optants citizenship en bloc, particularly because there were many 
more or less strong supporters of the Nazis among the optants, who, in the light of what was seen as subverting and 
eventually destroying Austria in the pre-annexation period, were not welcome to receive Austrian citizenship. Cf. 
Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 200f. The diplomatic developments around South Tyrol between 1922 and 
1938/1939 are analysed in detail in Leopold Steurer, Siidtirol zwischen Rom und Berlin 1919-1939 (Vienna, Berlin, 
Munich: Europa Verlag, 1980).
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The bitterness and disappointment of the SVP at their failure to achieve their economic 
and social objectives (control of the labour exchanges, control over immigration, language 
issues, ethnic proportions in the public sector) prevented any co-operation with the DC at 
regional level, which would have been essential for a more favourable Italian interpretation and 
administration of the autonomy statute. However, the SVP found itself in a difficult position. On 
a regional as well as national level, the party depended on good relationships with the DC, but 
this was very much a one-way street. Neither in Rome nor in Trentino could the SVP exercise 
any pressure on the DC. Even on a provincial level, the SVP had no real budgetary power, as 
the Minister of the Interior could decide upon the budget if no consent was reached among the 
councillors of both provinces. The votes of the three SVP deputies in the national parliament 
were hardly decisive, whereas abstention or even voting against the governing DC in Rome 
could worsen matters for the German population in South Tyrol.
During all this time, Italian suspicion of irredentist aspirations were kept awake by 
extremist factions in South Tyrol and Austria, and a growing interest in the matter in Germany. 
In 1949, a series of dynamite attacks on South Tyrol power pylons occurred.394 Simultaneously, 
South Tyrolese hopes for an eventual secessionist/irredentist solution were fuelled by two 
events -  the Italian demands for a plebiscite in Triest in 1953, and the signing of the Saar 
Statute between France and Germany in 1954.
The plebiscite in Triest increased tensions between the South Tyrolese and the Italian 
government. Austria remained relatively reluctant in this respect. Although Foreign Minister 
Gruber sent a note to the Western Allies demanding the same referendum for South Tyrol as for 
Triest,395 he also made it clear that Austria, after having sent several notes to the Italian 
government in 1951 and 1952 requesting the fulfilment of the Paris Agreement, was not willing 
to intervene in this case and left it to the SVP to decide on whether further steps should be taken
394 Ibid., p. 225-226.
395 Stadlmayer, Die Stidtirolpolitik, p. 484.
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or not.396 The reason for this unusual reluctance lay in the political considerations the Austrian 
government had to make in the early 1950s.397 Until 1955 Austria had not regained its full 
sovereignty and was still under Soviet occupation. In order to achieve this treaty, it had been 
necessary for the government to seek a good relationship with the West, into which Italy had 
become fully integrated. Furthermore, the economic situation in Europe in general and in 
Austria in particular made it essential for the Country to co-operate with EFTA and the EEC, 
two organisations in which Italy could effectively bloc Austrian integration. Consequently, 
foreign policy aimed at a good relationship with Italy, but also insisted that the meaning of the 
Paris Agreement was the preservation of the ethnic character of South Tyrol,398 that is, Austrian 
emphasis lay on the territorial dimension of South Tyrolese ethnic identity, a view shared by the 
majority of the German-speaking population in the province. In contrast to this, the Italian 
government had made it very clear that, in its view, the agreement only extended to an 
obligation to maintain the ethnic character of the German-speaking population and not of the 
whole region.
The Failure o f the Italian-South Tyrolese Negotiations in 1954
Official negotiations between the SVP and the Italian government on autonomy were reopened 
in 1954. At the beginning of these negotiations a memorandum of the SVP spelt out in detail the 
dissatisfaction the German-speaking South Tyrolese felt with the current autonomy regulations 
at the time. In particular, it was claimed that the South Tyrolese were subjected to genocide and 
that the protection of a minority needed formal equality and special laws which put the minority 
in a position where it could satisfy its own needs and interests out of its own legislative and 
administrative powers.399 In conclusion, two demands were made. First, that all artificial 
measures to encourage immigration cease, and that steps be taken to prevent their repetition. 
Second, that measures .be introduced to remedy the wrongs South Tyrol and its German­
39<* Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 231.
397 Cf. the more detailed analysis in Wolf, Siidtirol in Osterreich, p. 29f.
398 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 234.
399 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 227ff.
207
speaking inhabitants had suffered under fascism. This ‘victimisation’ aspect of South Tyrolese 
identity is particularly predominant among the older generation, who lived through the period of 
Fascist Italianisation. In contrast to Northern Ireland, however, where carefully selected 
memories about the conduct of the other population group have been preserved over centuries 
and shape mutual community perceptions until the present day, the memory of the fascist period 
is barely present as a significant feature of identity among the younger generations of South 
Tyrolese, and is one factor that has contributed to greater openness toward Italian culture and 
eased formerly predominant inter-ethnic tensions.
However, the South Tyrolese tried to realise their policy objectives not only through 
demands vis-a-vis the Italian government, but took two steps even before the official Italian 
response to the 1954 memorandum. One of them was the foundation by politicians and public 
figures from North and South Tyrol of the Berg-Isel-Bund for the preservation of language, 
culture, costumes, and traditions in South Tyrol. Second, in recognition that one of the reasons 
of continuing Italian im m igration  was the lack of a skilled industrial work force among the 
German-speaking population in South Tyrol, the Kulturwerk fur Siidtirol (Cultural Foundation 
for South Tyrol) was founded in West Germany, which by 1964 had collected over two million 
Deutschmark which were used, among other things, for the construction of hostels for students, 
cultural centres, and scholarships and courses for South Tyrol trainees and apprentices in West 
Germany.400
Unsurprisingly, the Italian response to the memorandum was disappointing from a 
South Tyrolese point of view. The general line of argument was that the South Tyrol question 
had been settled by an international agreement -  the Paris Agreement -  which Italy had 
fulfilled 401 The mandate of the agreement did not cover the preservation of the distinct German 
ethnic character of the territory but only of that of the German-speaking part of the population,
400 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 239.
401 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 227ff.
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which was not endangered by living alongside another ethnic group.402 The Italian government 
then drew a number of conclusions which made it easy for the SVP to predict, and exploit 
propagandistically, a continuation of what it perceived to be anti-German policies. These 
conclusions were that the SVP memorandum amounted to a demand for more autonomy under 
conditions that would turn Alto Adige into a reservation for German-speaking South Tyrolese; 
that no further concessions could be made on the part of the Italian government to the SVP, 
whose loyalty was doubtful after the Triest incident; that a revision of the autonomy statute and 
an open discussion of the Paris Agreement would bring the South Tyrol problem back to an 
international agenda which was unnecessary and undesirable as it was an internal Italian affair, 
and that the demands made by the South Tyrolese German-speakers were against the interests of 
the Italian minority in the province.
As nothing positive had been achieved by 1955, opposition grew within the party 
against the leadership’s moderate course. Although this was counter-productive from an Italian 
point of view, the government did not take active steps to prevent a development towards a 
more radical SVP. Thus, tensions within the SVP leadership and between local party 
organisations and the leadership increased in the course of 1956 and 1957. The 1957 party 
congress saw an almost complete transformation of the SVP leadership.403 The election of 
Silvius Magnago as the new party chairman marked the end of the policy of “foul 
compromise.”404 From then on, SVP policy aimed at a revision of the 1948 autonomy statute in 
favour of full provincial -  instead of shared regional -  autonomy and at the mobilisation of the 
German-speaking South Tyrolese population for this goal. However, the new policy did not 
strengthen the SVP position vis-a-vis the Italian government; rather, its powerlessness became 
increasingly obvious, especially in the light of these ambitious objectives, and dissatisfaction 
among local party organisations increased.
402 Ibid., pp. 240ff.
403 Eleven nominees for the party’s executive committee who were regarded as representatives of a co-operative 
course did not achieve a majority of votes, while so-called hard-liners did.
404 Friedl Volgger, Mit Siidtirol am Scheideweg (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1984), pp. 211-212.
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The Path to Violence
Dynamite attacks had occurred as early as in the late forties. From June 1956 until their arrest in 
January 1957, the so-called Stieler gang was active and carried out a series of dynamite attacks 
on monuments, military installations, power pylons, and rail tracks -  all of which were 
perceived as symbols Italianisation, and thus as a threat to the traditional South Tyrolese way of 
life. Yet, these attacks were all more or less uncoordinated attempts of individuals or small 
groups. From 1958 onwards, a more organised network of people willing to carry the opposition 
against Italian policies beyond the threshold of violence began to take shape. Resistance against 
what was seen as an unjust implementation of the 1948 autonomy statute existed in two camps -  
a mostly intellectual one in North Tyrol, and one consisting primarily of small farmers in South 
Tyrol.405 In the light of forty years of Italian ‘colonisation’ of South Tyrol, the increasingly 
organised resistance movement came to the conclusion that leaflets, mountain fires, and 
speeches had, after all, amounted to nothing, and that the time had come for actions of another 
kind 406
Eventually, an organisation was formed which called itself Befreiungssausschufi 
Siidtirol (BAS -  Committee for the Liberation of South Tyrol). The BAS sought contact with 
Austrian politicians and journalists407 and received financial and material support from the 
Berg-lsel-Bund -  initially in the form of propaganda material, but soon afterwards also in the 
form of explosives 408
The SVP’s position as the sole representative of South Tyrolese interests, and of its 
leadership, who were held responsible in part for the way in which the Italian central and 
regional government administered the autonomy, was not only weakened by inner-party 
discontent but also by the fact that Article 14 of the 1948 autonomy statute was used only very
405 Elisabeth Baumgartner, “Bomben filr Herrgott und Heimat”, in Baumgartner, Elisabeth and Mayr, Hans and 
Mumelter, Gerhard: Feiiemacht. Siidtirols Bombenjahre (Bozen: Edition Raetia, 1992), pp. 7-37, here pp. 30ff.
400 Baumgartner, Bomben, pp. 30ff.
407 Cf. Wolf, Siidtirol in Osterreich, pp. 242-243.
40  ^Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 31 Off.
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infrequently and its application often limited by central government decrees.409 This Article, 
which, together with Article 13, regulated the delegation of executive and legislative powers 
from the region to the province, had been one of the main reasons the SVP leadership had 
argued in 1948 for approval of the autonomy statute because it would grant the province its de 
facto autonomy 410 Nevertheless, the SVP could maintain effective control by partly shifting its 
stance towards a more determined policy of demands for a revised autonomy statute, while 
maintaining its condemnation of all terrorist activities, which were gaining momentum in a 
series of thirty to forty dynamite attacks between 1957 and I960.411 At a demonstration at the 
castle of Sigmundskron on 16 November 1957, a resolution was adopted which demanded 
separate autonomy for South Tyrol and in which Austria was asked to take the South Tyrol 
issue before the international community. This was followed by a new draft of an autonomy 
statute by the SVP, submitted to the Italian government in 1958. This caused renewed Italian 
fears in the province, the region and in Rome. The negative Italian response to the new draft 
statute, once again, highlighted the fundamental difference between the SVP and the Italian 
government412 The respect for the ethnic composition of the South Tyrolese people on its 
native soil, as demanded by the SVP, was perceived as threatening Italian immigration and the 
status of the Italian population in the province. Furthermore, the demand for ethnic proportions 
in the public sector would create a significant excess of Italian civil servants, while demands for 
economic independence would facilitate growth in the so-called South Tyrolese indigenous 
sectors (e.g., agriculture, tourism, small businesses) and simultaneously limit the development, 
if not further existence, of Italian industries in the area. The consequential deadlock in the 
negotiations was not the only factor that contributed to the steady escalation of the conflict. 
There were also a number of social developments which increased South Tyrolese 
dissatisfaction. Among all the Italian provinces, South Tyrol paid the highest amount of taxes.
409 Ibid.. p. 286.
410 Ibid., p. 287f.
411 Baumgartner, Bomben, pp. 33ff.
412 Cf. the detailed account in Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 294ff.
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There were hardly any prospects for the South Tyrolese young generation within the province. 
The status and use of German as the South Tyrolese mother tongue had not been improved 
significantly.413
Although this ‘ethnic emergency’ increased the homogeneity of the German-speaking 
South Tyrolese as a distinct group, it also contributed to the alienation of at least some parts Of 
this group from its political leadership. Because this section did not see themselves and their 
interests being sufficiently well and successfully represented in SVP policies, they did not feel 
obliged to comply with the party position on the use of violence. Interestingly, both factions 
justified their actions by recourse to the distinct Tyrolese love of freedom, patriotism and 
religiosity. In particular, it was the religious and political patriotism which allowed the SVP to 
mobilise ever more people to back its demands for a revision of the 1948 autonomy statute, 
while the protagonists of the dynamite attacks in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the 
later terrorists, also claimed to be motivated by this patriotism.414
Violent actions, however, did not have an exclusive autonomist background. By 1960, 
they also came to express anti-ethnic sentiments vis-a-vis the Italian population in the province, 
not least because of the economic dimension of the conflict415 and increased Italian neo-fascist 
activities in South Tyrol, including parades through the provincial capital Bolzano and threats of 
attacks. Apart from the increasing violence, the Italians also felt threatened by the fact that after 
decades of being a part of the Italian polity, Tyrolese north and south of the Brenner still 
insisted on the spiritual and cultural unity of Tyrol, arguing that with the exception of the period 
between 1809 and 1814, South Tyrol had been part of this unit for more than 1200 years. Both 
the violent and non-violent resistance movement sought to prove that there was a historic and 
substantial continuity of opposition to foreign domination that reached from the Napoleonic era
413 Baumgartner, Bomben, pp. 35ff.
414 Cf. Wolf, Siidtirol in Osterreich, pp. 68-70, also Elisabeth Baumgartner and Hans Mayr, “Die Feuemacht”, in 
Baumgartner et al., Feuemacht, pp. 39-60.
415 According to Baumgartner, some of the dynamite attacks in 1960/1961 were accompanied by leaflets with 
slogans such as “Italians, leave the jobs to the South Tyrolese!” Cf. Baumgartner, Bomben, p. 36f.
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to Italian fascism, Nazi occupation and on to the present-day injustices and was an inherent part 
of the South Tyrolese value system.416
The eventual break-up of the over ten year long coalition between SVP and DC at 
regional level in 1959 over unresolved matters of housing allocation procedures contributed 
further to the ever more intensifying political tensions in South Tyrol.417
The International Context
International and bilateral Austro-Italian relations were an important factor in the further 
escalation of the ethnic conflict in South Tyrol. As early as the beginning of the 1950s, 
conflicting Italian and Austrian interests on the issue of remigration had given back an 
international dimension to the South Tyrol question. Austria tried to facilitate its policy goals 
with a number of decisions that more or less forced optants to return to South Tyrol as they 
would otherwise face statelessness,418 while Italy demanded that the Austrian government stop 
these coercive policies and threatened to stop the necessary screening process of individual 
applications to regain Italian citizenship.419 By 1953, the optants question was eventually 
resolved with 201,305 persons having regained Italian citizenship and only 4,106 having been 
excluded during the screening process.420
This outcome was clearly in favour of the Austrian government, and the country’s 
position in the international arena was strengthened even further after the country regained its .
416 Cf. Wolf, Siidtirol in Osterreich, pp. 71-76.
417 C f Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 320 ff.
418 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, p. 208.
419 This was part of the 1947 agreement and granted Italy the right to deny citizenship to war and Nazi criminals.
420 However, not all those who could have returned to South Tyrol did so. Only about 22,000 of the 70,000 optants 
who had left as a result of the Option returned after 1945. The more qualified and uiban-orientated optants, however, 
remained in Austria, mainly because of the more favourable economic conditions north of the Brenner. But there 
were unexpected social problems; re-optants did not receive a very warm welcome among the South Tyrolese 
population who were generally unwilling to give shelter to whole families. Nevertheless, the German-speaking 
population grew faster than the Italian: between 1946 and 1953 South Tyrol increased by 21,995, the Italians by 
12,639, which equalled a net gain of 9,356. The allegation by Michael Gamper, a leading clergyman, that the German 
population in South Tyrol was on a death march, was also unfounded: unemployment in the region was the lowest in 
Italy, with 3.7% compared to a national average of 6.6%. However, none of the statistical evidence had any impact on
South Tyrolese propaganda that Germans in the province were under foreign encroachment Unsurprisingly, this
fuelled inter-ethnic tensions, and one member of the SVP executive committee is reported to have said in 1953 that 
by 1965 the German-speaking population would be in a minority position in their province “and then the bombs will 
explode.” Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 195-217.
213
full sovereignty in 1955.421 Austria had renounced its territorial claim to South Tyrol and 
recognised the border at the Brenner in the 1955 state treaty, but its role as a protective power 
for South Tyrol remained unaltered, as the country was a signatory state of the Paris 
Agreement.422 In this policy approach and the opportunities it opened, Austria differed clearly 
from the approaches of German governments towards the Saar and Alsace, but also from that of 
Irish government, at least before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.
The Austrian government was also under considerable pressure from politicians in the 
Austrian Bundesland Tyrol, from where a variety of initiatives emerged. North Tyrolese 
politicians acted under the premise that the German-speaking population of Tyrol on both sides 
of the Brenner remained one people and that the unity of Tyrol continued to exist at least in 
spiritual and cultural terms. This view was shared by the South Tyrolese, who, as an essential 
part of their identity, conceived themselves as Tyrolese before any other ethnic or national 
definition as a group. Historically, there is even a motion of the Tyrolese diet of 3 May 1919, in 
which separation from Austria and the subsequent formation of a Free State Tyrol are 
demanded.423 The official involvement of both North and South Tyrolese politicians in the 
solution of the conflict was acknowledged under Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky who forged 
the all-party consensus on South Tyrol that no treaty with Italy would be signed without the 
consent of the (South) Tyrolese 424 This resembled the approach that the French and German 
governments took in their attempt to resolve the Saar conflict in the early 1950s, when they 
agreed on holding a referendum on the negotiated settlement. With the disengagement of 
Germany from Alsace and the developments in the region after 1945, no such policy was
421 Four provisions in the Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955 had relevance for the South Tyrol question. Article 5 
determined the Austrian borders to be those of 1938, that is, the Brenner border was re-confirmed by the Allies and 
accepted by Austria. Article 9(i) demanded that Austria take steps to prevent any Nazi and militarist propaganda and 
organisations firom re-emerging. Article 9(ii) requested the dissolution of all organisations carrying out activities 
against the principles of the UN. In article 11, finally, Austria recognised the Italian peace treaty of 1946. Both 
Foreign Minister Figl and Chancellor Raab declared that the State treaty did not, however, prohibit Austria from 
addressing South Tyrol issues within the framework of the Paris Agreement.
422 From the viewpoint of the government in Vienna, this meant the right and obligation for Austria to concern itself 
with the fulfilment of this agreement. The Paris Agreement itself was reconfirmed by the Austrian State Treaty, 
which demanded the recognition of the Italian Peace Treaty, of which the agreement was a part. Austria also derived 
a mandate to act on behalf of South Tyrol from the frequent requests made by South Tyrolese politicians to do so.
423 Cf. Wolf, Siidtirol in Osterreich, p. 92.
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necessary there. In the Northern Ireland conflict the referendum idea precedes the Good Friday 
Agreement, but was practised there for the first time in the context of a negotiated multi-party 
settlement including the British and Irish governments and representatives from both traditions.
The first major step which Austria took after having regained its full sovereignty425 was 
to propose, on 8 October 1956, that a joint Austro-Italian expert commission look into the South 
Tyrol problem. The Italian government rejected this on 9 February 1957. However, in the light 
of the obviously worsening situation in South Tyrol, a gradual softening of the Italian position 
occurred. On 11 August 1957, a journalist close to the government in Rome published an 
Article in which mistakes in the Italian South Tyrol policy were admitted -  in particular, the 
unnecessary rhetoric which had kept the tensions alive and inconsiderate responses to the 
German-speaking South Tyrolese and their needs 426 Half a year later, on 21 February 1958, the 
Italian and Austrian government began to hold conversations427 about unresolved matters in 
South Tyrol. These conversations reached deadlock on three main issues -  provincial autonomy, 
equality of the German and Italian languages, and the introduction of ethnic proportions in the 
public sector.428 Then, Austria decided in 1959 to internationalise the matter.429 An early set­
back for Austria occurred in the South Tyrol debate before the Council of Europe, in which the 
conclusion was drawn that Italy had fulfilled all legal obligations arising from the Paris 
Agreement.430 Austria then moved the matter to the United Nations in 1960. When the general 
assembly agreed to debate the problem, the first Italian defence line was broken, namely that 
South Tyrol was an internal Italian affair. At the end of the UN session, a resolution was
424 Ibid.
425 Alta: negotiations between the Italian government and the SVP had restarted in 1954, Austria had sent three notes 
to the. Italian government between .1954 and 1955 inquiring about the status of the negotiations without receiving an 
answer. Cf. Stadlmayer, Die Stidtirolpolitik, pp. 486-487.
42<* Cf. Ritschel, Diplomatic, pp. 287-288.
427 The Italian government rejected the term ‘negotiations’.
428 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 320-321.
429 According to Stadlmayer, this marked the beginning of the third period of the Austrian South Tyrol policy after 
the signing of the Paris Agreement. The previous two being, first, a period where it was hoped that, through loyalty 
and trust, a favourable implementation of the autonomy statute could be achieved, and second, a period beginning in 
1956 in which Austria made it known that it regarded the Paris Agreement as not yet being fulfilled by Italy. Cf. 
Stadlmayer, Die Stidtirolpolitik, p. 509.
430 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 322ff.
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adopted on 31 October that called for bilateral negotiations between Austria and Italy to resolve 
the South Tyrol question. Should these not be fruitful, it was recommended that the dispute 
should be referred to other international organisations, including the International Court of 
Justice.431 This decision strengthened the second Italian defence line that South Tyrol was not a 
political, but a legal problem.
At the end of January 1961, the Austrian and Italian governments entered into direct 
negotiations. The generally frosty atmosphere was worsened by neo-fascist demonstrations in 
Milan, and negotiations did not get beyond the point of both sides stating their views and 
recognising that these were irreconcilable.432 The Italian standpoint was that negotiations were 
only acceptable within, but not over, the statute. Austria demanded that the province of Bolzano 
be given full legislative autonomy, that laws passed by the provincial parliament only be 
suspendable by the constitutional court, and that the autonomous executive be independent of 
the central government’s executive measures, including so-called semi-state organisations, 
especially in the housing sector.433 While these demands obviously represented South Tyrolese 
wishes, it was equally clear that they could not be fulfilled by Italy within the self-imposed 
limits of the current autonomy statute. The failure of the Milan negotiations led to renewed 
terrorist activities 434 This not only worsened the situation of the German-speaking South 
Tyrolese, but also had a negative impact on Austro-Italian relationships.435 The more radical 
group in the South Tyrolese population, and especially those organised in, or sympathising with, 
the BAS became increasingly frustrated with the slow momentum of the Austro-Italian
431 The eventual wording of resolution 1497 was proposed by the Irish delegate Connor Cruise O’Brien. Cf. 
Mittermaier, Siidtirol, p. 74.
432 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 353ff.
433 Apart from that, a number of additional powers for the province were demanded, especially in education, 
immigration, economy, culture, and public administration. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 353ff.
434 Dynamite attacks were carried out against the Mussolini/Italian Genius monument, against the former residence 
of Ettore Tolomei, against railway tracks, housing projects, and the barracks of the Financial Police.
435 There were, for example, several anti-Austrian demonstrations after the dynamite attack on the Mussolini/Italian 
Genius Monument, while in Austria anti-Italian resentments were based on the negative perception of the 
immigration policy in South Tyrol, on the continued validity of fascist special laws and of the appropriations carried 
out according to them, on a number of arrests and trials which the Austrian public regarded as unjust, and on 
increasing neo-fascist activities in the country in general, and in particular in South Tyrol. Cf. Wolf, Siidtirol in 
Osterreich, pp. 208-209. Cf. also the account of one of these trials in Christian Plaickner, “Der Plunderer ProzeB”, in
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negotiations and with what was perceived as a continuing Italian colonisation policy in 
contradiction of the commitments Italy had made in the Paris Agreement of 1946. During the 
night of 11 June 1961, these circles carried out a series of dynamite attacks against power 
pylons to disrupt the flow of electricity to the industrial zone of Bolzano -  in the eyes of many 
South Tyrolese a symbol of the Italian colonisation of their home country -  and to draw 
international attention to the situation in South Tyrol.436
This violent outburst was the clearest indication yet that the autonomy statute of 1948 
had failed to provide an institutional framework within which both Italian and South Tyrolese 
interests could have been accommodated in a mutually satisfactory manner. The reasons for this 
failure did not only lie within South Tyrol or Italy, but there were also a number of external 
conditions limiting from the outset the chances of success for the 1948 statute and eventually 
contributing to its failure being recognised.
Table 14: Conditions Accounting for the Failure of the 1948 Autonomy Statute
• In Italy:
□ Failure to realise the strength of resentment generated by the biased interpretation 
and implementation of the 1948 autonomy statute
□ Continuation of policies associated with the Fascist Italianisation campaign
□ Concessions only in marginal aspects and not on the core of issues perceived as 
essential by the South Tyrolese to preserve the ethnic character of the province and 
their distinct identity
□ Considerations about implications for other minorities and potential disputes with 
them (and their kin-states) arising from the South Tyrol issue
• In Austria:
□ Assumption of a patron role over the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol on 
the basis of the Paris Agreement
□ Cross-party consensus recognising the established border with Italy, yet 
simultaneously encouraging the South Tyrolese to demand full implementation of 
the 1948 autonomy statute to the benefit of the ‘German-speaking element*
□ Insistence that Italy had not fulfilled the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement
Scrinzi, Otto (ed.), Chronik Siidtirol, 1959-1969. Von der Kolonie Alto Adige zur Autonomen Provinz Bozen (Graz, 
Stuttgart: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1996), pp. 59-64.
436 One of the leaflets distributed in connection with the first wave of attacks reasoned that it was not the hate of 
people who spoke another language which motivated the assassins, but rather the right of self-preservation which had 
to be defended against a state which persecuted the South Tyrolese on grounds of their ethnicity and aimed at their 
cultural and physical extermination. See Mittermaier, Siidtirol, pp. 76-78.
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• In South Tyrol:
□ Dominance of the issue of preserving the ethnic German character of South Tyrol as 
the foundation of the South Tyrolese ethnic identity
□ History of Italian assimilation attempts and broken promises of safeguards for the 
German-speaking minority
□ Increasing feeling of vulnerability and powerlessness given the arrangements in the 
region Trentino-Alto Adige and the balance of political power there and in Rome
□ Tradition of (occasionally violent) resistance against foreign domination
□ Disillusionment of local activists with the SVP’s policy of ‘foul compromise’ and 
the lack of improvement resulting from it
□ Growing inter-ethnic tensions due to the failure to accommodate interests of both 
Italians and Germans in the province and the region
□ Access to financial, material, and logistical resources to conduct a limited campaign 
of violence
• International Context:
□ Failure of successive rounds of Austro-Italian negotiations and meetings of expert 
committees
□ Internationalisation of the South Tyrol issue before the UN without any visible 
improvement in the situation of the South Tyrolese
□ Failure of European institutions to exert sufficient pressure towards the resolution of 
contentious issues in the framework of the 1948 autonomy statute
A Renewed Attempt to Settle the Conflict: The ‘Paket’ Solution 
of 1969 and the New Autonomy Statute of 1972
The Impact of Violence
The dynamite attacks of June 1961, the outburst of the kleine Feuemacht (the little fire night) in 
July, and the subsequent guerrilla-like attacks on, and killings of, Italian security forces had 
immediate repercussions. First, within South Tyrol, the Italian government deployed large 
numbers of army and police personnel to prevent further attacks and to find the perpetrators. 
The use of oftentimes excessive force against the German-speaking population increased 
tensions and caused even deeper resentments against the Italian state in South Tyrol and 
Austria. Efforts to get hold of those who had planted the bombs were mostly unsuccessful in the 
first weeks after the June attacks. But with the BAS turning against ‘traitors* within the German 
population itself and targeting objects outside the province, the Italian police got vital 
information about the structure and membership of the BAS and managed to arrest most of its
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members between 15 and 25 July 1961.437 The immediate consequence of the arrests in the 
summer of 1961 was that the more ‘moderate’ wing around Kerschbaumer, which aimed at an 
improved autonomy, sought to avoid loss of life, and restricted itself to symbolic actions against 
material objects, was practically wiped out. This allowed a more radical wing around Georg 
Klotz to take command of the BAS, and to shift tactics to guerrilla warfare. Supported by 
extremist members of the Berg-Isel-Bund and a number of right-wing organisations from 
Germany and Austria, BAS headquarters were shifted to Innsbruck and Munich and in their 
attacks activists now deliberately targeted members of the security forces.438 These attacks 
continued until the late sixties.
While the BAS came under the spell of its radical faction, the SVP prevented a similar 
development within the party. A motion introduced by SVP senator Hans Dietl to demand the 
right of self-determination be granted to the South Tyrolese was defeated at an extraordinary 
party congress on 19 June 1961, after the party chairman, Magnago, had pointed out that this 
would prompt the authorities to outlaw the party 439 A threat to party unity from a rather 
different direction came with the introduction of the so-called Aufbau platform, in which 
representatives of the business community within the SVP voiced their concern about the 
economic and social consequences of violence and introduced a proposal based on a declaration 
of absolute loyalty to the Italian state and an improvement in social and economic rather than 
political aspects. With the SVP upholding its demands for genuine autonomy, a middle ground,
437 Through the alleged use of torture, confessions were obtained, which led to the two Milan trials in 1963 and 
1966, in which most of the defendants were sentenced to long prison terms of up to thirty years. In this context, 
Plaickner alleges that the SVP leadership asked the Austrian government not to take any diplomatic steps concerning 
the torture allegations as they feared that this might jeopardise their negotiations with the Italian government Cf. 
Christian, Plaickner, ‘Tauschgeschafte mit den Qualen der Gefolterten”, in Scrinzi, Chronik, pp. 67-87, here p. 80.
438 It is interesting to note that the judicial responses of the German and Austrian authorities were rather different 
Three trials in Austria (Graz 1962 and 1965, Linz 1967) ended with mild prison sentences between six and twelve 
months and most of the accused being acquitted on the rationale that it could not be the task of an Austrian jury to 
keep peace in Italy. In a trial in Munich in 1965 the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to cause explosions, 
of membership in a criminal gang, and of carrying out bomb attacks on power pylons and bridges in South Tyrol and 
their appeals were rejected by the federal court. Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 390ff., especially p. 395 
and Wemer Pfeifenberger, “Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Volker und Recht auf Widerstand”, in Scrinzi, Chronik, pp. 
34-49, here p. 45.
439 Plaickner, Tauschgeschafte, p. 76.
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which prevented a split of the party, was found between the Dietl and Aufbau wing.440 This 
middle ground policy, and the subsequently adopted policy of a greater preparedness to 
compromise, on the part of the SVP, included an official declaration of loyalty as demanded by 
the Italian minister of the interior on a meeting with the South Tyrolese senators and 
parliamentarians on 13 June 1961, and can be seen as another result of the bomb attacks.441
As for Austro-Italian relations, the most significant development was that the two 
governments continued to seek a settlement, as did the British and Irish governments despite the 
multiple setbacks in Northern Ireland. Despite this commitment to come to a bilateral solution, 
Austro-Italian relations were not at their best. In an official statement442 a few weeks after the 
bomb attacks, the Austrian chancellor Gorbach condemned both the attacks and the repressive 
response of the Italian authorities, pointing to the fact that a problem such as South Tyrol could 
be resolved neither by bombs nor by bayonets. This was countered by Italy insisting that it was 
the persistent demands by Austria for an improved autonomy status of South Tyrol that had 
sparked hopes among the German-speaking population in the province that violence might 
further their Austrian-backed cause.443 The Italian government also accused Austria of a lack of 
co-operation in security and judicial matters. At the Zurich meetings from 13 to 17 June and on 
24 June 1961, the Austrian delegation announced that it thought the time was ripe to proceed to 
part two of the 1960 UN resolution, i.e., to the search for a peaceful solution, after part one, the 
resumption of bilateral talks, had been fulfilled. The Italian government suspected that the 
motive behind this move was the Austrian hope that the terrorist activities in South Tyrol would 
awaken sufficient sympathy in the international arena so that a majority could be secured in the
440 Cf. Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 360-362.
441 According to Stadlmayer, facing a split, the danger of being outlawed, and perhaps a civil war, the SVP’s 
increased preparedness to compromise met with that of Rome. Cf. Otto Scrinzi, “Bomben in der Parteien HaB und 
Gunst”, in Scrinzi, Chronik, pp. 21-33, here p. 24.
442 Cf. the quote in Friedl Volgger, Mit Siidtirol am Scheideweg (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1984), p. 249. This line of 
argument, which accused the Italian government of having contributed to the rise of terrorism remained popular with 
the Austrian government until the late 1960s. In a statement on 1 July 1967, Chancellor Klaus emphasised once again 
the fact that the Italian failure to implement the promised autonomy was among the major contributing factors to 
violence throughout the decade. For Klaus’s statement, see Wolf, Siidtirol in Osterreich, p. 244.
443 Cf. the statement by the Italian foreign minister Segni before the UN in 1961 as quoted in Alexander von Egen, 
Die Siidtirolfrage vor den Vereinten Nationen (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1997), p. 64.
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UN to force Italy to agree to a broadening of the Paris Agreement.444 If that was indeed the 
Austrian calculation, then it proved to be wrong. The previous UN resolution on South Tyrol 
was merely confirmed by the general assembly in 1961.445
In this situation the Italian government showed a remarkable degree of flexibility vis-a- 
vis South Tyrol. As early as 24 July 1961, the Italian minister of the interior presented a plan to 
South Tyrolese Parliamentarians in Rome, according to which a committee was to be appointed 
to study the South Tyrol question to find a settlement.446 This plan was realised on 1 September 
1961 with the appointment of the so-called ‘Commission of Nineteen,’ which, according to the 
Italian government, originated from the wish “to offer the people of the Alto Adige that 
exchange of views already offered them by De Gasperi on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference 
and at the time rejected under Austrian pressure, based on the hope of a modification of the 
Brenner frontier.”447 This way, the Italian government managed for the moment to turn the 
South Tyrol problem from an international dispute to an inner-Italian affair, to demonstrate, at 
the same time, its concern for the German-speaking minority, and to provide the basis for future 
negotiations with Austria according to UN resolution 1457 of 1960.
It was certainly not a coincidence that all this -  the Italian offer of direct negotiations 
with the South Tyrolese and their acceptance of this offer -  occurred within months of the June 
bomb attacks. However, it would be too simplistic to attribute these developments only to the 
impact of the terrorist activities. Other factors included the resolution of the security problem 
with the arrest, or escape to Austria, of most of the June and July terrorists; the fact that with the 
SVP there existed a political representative of the German-speaking population that commanded 
the support of more than ninety per cent of the electorate within this population group; and, of
444 Cf. Mario Toscano, Alto Adige -  South Tyrol (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 
166.
445 From an Austrian point of view, the return to the UN in 1961 seemed a logical consequence after another 
deadlock had been reached. An Austrian proposal to appoint a commission of experts was ignored by Italy, and the 
exchange of diplomatic notes during the summer did not get any further than stating each government's position 
without regard for the position of the respective other side. Egen, Die Siidtirolfrage, pp. 61-63.
446 Cf. Plaickner, p. 77.
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equal importance, that the conflict was primarily one between the South Tyrolese German- 
speaking population and the Italian state and not an inter-ethnic conflict.
The ‘Paket’ and the New Autonomy Statute
During its almost three years of work, the ‘Commission of 19’, fifty-four issues were tackled. 
Initially, the negotiations made only slow progress because the starting points for both the 
Italian and the South Tyrolese members of the commission were far apart. The main issue of 
discontent was the question of the framework for autonomy -  while Italy was only willing to 
negotiate within the existing framework of regional autonomy, i.e., the autonomy granted to the 
joint region of Trentino-Alto Adige, the South Tyrolese demanded their own regional autonomy 
status. A breakthrough in this vital question was achieved in 1962 when the SVP declared its 
preparedness to abandon demands for a change in status of the province provided the provincial 
government and institutions were endowed with far more economic, social, and cultural 
powers.448 The Italian representatives in the commission were likewise willing to accept greater 
compromise. By 1964, forty-one of all the issues dealt with by the commission had been fully 
resolved; of the remaining thirteen, a partial agreement had been achieved over nine issues. 
Only four remained entirely unsolved. The final report of the commission on 10 April 1964 and 
the recommendations made in it, however, did not satisfy the SVP, mainly because some of the 
essential demands put forward by the SVP in the areas of culture and the economy had not been 
met.
In October, new talks between the two governments had been scheduled to begin after 
the ‘Commission of Nineteen’ had ended its work.449 These talks began on 25 May 1964 and 
were conducted between the two foreign ministers, Saragat and Kreisky. At this meeting 
Kreisky voiced his concern that the proposed regulations did not satisfy South Tyrolese
447 Toscano, Alto Adige, p. 169. The commission consisted of eleven Italians, seven German-speaking and one 
Ladin-speaking South Tyrolese.
448 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 397-400 and Antony E. Alcock, Geschichte der Stidtirolfrage. Siidtirol 
seit dem Paket 1970-1980 (Vienna: Braumtlller, 1982), p. 17.
449 Alcock, The South Tyrol Question, pp. 402-403.
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demands in a number of areas that were regarded as essential for a satisfactory autonomy, These 
included provincial competences for industrial development, the trade chambers and the private 
finance sector, school autonomy, public security and public waters. From a South Tyrolese 
perspective, these were key issues in the attempt to preserve the ethnic German character of the 
province and thus the foundations of an ethnic German identity. Industrialisation had always 
been seen as a crucial factor in all Italianisation attempts, and it was therefore essential that a 
significant measure of control over issues of industrial development, trade chambers, the private 
finance sector, and public waters (for reasons of electricity generation and preservation of the 
predominantly rural environment) be handed over to the provincial authorities. With the school 
system divided between German and Italian schools until the present day, school autonomy for 
each community was vital, but particularly so for the ethnic German population, as the schools 
were seen as an important instrument in the preservation of native German language 
capabilities. The security issue was, after the experiences under fascism and with the Italian 
response to terrorism in the early 1960s comparable in its symbolism to the discussions over 
police reform in Northern Ireland.
The Italian and Austrian foreign ministers agreed to appoint a commission of experts to 
tackle the altogether one hundred and eight single issues regarding the details of a new 
autonomy statute.450 By October 1964, ninety of them had been resolved, with the remaining 
eighteen, however, being the most important. Nevertheless, the approaches of both governments 
had become more flexible and more sensitive to the constraints under which the other 
government was acting. In a parliamentary speech on 9 August 1964, Aldo Moro insisted on his 
right as head of the Italian government to negotiate over South Tyrol on a bilateral basis with 
Austria, and he conceded that the Italian government was obliged to grant autonomy to the 
province of Bolzano under the Paris Agreement which included the devolution of legislative and
450 Egen, Die Stidtirolfrage, p. 70.
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administrative powers.451 Italy also recognised that any potential solution had to be accepted by 
the South Tyrolese, and that Kreisky did not only need to convince his government of the 
viability of any proposal worked out with his Italian counterpart on the basis of the 
commission’s report, but that he also needed parliamentary approval.452 The negotiations 
between the two foreign ministers resulted in an agreement on 16 December 1964. This 
agreement, however, was still subject to approval by South Tyrolese and (North) Tyrolese 
politicians, who met with Kreisky in January and March 1965. These meetings did not succeed 
in securing the necessary consent, and in a note to the Italian government of 30 March 1965, 
Kreisky communicated the South Tyrolese demand to reopen negotiations on thirteen points, 
including economic, administrative, and social matters as well as questions of school autonomy, 
employment regulations, and public security 453 The Italian government regarded these demands 
as very far reaching and considered them to require a new round of meetings at ministerial 
level454 After a further four years of negotiations, an agreement was reached between Italy and 
Austria, which consisted of a substantial revision of the 1948 autonomy statute and a so-called 
operational calendar in which both governments committed themselves to a certain sequence of 
events which would eventually lead to the dispute over South Tyrol being brought to an end.
The package, upon which the two governments agreed and which found the approval of 
a marginal majority of 52.4% within the SVP at an extraordinary party congress in 1969, 
contained 137 single measures, twenty-five detailed provisions, and thirty-one rules of 
interpretation 455 Among the most important measures were the substantial changes (measures 
1-72) and additions (measures 73-97) to the 1948 autonomy statute which delegate more 
competences to the province456 and the regulations that determine the equal status of the
451 Ritschel, Diplomatic, p. 538. A similar statement is included in Moro’s introductory speech in parliament after 
the 1966 elections. Cf. ibid.
452 Cf. Ritschel, Diplomatic, p. 547f.
453 Toscano, Alto Adige, p. 205. Cf. also Egen, Die Stidtirolfrage, p. 70.
454 Toscano, Alto Adige, p. 206.
455 Oskar Peterlini, Autonomie und Minderheitenschutz in Trentino-Stidtirol (Vienna: Braumtiller, 1997), p. 115f.
456 According to the Paket and the 1972 autonomy statute, the areas where the region maintained its competence 
were cut down from 25 to 13, while those for the provinces were increased from 17 to 40. Cf. also Norbert Mumelter, 
Die Selbstbehauptung der Stidtiroler (Vienna: Eckartschriften, 1980), p. 40.
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German language as a second official language in the province (measures 98-105); the 
redrawing of constituency boundaries for senate elections which assigned a third constituency to 
South Tyrol (106-120); the establishment of the Proporz scheme (measures 15, 19, 36, 49, 50, 
61, and 89), i.e., the recruitment or appointment of staff according to ethnic proportions in the 
public and political sector.457 The so-called internal guarantee took the form of a standing 
commission which is adjoined to the office of the Italian Prime Minister.458
The major points of criticism which were raised by part of the SVP centred around four 
issues that, similar to earlier objections, were perceived as crucial for the establishment of 
conditions conducive to the preservation, expression, and development of the ethnic German 
identity of the South Tyrolese and its foundations -  there were no guarantees against further 
Italian immigration, the Proporz regulations appeared too limited, the Italians were granted a de 
facto veto right in the provincial diet,459 and the international guarantees460 given by the Italian 
government seemed insufficient There was also a significant difference in the interpretation of 
the character and legal status of the Paket between Italy and Austria. The Italian point of view 
was that the measures were voluntary and not part of the Paris Agreement, while the Austrian 
government saw them being a part of the Italian obligations as lined out in the Paris Agreement. 
This difference of opinions had a significant impact on the international guarantees given. In the 
case of Austria approaching the International Court of Justice in any future dispute about the 
implementation of the Paket, it would have to prove, first of all, that these measures were part of 
the Paris Agreement to demonstrate that the dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the court and 
was not simply a matter of inner-Italian legislation 461
457 The Proporz regulations are spelt out in detail in Peterlini, Autonomie, pp. 170-172.
458 It consists of four German-speakers, two Italians and one Ladin, all of who are elected by the South Tyrolese 
provincial diet, and one representative appointed by the Prime Minister. The task of this commission is to solve 
problems that emerge in connection with regulations of the autonomy statute and future changes in the conditions for 
which these regulations were set out. The first election of the South Tyrolese members of the commission took place 
on 12 May 1992, the first meeting with the representative of the Prime Minister was on 6 April 1993.
459 Cf. the remarks on specific voting procedures in the provincial diet below.
460 Cf. the paragraphs on the operational calendar below.
46 * Cf. Alcock, Geschichte, pp. 27-28; Karl Zeller, Das Problem der volkerrechtlichen Verankerung des 
Sttdtirolpakets und die Zustandigkeit des Intemationalen Gerichtshofes (Vienna: Braumtiller, 1989), pp. 73, 84, 86; 
Christoph Zeyer, Der volkerrechtliche und europarechtliche Status von Siidtirol (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1993),
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The new autonomy statute, which is the central part of the package, passed all 
parliamentary hurdles in Italy and came into force on 20 January 1972. As a territorial 
autonomy statute, however, it has the double character of an instrument regulating the 
decentralised self-government of the province and providing for the protection of the German 
and Ladin-speaking minorities. The official name of the package -  ‘Measures in Favour of the 
Population of South Tyrol’ -  makes it already clear that minority protection is only one part 
within the whole set of measures and regulations. Only the Articles 63-68, 98-100, 115, 117, 
119-121, and 129 are specifically and exclusively designed to promote the German-speaking 
population within the province, while the rest of the Articles strengthened provincial autonomy 
vis-a-vis the region and the central government as a whole and introduced procedures to mediate 
between the interests of all ethnic groups in South Tyrol. The two most important regulations in 
this respect are, first of all, specific voting regulations in the provincial diet according to which, 
to be passed, all those laws that can potentially violate the rights of one of the ethnic groups 
have to have a majority among the representatives of each ethnic group regardless of their party- 
political affiliation. The same rule applies for the budget. However, these procedures only come 
into operation upon specific request of one of the ethnic groups represented in the diet. The 
other regulation determines that both the provincial and regional government have to be 
composed of representatives of the two strongest ethnic groups, i.e., the Germans and the 
Italians. Thus, despite its absolute majority, the SVP in South Tyrol has to form a coalition 
government with at least one Italian party which ensures not only legislative representation of 
the Italian-speaking population but also their representation in the South Tyrolese executive, 
and vice versa that of the German-speaking population in the regional parliament and 
government. This and a number of regulations in areas where, instead of the principle of 
proportional representation of all ethnic groups, the principles of parity and rotation are in force
pp. 47, 49, 54; and Felix Ermacora, Siidtirol und das Vaterland Osterreich (Vienna and Munich: Amalthea, 1984),
pp. 160-162.
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clearly disadvantages the Ladin-speaking group.462 However, Article two of the constitutional 
law under which the 1972 autonomy statute came into force states that the protection of local 
linguistic minorities is a national interest. This, on the one hand, limits the opportunities of the 
central government to dispute provincial laws because of their alleged violation of national 
interests. On the other haiid, the phrasing ‘local linguistic minorities’ caused suspicions within 
the SVP that this might be used as an instrument in favour of the Italian population in the 
province, who are in a numerical minority position in South Tyrol.463 Nevertheless, the Article 
covers the rights of the Ladin-speaking population in South Tyrol who, as an absolute minority, 
enjoy considerable attention from both Italian and German political parties competing for their 
votes and support in the provincial diet.464
The operational calendar outlined procedures for the implementation of the Paket as 
well as steps to be taken by both governments to settle the dispute over South Tyrol. In doing 
so, however, no timeframe was given as to when certain parts of the Paket had to be fulfilled 
and specific steps for the eventual settlement had to be completed.465 The sequence of events, 
however, was clearly lined out as the settlement of the dispute requiring prior full 
implementation of the autonomy statute. Only then was an official settlement of the Austro- 
Italian dispute to go ahead. This official settlement consisted of two main parts. One included 
declarations of the heads of both governments before their parliaments about the settlement, 
parliamentary motions on the issue, official letters to the Secretary General of the UN regarding 
the fulfilment of resolution 1457 and an Austrian declaration that the dispute had been settled. 
The other, and farther reaching, part was a bilateral agreement between Austria and Italy that in
462 Such other regulations are, for example, the positions of chairman and vice chairman of the regional and 
provincial diets, where a representative of the German-speaking and one of the Italian-speaking population take turns, 
and a Ladin speaker is simply not eligible.
463 Cf. Alcock, Geschichte, p. 32. Interestingly, this article was not included in the Italian constitution, as the Italian 
government feared rising demands from other linguistic minorities. Cf. ibid., p. 33.
464 Cf. Manuela Zappe, Das ethnische Zusammenleben in Siidtirol (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1996), p. 103f.
465 It took twenty years to complete the operational calendar. Austria declared in June 1992 that the dispute had been 
settled.
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case of any further disputes the International Court of Justice would be approached.466 The 
operational calendar, although not providing the same international guarantees as envisaged in 
the Kreisky-Saragat agreement of 1964, strengthened the Austrian position vis-a-vis the Italian 
government, and with it that of the German-speaking population in South Tyrol.467 There are 
two reasons for this. One is that the calendar qualifies the Paket as a ‘later practice* of the 
fulfilment of the Paris Agreement, the other is that it denies the Italian interpretation of the 
Paket as being part of voluntary inner-Italian legislation, but places all legislative measures in 
connection with the implementation of the Paket in the context of the fulfilment of the Paris 
Agreement.468
Developments after 1969/1972 proved that despite all difficulties arising from the 
implementation of the 1969 package solution, and occasional inter-ethnic and political tensions, 
both the Paket and the operational calendar provided a stable basis for the protection of the 
German and Ladin-speaking minorities in South Tyrol and for the accommodation of distinct 
interests of all ethnic groups within the framework of the provincial autonomy. The institutional 
arrangements of South Tyrolese autonomy are a classic example of a consociational settlement 
of an ethnic conflict. It incorporates the four basic principles of grand coalition (between at least 
one German and one Italian party forming the provincial government), segmental autonomy (in 
the cultural sector), proportionality (in the voting system and in public sector employment) and 
minority veto 469
466 This so-called ICJ treaty is a bilateral agreement in addition to the European Convention on the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts of 1957. In this treaty, Austria and Italy agree to a change of article 27a of the convention, 
which extends its validity retrospectively to the Paris Agreement of 1946. According to the so-called ratione temporis 
this European convention of 1957 did not automatically cover international treaties that had been signed before 1957. 
Only an agreement between the respective signatory states of such treaties could extend the coverage retrospectively. 
Cf. Ermacora, Siidtirol, p. 162.
467 Cf. Zeller, Das Problem, p. 84.
468 Cf. Zeyer, Der volkerrechtliche und europarechtliche Status, p. 54.
469 On consociational democracy cf., among others, the work of Arend Lijphart. See bibliography for further details.
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Developments after 1972470
The Institutional Practice of Autonomy in South Tyrol
The time period between 1972 and 1992, i.e., between the introduction of the new autonomy 
statute and the official Austrian declaration about the settlement of the dispute with Italy, has 
not been free of conflict. However, apart from some minor violent incidents between the late 
seventies and the late eighties, the background of which has never been fully uncovered, the 
conflict has taken a civilised form and tensions have been dealt with more or less successfully 
within the provincial, regional, and national institutional framework.471
The ‘administrative’ sources of this have been mainly two. On the one hand, there was 
until 1988 a rather slow implementation of the regulations set out by the new autonomy statute, 
and the precise ways and procedures of this implementation472 were a matter of frequent 
substantial quarrels between the German-speaking South Tyrolese and their Italian counterparts 
on the provincial, regional, and national levels. The other source of conflict was the growing 
Italian dissatisfaction with the way the SVP interpreted and executed autonomy regulations and 
their implementation procedures. These administrative sources of conflict, however, could only 
continue to have conflict potential because of the substantial issues that formed the basis upon 
which different interpretations of each ethnic group’s position arose. The substantial issues of 
concern for the German-speaking minority remained until 1992 the questions of language 
equality, of a sound financial basis for provincial autonomy, and of the degree of influence of
470 In the following, 1 will not refer to the Ladin-speaking group in South Tyrol as it was not a major participant in 
the ongoing conflict, siding with the SVP and the German-speaking population on most issues. Rather comprehensive 
accounts on the development of this third ethnic group in South Tyrol can be found, among others, in Mittermaier, 
Sudtirol, pp. 159ff.; Zappe, Das ethnische Zusammenleben, esp. pp. 214-218, and Peterlini, Autonomie, pp. 167ff. and 
198-202.
471 These bomb attacks and several possible explanations about their origin and objectives are extensively covered in 
Hans Karl Peterlini, Bomben aus zyveiterHand (Bozen: Athesia, 1992).
472 The autonomy statute as such is only the legal framework. For its implementation, so-called execution regulations 
(Durchfuhrungsbestimmungen) are needed, which have been repeatedly delayed in some areas. By 1984, no such 
regulations had been provided for the equality of the German language and its use in the public sector, before courts, 
and with the police; for public finance; in the sensitive area of toponomastics; for public transport and communication 
services; for mining and public waters; in some areas affected by ethnic proportion regulations; and with respect to 
some school affairs. For a more detailed analysis of this, cf. Mittermaier, Sudtirol, pp. 85-86.
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the Italian state on provincial laws and regulations. These issues have now been dealt with in a 
way satisfactory for the German community.473
For the Italian-speaking community in the province the major sources of substantial 
dissatisfaction were the ethnic proportions in the public sector, all matters related to 
bilingualism, and the strict cultural separation of the language communities,474 all of which 
added to the general insecurity of the Italian-speaking population in South Tyrol about their 
future and resulted in a decline in the number of Italians living in South Tyrol after 1971, with 
the Italian share of the population falling to under thirty per cent.
Party Politics in South Tyrol
With the exception of the Green Party, the party political system in South Tyrol is divided along 
ethnic lines. Ideological differences come into play only within each community.475 The overall 
tendency has been a slight decline in votes for the German parties, a more drastic one the Italian 
ones, and substantial gains for the cross-communal New Left/Greens, as the chart below shows.
In the German-speaking ethnic group, the SVP has dominated party politics for almost 
half a century after the end of the Second World War, regularly polling about ninety per cent of 
the German and Ladin vote in national, provincial and local elections and always achieving an 
absolute majority of seats in the provincial diet. Recently, however, the party has come under 
increasing pressure from four sides -  from the increasing electoral appeal of the interethnically
473 See Peterlini, Autonomie.
474 Cf. “Die Ergebnisse einer Meinungsumfrage unter der italienischsprachigen Bevblkerung von Bozen und Leifers 
ein Jahr nach den Gemeinderatswahlen vom Mai 1985”, in Benedikter, Rudolf, Dall’O, Noibert, KumpfmUller, Karl 
A., Mezzalira Girogio, and Pircher, Erika (eds.), Nationalismus und Neofaschismus in Sudtirol (Vienna: Braumtiller, 
1987), pp. 66-210, here p. 93.
475 This is true even for the trade union sector where an exclusive German trade union exists. Cf. in greater detail on 
this Rudolf Benedikter and Erika Pircher, “Die Siidtiroler Gewerkschaften zwischen Beschaftigungskrise und 
ethnischem Konflikt, 1983-1985”, in Benedikter et al., Nationalismus, pp. 287-331, esp. pp. 290-294.
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orientated Green Party,476 from more radically ethnocentric right-wing parties within the 
German-speaking population group,477 from the establishment of an exclusively Ladin party
Figure 4: The Party System in South Tyrol, 1948-1998
Qoss-Conmmal P. Ladin Party
Italian Parties
1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
challenging the SVP’s decade-old claim to represent all non-Italian groups in South Tyrol, and 
from an internal political challenge to its ideologically non-partisan catch-all approach.478 These 
challenges have resulted in a slight overall decrease of the vote polled by German parties from 
67.6% in 1948 to 63.5% in 1993, but increased slightly to 64.6% in 1998. The decrease of votes
476 This party, throughout its history, has been known by several other names, such as ‘N ew Left’ or ‘Alternative 
List for the Other South Tyrol’.
477 The Freiheitliche Partei Siidtirols (FPS) and the Union Jur Sudtirol (UfST) steadily increased their vote. The FPS 
polled 6.1% in the provincial elections in 1993 after just 1.35% in 1988, while the UfST increased the vote o f the 
SHB, its main constituent organisation, o f  2.29% in 1988 to 4.8% in 1993. By 1998, however, their share o f the vote 
had decreased again. Cf. below.
478 In particular, frictions between employer and employee wings within the party have contributed to speculations 
about the possibility and necessity o f  giving up the catch-all party in favour o f  a ‘normal’ plurality o f interest groups 
organised as political parties, similar to the Italian parties in South Tyrol.
231
for the SVP, however, was more dramatic. Its share in the vote fell from 67.6% in 1948 to 52% 
in 1993, the strongest decline occurring between 1988 and 1993 (-8.4%). Yet, in 1998 the party 
was able to reassert its dominating position within the German-speaking community -  in the 
provincial elections it won 56.6%, an increase of over four per cent compared to 1993.
Apart from the more obvious overall decline of support for Italian parties,479 the single 
most significant difference between the ethnic German and Italian party systems in South Tyrol 
is the absence of an Italian catch-all party. With the migration of Italians from a diversity of 
social backgrounds came also a diversity of political parties to South Tyrol addressing their 
clientele along traditional lines of ideological divisions. For a long period of time, the DC was 
dominant within the Italian community. The crisis of the Italian party system at the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s put an end to the DC’s position 480 The strongest Italian party in the 
second half of the 1980s was the neo-fascist MSI which won the local elections in Bolzano in 
1985 and secured approximately every third Italian vote in the 1987 parliamentary elections.481 
At the time it seemed that the MSI could rise to become a catch-all party within the Italian 
community similar to the SVP, but it has had to compete for votes with at least one other 
nationalist party, namely Forza Italia. In the 1998 elections, the MSI, under its new name 
Allianza Nationale (AN) lost about 6,000 votes, one seat, and almost two per cent of its share in 
the vote compared to 1993. The other two significant Italian parties are the Communist Party 
(PCI -  since 1993: PDS) arid the Socialist Party (PSI) both of which suffered from the crisis of 
the party system in 1992/93. The PCI always favoured an inter-ethnic approach to politics. The 
PSI, in contrast, is an openly pro-Italian party; it claims, however, to be in favour of co­
operation between the ethnic groups and the autonomy regulations in general. A last political 
force that needs to be mentioned in the context of South Tyrolese party politics is the
479 This corresponds to the decline in Italians living in South Tyrol, whose share in the population has remained 
under thirty per cent since 1981. Cf. below.
480 From around fifteen per cent before 1988, its share in the vote in South Tyrol decreased to 9.1% in 1988. The 
party broke apart in 1992/93, and one of the successor parties, the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI), won 4.4% (two 
seats) in 1993 and 2.7% (one seat) in 1998.
481 Cf. Franz Pahl, “Der Jubel der Schwarzhemden”, in Pahl, Franz, Tiroler Einheit — jetztf (Kiel: Amdt, 1991), pp. 
146-172.
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phenomenon of emerging regional parties, in this case of the Lega Nord.482 With only three per 
cent of the vote in the provincial elections in 1993 and less than one per cent in 1998, this 
impact has, at least from a quantitative point of view, not been significant. The developments in 
the Italian party system are displayed in the following chart.483
Inter-ethnic Relations and Their Impact on the Future of South Tyrol
The ethnic division of the party political system was a consequence of, as well as a cause for,
the particular way in which interethnic relations between the two main language communities in
South Tyrol developed. It was a consequence because for the most time after the partition of
Tyrol in 1919, tensions between both the Italian and the German population and between the
ethnic German community and the Italian state prevented the development of any significant
ties between the two communities, especially in the party sector, as the problem after 1945 came
to be seen as primarily political. The political arena consequently became the major field where
rights and interests were contested between representatives of the two distinct ethnic groups.
Party political separation, however, has also been a cause for the specific structure of interethnic
relations. The SVP’s dominance in, and influence on, both the political and civil sectors of
society in South Tyrol helped the party to impose its politics of cultural and social separation on
the relationship between the two major ethnic groups.484
482 On regionalism in Italy and its impact on South Tyrol, cf. Oliver Schmidkte, Politics o f Identity (Sinzheim: Pro 
Universitate Verlag, 1996).
483 DC -  Christian Democratic Party, MSI -  Italian Social Movement, PC1/PDS -  Communist Party of Italy/Party of 
the Democratic Left, PSI -  Socialist party of Italy, LN -  Lega Nord.
484 The relationship between ethnic Germans and Ladins in South Tyrol had traditionally been closer, primarily 
because the Ladins relied on, and backed, the SVP to negotiate favourable autonomy terms. Only recently, especially 
since the formation of the Ladin List as an electoral contestant and the growing awareness among Ladins about their 
own distinct identity and the need to protect it from being overwhelmed by the German dominance, has there been a 
certain degree of separation between die two non-Italian ethnic groups.
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Democratic Left (since 
1993 elections)
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The ethnic divisions in South Tyrolese society as they continue to exist until today have 
been strengthened by the ethnic division of labour -  the industrial sector is still predominantly 
Italian, while the agricultural and tourism sector remain firmly in German hands -  and by a 
distinct ethnic geography in South Tyrol with the majority of Germans living in rural areas, 
while Italians dominate the urban centres.485
All these factors have been mutually reinforcing and a persisting climate of mutual 
suspicion of either secessionism -  on the Italian side -  or of attempts of forced assimilation -  on 
the German side -  has so far prevented comprehensive social integration of all three ethnic 
groups. It is hard to say whether this should be considered an advantage or disadvantage for 
interethnic relations.
Clearly, among the younger generation of German-speaking South Tyrolese, who lack 
the personal experience of the fascism and the post-war period until the 1960s, the need for 
ethnic separation is much less felt486 than under the older generation many of whom still 
preserve their ‘victim identity’ and insist on the autonomy statute and its regulations are some 
form of compensation for the injustices inflicted on them. Among the Italian population, the 
preparedness to engage in more co-operation with the German-speaking group has persisted 
since the late sixties and early seventies,487 although it has occasionally been shaken by 
incidents that were interpreted as continuing irredentism.488
Because of the persisting ethnic interpretation of political, economic, and social 
competition, single events within one of the ethnic groups or outside of them have a great 
potential to trigger an increase in ethnic tensions, such as the MSI electoral success in the mid to
485 The census data from 1981 established that of the 123.695 Italians in the province (28.7% of the over-all 
population) eighty-seven per cent lived in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants, while the degree of urbanisation 
among Germans was only twenty-seven per cent In the provincial capital of Bolzano, 71.8% of the population was 
Italian, and the 25.1% Germans (or 26,000) living there were at the same time the largest congregation of Germans in 
the province, Cf. Hermann Atz, “Wirtschaftliche und soziale Rahmenbedingungen sowie Ergebnisse verschiedener 
Wahlen in Bozen”, in Benedikter et al., Nationalismus, pp. 10-65, here p. 12-13.
485 Cf. Zappe, Das ethnische Zusammenleben, pp. 160-161 and p. 179.
487 The turn in Italian public opinion is generally said to have been the first Milan trial in 1963. Cf. Franz von 
Walther, “Joumalismus mit Anteilnahme”, in Baumgartner et al., Feuemacht, pp. 158-167.
488 The Italian attitude towards co-operation with the German-speaking South Tyrolese population has been 
documented in “Die Ergebnisse einer Meinungsumfrage unter der italienischsprachigen Bevttlkerung von Bozen und
236
late eighties, the public display of South Tyrolese irredentist symbols in Innsbruck in 1984, and 
the events in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Similarly, strategic ethnic voting has 
become politically quite significant in South Tyrol. The electoral success of the neo-fascist MSI 
in the late eighties happened in particular at the local level (and only in South Tyrol in such 
proportions above national average), where Italians, frustrated with ethnic proportions that were 
perceived to be used to their disadvantage, desired a political and cultural counter-balance to the 
seemingly all-dominating SVP and German-speaking population in South Tyrol.489 By the same 
token, about one quarter of the overall SVP loss of eight per cent in the 1993 provincial 
elections can be attributed to the Ladin List, presumably as a result of the Ladin wish for their 
own political representation in the provincial and regional diets.490 But the SVP regained most 
of this vote in the parliamentary elections in the following year, apparently because the Ladins, 
without any chance of their own member of parliament in Rome, wanted to be represented by 
their long-term ally SVP rather than by an Italian party 491 The SVP’s recovery continued in 
1998, while the two ethno-centrist parties within the German-speaking community -  the UfST 
and the FPS -  lost about one quarter of their votes and one of their four seats.492
Another significant aspect of the ethnic voting pattern which has had an impact on 
interethnic relations, if only in terms of how the results are interpreted within each ethnic group, 
is the fact that during the 1993 provincial elections those parties gained votes which argued 
from a specifically ethnocentric political standpoint. These were the neofascist MSI, the right- 
wing UfST and FPS, and the Ladin List. Thus, despite growing social integration among the
Leifers ein Jahr nach den Gemeinderatswahlen vom Mai 1985”, in Benedikter et al., Nationalismus, pp. 66-210, esp. 
pp. 179-185 and pp. 201-205.
489 Cf. “Zusammenfassung”, in Benedikter et al., Nationalismus, pp. 401-435, esp. p. 413 and pp. 425-432; and 
Celestina Avanzini and Giorgio Mezzalira, “Versuch einer psychoanalytischen Interpretation des Verhaltens der 
Italienischen Sprachgruppe”, in Benedikter et al., Nationalismus, pp. 373-401, here p. 379 and p. 392.
490 The regional diet is made up by the elected members of both provincial parliaments.
491 Cf. Zappe, Das ethnische Zusammenleben, p. 85 and pp. 90-91.
492 The loss was greatest for the FPS, who lost more than 11,000 votes (1993: 18,669 -1998: 7,541) and one of their 
two seats. Their percentage share in the overall vote decreased from 6.1% to 2.5%. The UfST could gain almost 
2,000 votes and its share in the vote increased from 4.8% to 5.5%.
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younger generations and an increasing number of intermarriages,493 ethnic separation is 
continuously reinforced by singular events and their ‘ethnic* interpretation.
Another important consequence of the persisting ethnic separation is the cultural 
isolation of the South Tyrolese German-speaking population. Since the early 1970s, cultural 
policy, including schools and education, falls under the competence of each language group. 
Since then, the SVP has pursued a course of strict separation which has manifested itself in the 
following policy guidelines -  co-operation with the Italian population is only possible as long as 
the cultural characteristics of the German-speaking group are not in jeopardy; co-operation must 
never result in an ethnically indifferent South Tyrolese identity (the Paket and the 1972 
autonomy statute have banned the dangers of political alienation but not fears of cultural 
assimilation); and close co-operation with North Tyrol must be sustained to preserve the historic 
cultural unity of Tyrol494
This is problematic, as it basically means that Italians, who have been living in South 
Tyrol for some generations, are denied the right to feel just as South Tyrolese although they 
were bom there and may have close personal affiliations to the province. This attempt to 
preserve German cultural hegemony has not only had a certain alienating effect on the Italians, 
it has also meant an increasing cultural isolation of the German-speaking population itself, 
which in turn has contributed to the fact that the younger generation more and moire denounces 
traditional South Tyrolese identification patterns, while the older generation clings on to its 
traditional values and norms to re-affirm not only its distinct German culture, but also the SVP- 
orientated power structure in South Tyrol, which depends upon the preservation of a primarily 
ethnic identification and interpretation of politics, culture, and society.495
The particular fear of the older South Tyrolese generation of the emergence of a new 
South Tyrolese identity can only be understood out of the assumed consequences of such a
493 Cf. Alcock, Geschichte, pp. 67ff.
494 Ibid, pp. 63-64.
495 Cf. Oliver Schmidtke, The Politics o f Identity (Sinzheim: Pro Universitate Verlag, 1996), pp. 275-325; Zappe, 
Das ethnische Zusammenlehen, pp. 48-49, 99,103-105,179-180; Ermacora, Sudtirol, pp. 219-256; and Mittermaier, 
SUdtirol, pp. 189-195.
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process, namely the disappearance of ethnic borderlines in politics and society and the feared 
decline of the ancient South Tyrolese system of traditions, norms, and values for the 
preservation of which they had fought through the decades. It is then in this context that the 
success of ethnocentric German parties at recent elections becomes more understandable. In the 
future, their importance could grow and they might attract a larger share of the vote even among 
the younger generation if the turn to nationalist politics among the Italian population continues 
(Forza Italia, MSI) and political and economic difficulties that might occur in future will be 
interpreted along ethnopolitical lines. From this point of view, the failure to establish an 
ethnically indifferent civic identity in South Tyrol might prove to have severe repercussions. As 
of now, this fear is merely speculative.
Summary: The Success of the South Tyrolese Consociation
The South Tyrol conflict was primarily an ethnic conflict, in which one ethnic group -  South 
Tyrolese German-speakers -  challenged the Italian state over its apparently discriminatory 
policy agiainst an ethnic minority that had been annexed to the Italian polity after the First 
World War. Again, the conditions under which the conflict developed and was eventually 
reduced to such a level that it could be dealt with inside a consociational democracy had various 
internal and external sources.
The way towards the conclusion of a final settlement was very complicated. Throughout 
the 1960s, the Italian state conducted negotiations with the Austrian government on a bilateral 
level and the SVP as the representative of the South Tyrolese German speakers in the 
Commission of Nineteen. Simultaneously, Austria and the SVP maintained open lines of 
communication. Although their relationship was not always free of tensions, especially during 
the period of the social democratic government before 1965, they co-ordinated their 
negotiations strategies. An initial agreement reached between the Austrian and Italian 
governments in 1964 failed to get the approval of the German-speaking South Tyrolese, but this 
did not lead to a break-up of negotiations. The Italian government maintained its links to 
Austria, and simultaneously intensified the process of direct engagement with the SVP. Through
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this two-level approach it was possible to negotiate the substance of the settlement with those 
directly concerned, namely the German-speaking South Tyrolese, while the implementation and 
guarantee procedures were addressed by the two governments. This way, a complex, and 
generally satisfying settlement was reached, which included a double arbitration mechanism in 
case of future disagreements -  internally in the form of a standing commission adjoined to the 
office of the Prime Minister and internationally With the option to approach the International 
Court of Justice.
Three major factors can be named that have particularly contributed to the successful 
negotiation and implementation of a settlement -  the atmosphere of compromise among the 
negotiating parties Austria, Italy, and South Tyrolese Germans; the lack of inter-ethnic hatred 
which reduced the conflict to a minority-state dispute; and the Austrian encouragement of the 
German population to settle for a solution within the confines of the Italian polity and the 
government’s active contribution on the international and bilateral levels to achieve such a 
solution.
Further factors that need to be taken into account are the prosperous state of the South 
Tyrolese economy with comparatively low levels of unemployment. This rather favourable 
economic situation made, and still makes, sufficient resources available and prevents severe 
ethnic competition in economic terms, not least because of the still existing ethnic division of 
labour and the specific demographic structure of South Tyrol.
In addition to that, the speedy success with which the Italian government managed the 
major violent outbursts in the early 1960s and the commitment of all major political players to a 
settlement of the problem despite recurring violence in the late 1970s and 1980s had a positive 
impact on the management of the South Tyrol conflict.
Equally significant for the eventual solution was the fact that there was only one major 
political party among the German-speaking population in the province. The political and to 
some extent civic dominance of the SVP and its policy of seeking a settlement within the Italian
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polity made the negotiation process from the beginning more likely to succeed and eventually 
brought about the desired results.
Table 15: Conditions Accounting for the Success of the Consociational Approach to Conflict 
Settlement in South Tyrol
• In Italy:
□ Two-level negotiation approach of the Italian government, including both the South 
Tyrolese and the Austrian government in the settlement process
□ Greater preparedness to compromise after the swift containment of violence
□ Acceptance and gradually full implementation of a comprehensive settlement with a 
double arbitration mechanism
a  Development of an asymmetric framework of regional structures and different 
autonomy statutes across Italy
• In Austria:
□ Commitment to continue settlement efforts despite the difficult bilateral relationship 
with Italy
□ Encouragement of the political leadership of the SVP to settle for an inner-Italian 
solution
□ Constant consultations with representatives of the German-speaking minority during 
the negotiation process and subjection of any agreement to their consent
□ Policy of strict non-interference once a settlement had been reached, except in areas 
where the settlement provided for Austrian engagement
□ Official settlement of the dispute with Italy only after consultation with the South 
Tyrolese
• In South Tyrol:
□ High degree of political consensus among German-speaking population and virtual 
monopoly position of the SVP
□ Decreasing level of inter-ethnic tensions
□ Economic prosperity of South Tyrol
□ Ethnic division of labour
□ Ethno-demographic segmentation of the population
□ Growing cross-communal regional allegiance and interest structure
• International Context:
□ Bilateral commitment to finding a mutually acceptable solution
□ Sensitivity towards the constraints within which each side was operating
□ International encouragement to settle the conflict peacefully
□ Built-in guarantees for international mediation in case of disputes over the 
implementation of the ‘Paket’ solution




































































Norman Conquest of Ireland begins.
Statutes of Kilkenny: Aimed at stopping assimilation of English in Ireland into Gaelic culture. 
Rebellion of the Earls of Kildare.
Elizabethan Wars in Ireland.
Munster rebellion against military regime in Ireland.
O’Neill and O’Donnell rebellion: After initial success, the uprising is defeated at the Battle of 
Kinsale.
Flight of the Earls.
Beginning of the plantations of Ulster.
Catholic-Gaelic rebellion to regain land confiscated for Protestant settlers.
Cromwell’s army defeats rebellion, Catholic landowners are exiled to Connaught 
Siege of Derry.
Battle of the Boyne: William in of Orange defeats James 0L 
Irish parliament wins legislative independence form Britain.
Society of United Irishmen is founded.
Loyal Orange Institution (i.e., Orange Order) is formed.
Rebellion of the United Irishmen.
Act of Union.
Apprentice Boys of Derry formed.
Catholic Emancipation A ct Abrogation of the last penal laws against Catholics.
Great Famine.
Formation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood.
First Land Act introduced in Westminster Parliament 
Irish National Land League formed.
First Home Rule Bill defeated.
Foundation of Sinn F6in.
Formation of Ulster Volunteer Force.
Easter Rising in Dublin.
Anglo-Irish War of Independence.
Government of Ireland Act
Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and Ireland.
Irish Civil War.
Six counties of Northern Ireland opt out of the Irish Free State.
Foundation of Fianna Fail.
Foundation of United Irish Party (later Fine Gael).
Irish Constitution approved in a referendum, including two articles that claim sovereignty over the 
whole island of Ireland.
Establishment of the Republic of Ireland which leaves the Commonwealth.
Ireland Act guarantees Northern Ireland’s position in the United Kingdom.
IRA Border Campaign.
Campaign for Social Justice formed, which was later to be succeeded by NICRA.
Ulster Volunteer Force formed.
Formation of NICRA.
First Catholic civilian killed.
First Protestant Civilian, first RUC officer, and first IRA members killed. First bomb attacks.
First member of the British Army killed.
Bloody Sunday.
Power sharing executive established, implementation of Sunningdale Agreement UWC strike 
brings an end to the initiative.
Constitutional Convention fails to reach a settlement 
Devolution initiative by Roy Mason.
Devolution initiative by Humphrey Atkins.
Rolling Devolution attempt by James Prior.
Anglo-Irish Agreement 
Libyan arms shipment for the IRA.
SDLP-SF talks.
Brook/Mayhew initiative.
Hume/Adams Initiative. Downing Street declaration.
IRA and CLMC cease-fires.
‘New Framework for Agreement’ produced by British and Irish governments.
IRA cease-fire breaks down.
Elections to the Peace Forum and beginning of talks process.
IRA cease-fire reinstated. Sinn Flin admitted to peace talks. DUP and UKUP leave peace talks. 
Good Friday Agreement Referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approve the 
agreement
Elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly as first step of implementing the Good Friday 
Agreement.
The issue of decommissioning of paramilitary weapons creates a deadlock in the set-up of the 
Northern Ireland Executive because the UUP refuses to sit in an executive with Sinn Flin before 
the beginning of IRA decommissioning.
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As a result of the partition of a formerly colonial British territory in 1920, Northern Ireland is 
constitutionally, a part of the United Kingdom, yet geographically it is located on the island of 
Ireland. Consisting of six counties, its population is just over 1.5 million. For almost eighty 
years after partition, a conflict has existed between one section of the population in Northern 
Ireland that aimed at the restoration of a united Ireland, and another section and the British state 
seeking to secure the union between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. This conflict 
about fundamentally different political aspirations has been exacerbated by inequalities between 
the Unionist and Nationalist communities, by the wounds inflicted through violence, but also by 
increasing intra-communal diversity. ‘Nationalist’ and ‘Unionist’ are terms that refer very 
broadly to the political divide in Northern Ireland. This political divide, to some extent, 
coincides with the religious divide into Catholic and Protestant congregations. Considering the 
conflict in Northern Ireland to be about political rather than religious aspects of ethnic identity, 
that is, about conflicting notions of national belonging, I will generally refer to political rather 
than religious communities throughout the following.
The violent escalation after almost fifty years of Protestant majority rule forced the 
political actors in Northern Ireland, including the Irish and British governments, to seek 
solutions to the problem. After thirty years of failure to find an overall acceptable settlement, 
the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 provides some hope that a stable institutional framework 
has been found to address the grievances, anxieties, and hopes of both communities in Northern 
Ireland at last.
Inter-Communal Relationships in Northern Ireland, 1968-1998
The central problem of inter-communal relationships in Northern Ireland is the fact that the 
mere existence of another community is perceived as a threat by the other, yet both 
communities, because of the territorial and demographic mix, depend upon one another in 
resolving their differences and achieving a stable settlement of the conflict.496 While recent
496 Cf., for example, Karin Eyben, Duncan Morrow, and Derrick Wilson, A Worthwhile Venture? Practically 
Investing in Equity, Diversity, and Interdependence in Northern Ireland (University of Ulster, 1997).
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United Kingdom government policy in Northern Ireland has generally acknowledged this as a 
fact and pursued policies both to develop each community separate from the other one as well as 
to encourage inter-communal co-operation, relationships between the communities have not 
improved significantly over the past three decades.
In order to understand why this is the case and why the nature of the relationship 
between Catholics and Protestants, Nationalists and Unionists, Republicans and Loyalists is a 
factor of such importance for the development of the conflict, it is necessary to examine four 
issues -  demographic developments, including segregation patterns, the degree of (inequality 
between them, the balance of political power between the communities, and the impact of 
violence on inter-communal relationships.497
Demographic Developments498
The significance of demographic processes can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, most of 
which are related to the perception by each of the two communities of its own present and future 
situation in Northern Ireland and, to some extent, of the conflict as a whole and of the 
developments it will undergo in the years to come. For the Nationalist/Catholic community, the 
actuality of being in an absolute minority position, not only in the United Kingdom, but also in 
their actual homeland, because of the particular way in which the partition was carried out in 
1920, left them with little hope of achieving a change in their situation for the better. The 
system of majority democracy that was in operation in Northern Ireland for most of the century 
until the dissolution of Stormont in 1972 provided the Unionist/Protestant community with a 
great degree of influence and power because of the commitment to majority consensus. Even 
after the introduction of direct rule, the Unionist community retained an effective veto to 
prevent a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, as long as they remained the 
majority of the population.
497 One further aspect -  the different perceptions of the nature of the ongoing conflict -  needs to be considered as 
well. As this issue is more directly related to attempts of settling the conflict, I will discuss it in greater detail in a 
separate section, and now turn to an analysis of the other four issues.
498 If not otherwise mentioned, all the following data were taken from Northern Ireland census returns.
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Northern Ireland has seen a steady natural increase in its population in recent decades, 
and within it, especially since 1971, an increase of the share of the Catholic community.499 As a 
result of this, the age structure of the population is very favourable, with more than fifty per cent 
of the people being younger than thirty-five years.500 The Protestant share in the population has 
decreased since about 1961, dropping between then and the 1991 census by more than fifteen 
per cent. A second development of this period is the increasing number of people who do not 
state their religion, or make use of the option to declare that they have no religion, which was 
introduced for the first time in the 1991 census.
Apart from the changes in the ratio between the two communities, the predominant 
feature of demographic developments in Northern Ireland has been the increasing segregation 
between Catholics and Protestants. It occurs in a variety of interrelated forms, such as 
residential (also known as material or territorial segregation), institutional, economic (also 
known as cultural division of labour), political, ideological, social, and interpersonal 
segregation.501 The most striking fact about segregation patterns in Northern Ireland is that all 
but one of them have developed to rather high, although territorially differing, degrees. The one 
that is least developed is institutional segregation which exists primarily in the education and 
religious sectors and to a lesser degree in the legal practice within the two communities. So far 
there has been no official recognition that a society as widely and completely segregated as that 
of Northern Ireland can not be managed through integrated institutions. This failure has in part 
been responsible for the many unsuccessful attempts of achieving a settlement in the past, 
because the precondition of integrated institutional management, namely a more integrated 
society, has proven impossible to establish.
Segregation in Northern Ireland varies between local government districts and between 
urban and rural areas. While certain areas in Northern Ireland have had a majority of one
499 Official census data for 1981 show a decline of the Catholic population, and for 1991 a steep increase. Both 
developments must be seen in the context of a widespread Nationalist boycott of the 1981 census.
500 This has not always been the predominant trend since (accessible) records began in 1861.
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community for centuries because of the particular interaction of historical factors with social, 
economic, and political ones, more recent studies of segregation patterns suggest that its 
primary causes are to be found in the political situation, i.e., considerations about safety and 
community solidarity.502
In more general terms, segregation is an instrument to control and resist a situation that 
is perceived as threatening. Ways in which functions of segregation manifest themselves are the 
creation of safe areas for a somewhat normal community life, including political, economic, and 
legal/judicial aspects and the determination of the degree of contact with the respective other 
community. Segregation as resistance is closely related to aspects of control -  resistance is 
aimed at neutralising attempts to impose another community’s preferences (dominance), but is 
also aimed at eliminating the dangers of community disintegration.503
Another indicator of the present level of segregation is the percentage of mixed 
marriages in Northern Ireland.504 The response, or lack of it, by Northern Ireland institutions to
501 Marie Smyth, “Borders within Borders: Material and Ideological Segregation as Forms of Resistance and 
Strategies of Control”, Templegrove Conference Papers, http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/segregat/temple/confer2. 
htm.
502 In Belfast, for example, residential segregation seems to have been a characteristic feature at least since the 
beginning of this century. The first available figures are those for 1911, and they show forty-one per cent of Catholics 
and sixty-two per cent of Protestants living in segregated quarters, with these figures rising until 1969 to fifty-nine 
per cent and sixty-nine per cent, respectively. Cf. Brendan Murtagh, ‘Ts Segregation Desirable?”, Templegrove 
Research Paper, http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/segregat/temple/discuss2.htm. By 1993, of fifty-one wards in 
Belfast, eighteen had less than ten per cent Catholics, including fourteen with two per cent or less; while twelve 
wards had less than seven per cent Protestants, including six of them that were exclusively Catholic. Of the remaining 
twenty-one seemingly integrated wards, five were internally segregated by peace lines, while seven had once had a 
predominantly Protestant population, many of which were moving away. Cf. David McKittrick, “Apartheid Deepens 
on the Streets of Ulster”, The Independent on Sunday, 21 March 1993.
503 A study of thirty-nine towns revealed, for example, that seventeen of them showed criteria of high segregation in 
terms of dominance. Considering now that these seventeen towns contained seventy-eight per cent of Northern 
Ireland’s urban population, it becomes clear that more than three-quarters of the urban population have been exposed 
to the benefits and disadvantages of group dominance. The process of ‘greening’ in urban areas, i.e., the influx of 
Catholics and the subsequent change in the population ratio, has increased the Catholic isolation index (the degree to 
which Catholics live in predominantly Catholic areas). Protestants, on the other hand, whose isolation index should 
have decreased, used segregation as an instrument of maintaining their degree of isolation from Catholics, and with it 
the existing majority-minority ratio of dominance by moving to, and preserving, predominantly Protestant living 
quarters. These findings are backed by earlier and later case studies of particular urban areas. An analysis of 
population movements in Derry/Londonderry found a changing group ratio as a result of an increase in the number of 
Catholics and a simultaneous decline in that of Protestants, a parallel inner-city migration of Protestants to ‘safe’ 
areas, and an increasing communal segregation. Marie Smyth, “Borders within Borders: Material and Ideological 
Segregation as Forms of Resistance and Strategies of Control”, Templegrove Conference Papers, 
http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/segregat/temple/ confer2.htm. A study of ethnic residential segregation between 
1911 and 1981 has demonstrated that an accurate measurement and evaluation of segregation depends on the criteria 
selected, such as dissimilarity, dominance, isolation, and exposure. Cf. Michael A. Poole and Paul Doherty, Ethnic 
Residential Segregation in Northern Ireland (Coleraine: University of Ulster/Centre for the Study of Conflict, 1996).
504 A 1996 study on the institutional responses to mixed marriages indicated a percentage of 2.3%, based on the 1991 
census, throughout Northern Ireland; while data based on an analysis of the 1993 Social Attitude survey showed the
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the occurrence of mixed marriages reveals that the churches, in general, find it difficult to 
accept and handle mixed couples, that the education system, although bearing great potential 
through the introduction of integrated schools, has not found itself able to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to cater for the needs of children from mixed marriages, and even the 
Northern Ireland Housing executive, although it has developed formal structures to deal with 
community relations and discrimination, has not been able to apply a consistent approach to the 
challenges -  both positive and negative -  mixed marriages pose in Northern Ireland.505 
Institutions, in their failure to respond adequately to instances of social segregation, more or less 
encourage it.
Although the high and steadily increasing degree of segregation suggests that it is 
perceived as desirable for the variety of reasons outlined above, there are also unintended 
negative side effects to it in relation to security concerns. Segregation can not guarantee the 
community’s safety. Living in a highly segregated area or ward means confessing one’s 
religious/political/ethnic identity in public. The designation of an area as Catholic or Protestant 
makes it, to some extent, even more likely that attacks on the community as a whole and/or on 
individual members occur. This, however, can somehow be countered by the possibility of more 
active ‘security measures’ taken by the community and of a collective responsibility for, and 
pool of, resources of defence. Similar side effects exist for the economic and social development 
of the segregated community.506 The high levels of segregation in Northern Ireland indicate that 
the two communities are, to a significant degree, unassimilated. There is little doubt about the 
fact that segregation is widely desired as a means to take control of one’s community’s situation 
at residential levels and beyond. The desirability of segregation is based upon the assumption
regional differences ranging from 8.4% in Belfast to 6.2% in the eastern Counties and 2.2% in the western ones. Cf. 
Valerie Morgan et al., Mixed Marriages in Northern Ireland. Institutional Responses (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 
1996).
505 Ibid.
506 Brendan Murtagh, “Is Segregation Desirable?”, Templegrove Research Paper, http://www.cain.ulstac.uk/issues/ 
segregat/temple/discuss2.htm has shown that there is a higher proportion of per capita incomes under £5,000 per year 
(sixty-nine per cent in highly segregated areas as compared to forty-five per cent overall), of unemployment (thirty- 
one per cent as compared to fourteen per cent), of dependency on income support (forty-one per cent as compared to 
twenty-one per cent). Similar figures exist for the education sector, where of the economically active population in all 
of Northern Ireland twelve per cent had achieved A-level standard and another twelve per cent a university degree as 
highest qualification, while the respective figures for highly segregated areas were two per cent and one per cent
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that it, and only it, allows communities their identity and safety, thus outweighing the inevitable 
repercussions of deprivation and stigmatisation. The question that remains is whether it is 
desirable for Northern Ireland as a whole to stop this trend of further segregation or even to 
reverse its current levels. The answer depends upon the kind of settlement that is envisaged for 
the conflict. As long as the institutional level of segregation does not approximate segregation 
levels in other areas of society, a stable settlement is likely to be impossible. There are two 
solutions to this problem. One is to reverse the existing level of segregation and thus to create a 
situation in which institutional integration has a match in society. The other solution would be 
to increase the level of institutional segregation and enable each community to take care of its 
own affairs as widely as possible.
Equality and Perceptions of Discrimination and Deprivation
Discrimination and deprivation are two factors that contribute strongly to the emergence,
escalation, and continuation of ethnic conflicts.507 The fact that deprivation is very often
perceived as a result of a deliberate policy of discrimination by those who are, or feel, deprived
does not establish the actuality of a causal relationship. Only if there is an actual link between
discriminatory policies with deprivation will a policy of affirmative action and/or equal
opportunities improve the situation. Where reasons for deprivation lie in other areas (e.g.,
structural disadvantages of a certain region), other policies are needed.
In the context of ethnic conflicts, it is important to realise that it is not necessarily the 
actual levels of discrimination and deprivation that contribute directly to the conflict, but group 
and individual perceptions of who is discriminated by whom and who is deprived of what good
507 Discrimination is a deliberate policy for or against individuals or groups based on criteria defined by those who 
discriminate. Discrimination can be negative, in this case individuals or a group are singled out to worsen their 
situation. However, it can also be positive, i.e., individuals or a group can be singled out for preferential treatment 
over other individuals or groups. If the latter is done to remedy past injustices and increase the equality of individuals 
and communities in society, it can also be referred to as affirmative action, as it is the case in the American context. 
Positive discrimination by a group on its own behalf has occurred in South Africa during the years of apartheid, but in 
its less extreme forms it can also be observed in many other countries where the ethnic composition of the population 
and the corresponding power balance between the ethnic groups allows one section of society to be in a dominant 
position. Relative deprivation, on the other hand, although it can be, and often is, the result of a deliberate policy of 
discrimination, is a concept to measure differences between the standard of living of one individual or group in 
relation to an appropriate reference person or group. To state that one group is worse off than another means 
observing an objective situation, but not attributing the well-being of one group to the deprivation of another.
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by whom. In addition, a once severe experience of discrimination and deprivation by one group 
is difficult to remedy in the short term It requires a long term effort not only to put group and 
individual relationships on a more equal footing, but also to create a public awareness that this 
process is under way, has been successfully completed, and that the status of equality, once 
achieved, is maintained. While all these factors have had their bearing on the situation in 
Northern Ireland, an additional difficulty has been that throughout the 1970s and 1980s the 
process of addressing differences in the standard of living between the two communities, as far 
as it was under way at all, coincided with an economic recession. This being the case, neither 
the Nationalist community could reach the same standard of living the Unionist community had 
had before, nor could the latter, in its entirety, maintain its previous living standard. As a result 
of this, tensions in Northern Ireland increased because Catholics/Nationalists did not see the 
expected improvement, while Protestants/Unionists attributed the decline in their living 
standard, at least in part, to the process of establishing equality and denounced it as unjustified 
positive discrimination in favour of the Nationalist community.
Deprivation is not solely dependent upon economic conditions, but also upon actual 
policies on the ground, and whether they are discriminatory or not. One of the issues around 
which the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed was the perceived (and 
actual) unfair allocation of houses between members of the two communities, and not the issue 
of shortages in housing facilities as such. A similar case can be made for fair employment 
practices. While fair employment depends upon the availability of jobs in general, the 
distribution of available jobs among the communities does not, and employment policies along 
the lines of communal favours are equally unacceptable as similar housing policies. What is at 
stake here is the equality of opportunity -  a community that is deprived of equal chances in 
society in such essential areas as employment and housing will naturally feel discriminated 
against and try to rectify this state of affairs. Northern Ireland is a good example of how patterns 
of deprivation and discrimination and the inability and partial unwillingness of politicians to
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change them can lead to protracted violent conflict, while actual improvements in the situation 
do not equally lead to an end of the conflict.508
The Balance of Political Power Between and Within the Communities509
The two most important trends in relation to the balance of political power in Northern Ireland 
over the past thirty years are that the political influence510 of Nationalist parties has grown at the 
expense of the Unionist community and that, at the same time the diversity of political parties 
within all the three party blocs -  Nationalist, Unionist, and cross-communal -  has increased.
The Unionist bloc consists of the UUP, the DUP, and a number of smaller, and over 
time different, Unionist parties. The two main contenders for the Nationalist vote have been, 
since 1982, the SDLP and Sinn Fein. Between 1973 and 1982, the SDLP competed with a 
number of smaller Nationalist parties. Before 1973, the Nationalist Party, the Republican 
Labour Party, and occasional independent candidates ran in elections. The most persistent 
element of the cross-communal bloc has been the APNI. Until 1977, its main competitor was 
the Northern Ireland Labour Party, after 1981, it was the Worker’s Party, and more recently the 
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition. Other parties whose position can not be determined on the 
confessional/non-confessional scale, such as the Natural Law Party, have also contested 
elections. The general trend of vote distribution among the three major blocs is exemplified in 
figure six.
The increasing diversification within each of the blocs has had different effects. In the 
Unionist bloc, it has meant that the UUP, although it has managed to retain its leading position 
(except in European elections, where the DUP has been the strongest party since 1979), has lost
508 A good overview of the development of the housing situation is Martin Melaugh, Majority Minority Review 3: 
Housing and religion in Northern Ireland (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1994). On (un)employment see Bob 
Rowthome and Naomi Wayne, Northern Ireland - The Political Economy o f Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) 
and A. M. Gallagher, Majority Minority Review 2: Employment, Unemployment and Religion in Northern Ireland 
(Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1991).
509 All data from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/elecLhtm. A good overview of party-political 
developments between 1969 and 1989 is Brendan O’Leary, “Party Support in Northern Ireland, 1969-1989”, in John 
McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (eds.), The Future o f Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 
342-357. Similar, Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, The Politics o f Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland 
(London: Athlone Press, 1993), pp. 185ff.
510 Measured in seats won in elections at local, provincial, and parliamentary level.
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votes and seats, mostly to its main contender, the DUP.511 This split of Unionist votes has had 
the effect that the SDLP has become the party with highest percentage share in votes in the 1998 
Assembly elections.
In the nationalist camp, the SDLP is unquestionably the stronger performer in elections, 
and has always, with some exceptions in the 1980s, won more than twenty per cent of the vote. 
Sinn Fein after good performance in the early eighties, lost significant electoral support after the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, but could regain most of it and win new voters from the early 1990s 
onwards when the party managed to establish itself more credibly as a democratic, non-violent 
political force.512
The APNI has always been the dominant party in the cross-communal sector, yet its 
electoral performance has only been satisfactory at local and provincial level and after the 
introduction of the Single Transferable Vote system (STV). The Worker’s Party never had a 
share of more than three percent of the valid vote. The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, 
however, has managed to win seats both in the 1996 Forum and in the 1998 Assembly elections.
In general, the balance of power has been altered at local and provincial toward fairer 
representation of the Nationalist and cross-communal vote with the introduction of STV. In 
parliamentary elections, the plurality system is still in operation for the eighteen Northern 
Ireland constituencies, but the overall increase in Nationalist votes has brought about a more 
balanced representation of the electorate in Westminster as well.
511 Only in European elections has the DUP consistently out-polled the UUP.
512 Evans and O’Leary identify two sources of Sinn F6in support -  politically the party has benefited from being 
identified with the ‘first peace process’, demographically Sinn F6in’s strength is that a large number (sixty per cent) 
of voters belong to the 18-34 age cohort. Cf. Geoffrey Evans and Brendan O’Leary, “Northern Ireland: La Fin-de- 
Sidcle, the Twilight of the Second Protestant Ascendancy, and Sinn F6in’s Second Electoral Coming”, in 
Parliamentary Affairs vol. 50, no. 4,1997, pp.672-680, here p. 674.
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The Impact of Violence on Community Relations513
The Northern Ireland conflict has been among the most violent ethnic conflicts in post-World 
War Two West European history. It has cost more than 3,000 lives, thousands more have been 
injured, and millions of pounds worth of damages have been caused. Yet the impact of violence 
on the conflict can not only be measured in these terms. Used by the paramilitary groups of both 
communities to realise their goals as well as by the British state and its institutions to preserve 
the status quo and prevent further escalation, violence has not only been a symptom of the 
incompatibility of communal identities in Northern Ireland, but has also intensified existing 
tensions and kept them at a high level for the past thirty years. Violence in Northern Ireland is 
not only a matter of paramilitary groups, the army, and the police. It also occurs in the form of 
spontaneous and organised rioting and clashes between infuriated mobs and between them and 
the security forces. While these are better understood in terms of occasionally deteriorating 
relationships between sections of the two communities, the campaigns of Loyalist and 
Republican paramilitary organisations are a valuable source for analysing the reasoning of the 
radical factions in each community.514 This will provide a deeper understanding of how the 
conflict as such is perceived and how the actions of the respective ‘other’ side are interpreted. 
Such an analysis can then be used as a further element in an informed assessment of the 
situation in Northern Ireland and the potential remedies for it.
Republican Violence
Violence by Republican paramilitaries has accounted by far for the greatest number of deaths in 
Northern Ireland as a whole. This overall picture, however, needs to be clarified in a number of 
important ways. Between 1969 and 1994, the time when the first cease-fires were announced in 
the recent peace process, Republican paramilitaries were responsible for more than half of all
515 All figures in this section are based on Mary Therese Fay et al., “Mapping Trouble-Related Deaths in Northern 
Ireland 1969-1994”, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/cts/tables.htm and on “Annual Deaths in Northern Ireland 
by ‘Status’ of Person Killed, August 1969 to December 1995”, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/death95w.htm.
514 According to O’Duffy, “changes in the intensity and targets of Republican violence can best be explained by 
three instrumental factors related to political context: strategic objectives, the effects of security policy (upon 
opportunity structures), and the organisational strength of each paramilitary group.” Brendan O’Dufly, “Violence in
254
lives lost in the Northern Ireland conflict (58.8%), and killed more than twice as many people as 
their Loyalist counter-parts, and about six times as many as the security forces. Almost exactly 
one half of their victims (50.7%) were members of the security forces, about half from within 
and half from without Northern Ireland, but more than one third (37.1%) were civilians, 
including not only innocent bystanders, but, for example, also contract workers for the ‘crown 
forces.’ Loyalist paramilitaries, apart from the security forces, the other direct adversaries of 
Republican paramilitaries, accounted for only 1.5% of their victims, while infighting among 
Republican paramilitary organisations and splinter groups caused significantly more casualties 
(10.7%).515
As regards the religion of Republican paramilitaries’ civilian victims, the greatest 
number of their victims were Protestants (37.4%), which amounts to almost three quarters of all 
Protestant deaths in the conflict. At the same time, they were responsible for most of the deaths 
among people whose religion could not be established (89.4%) or among people from outside 
Northern Ireland (94.6%). One quarter of all Catholics killed between 1969 and 1994 died as a 
direct consequence of Republican paramilitary action.
Even though the status of victims -  civilian, Loyalist or Republican paramilitary, 
security forces -  suggests a non-sectarian campaign against selected target groups with a high 
number of civilian bystanders killed, a look at the religion of these victims reveals that, in its 
results, Republican paramilitary warfare had a sectarian outcome. The unwillingness and 
inability to understand that the perception of Republican violence among the Unionist 
community and in the wider British and international public would be that of sectarian warfare 
is reflected in the justification patterns used by Republican paramilitaries.516
The major Republican paramilitary organisations are/were the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the real IRA, and the Continuity Army
Northern Ireland 1969-1994: sectarian or ethno-national?”, in Ethnic and Racial Studies vol. 18, no. 4, October 1995, 
pp. 740-771, here p. 741f.
515 A part of this high number of self-inflicted casualties has also been caused by prematurely exploded bombs and
accidents in the production and handling of explosives.
Council. As the latter three were formed as breakaway groups from the IRA, a joint command 
structure among them has never existed.
Loyalist Violence
Loyalist paramilitaries have also contributed significantly to the overall death toll in Northern 
Ireland since 1969. Of all victims killed in the conflict, Loyalist paramilitary violence has 
accounted for twenty-nine per cent of them, of which 87.5% were civilians. The next highest 
percentage of victims were from within the Loyalist paramilitary community itself (6.5%), 
followed by Republican paramilitaries (4.3%), and members of the security forces (1.2%), most 
of them (ninety-one per cent) from Northern Ireland.
As regards the religion of their victims, Loyalist paramilitaries killed almost half of all 
Catholic victims in the conflict (49.6%), which equals more than three quarters (75.5%) of all 
victims caused by Loyalist paramilitary violence.
These figures qualify the Loyalist campaign ‘in defence of their ancient rights’ as one 
that has been strongly sectarian and very indiscriminate in the selection of targets. This was also 
reflected in the justification patterns used and demonstrates the very wide concept of who and 
what is perceived as threatening as well as the inability that it is, to some extent, the reaction to 
this perceived threat that produces an actual threat in response to that reaction.517
The three major Loyalist paramilitary organisations are the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 
the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), which has also operated under the cover name Ulster 
Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the only recently founded Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). UDA and 
UVF have operated under the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) and generally co­
ordinated their strategy. However, during the final months of the talks process in 1997/98 the joint 
Loyalist command structure collapsed.518
515 On details of Republican justifications, Stefan Wolff, Political and Philosophical Aspects o f Strategies Justifying
Violence in Northern Ireland (Marburg: Tectum 1995).
517 On details of Loyalist justifications, ibid.
518 This has also resulted in the emergence of splinter groups that have not called cease-fires, such as the Red Hand 
Defenders.
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Violence and Community Relations
Violence has had an impact on community relations and vice versa at three levels -  segregation, 
polarisation, and alienation.519 Violence may not be the primary cause for, or result of, either of 
these three dimensions of community relations, yet there is a strong inter-relation between them.
Segregation, although it has been a long-term trend has increased as a result of inter- 
communal violence. This was the case especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but on a 
lower level it has continued in subsequent decades. While intimidation from the ‘other* 
community and fear of violence have contributed to increasing residential segregation, peer 
pressure from within one’s own community has also had a share in establishing the largely 
segregated structure of residence in Northern Ireland today.520 Increasing segregation is likely 
to make it easier to develop and maintain stereotypes about the other community and its 
intentions towards one’s own community. Because of this, then, there will be even less 
understanding for the position of the other community, which, in its rejection, increases 
homogeneity and solidarity within one’s own community. On this basis, violence against this 
other community becomes more easily acceptable and justifications are more readily available.
This is also the basis upon which polarisation grows. The degree to which both 
communities differ in their perceptions of the nature of the Northern Ireland conflict and its 
potential solutions is influenced by more or less informed judgements about the other 
Community and its political agenda. Violence and the interpretation of violent acts is likely to 
reinforce polarisation. At the same time, the stark polarisation between the two communities 
over what could be an acceptable and desirable future for Northern Ireland, and the inability to 
reach an agreement by peaceful means increased the preparedness of some sections within each 
community to engage in violence to either achieve their goals or, at least, prevent the other 
community from achieving theirs.
519 For a specific case study on these three aspects of community relations see Andrew Hamilton et al., Violence arid 
Communities (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1990).
520 Templegrove Action Research Limited, Sixth Public Discussion: “ The Effects of Political Violence”, 
htttp://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/segregat/temple/discuss6.htm.
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The lack of political progress over almost thirty years of violent conflict and the 
inability of the security forces to provide protection from acts of terrorist violence has also 
contributed, though unequally, to an increasing alienation of both communities from the British 
state and its institutions. While this has always been a feature of the relationship between the 
Nationalist community and the Stormont and later the British political systems, alienation has 
also affected the Unionist community, especially after the Anglo-Irish Agreement and after the 
recent Good Friday Agreement. The sense of being left alone with unresolved problems has 
triggered processes in both communities in which paramilitary organisations have partly 
replaced organs of the state. This is more obvious and widespread within sections of the 
Nationalist community, where paramilitaries not only ‘protect’ their community from sectarian 
attacks, but also police it and provide a number of community ‘services.’ Within the Unionist 
community the aspect of protection is still the strongest notion of alienation, but increasing 
alienation from the British state and its institutions could here, too, lead to a broader approach. 
Unionist alienation from Britain has its origins in the days of partition. Unlike in South Tyrol or 
Alsace, national political parties withdrew from campaigning in Northern Ireland, thus 
encouraging the build-up of an almost exclusively sectarian party system for the decades to 
come. The creation of a parliament in Northern Ireland was also not the preferred option of 
Unionists, because it marked Northern Ireland as different from the rest of the United 
Kingdom,521 yet having a parliament elected by popular vote was at the same time perceived as 
a safeguard against a British sell-out, and thus still an option with a fairly positive connotation.
Community relations that are based on the historic experience of inequality, 
deprivation, and discrimination are more likely to form the background against which inter- 
communal violence can develop and escalate. While it has, therefore, been important to reduce 
the level of violence and ‘to take the gun out of politics,’ the various policies applied to do so 
have had different degrees of success and have had and will have distinct consequences. 
However, while there is no correlation between the reduction of inequality, deprivation, and
521 Personal communication from Antony Alcock. See also Antony E. Alcock, Understanding Ulster (Lurgan: Ulster
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discrimination and the general downward trend in death tolls recorded in the Northern Ireland 
conflict over the past two decades,522 positive correlation exists in relation to increasing 
residential segregation but it is hard to say whether and where a causal relationship exists. 
Nevertheless, the reduction of death tolls since the early 1970s can be attributed to a number of 
factors -  improved capabilities of the security forces, better security co-operation between the 
British and Irish governments, and changed tactics and political agendas of the paramilitary 
organisations and the radical political parties in both communities.523
The declaration of cease-fires by the major paramilitary organisations on both sides in 
1994 and 1997 and their continuation despite opposition to the Good Friday Agreement from 
sections within both communities indicates that there is a growing understanding that it will not 
be possible to achieve any stable settlement of the conflict through violence. This, however, 
does not mean that the structure of community relations in Northern Ireland could not facilitate 
a renewed violent escalation of the conflict despite the settlement achieved in the Good Friday 
Agreement. Even though this may not lead to the same degree of guerrilla and sectarian warfare 
as before 1994, community relations could continue to deteriorate further as a result of violent 
eruptions. As the Good Friday Agreement is built largely on the assumption of the possibility 
and desirability of inter-communal co-operation, and as its implementation crucially depends 
upon the cooperation of both communities, violence has the potential to destroy the agreement, 
mostly because of the structure of communal interests and the design of the institutional process 
envisaged by the agreement.
Developments within Each Community
Judging from the support the different political groupings have been able to muster, a broad 
political basis in favour of a settlement along the lines of the Good Friday Agreement seems to
Society, 1994).
522 Cf. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996), pp. 288-296.
523 A good overview of the likely factors accounting for patterns of intensity of violence in Northern Ireland can be 
found in Brendan O’Duffy and Brendan O’Leary, “Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-June 1989”, in John McGarry 
and Brendan O’Leary (eds.), The Future o f Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also
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have formed, which is currently represented by the UUP, PUP, SDLP, SF, APNI, and NIWC. 
Yet to either side of this middle ground, there are political forces that do not accept the 
agreement as the final word in the Northern Ireland conflict, and they have gained in support 
over recent elections. Much will depend upon whether these exclusionist forces can erode the 
current inclusionist majority and recreate a similar political stalemate as it has existed in various 
forms in Northern Ireland for the past thirty years.
The Unionist/Protestant Community
The historical roots of Ulster Unionism as a political doctrine advocating the preservation of 
Northern Ireland’s links with the United Kingdom go back to the 1798 rebellion of the United 
Irishmen. The defeat of the uprising stood at the beginning of a process at the end of which the 
Presbyterian bourgeoisie of Northern Ireland had become re-estranged from the Catholic 
population and had put its hopes on a political alliance with the land owning Protestant 
aristocracy.
In its modem form, Unionism has been used as an umbrella term for a variety of 
different political ideologies that share the rejection of a united Ireland and the preference for 
British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. The two strands most commonly identified are Ulster 
Loyalism, with an emphasis on the distinct culture of Ulster and on the political links with the 
British state, and pro-British Unionism, which prioritises the links with Britain and has less 
strong patriotic feelings about Northern Ireland.524 The first tradition is most strongly expressed 
in the ideology and politics of the Democratic Unionist Party, while the second tradition finds 
its corresponding party in the Ulster Unionist Party.
Until the late 1960s, the Unionist Party was the dominant force within its community, 
but the beginning of the ‘Troubles’ marked the end of political and ideological homogeneity of 
Unionists/Protestants, in a similar development that had almost led to the split of the SVP in 
South Tyrol. In 1970 the Democratic Unionist Party, led by the Moderator of the Free
chapter seven in McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, and chapter seven in McGarry and O’Leary, 
The Politicsjyf Antagonism. — “ .
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Presbyterian Church, Ian Paisley, emerged from the Ulster Protestant Party. While the DUP is 
still a major political force in Northern Ireland today, other parties created around that time have 
been rather short-lived. Vanguard, the Unofficial Ulster Unionist Party, the United Ulster 
Unionist Party, the Pro-Assembly Unionists, and others who came into being as a result of splits 
within, and subsequent break-ups from, the Unionist Party contested a number of elections 
successfully before either re-uniting with the now Ulster Unionist Party by the end of the 1970s 
or became electorally insignificant.
The Ulster Unionist Party
The UUP’s identification with the union, although conditional upon its functioning as a 
safeguard as well, is primarily civic and in terms of the political institutions and values for 
which the union is a symbol to them. The increasing political and ideological distance from the 
DUP has prevented, in recent years, and in contrast to the 1980s, meaningful political coalitions 
between the two parties to maximise their political influence. The UUP, as a representative of a 
less culture-orientated Unionism, has been able to follow a more flexible approach in politics.525 
This has become apparent since the beginning of the talks process that ended with the 
conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement. The orientation towards liberal British traditions and 
institutions has led the UUP to understand that certain changes in the status quo will be 
necessary to achieve a sufficiently broad cross-community consensus upon which a stable 
settlement can be built. The differences within the party that have emerged in this process are 
not so much differences about the need to build such cross-communal consensus, but rather 
about the degree to which the UUP, and in some sense the Unionist/Protestant community as a 
whole, should compromise on some of the basic principles of Unionism. The majority of the 
UUP’s political leadership, in contrast to the parliamentary party, has, since the late 1980s, 
cautiously embraced the evolving talks process. Firmly committed to preserving the union with
524 Jennifer Todd, ‘Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture”, in Irish Political Studies, 2 (1987), pp. 1-26.
525 There had been some signs of greater flexibility in the 1991-92 negotiations, but the first significant indication of 
this new approach was the party’s document “A Blue Print for Stability”, which was published in February 1994 (one 
year after the Joint Declaration, which had been rejected). Subsequently, a number of Unionist positions put forward 
in this document were reflected in the Framework Documents of 1995 and eventually in the Good Friday Agreement.
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Great Britain, to avoiding the sharing of executive responsibilities with the Republic of Ireland, 
and to preventing a formal veto right for the Nationalist community in the political process in 
Northern Ireland, the UUP remained in the talks process even after the admission of Siim 
Fein.526 The Good Friday Agreement was signed, and subsequently supported by a majority of 
the party’s executive council, as a document that, according to the UUP’s view, had achieved 
these three basic aims.527 Consequently, the party actively engaged in the Yes-campaign and 
conducted its campaign for the assembly elections along this interpretation of the Good Friday 
Agreement as a victory for, rather than a threat to, Unionism.528 With this double strategy of 
endorsing the Good Friday Agreement and simultaneously defending its position as a guardian 
of Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom, the UUP managed to win twenty- 
eight seats in the new assembly, thus becoming the strongest party.529
The Democratic Unionist Party
Throughout the 1970s (and before that in its predecessor, the Ulster Protestant Party) the 
membership of the DUP had a mostly rural, fundamentally Presbyterian background. Since the 
1980s, the party has undergone a process of partial secularisation and has come to include 
urban, well-educated, and less religion-based sections in its membership as well. This has 
created frictions over policy-making and agenda-setting, and has contributed to tensions 
between the increasingly urban middle-class leadership of the party and its core electorate of 
either urban working class or rural farmers. What unites the party after all is the common 
perception of being isolated and besieged by enemies within the province, in form of the
526 The UUP had insisted upon elections to the Peace Forum in 1996, instead of a less formal arrangement for the 
talks process.
527 See, for example, “Speech by Rt. Hon. David Trimble to the Northern Ireland Forum, 17 April 1998”, 
http://cain.ulsLac.uk/events/peace/docs/dtl7498.html
528 Ulster Unionist Party, “Secure the Union, Build Our Future” (UUP Assembly Election Manifesto), 
http://www.uup.org.
529 However, there is a strong possibility that some of those elected as UUP candidates may well side with opponents 
to the Good Friday Agreement on a number of issues. In addition, the number of seats secured by the UUP was 
initially equal to that of the anti-agreement unionists (twenty DUP, five UKUP, and three independent Unionist 
members of the new assembly), but has subsequently become smaller because of the resignation of one of its 
members from the party. From a percentage point of view, the UUP has lost its top position to the SDLP. While this 
signifies, to some extent, a further decrease in the UUP’s popularity and attractiveness of its policies in the wider 
Unionist community, it is also an indication of the political and ideological diversification of Unionism that manifests 
itself in a differentiation of the party-political system.
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Republic of Ireland, certain parts of the British political establishment, in particular Labour, the 
European Union, the United States, and so on. Even though justifications of why the union with 
Great Britain is needed differed in recent years within the party, there still seems to be a 
common understanding that the political allegiance to the United Kingdom provides the best 
safeguard against incorporation into the Irish Republic. This Ulster loyalist tradition has been 
described as being primarily loyal ‘to “the Crown, rather than Parliament, provided the Crown 
defends Protestant liberties in Ulster.’530
It is against the background of primarily cultural identification with Ulster and only 
secondary political identification with the British state that the DUP has opposed any changes to 
the status quo and an end of majority rule in Northern Ireland. Successive negotiation initiatives 
have been rejected or disrupted by the DUP, or, whenever they were concluded successfully, 
their outcome was prevented from coming to fruition.531 Recent DUP political ideology has 
centred around very few issues, such as ‘Dublin Rule’ (title of the 1997 Westminster election 
manifesto), terrorism and decommissioning, prisoners, and policing, all of which are presented 
from an extremely biased and self-righteous position.532 Although the 1998 referendum was the 
first time that a Nationalist-Unionist bloc out-voted the hard-line Unionist position, the 
campaigns that the DUP has conducted has been rather successful both in the referendum on the 
Good Friday Agreement in May 1998 and in the Assembly elections in June. Capitalising on the 
historical distrust of some sections of the Unionist community and the increasing alienation 
from British Northern Ireland policy and its results in recent years, the DUP managed to 
mobilise a significant amount of no-voters in the Unionist community and won twenty out of
530 McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, p. 112.
531 The DUP Leader, Ian Paisley, was at the forefront of the UWC strike in 1973 that brought down the structures 
established by the Sunningdale agreement. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement met the fierce opposition just as much 
as the 1993 Joint Declaration and the 1995 Frameworks Documents. Cf. Democratic Unionist Party, “Proposal for a 
Constitutional Convention: Breaking the Logjam, September 1993”, http://www.dup.org.uk/proposal.htm, and 
Democratic Unionist Party, “Proposal for a Constitutional Convention: A Better Way”, January 1995”, http://www. 
dup.org.uk/proposaI.htm.
532 Sees for example, the DUP Assembly Manifesto 1998, the DUP Manifesto 1997, the 1996 Local Government 
Manifesto, the 1993 Constitutional Manifesto, and DUP briefing documents on “Consent”, “Sinn Fein and the IRA”, 
and “Understanding Events in Northern Ireland. An Introduction for Americans”, all of which are available at 
http://www.dup.org.uk.
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the one hundred and eight seats in the new assembly with the premise to obstruct the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.
Other Unionist Parties
Three other Unionist parties exemplify the trend of diversification -  the United Kingdom 
Unionist Party (UKUP), the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), and the Progressive Unionist Party 
(PUP).
The UKUP, led by Robert McCartney, has been represented at Westminster since 1995, 
when McCartney won the North Down seat in a by-election after the death of the previous MP 
from the Ulster Popular Unionist Party. At Westminster the UKUP took the Labour whip, but 
did not follow that party’s policy on constitutional issues. The UKUP has been fiercely opposed 
to the Framework Documents533 and the direction of the talks process, eventually pulling out of 
it in September 1997 after Sinn Fein had been admitted. In relation to the 1995 Framework 
documents, the party targeted, in particular, all proposals aimed at the establishment of any form 
of Irish involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. As the party favours the legislative 
integration of Northern Ireland with Great Britain, it also rejected the establishment of a 
Northern Ireland Assembly as a further step of disintegration and distancing the province from 
the UK mainland. Politically the UKUP is closer to the DUP than to other Unionist or Loyalist 
parties in Northern Ireland and has increasingly distanced itself from the British Labour Party as 
well. With a clear No-agenda, the UKUP contested the elections to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly on 25 June 1998 and won five seats in the new assembly.534
The Ulster Democratic Party is one of the smaller loyalist parties representing mostly 
working class interests. Because of its affiliation with the paramilitary UDA, it has played a 
significant, yet not always entirely successful role in the talks process. While the party has
533 Cf. in detail Robert McCartney, The McCartney Report on the Framework Documents, http://www.ulsterorg.uk/ 
ukup/reports. Also, Robert McCartney, The McCartney Report on Consent, http://www.ulsterorg.uk/ukup/reports. 
The following information about the UKUP’s ideology and policy is mostly taken from these two reports published in 
1997. A more detailed discussion of content and impact of die Framework Documents will be provided in the section 
“From the Framework Documents to the Good Friday Agreement” below.
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retained a strongly pro-union position throughout the talks process, it has also seen the peace 
process as an opportunity, rather than as a threat. In a response to the British and Irish 
governments’ 1995 Framework documents, the UDP rejected the entire content of the 
proposals, but insisted that there was nevertheless an opportunity to engage in dialogue.535 Even 
though the UDP was part of the successful Yes-campaign for the referendum, it did not manage 
to win a single seat in the new assembly.
The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) was founded in 1977, ‘to fill the obvious gap that 
existed in relation to the Loyalist working class which was being under-represented and mis­
represented.’536 Although the party was affiliated with the paramilitary UVF/UFF, it accepted 
the principle of sharing responsibility with Nationalists on the basis of consent early on, but 
rejected any form of interference from the Republic of Ireland or any formal co-operative 
structures between the United Kingdom and the Republic with regard to Northern Ireland. 
Nevertheless, party policy and strategy began to change and the PUP has actively participated in 
the talks process, accepted the presence of Sinn Fein in i t537 and distanced itself on more than 
one occasion from other Unionist parties opposed to negotiations over the future of Northern 
Ireland.538 The party has endorsed the Good Friday Agreement as an opportunity for Unionists 
to take part in the shaping of the future of Northern Ireland539 by securing the union of Northern 
Ireland with Great Britain, through the Nationalist community’s and the Republic of Ireland’s 
acknowledgements of the principle of consent on the constitutional status of the province, and 
by guaranteeing the future assembly’s right to determine the scope of North/South co­
534 This success has not prevented the split of the party in early 1999, which left McCartney isolated with the 
members of his parliamentary party alleging that he had planned to withdraw the UKUP from the assembly. Cf. 
Brendan O’Leary, “The Nature of the British-Irish Agreement”, in New Left Review no. 233 (1999), pp. 66-96.
535 This was mainly justified with reference to the party’s conviction that a refusal to talk would have destabilising 
consequences not only for the Unionist community, but also for Northern Ireland as a whole and for its relationship 
with Great Britain. (See Ulster Democratic Party, “Response to the Government Framework Documents”, 
http://www.udp.org/framewor.htm.) For the same reason, the party engaged actively in the 1997/98 talks process and 
endorsed the Good Friday Agreement as strengthening the union with Great Britain, facilitating cross-community co­
operation, and promoting realistic co-operation and policy co-ordination with the Republic of Ireland. (See Ulster 
Democratic Party, “What the Agreement Actually Contains”, http://www.udp.org/what.htm.)
536 Progressive Unionist Party, ‘Tarty Origins”, http://www.pup.org/origins.htm.
537 “Speech by David Ervine”, http://www.pup.org/speechl.html.
538 See for example, Billy Hutchinson and David Ervine, “Letter to the Editor, May 1996”, http://www.pup.org/ 
letter.html; Billy Mitchell, “Statement on Behalf of the PUP Executive Council”, http://www.pup.org/agree2.html; 
David Ervine, “Press Statement, 20 January 1998”, http://www.pup.org/state2.html.
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operation.540 In the assembly elections on 25 June 1998, the PUP secured two seats for its 
candidates.
Both the UDP and PUP have, earlier than the two main Unionist parties, shown signs of 
compromise and preparedness to engage in negotiations. Although representatives of both 
parties rejected the Framework Documents, they indicated at the same time that they would be 
willing to talk, if not based on these documents, then at least about how a mutually acceptable 
basis for negotiation could be reached.541
The party-political diversity of Unionism reflects the fact that it now ‘accommodates a 
number of divergent and contradictory ideological impulses and political interests sharing little 
in common save for a commitment to the Union itself.’542 The broad spectrum of forms of 
identification with the United Kingdom, of conditions upon which loyalty is made dependent, 
the great number of interpretations given by Unionist parties of the situation in Northern Ireland 
and its potential remedies, and the variety of policies pursued by them to secure a future for 
their community does not allow too many generalisations about the nature of Unionism. For 
example, suggestions that Unionism was ‘more interested in statehood than in nationhood*543 
might be true for one section of Unionism, but not for another.
It remains to be seen whether those elements that are common to Unionist identity, such 
as the rejection of Irish unification, will lead to closer co-operation among Unionist parties in 
the future, or whether those aspects that distinguish the various streams of Unionism from one 
another will be reinforced. While Unionists will always share their common origin, memories 
and the way in which they are interpreted, the political consequences of greater or lesser 
polarisation within Unionism will be rather different. They range from the possibility of 
radicalisation of some or all sections of Unionism to the marginalisation of either the moderate
539 Progressive Unionist Party, “The Good Friday Agreement”, http://www.pup.org/agree.html.
540 Progressive Unionist Party, “The Reality of the Agreement”, http://www.pup.org/agree3.html and Progressive 
Unionist Party, “The Union Is Secure”, http://www.pup.org/agreel.html.
541 A summary of the UDP and PUP positions can be found in Nicholas Watt, ‘Fringe Loyalists Attack ‘Kneejerk' 
Reaction to Leak”, The Times, 3 February 1995.
542 Colin Coulter, “The Character of Unionism”, in Irish Political Studies, 9 (1994), p. 7.
543 Arthur Aughey, Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Belfast 1989), p. 18.
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or hard-line elements. The outcome of this process will partly depend on the success of the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement and in turn shape this process and potentially the 
way in which the institutions provided by the agreement will operate.
The Nationalist/Catholic Community
The origins of Nationalist, and Republican, ideology can be traced back to the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. Irish nationalism, as the striving for independence from Britain 
and for a united Irish state, historically was not confined to (sections of) the Catholic 
community. The 1798 rebellion of the United Irishmen brought some Catholics and some 
Protestants together for this goal. Yet their defeat, the industrialisation of eastern Ulster, the 
growing conviction among Protestants that they could expect a better future in a union with 
Great Britain, and the colonial relationship between Britain and Ireland and the settler-colonial 
pattern of relationship between and within the two communities in Ireland let nationalism 
become the dominating ideology among Catholics only. The Republic of Ireland manifested its 
claim to the whole island in the 1937 constitution and an Irish High Court decision in 1990 
stressed the character of this claim as a constitutional imperative. Irish nationalism, even before 
its dramatic rise in the late 1960s, had had significant support in Northern Ireland as well as in 
the Republic.544
The situation, however, began to change from the mid sixties onwards. The Northern 
Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was founded in August 1966 and soon became the 
most important civil rights group in Northern Ireland. Although Republicans and Nationalists 
were active in its creation, NICRA was initially not a Nationalist or Republican organisation, 
but professed itself exclusively concerned with the human rights situation in Northern Ireland. 
The objectives of the organisation were to defend the basic freedoms of all citizens and to 
protect the rights of each individual citizen, to create awareness about actual and potential 
abuses of power, to demand guarantees for basic civil rights, such as freedom of speech,
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assembly, and association, and to educate the public about their lawful rights. Only gradually 
these issues became ethnicised -  because of the nature of Unionist government at Stormont, 
NICRA had to advocate in particular the rights of the Catholic minority, which in turn alienated 
the Unionist community from it. The more NICRA became an advocate of the rights of 
Catholics and the more hostile the response of the Unionist controlled government institutions 
in Northern Ireland responded, the more united the Catholic community became in its 
determination to change the situation, and the greater became the influence of Republicans in 
the civil rights movement. To realise that it was obviously impossible to have equal rights as a 
Catholic in Northern Ireland was just one step short of a large-scale revival of Nationalist 
ideology advocating Irish reunification.
The party-political spectrum within the Nationalist community at the time was rather 
diverse. Alongside the Nationalist Party and Republican Labour Party who contested elections, 
Sinn Fein was engaged in a policy of non-co-operation. Apart from these formal political 
parties, a number of societies and associations existed, such as the Wolf Tone Society, the 
Republican Clubs, and the Connolly Association. While united in their commitment to improve 
the situation of the Catholic minority and in their belief that this was done best by Irish 
unification, there had always been a split between Republicans and Nationalists about how to 
achieve this aim with the former being prepared to use violence while the latter were convinced 
of the long-term superiority of peaceful political means. With a streamlining of the party- 
political system in the seventies, this split became institutionalised in a two-party system within 
the Nationalist community consisting of the SDLP and Sinn Fein.
The Social Democratic and Labour Party
The SDLP, which stood for election for the first time in 1973 in the assembly and local 
government elections, has always operated on the principles that its long-term political goal was 
Irish unification, that this could not be brought about against the will of a (Unionist) majority in
544 An informative study of the history of nationalism in Northern Ireland is Eamon Phoenix, Northern Nationalism. 
Nationalist Politics, Partition, and the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland, 1890-1940 (Belfast: Ulster Historical 
Foundation, 1994).
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Northern Ireland, and that it was necessary to find some interim arrangements, most preferably a 
form of power-sharing, which would allow the Catholic community a decent life in Northern 
Ireland before unification. This has been translated into political practice in the SDLP’s 
participation in all power-sharing experiments (with the notable exception of James Prior’s 
‘rolling devolution’ in 1982), in several rounds of negotiations with the Unionist parties from 
the early 1970s onwards, as well as in political initiatives of its own.545 In all its policies, the 
SDLP has demonstrated a serious commitment to non-violence and to an inclusive settlement of 
the conflict in Northern Ireland.
The stress put on the notion of a united Ireland has, over the past several years, been 
substituted more and more by an emphasis on a settlement based upon democracy and equality 
that was to be brought about by dialogue and negotiations with both the Irish and British 
governments and ther Unionist parties in Northern Ireland. From the late 1980s onwards, the 
SDLP recognised that one of the essential pre-conditions for any move forward would be an end 
of the violence in Northern Ireland, which in turn would require the inclusion of Sinn Fein in 
the negotiation process. Against this background, SDLP leader John Hume and Sinn Fdin 
President Gerry Adams engaged into a dialogue out of which emerged the first IRA cease-fire ini 
1994. Yet the SDLP knew that it took more than the co-operation of Sinn Fein and an IRA 
cease-fire to break the stalemate in Northern Ireland’s political process. The failure to get 
substantial negotiations under way during the first IRA cease-fire between 1994 and February 
1996 did not stop the SDLP from continuing its advocacy of an inclusive settlement. Talks with 
Sinn Fein continued and after the Westminster elections of May 1997 had created a new 
opportunity for peace, the SDLP and Sinn Fein launched a second joint statement in which both 
parties reiterated that their ‘primary objective remain[ed] the achievement of a just and lasting 
peace for all the people of this island’ and that such a ‘just and lasting settlement will only be 
achieved if it is based on principles of democracy and equality and has the allegiance of both
545 Examples of this latter approach are the New Ireland Forum in the 1980s and the Hume/Adams Initiative in the 
early 1990s.
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traditions.’546 The SDLP’s emphasis on democracy and equality, rather than Irish unification, is 
reflected throughout recent documents of the party.547 hi connection with other strategy 
documents it becomes clear that the SDLP is likely to consent to an agreed comprehensive 
solution short of Irish unification, if issues of democracy and equality are satisfactorily 
combined with substantial North/South structures.548 Evidence of this reformation continued in 
the party’s manifesto for the assembly elections in June 1998, in which no mention of a united 
Ireland is made. Rather, the SDLP committed itself to working ‘constructively in the 
[North/South] Ministerial Council to achieve the maximum harmonisation of social and 
economic provision throughout Ireland.’549 The party has so far avoided formally abandoning a 
policy for Irish unification,550 and its approach to the Good Friday Agreement indicates that 
federalisation and/or European regionalism continues to be the dominant constitutional agenda 
of the SDLP.
546 Joint Statement by John Hume and Gerry Adams, 18 July 1997.
547 Submissions to the peace talks on all three strands stressed the ‘totality of relationships' involved in the Northern 
Ireland conflict, i.e., new political arrangements in Northern Ireland, a framework for North/South co-operation, and 
an updated Anglo-Irish Agreement. The SDLP recognised the principles of consent, parity of esteem, and equality 
and equity as the fundamental guidelines of the negotiation and settlement process. The party also ‘recognised that 
the historical fact of 75 years of partition has created new realities’ but stated in the same context and at several other 
occasions that ‘this does not mean that SDLP, or Nationalists, will ever consent to the status quo which has obtained 
in Northern Ireland since its foundation.’ SDLP Submissions to Talks, October/November 1997, 
http://www.sdlp.ie/sdlp/talks.htm.
548 Already the 1997 Westminster election manifesto did not contain any specific reference to Irish unification, but 
focussed in rather general terms on the peace process in Northern Ireland and provided a detailed political agenda for 
development within Northern Ireland. Cf. SDLP, Real Leadership, Real Peace (Manifesto for the Westminster 
Parliamentary Elections 1 May 1997). In his address to the 27th Annual Conference of the SDLP in November 1997, 
John Hume outlined his party’s vision of the Ireland they wanted to achieve as a result of the talks process -  ‘an open, 
outward-looking, tolerant island economy with carefully constructed linkages into Europe and the US, a society with 
high levels of education, employment, and social solidarity.’ Cf. John Hume, Conference Address to the 27th Annual 
Conference o f the SDLP, Belfast 15 November 1997. The stress on economic, rather than political, relationships 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was also emphasised by Hume saying that a ‘key part of the 
way forward (although not the only one) is to build on North-South co-operation towards a fully functioning all­
island economy.’ Cf. John Hume, Conference Address to the 27th Annual Conference o f the SDLP, Belfast 15 
November 1997.
549 SDLP, Now, Say Yes to a Future Together (SDLP Manifesto for the Assembly Elections 25 June 1998). In the 
context of European integration, the party even makes a clear distinction between the two political entities on the 
island when claiming that ‘European integration ... offers great opportunity for Ireland and Northern Ireland’ and 
when demanding that ‘the European Union must work in the interests of the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland.’ 
Cf. SDLP, Now, Say Yes to a Future Together (SDLP Manifesto for the Assembly Elections 25 June 1998).
550 In its submissions to the peace talks, the SDLP stated that there was ‘an inherent requirement that any new 
arrangements should create a sense of confidence and that they are not simply a short-term expedient They must be 
durable, yet flexible and capable of development to accommodate the dynamic of change “within the totality of 
relationships.’” Cf. SDLP Submissions to Talks, October/November 1997, http://www.sdlp.ie/sdlp/talks.htm. In a 
similar vein, John Hume welcomed the Good Friday Agreement stressing its importance as well as hoping for its 
durability by saying that ‘We must safeguard and cherish this agreement we have worked so hard to accomplish.’ Cf. 




Thus, it is not the sense of a certain permanence of the settlement that puts the SDLP in 
opposition to Sinn Fein, but rather the pace of further developments. The Republican party has 
consistently argued for Irish unification since its foundation and has continued to do so after the 
Good Friday Agreement. What has changed in the party’s strategy is the means by which this 
ultimate goal of Republican politics and ideology is to be achieved. Until very recently, the 
party has often justified and supported, or at least tolerated and accepted, violence as a means of 
politics and tried to provide rationales for, and to facilitate understanding of, politically 
motivated violence by Republicans. However, since the late 1980s there have been continuous 
and eventually successful attempts on the part of the Sinn Fein leadership to move the party into 
democratic politics. In the early 1980s the party had begun to contest elections, yet refused to 
take its seats at either Westminster or in any assembly-like body. While the eighties were a 
period in which the Republican movement prided itself in the double strategy of the ‘bullet and 
the ballot box’, Sinn Fein was crucial in bringing about the two IRA cease-fires in 1994 and 
1997. The party entered the talks process after signing up to the so-called Mitchell principles, 
which commit all signatories to the principles of consent and non-violence.551 Yet the change in 
tactics has not resulted in, or from, a change in overall strategy, as Sinn Fein remains committed 
to achieving a united Ireland.552
The notion of Irish unification was not the only area of dissent between the SDLP and 
Sinn Fein. Two other contended positions were closely linked to it -  the role of the British 
government and the Unionist veto. While the SDLP was and is prepared to accept a role for the 
British government in the long term, Sinn Fein’s position is much more determinedly focussed
551 These (six) principles are part of George J. Mitchell, John de Chastelain, and Haiti Holkeri, Report o f the 
International Body (published 22 January 1996).
552 The party’s submissions to the peace talks in this respect stand in a long line of similar policy documents by Sinn 
F6in, in which a united Ireland is described as the ‘desire of the Nationalist community’ and ‘the best and most 
durable basis for peace and stability.’ Cf. Sinn F6in, Peace in Ireland: Freedom, Justice, Democracy and Equality. 
Principles and Requirements. (Sinn F&n Submissions to Peace Talks), http://sinnfein.ie. Sinn Fain’s principal 
position that the permanent solution of the Northern Ireland conflict can be brought about by Irish unification has also 
been stressed by Gerry Adams in an article on the peace talks in which he outlined the requirements for agreement 
Adams stated that ‘Sinn F6in sees a 32-county republic, working through a new relationship with our nearest 
neighbours, based upon our mutual independence as the best way to eradicate the range of political, social, economic,
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on forcing Great Britain to withdraw form Northern Ireland.553 Also, Sinn Fein does not accept 
a Unionist veto on developments in the north, as the party insists that the principle of consent 
‘must be universally applied to the people of Ireland. Universal application of consent precludes 
a sectional approach.’554 Since the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement, this position has 
been reiterated in a variety of contexts and ways, all of which underline Sinn Fein’s support for 
the goal of Irish unification. It was important for the party, and the Republican movement in 
general, to maintain their commitment to this goal throughout the talks process to prevent a 
split, a breakdown of the IRA cease-fire, and a loss of electoral support. The signing of the 
agreement put a new challenge to Sinn Fein, as it had to enter, with all other parties, into the 
contest of how to interpret the agreement reached.555 In contrast to Unionists, and to some 
extent to the SDLP, Sinn Fein does not accept the agreement as a permanent solution to the 
Northern Ireland conflict, but continues to insist on Irish unification as the terminal point of this 
process.556
In the focus on economic co-operation with the Republic and the establishment of the 
respective institutions, Sinn Fein has become remarkably close to the SDLP.557 In general, 
SDLP and Sinn Fein have similar positions on issues regarding justice, equality and rights in 
Northern Ireland. Both accept that all three dimensions of the peace process need to be explored 
to the full to advance Northern Irish society, and both place considerable emphasis on the
and other inequalities which affect the people of this island.’ Cf. Gerry Adams, “Nationalist Requirements for an 
Agreement”, http://sinnfein.ie.
553 Gerry Adams, Presidential Address to (the reconvened) Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, 10 May 1998.
554 Sinn F6in, Peace in Ireland: Freedom, Justice, Democracy and Equality. Principles and Requirements. (Sinn 
F&n Submissions to Peace Talks), http://sinnfein.ie.
555 Recognising that the Good Friday Agreement was not yet the full realisation of the Republicans’ aim to achieve a 
united Ireland, because it upheld the Unionist veto (which is not really a Unionist veto, but rather one of the majority 
in Northern Ireland or the assembly) over the constitutional status in Northern Ireland, the Sinn F6in leadership has 
constantly described it as ‘a basis for adanvcement’ and as regulating the period of ’a peaceful transition to a just 
settlement.’ Cf. Gerry Adams, Presidential Address to Sinn F6in Ard Fheis, 18 April 1998.
556 Yet even Sinn F6in shifted its emphasis, although not as significantly as the SDLP. The assembly election 
manifesto included only one reference to the goal of Irish unification although the Good Friday Agreement is once 
again only seen ‘as part of a transitional process to Irish unity and independence.’ Sinn F&n Manifesto for the 1998 
Assembly Elections, http://sinnfein.ie.
557 The political agenda outlined commits the party to work within (and not beyond) the framework of the agreement 
by following a co-operative approach to the parliamentary democratic process. Naturally, the North/South dimensions 
play a more prominent part in the five elements identified by the party ‘to eradicate the causes o f ... prevailing 
injustices’ -  creation of an all-Ireland economy, transformation of the Six-County economy, elimination of the 
economic distortions of partition, development of economic justice across Ireland, and introduction of economic 
democracy. See the Sinn F6in Manifesto for the 1998 Assembly Elections, http://sinnfein.ie.
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operation of North/South institutions. However, official Republican policy is that this is just 
another step towards unification.
Settling the Conflict: Political Initiatives to Resolve the 
Northern Ireland Conflict, 1968-1998
Ever since the conflict in Northern Ireland escalated violently attempts have been made, and 
solutions been proposed, to accommodate the interests of all the parties involved in the conflict. 
Mutually hostile perceptions of the respective other community and its intentions have, in the 
past, led to the rejection of proposals made, or supported, by the other community, or, wherever 
something akin to a middle ground had been found, at least the more radical parts within each 
community have rejected it as insufficient for their purposes.
The Conflict about the Conflict and Its Solutions558
Explanations of the conflict vary widely between and within the two principal communities in 
Northern Ireland. Generally, a line can be drawn between external and internal accounts. The 
two external explanations are the Nationalist, and especially Republican, contention that the 
involvement of the British state into what is essentially described as internal Irish affairs is the 
major cause of the conflict; the alternative Unionist and Loyalist versions are that the Republic 
of Ireland in upholding its constitutional claim to the whole of Ireland in Articles two and three 
of its 1937 constitution unnecessary fuelled the existing tensions and encouraged the 
Nationalist/ Republican tradition to strive for Irish reunification.559
Internal explanations, in contrast, see the roots of the conflict in a variety of factors 
within Northern Ireland itself by focussing on the implications of economic, religious, andi/or 
cultural conditions in the province. Economically, deprivation and systematic discrimination of 
Catholics/Nationalists in Northern Ireland is the most common argument to account for the 
conflict alongside suggestions of economic opportunism of those who actually profit from the 
ongoing conflict. As an explanatory concept, religion is either seen as a phenomenon that
558 An excellent overview of the various interpretations of the Northern Ireland conflict is McGarry and O'Leary,
Explaining Northern Ireland.
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deepens and aligns already existing social divides, making positive inter-communal 
relationships virtually impossible, or the religious fanaticism of certain sections within each 
community is interpreted as the driving force behind the conflict policies of each community. 
Cultural accounts, finally, treat the conflict as either inherited, i.e., simply as a tradition of being 
in conflict with the other community and/or the authorities, or as ethno-centrist clash of two 
fundamentally different cultures.
As a consequence of this conflict about the conflict, proposed solutions have differed 
widely. The range reaches from full integration of Northern Ireland with Great Britain, to 
devolution, independence, repartition, and eventually to Irish unification, with a variety of 
different models for each of the major proposals.
Integration with Great Britain, defined as direct government by Westminster, is an idea 
mostly supported by various streams within the Unionist community and based on an 
understanding of the conflict as caused by the ‘Irish dimension’ of the conflict. Full integration, 
in one version, aims at making Northern Ireland part of the United Kingdom that would neither 
be treated any differently from any other part of the country, nor would it have separate, or 
independent, or different institutions. A slightly lesser full variant is proposed by supporters of 
electoral integration. According to this model, the main British political parties should expand 
into Northern Ireland to create a party-political ‘normality’ above sectarian divisions and thus 
eliminate or at least gradually realign Northern Irish political parties on other issues. Both 
models of integration suggest modification of the present system of direct rule, which, at the 
time of its introduction, was supposed to be temporary. However, there is a third group of 
integrationists who argue that, instead of changing the current system, it should simply be made 
permanent.
In contrast to the various types of integration, which were supported almost exclusively 
by Unionists, the idea of a devolution of powers held by the Westminster government, has been 
favoured, in its various forms, and each of them with different degrees of support, by sections of
^  As part of the Good Friday Agreement, the Irish Constitution has been provisionally modified in this respect
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both communities. While a return to simple majority rule, as it existed between 1921 and 1972, 
was, and still is, favoured among significant sections of the Unionist community, notably the 
DUP and some parts of the UUP, this proposal enjoys no support from within the Nationalist 
camp. Majority rule with safeguards such as a bill of rights and an election system based on 
proportional representation is a more moderate approach that tries to take account of the historic 
concerns of the minority community. However, any significant support for such a solution has 
always been confined to unionism. Another proposal for a devolutionist arrangement, supported 
by the explicitly cross-communal Alliance Party, and to some extent by sections of the UUP, 
was power sharing, giving political representatives from both communities the opportunity to be 
involved in the executive and legislative branches of a new system of government in Northern 
Ireland. While the moderate Nationalist community, primarily the SDLP, support the idea of 
power sharing, they want it to be qualified by some sort of executive and legislative 
involvement of the Republic of Ireland, which was unacceptable for Unionists before the 1990s.
Somewhere between suggestions for integration into Britain and Irish reunification 
stand (i) proposals for repartition along the major demographic divides in the West and South 
West of the province, (ii) the independence of Northern Ireland from both Britain and the 
Republic, and (iii) joint authority of both states over Northern Ireland. With the exception of 
joint authority, which found significant supported among nationalists, none of these proposals 
was attractive to either of the two major traditions in Northern Ireland.
In contrast, the idea of a united Ireland has always been very popular as a long-term 
goal in the Nationalist community. While moderate Nationalists favour its achievement by 
consent and peaceful, constitutional, and democratic ways, Republican paramilitary groups, 
most notably the IRA, have tried since 1921 to force the issue through violence. While this 
approach is rejected by large sections of the Nationalist community, a majority of the same 
community is nevertheless united over the desirability of the goal of Irish unification, a proposal 
that quite strongly opposed by Protestants/Unionists.
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All these positions have developed and gradually changed over time. Nevertheless, they 
provide a general understanding about where the distinct political traditions and different parties 
within them come from. As such, they form the context in which the Sunningdale and Anglo- 
Irish Agreements were concluded and the Joint Declaration made.
Sunningdale, the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Joint Declaration 
The Failure of Sunningdale
In 1972 and 1973, the British government had published The Future of Northern Ireland: A 
Paper for Discussion560 and subsequently constitutional proposals for the province.561 As a 
consequence, elections to a power sharing assembly were held on 28 June 1973. Based on an 
electoral system according to which between five and seven candidates were elected by 
proportional representation in each of the parliamentary constituencies and on a turnout of 
72.5%, the elections returned seventy-eight representatives of eight parties to the new assembly. 
The official Unionists won 29.3% of the vote and sent twenty-four members to the assembly, 
followed by the SDLP with 22.1% and nineteen successful candidates. Together with the 
Alliance Party, which won 9.2% of the vote and eight seats, they formed a coalition government 
(Northern Ireland executive), initially supported by fifty-two of the seventy-eight members of 
the assembly, which was in favour of both the idea of power-sharing and of a Council of Ireland 
to be established subsequently.
Between 6 and 9 December 1973, representatives of the British and Irish governments 
and of the parties involved in the designated executive met at Sunningdale and discussed and 
agreed the setting up of the Council of Ireland. The provisions foresaw a Council of Ministers 
with executive, harmonising, and consultative functions, consisting of an equal number of 
delegates from the Northern Ireland executive and the Irish government, and a Consultative 
Assembly of thirty members from each of the parliaments, chosen by proportional 
representation on the basis of the single transferable vote system within each parliament. The
56® Northern Ireland Office, The Future o f Northern Ireland: A Paper fo r Discussion (London and Belfast: HMSO,
1972).
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council was to have executive functions, by means of unanimous vote in the Council of 
Ministers, in the fields of environment, agriculture, co-operation in trade and industry, 
electricity, tourism, transport, public health, sport, culture, and the arts. The conference also 
agreed on closer co-operation in security-related matters, on inviting the Council of Ireland to 
draft a human rights bill, and on the possibility of a future devolution of powers from 
Westminster to the Northern Ireland assembly and the institutions of the Council of Ireland.
The initially favourable situation began to change dramatically early in 1974. The 
Westminster elections on 28 February had been turned into a referendum on the new 
constitutional status of the province and the involvement of the Republic. Opponents of any 
change in the status quo united in coalition called the United Ulster Unionist Council and won 
fifty-one per cent of the vote and eleven of the twelve seats in Northern Ireland, with the 
remaining seat going to the SDLP. Shortly afterwards, the newly established Ulster Workers’ 
Council (UWC) called for new elections to the Northern Ireland assembly. When a motion 
against power sharing and the Council of Ireland was defeated in the assembly by forty-four to 
twenty-eight votes on 14 May 1974, the UWC called for a general strike. The following two 
weeks of the strike brought Northern Ireland to an almost complete standstill. The failure to 
break-up the strike and the unwillingness to negotiate a settlement with the UWC, eventually, 
led to the resignation of the Northern Ireland executive on 28 May 1974. The assembly was 
prorogued two days later.
The essential conditions for the success of power-sharing and a formal institutional 
involvement of the Republic of Ireland in the affairs of Northern Ireland had not been there, and 
even where they had appeared to be present, they were not stable enough to endure the pressures 
exercised on them. Even though the initial elections to the Northern Ireland assembly seemed to 
be a clear vote in favour of the new constitutional status, the reality of the situation in the 
province betrayed this superficial impression. The co-operating elites in the assembly had a 
rather secure two thirds majority in the assembly, but their influence and control over their
Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals (Cmnd. 5259), released 20 March 1973.
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(former) electorate on the outside was far less permanent and stable, in particular as far as 
Unionists in favour of the new arrangements and the Alliance Party were concerned.562 Apart 
from this lack of popular support for the settlement, there was also an essential lack of 
institutional support and failure of politicians to implement counter-measures. While British 
government policy was not to negotiate with the UWC, there were no decisive steps taken to 
prevent the breakdown of public life in Northern Ireland, nor was enough done to counter the 
pressure from UWC activists on members of the Unionist community who were opposed to the 
strike or undecided about their role in it. Sunningdale was not a treaty between two states, but 
an agreement reached between two states and a selected number of political parties. In order to 
work, it would have required substantial support for those partners in the agreement who were 
most volatile to pressures from within their own communities. The pro-agreement parties in 
both blocs were vulnerable to out-flanking by hard-core radicals. That this support for pro- 
agreement politicians was not forthcoming was one of the major reasons for the failure of this 
early attempt to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict.
Table 16: Conditions Accounting for the Failure of Sunningdale
• In the United Kingdom:
□ Failure to take decisive measures in support of the pro-agreement parties in 
Northern Ireland and to defeat the general strike in its early stages
• In Northern Ireland:
□ Vulnerability of the pro-Agreement parties to out-flanking by radicals in both 
communities
□ Traditional mistrust of large sections of the Unionist community towards all issues 
involving cross-border co-operation
□ Recent high level of violent inter-ethnic conflict
□ Ability of the UWC to mobilise key sections of the Unionist community in a general 
strike against the agreement
□ Lack of popular and institutional support in defence of the agreement
• International Context:
□ Lack of any pressure on the conflict parties to resolve their differences through 
compromise
562 The votes both received in the 1974 Westminster elections were cut down to one third of the results they had. 
achieved in the 1973 assembly elections. Part of the explanation lies in the different voting systems applied in both 
elections -  PR for the assembly and plurality rule for the Westminster elections.
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The Anglo-Irish Agreement
After the failure of Sunningdale, the British government initiated several other initiatives. In the 
wake of Sunningdale, these initiatives were either strictly limited to Northern Ireland itself, such 
as the 1974/75 constitutional convention, or, when they had cross-border implications, they did 
not involve any Northern Irish political parties, as with the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental 
Council set up in 1981. Yet, none of these initiatives were successful.
Between 1982 and 1984, another attempt was made to resolve the conflict by 
reintroducing devolution. A scheme of ‘rolling devolution’ involving an assembly and a 
committee-style executive was proposed. The devolution of powers to elected representatives in 
Northern Ireland was supposed to be gradual and subject to seventy per cent agreement in the 
assembly to be elected. As there was no adequate recognition of the nationalist tradition in 
Northern Ireland, both Sinn Fein and the SDLP participated in the 1982 elections on an 
abstentionist platform and subsequently boycotted the assembly.563
In 1983 the Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour parties of the Republic of Ireland met 
with the Northern Irish SDLP in Dublin at the so-called New Ireland Forum to discuss the 
future of Northern Ireland from their viewpoint.564 Until February 1984, eleven public meetings 
were held. In September 1983 delegates from the Forum visited Northern Ireland and in January 
1984 the United Kingdom. In conclusion, the Forum produced a report565 in which the members 
gave their analysis of the problem, examined the situation in Northern Ireland, and presented 
three potential solutions to the conflict -  a unitary Irish state, a federal or confederate Irish state, 
and joint British-Irish authority over Northern Ireland. While this report represented a 
determinedly Nationalist interpretation of the conflict and its solutions, it nevertheless signalled 
to the British government that there was a certain basis for negotiation and compromise.
Given this and a British desire to involve the Republic of Ireland in the responsibility of 
running the province amidst the continuously serious security situation, alongside a growing
563 Cf., for example, Michael J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-1989. Its Nature 
and Execution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 150.
564 Invitations had also been issued to Unionist parties, who decided to boycott the event.
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Irish interest to stabilise the situation in the north and to prevent a spill-over of violence and/or 
Republican influence, a new and joint approach to the conflict seemed possible. Furthermore, 
the British government realised that it had failed in its campaign to criminalise republicanism, 
and both governments faced a growing appeal of republican ideology within the nationalist 
community, in particular after the hunger strikes of the early 1980s. Based on these 
considerations, both governments decided to enter into negotiations, which resulted in the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.
The agreement dealt with a variety of issues, including an Intergovernmental 
Conference, a human rights bill for Northern Ireland, security and judicial policies, and cross- 
border co-operation on economic, social, and cultural matters. The British attempt to address 
concerns of the Nationalist community was apparent, but as the implementation of the 
agreement did not effect any dramatic or even particularly noticeable change, the reward for 
Britain alienating the Unionist community was not forthcoming as expected. Although the 
influence of Sinn Fein within the Nationalist camp decreased towards the end of the 1980s, 
activities of the IRA did not decline. On the contrary, hard-line Republican opposition to Britain 
and IRA activity566 increased. The declining electoral appeal of Sinn Fein in the mid to end- 
19805 set in motion a rethinking process among the leadership of the party. Eventually, the 
party moved away from its unqualified support for, or at least tolerance of, republican violence 
to become one of the participants in the peace process(es) of the 1990s that finally brought 
about the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
The more severe repercussions, however, originated from within the Unionist 
community. In a survey of January 1988, 55.1% of those who declared themselves as 
Protestants voiced their opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, compared with 7.9% of those 
describing themselves as Catholics. Only 8.7% of Protestants opted more or less in favour of the 
agreement, as compared to 31.8% of Catholics who did so. Asked in the same survey for the 
biggest problem in Northern Ireland, only 8.6% of Catholics, but 29.5% of Protestants pointed
565 New Ireland Forum, Report (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1984).
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to the Anglo-Irish Agreement.567 Strong Unionist opposition failed to secure one of the central 
objectives of the British government, namely to strengthen moderate Unionism in the form of 
the UUP and marginalise radicals in Ian Paisley’s DUP. Similarly unsatisfactory were the 
working of the Inter-Governmental conference, acknowledged in the official 1989 review, the 
hoped-for improvement in the security situation,568 and the envisaged cross-border co­
operation.
Although the Anglo-Irish Agreement had by no means failed as badly as Sunningdale, it 
did also not produce a significant breakthrough in the political stalemate in Northern Ireland. In 
some respects, such as the increasing alienation of parts of the Unionist community, it even 
worsened the situation and prevented major progress for the years to come. Although the 
stalemate continued, it did so on a different level. The agreement had shown that solutions were 
possible to which the two governments and a significant part of the Nationalist community 
could agree. This had a positive long-term effect on the opportunities to reduce the level of 
violent of conflict and to increase the chances to achieve an inclusive agreement for the future 
of Northern Ireland, because it made uncompromising, hard-line unionism less credible as a 
strategy to preserve Northern Ireland’s link with Great Britain and, similarly, indicated that 
there was overwhelming support for constitutional, non-violent politics within the Nationalist 
community, the latter finding its expression in the poor electoral performance of Sinn F6in in 
the late 1980s, early 1990s. The limited success that the Anglo-Irish Agreement had in the short 
term was mostly a Consequence of it being reached and implemented at inter-governmental 
level.569 This being a recognition of the situation in the mid 1980s, in which cross-communal
566 This was also facilitated by a shipment of weapons and equipment from Libya.
567 Cf. Andrew Hamilton et al., Violence and Communities (Coleraine: University of Ulster, Centre for the Study of 
Conflict, 1990).
568 According to RUC statistics, the three years prior to the Anglo-Irish Agreement produced 195 deaths, 2,342 
injuries, 716 shooting incidents, 607 explosions, and 1708 armed robberies. The respective figures for 1986-1988 are: 
247 deaths (+27%), 3,661 injuries (+56%), 1,132 shootings (+58%), 661 explosions(+9%), and 2,253 armed 
robberies (+31%). This increase was not necessarily a direct effect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement as O’Leary and 
McGarry have shown in The Politics o f Antagonism, pp. 270-273.
569 It needs to be mentioned, however, that the Irish government continuously consulted with the SDLP, while the 
British government had no contact with Unionists during the negotiations. This contributed to the strengthening of 
Unionist  fears and the weakening of moderates. At the same time, this Irish policy was not unanimously embraced in 
the Republic either -  both Ian Gow and Mary Robinson resigned over this issue. Personal communication from 
Antony Alcock.
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agreement was virtually impossible, the British and Irish governments also had to accept that no 
stable and durable solution would be possible without the involvement and consent of the 
parties representing the two traditions in Northern Ireland.
Table 17: Conditions Accounting for the Limited Success of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
• In the United Kingdom:
□ Deliberate attempt to address concerns of the Nationalist community, even at the 
price of alienating sections within the Unionist community
□ Failure to deliver on key aspects of the agreement, such as the Inter-Governmental 
Conference, cross-border co-operation, and an improved security situation
• In the Republic of Ireland:
□ Upholding of the constitutional claim to Northern Ireland and its perception by 
Unionists as a threat to a non-negotiable aspect of their identity
□ Failure to deliver on key aspects of the agreement, such as the Inter-Governmental 
Conference, cross-border co-operation, and an improved security situation
• In Northern Ireland:
□ Exclusion of the political parties in Northern Ireland from the formal negotiation 
process
□ No opportunity for the people of Northern Ireland to approve of, or reject, the 
agreement
□ Disappointment among Nationalists and Republicans about the lack of visible 
improvements in their situation
□ Increased hard-line Republican resistance against British policy
□ Radicalisation of the Unionist community in opposition to the ‘Irish’ dimension of 
the agreement
□ Continued high levels of violent inter-ethnic conflict
• International Context:
□ Lack of any pressure on the conflict parties to resolve their differences through 
compromise
□ Support of the IRA through Libyan arms shipments
The Joint Declaration
In 1988, the UUP, the DUP, the APNI, and the SDLP had met in West Germany without 
achieving any breakthrough. Talks had also been held between the SDLP and SF in the first half 
of 1988. More significant than these talks, however, was an announcement by SF President 
Gerry Adams in March 1989 that he sought to establish Sinn Fein as a democratic political 
movement in pursuit of self-determination. This and the public acknowledgement by the then 
Northern Ireland secretary Peter Brooke that the IRA could not be defeated militarily, that he 
would not rule out talks between the government and SF should IRA violence cease, and that
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the British government had no selfish strategic or economics interests in Northern Ireland paved 
the way for the Brooke/Mayhew talks, involving the UUP, the DUP, the APNI, and the SDLP. 
These talks were held between March 1991 and November 1992 during a break in the operation 
of the Anglo-Irish inter-govemmental conference to ensure the participation of the Unionist 
parties. The arrangements for the talks provided for three different strands -  relationships in 
Northern Ireland, between the province and the Republic, and between the two governments. 
While talks about the relationships in Northern Ireland came to a standstill in June 1992 because 
there was little sign of compromise and the gap between the different positions seemed, at the 
time, impossible to bridge, the parties nevertheless agreed to move on to talks about strand two. 
With no major progress made, and decreasing willingness to co-operate on the part of the DUP, 
the talks eventually collapsed when the resumption of the Maryfield secretariat570 prompted the 
Unionists to withdraw form the talks.
Li April of the following year it was revealed that Gerry Adams of SF and John Hume 
of the SDLP had held a series of talks for two years discussing the contributions their parties 
could make to bringing about peace. After their talks had become public, they issued a first joint 
statement in April and a second one September, which became known as the Hume/Adams 
Initiative, and outlined the Nationalist and Republican views of a road to peace. Unionist 
opposition to the Hume/Adams Initiative coincided with a new series of violent attacks by and 
against both communities, of which an IRA bomb on the Shankhill Road in Belfast was the 
most costly in human casualties.571 It was also revealed that there had been secret talks between 
the British government and SF. At the end of the year, following a series of meetings Irish 
Prime Minister Albert Reynolds and British Prime Minister John Major issued the Joint 
Declaration.
The significance of the declaration, and the single most important difference to the two 
documents discussed before, was the fact that the British government acknowledged that it was
570 This was part of the permanent institutional framework set up by the Anglo-Irish Agreement
571 Oh Thursday 21 October 1993, ten people (nine civilians and one IRA member) were killed when a bomb 
exploded prematurely in a fish shop on the Shankhill Road in Belfast.
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‘for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, 
to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently 
given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.* The explicit 
reference to the notion of self-determination had a highly symbolic value, positively connotated 
for the Nationalist community, with more negative implications for the Unionist tradition.
Further confidence-building measures followed early in 1994 when the broadcast ban 
on SF was lifted in the Republic of Ireland, Gerry Adams was given a visa to enter the USA, 
and the Northern Ireland Office issued a statement in which it addressed questions by Sinn Fein 
concerning the Joint Declaration. Although Sinn Fein remained critical of the Declaration, a 
secret meeting was held between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick 
Mayhew, and a SF delegation in August, which was followed by an IRA announcement about 
the ‘complete cessation of all military activities’ on 30 August.
While relations between the Nationalist community and its representatives, on one side, 
and the Irish government, on the other, grew closer, the increasing degree of alienation between 
the DUP, which represented the more radical sections of Unionism and Loyalism, and the 
British government became apparent when John Major cut short a meeting with DUP leader Ian 
Paisley on 6 September 1994. Ten days later, the British government lifted the broadcast ban on 
SF. On 13 October 1994, the Combined Loyalist Military Command announced its own cease­
fire. At the end of the year, the British government, represented by officials of the Northern 
Ireland Office, began a series of talks with those political parties of Northern Ireland that had 
affiliations with paramilitary organisations, namely Sinn Fein (9 December 1994), the 
Progressive Unionist Party, and the Ulster Democratic Party (both on 15 December 1994).
Thus, within a year of the Joint Declaration, cease-fires had been announced by the 
major paramilitary organisations that did not cover a specified period of time (as they had in the 
past), but seemed, if not permanent, at least longer-term. In addition, the British government had 
entered in official and formal talks with representatives of the paramilitary organisations of both 
communities, and Sinn Fein was heading back into the political process, being recognised as a
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necessary partner by both governments. Although Unionist opposition to the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement and the Joint Declaration remained, the conditions to move forward towards a 
lasting settlement seemed rather good.
From the Framework Documents to the Good Friday Agreement
Realising that, despite these favourable conditions, the causes of conflict in Northern Ireland
had not been removed, the British and Irish governments developed A New Framework for
Agreement, which proposed structures for North-South (or, Northern Ireland -  Republic of
Ireland) and East-West (British-Irish) institutions and sought to integrate the earlier suspended
three-strand talks with a new effort of peacemaking.572 Both governments recognised that a
settlement would not be possible without significant and substantial compromise from all
conflict parties and reaffirmed the basic positions of the Joint Declaration -  the principles of
self-determination and consent, peaceful and democratic means as the only acceptable political
strategies and tactics, and the recognition of the fundamental ‘rights and identities of both
traditions.' In addition, the British government proposed its own ideas for a possible solution of
the conflict within Northern Ireland in a document called A Framework for Accountable
Government in Northern Ireland, in which a separation of powers between legislature,
executive, and judiciary was recommended to the political parties of Northern Ireland.
Throughout 1995, contacts and official talks continued between the British government 
and Sinn F6in, and although no major progress was achieved an eventual settlement seemed to 
have come closer.573 However, the end of the IRA cease-fire in February 1996 and the 
resumption of (Republican) violence throughout the region, targeting primarily the security 
forces, and in England proved to be a major setback. Despite this, the British and Irish 
governments announced the beginning of all-party talks, following elections to them in May, for
572 Cf. Brendan O’Leary, “Afterword: What is Framed in the Framework Documents”, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
vol. 18, number 4, October 1995, pp. 862-872, here p. 867.
573 Part of the reason for the lack of progress was the British insistence that the decommissioning of paramilitary 
weapons had to precede SF’s admission to formal multi-party talks. This pre-condition was set by the Tory party after 
the negative response by Unionists to the Framework Documents. It somehow reflects the wider problems of the 
Conservative government and its decreasing majority in Westminster. Cf. Brendan O’Leary, “The Conservative
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June 1996. Although Sinn Fein polled a record 15.5% of the vote in these elections, the party 
was not allowed to take its seats at the negotiation table,574 because IRA violence continued and 
the party did not sign up to the Mitchell principles of non-violence.575 The multi-party talks 
commenced as planned but did not bring about any significant results in their first year.
The election of a Labour government in the general elections in May 1997, the 
emphasis Labour put on reaching a settlement in Northern Ireland, and the perception, 
especially among the Nationalist community, that there was a new approach in Northern Ireland 
policies opened new possibilities. In July 1997, the IRA renewed its cease-fire. After Sinn Fein 
had signed up to the Mitchell Principles, the party was allowed into the multi-party talks at 
Stormont, which, however, resulted in the DUP and the UKUP walking out. After more than 
half a year of intensive negotiations with several setbacks, eight political parties in Northern 
Ireland and the British and Irish governments agreed to what has become known as the Good 
Friday Agreement.576
Difficulties that arose during the talks process had a number of sources. There was, first 
of all, the complicated structure of divergent interests that had to be accommodated. A majority 
of the Nationalist community, at least in the long term, favoured Irish unification, while the 
Unionist community insisted firmly on the affirmation of the union of Northern Ireland with 
Great Britain. In addition to these hardly compatible demands by the political parties on the 
ground, both states had territorial, economic, and political interests in Northern Ireland, which 
needed to be addressed.
Stewardship of Northern Ireland, 1979-1997: Sound-Bottomed Contradiction or Slow Learning?”, in Political 
Studies, vol. 45, pp. 663-676, here p. 672.
574 The Conservative Party (by then in office for seventeen years) had suffered for a long time from what O’Leary 
calls the ‘talking and not talking to terrorists syndrome’. However, under the government of John Major, parts of the 
Tory elite became more flexible. While they did not effectively exclude the possibility of negotiations with Sinn F6in 
(before the 1997 elections were called), their initial over-extensive talks about talks and the burdening of the latter 
with the decommissioning issue did not have a positive impact on the peace process. Cf, O’Leary, “The Conservative 
Stewardship of Northern Ireland”, p. 672f.
575 Former US Senator George Mitchell played a major role a chair of the negotiation process. In general, American 
influence (both the Irish-American lobby and the Clinton Administration), and pressure, on all negotiating parties was 
among the facilitating factors of the Good Friday Agreement.
576 Details of the Good Friday Agreement are discussed below in the section “The Good Friday Agreement -  A Way 
to a Lasting Settlement?”
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Mutual perceptions of each other’s agenda and distinct interpretations of the conflict, its 
roots, and possible solutions did not make the negotiation process any easier either. All parties 
agreed that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland required the consent of a 
majority, yet the territorial frame for the application of the consent principle was a matter of 
contention. Unionists insisted on a simple majority principle within the territorial borders of 
Northern Ireland by pointing to two principles endorsed by the United Nations, namely that of 
the territorial integrity of existing states and that of the accommodation of minority rights within 
existing borders.577 For obvious reasons, the Nationalist minority preferred the whole island of 
Ireland.578 Similar problems existed in relation to the establishment of North-South institutions. 
While Catholics/Nationalists favoured an arrangement with far-reaching executive and 
legislative competences for such bodies,579 Unionists wanted to limit these powers as much as 
possible, yet agreed to the setting-up of a British-lrish Council, in which representatives of all 
territorial and political units of the British Isles would have a seat and vote.580 In addition to 
these differences between the two communities, there were also differences within them. On the 
one side, both camps included parties and groups outside the negotiations that were firmly 
opposed to the peace process as they did not see it as an appropriate way to realise their ultimate 
political goals 581 But even between those parties who had committed themselves to the peace 
process such differences existed. While some sections of the Unionist community (most notably 
the UUP, PUP, and UDP) saw the peace process as a chance, created by the paramilitary cease­
fires, to negotiate a lasting settlement, other parts (in particular the DUP) interpreted the IRA 
cease-fire as a declaration of defeat by nationalism and thus saw no need to make any 
substantial concessions. Similar differences existed about the nature of any agreement to be 
reached. While Sinn Fein considered it merely as a stepping stone towards Irish unification, the
577 Ulster Unionist Party, “Proposals for the Three Strands”, UUP Press Release, 11 February 1998.
578 Sinn F6in argued in this context with another UN-endorsed principle, namely that of the self-determination of 
peoples. Cf. Sinn F6in, “Peace in Ireland: Freedom, Justice, Democracy, and Equality”, http:www.sinnfein.ie/ For the 
SDLP view, Social Democrat and Labour Party, “Submissions to Talks October/November 1997”, http://www.sdlp. 
ie/sdlp/talks.htm.
579 Social Democrat and Labour Party, “Submissions to Talks October/November 1997”, http://www.sdlp.ie/sdlp/ 
talks.htm.
580 Ulster Unionist Party, “Proposals for the Three Strands”, UUP Press Release, 11 February 1998.
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SDLP and the Unionist and cross-communal parties attributed a much more permanent and 
definite character to it.
The different demands and expectations of the parties were not the only problem for the 
ongoing negotiations. Throughout the talks process, inter-ethnic tensions between the two 
communities erupted violently. Serious riots, indicating the depth of feelings in both 
communities, also occurred over Christmas 1997. Although they did not terminate the 
negotiation process, they demonstrated the difficulty of accommodating the rights and interests 
of both communities in a comprehensive settlement. In the course of the riots, the Northern 
Ireland security forces more often than not ended up between the fronts of the Nationalist and 
the Unionist communities. The RUC faced political situations which to solve they were not 
mandated because of their function, nor were they able or willing to implement respective 
decisions in many cases because of their predominantly Unionist composition.
Tensions also existed between parts of the negotiating elites; most notably in this 
context was the refusal of the UUP to engage in direct talks with Sinn Fein. These inter-elite 
tensions highlighted the problem of intra-group heterogeneity. While each community was 
represented by a number of parties, there were also three parties with a decisively cross- 
communal approach to politics, namely the Alliance Party, the Women’s Coalition, and 
Labour.582 The moderate parties of the two community-based camps -  the SDLP and the UUP -  
were subject to continuous pressure from the more radical sections of their own communities, 
which limited their ability to compromise out of fear that the concessions to the ‘other* side 
could be instrumentalised in the competition for electoral support in the segregated party system 
as well as in the struggle for influence within the two parties.583
581 This was particularly true for some paramilitary splinter groups.
582 The latter two are more properly described as micro parties.
583 The effects of this were less strong in the Nationalist camp, where the SDLP only faced significant competition 
from Sinn F6in. The party system within the Unionist community, however, was more split The second largest 
Unionist party, Ian Paisley’s DUP, did not participate in the talks process at all, nor did the UKUP. Hie two other 
Loyalist parties that took part in the negotiations were the PUP, representing the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force 
and Ulster Freedom Fighters, and the UDP, which is the political wing of the Ulster Defence Association.
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A further threat to the successful completion of the talks process was the danger posed 
by paramilitary splinter groups, like the Loyalist Volunteer Force, a break-away from the Ulster 
Volunteer Force, and the Irish National Liberation Army and the Continuity Army Council.584 
While these continued their campaign, the major paramilitary groups were, to differing degrees, 
successful to uphold their cease-fires against opposition from within their own ranks, which had 
considerable repercussions for the talks process as the parties who were thought to be connected 
to paramilitary groups were held responsible for the actions of the latter.585
Eventually, the role and positions of the two governments added to the difficulties. Both 
states had a rather ambiguous role -  they were at the same time sponsors of the talks process, 
parties to the conflict that needed to be resolved, as well as ‘protectors’ of their respective 
communities. The latter role was particularly difficult for Britain as it had, as the sovereign 
power, the role of mediating between the interests of both communities. This created and 
reinforced a certain Unionist anxiety about being left alone to defend their interests and 
hardened their stance on a number of occasions. Although the change of government in May 
1997 did not effect the British Northern Ireland policy very much because of the traditionally 
bi-partisan approach. In addition, the new Labour government’s policy learning had already, 
taken place and it did not carry any of the Conservatives’ baggage. The Irish coalition 
government of the time, however, faced stronger pressures from the opposition, but also from 
members of the parties in the ruling coalition, not to withdraw the constitutional claim, and Was 
therefore less flexible on this issue.
584 The cease-fires of the major paramilitary organisations were broken on several occasions. Loyalist extremists 
carried out car bomb attacks in Northern Ireland on 22 and 28 December 1997 and on 20 January 1998. INLA defied 
the IRA cease-fire on 27 December 1997 by killing LVF leader Billy Wright inside the Maze Prison in Northern 
Ireland.
585 While the IRA was generally successful in enforcing the cease-fire commitment in all its brigades, one incident of 
the cease-fire broken lead to Sinn F6in’s exclusion from the talks for two weeks in March 1998. This fate had been 
shared earlier by the UDP, which represented the less disciplined UDA. Anyway weak in its grip on the 
paramilitaries, the party’s authority was further damaged when the British government engaged in direct talks with 
UDA prisoners bypassing the UDP leadership. The UVF, on the other hand, was the most successful of the 
paramilitary groups in terms of upholding its cease-fire, even if the price was the break-away of the LVF, which 
recruited most of its members from dissatisfied former UVF members. Nevertheless, the UVF’s discipline put the 
PUP, which represented the group politically, in a stronger and more flexible negotiation position in the peace 
process.
Other problems that occurred were the parallelity rather than combination of 
confidence-building and negotiation process, and the circulation of a variety of different papers 
by several participants in the talks without a unanimously agreed negotiation document Despite 
these serious difficulties, agreement was eventually reached, not least due to pressure exerted by 
the two governments, the combined chairmanship of the talks, and the Clinton administration.
The Good Friday Agreement -  A Way to a Lasting Settlement?
The Substance of the Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement, which eventually found the consent of all parties involved in the 
talks process on 10 April 1998, is accompanied by a declaration of support from the two 
governments, in which they commit themselves to recognising and implementing the will Of the 
majority of the people in Northern Ireland regarding the constitutional status of the province and 
to upholding the right of all people in Northern Ireland to have dual citizenship of the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. At the same time as the Good Friday Agreement was 
signed, a new agreement between the two governments will replace the old Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. In Article 1, the same commitments are made as in the declaration of support, 
Article two confirms the will of both governments to support and implement the Good Friday 
Agreement where this falls under their jurisdictional competence, and Article three lays down 
the procedures for phasing out the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. Article four describes the 
conditions for the new agreement to enter into force as the enacting of British legislation in 
accordance with the Constitutional Issues section of the Good Friday Agreement, the 
amendment of the Irish constitution and its approval in a referendum (also in accordance with 
the Constitutional Issues section of the Good Friday Agreement), and the establishment of the 
institutions outlined in the Good Friday Agreement.
The agreement deals with three main issues -  democratic institutions in Northern 
Ireland (Strand One of the negotiations), a North-South Ministerial Council (Strand Two of the 
negotiations), and the British-Irish Council, the British-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference, 
and Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity (Strand Three of the negotiations).
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Concerning Strand One of the negotiations, the establishment of a 108 member strong 
assembly was agreed. This assembly is elected by the single transferable vote system from 
existing Westminster constituencies. It will initially exercise full legislative and executive 
authority over the powers currently held by the six Northern Ireland Government Departments. 
Subject to later developments, the assembly could take on responsibility for Other matters in 
accordance with the agreement. Among the safeguards to ensure that all sections of the 
community can participate in the work of the assembly and to protect them in their rights and 
identities are the allocation of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership in 
proportion to party strength in the Assembly; the subordination of legislation to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any future Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland over 
assembly legislation; arrangements to ensure that key decisions are taken on a cross-community 
basis;586 and the creation of an Equality Commission. Crucial for the operation of the Assembly 
is that its members register their identity as Nationalist, Unionist or Other to have a 
measurement of community support in place for decisions taken according to the cross- 
community consent procedures.
According to the agreement, a Committee for each of the main executive functions of 
the Northern Ireland Administration is established. Chairs and Deputy Chairs of these 
committees are allocated proportionally according to the d’Hondt system, while ensuring 
membership in the Committees in proportion to party representation in the Assembly. The 
responsibility of the Committees includes scrutiny, policy development, consultation, and 
legislation initiation functions with respect to the Departments with which they are associated, 
and will have a role in initiation of legislation. Their powers will include to consider and advise 
on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the context of the overall budget allocation; to 
approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of relevant primary
586 There are two such mechanisms: parallel consent; a weighted majority (sixty per cent) of members present and 
voting, including at least forty per cent of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting. Key 
decisions requiring either of these procedures cross-community support include the election of the Chair and Deputy 
Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. There is 
also the possibility that these procedures can be triggered by a petition of concern brought by at least 30 of the 108 
members of the Assembly.
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legislation; and to initiate enquiries and make reports. In addition to these permanent 
committees, the Assembly has the right to appoint special committees as required.
Executive authority on behalf of the Assembly rests with the First Minister and his or 
her deputy and up to ten Ministers with departmental responsibilities. Following the joint 
election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of Ministers are allocated to 
parties based on the d’Hondt system based on the strength of each party in the assembly. An 
Executive Committee, comprising all ministers and the First and Deputy First Minister is to 
handle all issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers to formulate a 
consistent policy on the respective issue. Ministers have full executive authority in their 
respective departmental areas within a policy framework agreed by the Executive Committee 
and endorsed by the Assembly. In the early hours of 18 December 1998, the pro-Agreement 
parties at Stormont reached agreement on a list of ten departments for the future government, 
namely agriculture and rural development, enterprise, trade and investment (to include tourism), 
health, social care and public safety, finance and personnel, education, advanced education, 
training and employment, the environment, regional development, social development, culture, 
arts and leisure. This was a significant step forward on the way to full implementation Of the 
Good Friday Agreement. However, it did not mean the devolution of power to these ministries, 
an issue that (in September 1999) continues to be delayed.
Concerning legislation, which can be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a 
Minister, the Assembly can pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in all areas where it 
has devolved powers. The passing of legislation is subject to decisions by simple majority of 
members voting, except for decisions that require cross-community support, to detailed scrutiny 
and approval in the relevant Departmental Committee, and to co-ordination with Westminster 
legislation. Any disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts. In its 
relations with other institutions, the Assembly has to ensure cross-community participation.
As there are a number of powers which will not be devolved to the assembly, the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland retains a role in the political process, including the NIC
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matters not devolved to the Assembly, the approval and laying before the Westminster 
Parliament of any Assembly legislation, and to represent Northern Ireland interests in the 
United Kingdom.
The Parliament in Westminster will continue to be responsible, among other things, for 
legislation on non-devolved issues and for legislation necessary to ensure the United Kingdom’s 
international obligations in relation to Northern Ireland.
The agreement also establishes a consultative Civic Forum comprising, among others, 
representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors and acting as a consultative 
mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues.
With respect to Strand Two, which dealt with North/South relations, agreement was 
reached on the establishment of a North/South Ministerial Council to institutionalise formal 
relationships between the executive organs of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.587 
Its responsibilities include consultation, co-operation, and implementation of decisions on issues 
of mutual concern. All decisions of the Council have to be by agreement between the two sides.
Council meetings are to be held in three different formats -  in plenary format twice a 
year, with the Northern Ireland delegation being led by the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister and the Irish Government led by the Taoiseach; in specific formats with the 
delegations being represented by the respective Minister; and in other appropriate formats to 
consider institutional and cross-sector matters and to resolve any issues of discontent. Even 
though the Council and the delegates represented on it have the authority to take decisions on all 
matters within their competence, implementation is subject to approval by both parliaments.
As a prerequisite for the formal devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
inaugural meetings will have to take place of the Assembly, the British/Irish Council and the 
North/South Ministerial Council in their transitional forms. With a delay of more than one 
month (the original deadline had been 31 October 1998) the parties in Northern Ireland agreed
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six implementation bodies for the North/South Ministerial Council by 18 December 1998 -  
inland waterways, food safety, trade and business development, special EU programmes, the 
Irish and Ulster Scots languages, and agricultural and marine matters. Areas of functional co­
operation were determined as selected aspects of transport, agriculture, education, health, 
environment, and tourism.588 A change in the arrangements regulating the operation of the 
North/South Council is possible in the future by agreement of the governments of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the endorsement of their respective parliaments. Further tasks for the 
council in the future relate to representing Irish interests at the European level, to develop a 
form of inter-parliamentary co-operation and to establish a consultative forum comprising 
representatives of civil society.
According to the agenda of the talks process, Strand Three dealt with three different 
issues -  the establishment of a British-Irish council, the creation of a British-Irish 
intergovernmental conference, and the broad field of rights, safeguards and equality of 
opportunity in Northern Ireland.
The British-Irish Council was to be established in relation to a new British-Irish 
Agreement to deal with the totality of relationships among the peoples of ‘these islands’, and 
was thus to bring together within a formal institutional framework representatives of the British 
and Irish Governments, of the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
and of territorial and political units in the British Isles. The format of meeting is similar to that 
of the North/South Council. Issues with which the British-Irish Council is to deal include 
transport links, agriculture, environment, culture, health, education and the European Union. 
Common policies can be agreed by the members of the British-Irish Council without being 
binding for all of the regions represented in it  Further arrangements of the operatibtial 
procedures of the British-Irish Council and changes to existing ones are subject to negotiations 
and consensual agreement among the representatives within it.
587 A more detailed discussion of the nature and workings of the North/South Ministerial Council can be found in 
O’Leary, “The Nature of the British-Irish Agreement”, pp. 80-82.
588 In the area of tourism, a joint North-South public company is to be established.
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In addition to the British-Irish Council, a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
will be established according to a new Anglo-Irish Agreement subsuming both the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1985 
Agreement. The task of the conference will be to promote broad and substantial bilateral co­
operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. As part of this, the 
conference will also deal with all the non-devolved matters of the affairs of Northern Ireland, 
including security, rights, justice, prisons, and policing.
The third area -  rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity -  covers a wide variety 
of different matters and sets out a framework for the implementation of new policies in the areas 
of human rights, reconciliation, economic, social and cultural issues, decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons, security, policing and justice, and prisoners, including the necessary 
changes in United Kingdom and Irish legislation, the creation of new institutions in Northern 
Ireland, the set-up of a commission on policing and of a joint committee of representatives of 
the Human Rights Commissions in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland, and a 
review of the criminal justice system.
Pitfalls on the Way Forward
Different Expectations and Interpretations
The two communities and the political parties representing them have interpreted the Good 
Friday Agreement in very different fashions. The interpretations reached from ‘destruction of 
the union with Britain’ (DUP, UKUP) to ‘strengthening the union’ (UUP, PUP) in the Unionist 
community, and from ‘basis for a (permanent) settlement’ (SDLP) to ‘transitional arrangement 
on the road to a united Ireland’ (SF) in the Nationalist community. The stability of the political 
process will essentially depend upon the ability of the arrangements to manage and 
accommodate these diverse expectations about what the long-term political and constitutional 
perspectives for Northern Ireland are under the Good Friday Agreement.
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Closely related to these general expectations, are the various demands in terms of the 
contentious issues not covered by precise arrangements in the Good Friday Agreement, but 
deferred to later specification. Of all these, the matter of the early release of prisoners is 
probably the one that can be resolved most easily, as it effects both communities in a similar 
way -  both communities include victims and prisoners and their friends and relatives. Provided 
that the release of prisoners does not spark a new round of feuds and vendettas, it is likely that 
their release could provide some stability by exercising pressure on the paramilitary 
organisations to uphold their cease-fires and might provide incentives for those paramilitary 
groups who have not declared cease-fires yet to do so.
Policing
Against the background of very different community experiences and levels of identification 
with the police forces in Northern Ireland, the issue of policing has remained one of the most 
contentious areas of disagreement even after the Good Friday Agreement, as community 
expectations and demands are very divergent. The fundamental conflict here is not so much 
over whether there should or should not be a reform of the policing system, but over the degree 
to which such a reform should be carried out. While Nationalist opinion tends towards radical 
reform, up to the disbanding of the RUC, Unionist attitudes, although recognising the need for a 
more representative police force, favour less decisive reforms. This difference in approach has 
not least to do with the widespread feeling among Protestants/Unionists that the RUC is ‘Our’ 
police force as compared to the Nationalist perception of the RUC being ‘their’ police force. 
The 1992 Social Attitudes Survey highlighted the degree of difference in perceiving the RUC. 
Only thirty-nine per cent of Nationalists were quite or very satisfied with the RUC’s work, an 
almost equal number being quite or very dissatisfied (thirty-seven per cent). A significantly 
different picture emerged about satisfaction among Unionists -  eighty-seven per cent were 
either very or quite satisfied, as compared to only six per cent of them who noted their 
dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction in the two communities about the RUC’s effectiveness in dealing 
with non-sectarian crime differed equally. Among Nationalists, twenty-six per cent believed the
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police were doing a very or fairly bad job; among Unionists, the corresponding figure was four 
per cent. In relation to sectarian crime, forty-two per cent of Nationalists gave the RUC credit 
for its efforts, while more than twice as many Unionists (eighty-eight per cent) did so. In a 1996 
survey for the White Paper Foundations for Policing, the degree of satisfaction with the RUC’s 
work remained at a similar level in the Unionist community, while it seemed to have improved 
among Catholics/Nationalists. A difference between the two communities of more than ten per 
cent, however, remained with seventy-nine per cent of Protestants/Unionists and sixty-seven per 
cent of Catholics/Nationalists thinking that the RUC did a good job. As regards the equality of 
treatment of members of both communities by the RUC, attitudes have changed only little, as 
among Catholics/Nationalists far fewer people assumed equality of treatment at the hands of the 
RUC as a given in Northern Ireland.589
Clearly, from this point of view, both communities have very different expectations 
about the degree of reform necessary. Although the Good Friday Agreement does not make any 
specific provisions in relation to a reform of the police service, but leaves details to further 
negotiations and the recommendations of an independent commission, the terms of reference for 
the work of this independent commission are quite tight.590 Nevertheless, the question once 
again arises whether the general structures of the political process laid out by the agreement will 
be able to accommodate the different demands of the two communities. The strong orientation 
towards co-operation and joint structures against the background of fundamentally different 
expectations about the outcome of reform raise some doubts about the success of this venture.
Parades
Similarly, the parades issue is highly contentious between the two communities, again related to 
the father different experiences historically and the notions connected to it. Clearly, parades
589 Cf. Maiy Duffy and Geoffrey Evans, “Class, Community Polarisation, and Politics”, in Lizanne Dowds, Paulai 
Devine, and Richaid Breen, Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: The Sixth Report (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1997).
590 Annex A of the provisions on “Policing and Justice” stipulates in relation to the independent commission that 
“[i]ts proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, including composition, 
recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police 
service that can enjoy widespread support from, and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a whole.” It goes
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form an important aspect of Unionist identity. The commitment towards a recognition of equal 
chances for both traditions in Northern Ireland to be expressed and developed requires respect 
for parades.591 Equally, however, it requires the respect for the feelings of the Nationalist 
community, many of whom feel offended by what they perceive as triumphalist and sectarian 
manifestation of Unionist supremacy. Yet again, the division between the communities is not as 
clear-cut. The Nationalist community does not in general dispute the right of 
Protestants/Unionists to march and perform their rituals, but rather demands equal respect for 
the feelings of its members, i.e., to abstain from marching through mainly Catholic estates. The 
Unionist community, on the other hand, is prepared to make certain concessions, such as not 
having their bands play while marching through Nationalist residential areas, but they insist on 
their right to march on the ‘Queen’s/King’s highway’ and see any limitation of this right as 
violation of their basic civil liberties, and as a threat to their traditional way of life.
The parades commission, set up to deal with this contentious issue, has so far not been 
very successful in brokering any long-term deal between the opposing sides in any of the main 
areas of contention,592 all of which are predominantly Catholic housing estates. Any decision 
made by the commission is likely to offend either of the two communities -  re-routing or 
banning a parade has caused severe disturbances and rioting in past years among Loyalists, 
while the permission to allow a parade to go ahead has had similar effects in the Nationalist 
camp. In addition, enforcing a decision of the parades commission has not always been possible 
or easy for the security forces, as the 1996 and 1997 events in Drumcree have proven.
While it is unlikely that this issue will severely disrupt the peace process and the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, its annual recurrence and high degree of 
emotionality involved will not further inter-communal reconciliation unless a more widespread
then on to outline in relative great detail how the proposals of the independent commission are to contribute to 
enabling the RUC of policing in a peaceful society.
591 The only significant parade of a Nationalist organisation, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, is rather low profile, 
but there are a number of Republican parades.
592 These are Bellaghy, Bogside, the Garvaghy Road in Portadown, Dunloy, Newtownbutler, and the (Lower) 
Ormeau Road in South Belfast.
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understanding of each other’s position and preparedness to accept responsibilities for the future 
alongside ancient rights develops.
Decommissioning
Finally, decommissioning is a matter over which the two communities are split within 
themselves. While both include large sections of people supporting the principles of non­
violence and of strictly peaceful means in politics, there is also a hardcore of Loyalist and 
Republican followers who have affiliations with paramilitary groups and whose mindset is 
rather different. Having lived through thirty years of troubles, both the constitutional and 
paramilitary camps have had rather similar experiences, yet their interpretations and conclusions 
were fundamentally different. What complicates the issue further is the fact that it seems 
difficult for the hardcore in each community to understand that the security of one’s own group, 
based on the continued ability to defend oneself with arms, is very often perceived as a threat by 
the respective other group. Mistrust and the experience of suffering over decades are unlikely to 
be transformed into trust and mutual understanding in the short term. On the other hand, even if 
decommissioning took place, it might give a false sense of security as it does not involve a 
disruption of the existing paramilitary structures nor a destruction of the paramilitary’s 
capability to rearm themselves at any time.
As of April 1999, the issue of decommissioning continues to have severe political 
repercussions inasmuch as the UUP has created a connection between the beginning of 
paramilitary disarmament and the ability of political parties linked to paramilitary organisations, 
in particular Sinn Fein, to become members of the new Northern Ireland executive.593 If 
Unionists manage to prevent Sinn Fein from taking its seats on the executive, or alternatively to 
delay further implementation of the agreement, this would contribute to further alienation not 
just between (sections of) the two communities, but also between parts of their elite. Several 
attempts to resolve the decommissioning deadlock, including an initiative by Tony Blair and
593 In contrast to the PUP, Sinn F6in is entitled to seats on the executive because of its performance during the 1998 
assembly election.
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Bertie Ahem for a collective act of reconciliation,594 have failed so far. A more recent initiative 
by John Hume proposes that Sinn Fein would expel itself from the executive if, within one 
month of taking up their seats, the decommissioning of IRA weapons had not begun.595
As the workability of the Good Friday Agreement depends particularly on a high degree 
of elite and inter-communal co-operation, the issue of decommissioning, and how it is handled, 
is of grave importance for the political future of Northern Ireland not just from a security point 
of view. Despite the fact that the major paramilitary organisations remain committed to their 
cease-fires, the Omagh bomb of August 1998 made it clear that there are also very grave 
security aspects.
Thus, the deadlock over decommissioning that has delayed the implementation of the 
Good Friday Agreement on several occasions so far is an indication of the procedural and 
political difficulties that might occur in its future operation. Politically, all parties in the 
assembly, and more so in the executive, have to formulate their policies with respect to the 
interests of the communities they represent and, ideally, with an eye to the workability of the 
institutions created by the agreement, that is, with an eye to the pressures to which their partners 
and opponents in the assembly and executive are subjected. The existence of extensive 
communal veto powers and the particular procedural set-up in which all the institutions created 
by the Good Friday Agreement, then, might enable parties to bloc the political process.
594 Blair and Ahem had suggested the following:
“On [date to be set] nominations will be made under the d'Hondt procedure of those to take up office as ministers 
when powers are devolved.
At a date to be proposed by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning but not later than [one 
month after nomination date] a collective act of reconciliation will take place. This will see some arms put beyond 
use on a voluntary basis, in a manner which will be verified by the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning, and further moves on normalisation and demilitarisation in recognition of the changed situation on 
security.
In addition to the arrangements in respect of military material, there will at all times be ceremonies of remembrance 
of all victims of violence, to which representatives of all parties and the two governments, and all churches, will be 
invited.
Around the time of the act of reconciliation, powers will be devolved and the British-Irish Agreement will enter into 
force.
The following institutions will then be established: the North-South Ministerial Council, the North-South 
Implementation Bodies, the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.
By [one month after nomination date], the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning will make a 
report on progress. It is understood by all that the successful implementation of the Agreement will be achieved if 
these steps are taken within the proposed time-scales; if they are not taken, the nominations mentioned above will.fall 
to be confirmed by the Assembly.
595 As of April 1999, official responses to Hume proposal have been vague, but not unfavourable.
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Summary: A Future for the Good Friday Agreement?
Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the Good Friday Agreement and its endorsement by 
overwhelming majorities in Northern Ireland and the Republic, the question remains whether it 
provides an effective framework for a permanent resolution of the conflict. In order to answer 
this question, the following issues need to be clarified: In how far is the 1998 agreement 
different from previous agreements reached on Northern Ireland? In how far are the 
circumstances different in 1998 and beyond as compared to 1973, 1985, and 1993? What 
potential problems can arise in the course of the implementation of the agreement and in the 
developing political process in general and how effectively can these problems be dealt with 
within the agreed institutional framework?
Starting with the first of these issues, a comparison between the Sunningdale 
Agreement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Joint Declaration, and the Good Friday Agreement 
reveals that there is a core of issues dealt with by all these agreements in a similar manner.














Republic of Ireland .
United Kingdom, 
Republic of Ireland, 
UUP, UDP, PUP, 
NIWC, L, APNI, SF, 
SDLP
Consent Principle . X X X X
Self-Determination 0 O X X
Reform of the Policing 
System X X 0 X
Prisoners X (X) 0 X
Bill of Rights X X (X) X
Abandonment of 
Violence X X X X
Security Co-operation X X 0 X
Cross-border Co­
operation X X X X
Recognition of Both 
Identities o X X X
Inter-governmental
Co-operation X X X X
Institutional Role for 




(X) X X X
Inter-Island Co­
operation 0 (X) X X
Devolution of Powers X X (X) X
Key: X -  issue addressed; (X) -  issue implicitly addressed; O -  issue not addressed.
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However, there are also a number of differences between the agreements. These relate, 
in the first place, to the signatories of each of the agreements. While the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland have signed all of them, the prior negotiation process did only on two 
occasions (Sunningdale and Good Friday Agreements) involved political representatives from 
the communities in Northern Ireland. Clearly, the participation has been far broader in the 
1997/98 talks process and, even more significantly, comprised representatives of paramilitary 
organisations alongside the mainstream constitutional parties.
A second difference concerns the comprehensiveness and detail of the arrangements. 
Here the Good Friday Agreement, as it is based on an inclusive negotiation process, addresses 
the greatest number of issues and lays down, for most of these issues, in great detail the 
operational procedures for their implementation.
A third difference is the character of the implementation process. Only the Good Friday 
Agreement was proposed to the people in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland in a; 
referendum, while all the others were more or less implemented by government decree, thus 
giving the people a sense of imposition. The majority with which the Good Friday Agreement 
was endorsed by the population north and south of the border and across the communities in 
Northern Ireland is so far unprecedented in the history of the conflict. A survey in 1996 on the 
attitudes of relevant publics in Northern Ireland towards negotiations and negotiated settlements 
concluded that, if a settlement based on the 1995 framework documents was to work, it would 
require positively persuading Unionists that such an agreement would offer “them the best long­
term insurance they can get” and that there would be no better alternative. Parallel to this, 
nationalists should not be told, nor maintain, “that they have established all the necessary 
stepping stones to achieving a unified Ireland within a decade.” Given the referendum and 
election results, the persuading of Unionists seems to have been sufficient to generate a small 
majority within the Unionist community to support the Good Friday Agreement However, it
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remains to be seen how long this majority will persist under the strains to which the agreement 
has been, and continues to be, subjected.596
Fourth, as another contextual matter, since the beginning of the final round of the 
negotiation process in the autumn of 1997, the major paramilitary organisations on both sides 
have upheld their cease-fires, thus providing a climate of relative calm and peace.
Finally, there is the question of what alternative arrangements will be put in place in 
case the Good Friday Agreement fails. In particular, a comparison with the situation that existed 
after Sunningdale reveals that the incentives for both communities to find a modus vivendi 
within the agreement structure are more compelling than they were before. The failure of 
Sunningdale meant the re-introduction of direct rule, an outcome that many in the Unionist 
community preferred to power sharing. A failure of the Good Friday Agreement, however, will 
mean most likely that the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland will move towards 
shared sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Clearly, this is not an outcome that Unionists would 
prefer. Nationalists, however, would also lose out, as the influence of both communities on the 
decision making in Northern Ireland would decrease to a level well below to what they have 
achieved now.
Considering the (potential) problems facing the implementation of the agreement in 
relation to different expectations and expectations, parades, decommissioning and policing, the 
institutional framework set up by the Good Friday Agreement needs to be examined in its 
capability to deal with them in a satisfactory way. All the potential pitfalls outlined above 
concern primarily the conflicting parties in Northern Ireland, yet the two governments are 
involved to a certain degree in each of it. The consequence of this is that the British-Irish 
Council will have no direct involvement in the settlement of these problems, as its mandate does 
not cover anything beyond common policies agreed by all participants.
596 Cf. Geoffrey Evans and Brendan O’Leary, “Frameworked Futures: Intransigence and Flexibility in the Northern 
Ireland Elections of May 30 1996” in Irish Political Studies 12,1997, pp. 23-47, here p. 45f.
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The internal institutional set-up consisting of the assembly and the executive in 
combination with the interest structure of the parties represented in them will be involved to a 
considerable degree, yet the procedure of decision-making and implementing suggests that 
agreement will be very difficult to reach.
That will leave considerable problems for the North/South institutions and their 
operation as they might be instrumentalised for other political goals. It is also likely that, 
because of their involvement in the prisoner and security policy issue, both the British and Irish 
governments individually and the newly established intergovernmental conference would be left 
with a great deal of tough decision-making and implementing as well as mediation between the 
political parties in Northern Ireland. Even though the British government has retained authority 
over security policy, enforcing decommissioning would neither be easy, nor are the 
consequences of a security crack-down on paramilitaries foreseeable. Similarly, any decisions 
on policing are extremely unlikely to go down well with either of the communities -  a half­
hearted middle-of-the-road approach would alienate both of them from the government, 
disbanding the RUC might please the Nationalist community, while leaving things mostly as 
they are would be acceptable to the Unionist community only.
In summary, the conflict in Northern Ireland in all its different aspects and dimensions 
and in its dependence on factors that can be influenced only to a limited degree by the political 
actors in Belfast, London, and Dublin is not certain, but also not unlikely, to be resolved within 
and by the institutional framework set out in the Good Friday Agreement. The reason for this 
uncertainty is that the Good Friday Agreement, as any other agreement reached before, is 
dependent upon co-operation and compromise of two communities that have fundamentally 
different political aspirations and identities. These, of course, may change over time provided 
opportunities and incentives for such change exist.
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Table 19: Conditions Accounting for the Possibility of the Good Friday Agreement
• In the United Kingdom:
□ Change in government, fresh and more determined approach to achieve an inclusive 
settlement
□ Pressure on all sections of the communities in Northern Ireland to compromise
□ Greater degree of flexibility on key issues, such as Sinn F6in participation in the 
negotiation process, decommissioning, early release of prisoners, etc.
□ Negotiation of a new Anglo-Irish Agreement
□ Reiteration that any change in the constitutional future of Northern Ireland was 
subject to the approval of the people of Northern Ireland
□ Close co-operation with the government of the Republic of Ireland and the 
international chairmanship of the talks
• hi the Republic of Ireland:
□ Preparedness to withdraw the constitutional claim to Northern Ireland
□ Pressure, particularly on Sinn Fein and the IRA, to appreciate the opportunity 
presented by the multi-party negotiations in 1997/98
□ Active steps to address concerns of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland
□ Close co-operation with the government of the United Kingdom and the 
international chairmanship of the talks
□ Opportunity for the citizens of the Republic of Ireland to approve the agreement
• In Northern Ireland:
□ Inclusion of all parties in the negotiation process based on a prior election
a  Opportunity for the people of Northern Ireland to approve the agreement
□ Protection mechanisms built into the agreement to address concerns of both 
Communities
□ Cease-fires of all major paramilitary organisations considerably reducing the level 
of violent inter-ethnic conflict
• International Context:
□ International, particularly American, involvement in the talks process, including 
official and unofficial pressure on both communities to come to a settlement and on 
the IRA to maintain its cease-fire
VIII. Condominium Status as a Settlement for 
Ethno-Territorial Cross-Border Conflicts
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Preliminaries: Two Case Studies of Condominia
The patterns of conflict settlement in both South Tyrol and Northern Ireland fall within the 
larger category of bilateral mechanisms. However, among such bilateral solutions to 
accommodate ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts, a major distinction must be made between 
those which provide for a permanent institutional involvement of the kin-state, such as in 
Northern Ireland, and those which accord it only a temporary role during the negotiations, and 
potentially one in the monitoring of the implementation and operation process, as has been the 
case in South Tyrol. Further examples of this latter kind of bilateral settlements latter can also 
be found in the numerous bilateral agreements established in the inter-war period under the 
auspices of the League of Nations and, more recently, in the context of the democratisation in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The precise nature of these compromises can span from basic 
human rights guarantees, to forms of cultural autonomy, and to complex consociational 
frameworks.
Yet, not every ethno-territorial cross-border conflict can be solved through either of 
these bilateral mechanisms, or, for that matter, through the political and economic integration of 
an external minority, such as in Alsace. An only temporary role of the kin-state may not in 
every case be acceptable to the external minority, nor may a secession/irredenta be acceptable to 
is host-state or the international community. In this context, then, it seems particularly 
worthwhile to look at what is referred to as condominium. So far, no comprehensive theory of 
the condominium has been developed, and it can certainly not be the task of this study to do 
so.597 Nevertheless, some brief and general remarks about this special kind of arrangement must 
and can be made.
597 Interesting case studies of the condominium problem are Cyril S. Belshaw, Island Administration in the South 
West Pacific (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), R. A. S. Forster, “Vanuatu -  The End of an 
Episode of Schizophrenic Colonialism”, The Round Table 280 (1980), pp. 367-373, Edward Jacomb, France and 
England in the New Hebrides (Melbourne, 1914), James V. MacClancy, To Kill a Bird with Two Stones (Port-Vila, 
1980), Linden A. Mander, “The New Hebrides Condominium”, in The Pacific Historical Review, June 1944, pp. 152- 
162, D. Schindler, “Andorra”, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia o f Public International Law (Amsterdam: 
North Holland, 1992), vol. I, pp. 164-165, and George Woodcock, ‘Two-Fellow Government”, History Today 
25(1975)8,568-575.
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Condominiums have historically not been set up to accommodate ethnic conflicts; 
rather, they were meant to settle territorial disputes between states. Nevertheless, their potential 
relevance in the context of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts must not be underestimated, 
because they can be used to set up a meaningful framework within which ethnic as well as 
territorial claims can be accommodated. Potentially, a condominium arrangement might even be 
the only way to manage protracted secessionist/irredentist ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts successfully and to arrive at a permanent and stable settlement. The conditions for such 
success are several, depending both upon the nature and intensity of the ethnic and teiritorial 
conflicts and on the provisions adopted in the condominium settlement.
As the previous case studies have indicated, there are three basic patterns ethno- 
demographic situations in disputed territories in the context of ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts -  relative ethnic homogeneity, i.e., the disputed territory is primarily inhabited by 
members of the external minority, as in the Saar and Alsace; ethnic heterogeneity with the 
external minority either being a local majority, as in South Tyrol, or a local minority, as in 
Northern Ireland. It has also become obvious from the previous case studies that, all else being 
equal, the settlement of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts that involve an ethnically mixed 
disputed territory with actual or potential high levels of inter-ethnic conflict are more difficult; 
and I will therefore, and for other reasons that will become apparent, concentrate in the 
following on condominium arrangements for ethnically mixed disputed territories.
Prior to this, however, it seems reasonable to examine actual examples of cohdominia, 
even though they may not have been adopted as settlements for ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts in the way the term is used here. Recent history has seen two basic types of 
condominium. One is the Andorran arrangement of territorial self-government of the area in 
question with the decisions made at territorial level subject to approval by the condominium 
powers. The other model is the New Hebrides, where the result of the Franco-British settlement 
of 1906 and its predecessors was the non-territorial division of the area with each power 
retaining supreme authority over its respective citizens/subjects and other (non-native) residents
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being free to choose under whose jurisdiction they wish to fall. The examination of these two 
cases will highlight the specific circumstances under which both condominiums came into 
existence and were/are operated. From this, a model will be developed that will outline a 
condominium-style settlement that could be successfully employed for the settlement of ethno- 
territorial cross-border conflicts in ethnically mixed areas with (potentially) high levels of inter­
ethnic conflict.
The Franco-Spanish Condominium in Andorra
Andorra is the oldest and most successful condominium in the world. After gaining statehood in 
1278, the country has survived unharmed, existing between its two neighbour countries France 
and Spain, which jointly guarantee its rights and liberties.
With an area of only 450 square miles and a resident population of about 75,000, 
Andorra is completely dependent upon the provision of most services by its neighbours. The 
national population is widely homogeneous both in its religion (Roman Catholic) and language 
(Catalan). However, only thirty per cent of all people resident in Andorra have Andorran 
citizenship, while the other seventy per cent are mostly migrant workers from Spain and France.
The first Andorran constitution was adopted by the Andorran people and approved by 
the joint (co-statal) sovereigns in 1993. It set out unique provisions to accommodate the historic 
rights of the two co-princes and the Andorran desire for greater political independence. Thus, 
Andorra became a parliamentary democracy that retains as its head of state two co-princes, 
namely the President of France and the Bishop of Urgell in Spain. The new arrangements 
changed Andorra’s political system from co-statal sovereignty to a system of sovereignty shared 
between the two co-princes and the Andorran people.
From the Beginnings of Andorran History to the 1993 Constitution598
After the fall of the Roman Empire, of which Andorran had been a part, the area was used by
various Germanic tribes as a gateway into the Iberian Peninsula. By the time of the invasion of 
the Moors, the Andorran population was mostly of Christian belief. Consequently* they 
supported Charlemagne in his struggle against the Arabs and were awarded the Carta de 
Fundacio d\Andorra. The Parishes of Andorra were mentioned for the first time in the act of 
consecration of the Cathedral of La Seu dTJrgell in 839 as belonging to the territory of the 
Count of Urgell. After the death of Charlemagne and the partition of his empire, Andorra fell 
under the rule of the Count of Urgell, who ceded the lands to the Bishop of Urgell in 1133.
As a result of military disputes between the Church of Urgell and some neighbouring 
lords, the Bishop sought the protection of the Caboet family. In 1159, the Bishop and the 
Caboets agreed a treaty that recognised the sovereignty of the Bishop of Urgell over Andorra. 
Despite the agreement, the dispute was not resolved until 1278, when the Count of Foix and the 
Bishop of Urgell signed a new peace treaty after the King of Aragon had exercised pressure on 
both warring parties. This and a later treaty recognised Andorran independence and the 
simultaneous obligation to pay an annual tribute alternately to the Count of Foix and to the 
Bishop of Urgell. This historic agreement still forms the basis of Andorra's constitution and 
political institutions.
In 1419 the population of Andorra petitioned the two co-princes to obtain permission 
for the establishment of a local parliament to take care of local affairs. The heads of households* 
i.e., the male citizens over the age of twenty-five, elected the twenty-four members of this 
Council of the Land (four from each parish).
Over time, the rights of the French co-prince passed into the hands of the King of 
France as a consequence of the Counts of Foix’s accession to the throne. When the French
598 The history of Andorra is only sparsely documented. The following short account is based upon the following 
sources: Europa World Yearbook 1996, vol. I, pp. 352-355; Schindler, D., “Andorra”, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), 
Encyclopaedia o f Public International Law (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1992), vol. I, pp. 164-165; Daniel J. Elazar 
(ed.), Federal Systems o f the World (Essex: Longman, 1991); information publicly accessible at 
http://www.andorra.ad/ The CIA World Fact Book at http://www. odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/an.htm;
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monarchy was overthrown in 1793, Andorra remained without French protection until 1806, 
thus risking becoming a territory under the exclusive sovereignty of the Bishop of Urgell. 
However, the French rights to Andorra, and the Andorran rights to independence, were 
reinstated with the institution of Napoleon I as Emperor of France. When France became a 
republic in 1870, the responsibilities and rights of the French Emperor concerning Andorra 
passed to the President of the Republic.
In 1933, an attempt by a handful of Andorran Royalists to install a monarchy failed 
because of the joint intervention of the two co-princes. After the suspension of the Council of 
the Land, new elections were held according to a revised election law, allowing every male 
citizen over twenty-four years of age to participate actively, and every man over the age of 
thirty to stand for election. It was only in 1970 that women were granted active and passive 
voting rights. In 1971 the age barrier for active voting was lowered to twenty-one years. In 1978 
the administrative structure of Andorra was changed from six to seven parishes.
In 1981* the Andorran citizens petitioned their co-princes again to allow them to set up 
their own executive branch. This was granted by the co-princes and a government was 
established, whose Head is elected by the General Council and who is assisted by four to six 
Government Councillors, who act as Ministers, each responsible for a particular area.
Constitutional Arrangements for the Condominium
First attempts to reform the medieval institutions of Andorra had failed in 1984, but
after the elections in 1989 resulted in a narrow majority for reform-orientated politicians a 
constitution Was drafted. It was approved by Parliament in 1992 and adopted after a referendum 
in March 1993.
the US State Department’s Human Rights Country Report for Andorra for at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/andorra. html.
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The Status o f the Co-Princes
Title three of the Andorran constitution makes binding arrangements for the role of the co- 
princes -  the Bishop of Urgell and the President of the French Republic -  in the Andorran 
political system, in which they form a joint and indivisible institution, have equal power, and 
assume the highest representation of Andorra (Art. 43/1,2).
In their responsibility for moderating and arbitrating the functioning of the Andorran 
political system, the co-princes are granted immunity. Sole responsibility for their acts lies with 
those Andorran representatives who counter-sign their acts (Art. 44/2, 3). Co-principal 
responsibilities that require the counter-signature either of the Head of Government or of the 
Sindic General (speaker of the parliament) include calling general elections and referenda, 
appointing the Head of Government and other office holders, signing the decree for the 
dissolution of parliament, accrediting diplomatic representatives to Andorra, and enacting laws 
passed by parliament (Art. 45/1, a-h). In addition to these functions, the co-princes also 
participate in the negotiation of international treaties that have an effect on Andorra’s relations 
with France and Spain (Art. 66/1).599
Independent of the approval of Andorran officials, the co-princes are allowed to 
perform a variety of functions, including: exercising the prerogative of grace, establishing 
institutions and appointing officials necessary for the performance of their co-principal 
functions, appointing the members of the Higher Council of Justice and of the Constitutional 
Court, requiring preliminary judgements of the constitutionality of laws and international 
treaties before their enactment or ratification (Art. 46/1, a-f). These functions may be delegated 
to the permanent representatives of the co-princes (Art. 46/2).
Legislative, Judicial, and Executive Institutions
According to Article 50 of the constitution, the parliament represents the Andorran people (i.e., 
the citizens of the co-principality), exercises legislative and budgetary powers, and controls the
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government. Election to the parliament, which has a minimum of twenty-eight and a maximum 
of forty-two seats, is half by proportional representation (with Andorra as a single constituency) 
and half by simple majority vote of two candidates from each of the seven provinces (Art. 52). 
About seventy per cent of all people resident in Andorra are excluded from voting, as the ethnic 
composition of the population is thirty per cent Andorran, who are eligible for voting, sixty- 
one per cent Spanish, six per cent French, and three per cent other foreign nationals, none of 
whom qualifies for voting according to Andorran law.600
The legislative initiative rests with the members of parliament and the government (Art. 
58/1). However, if at least three parishes act jointly together or a legislative proposal is signed 
by at least ten per cent of the electorate, this is equally considered an appropriate legislative 
initiative, which the parliament has to take into account (Art. 58/2).
The parliament elects the speaker and deputy speaker from within its members, and the 
head and ministers of the government from candidates who are not members of the parliament 
(arts. 55/1, 2; 78/2). The parliament may be dissolved prematurely on an initiative by the head 
of government and after the approval of the co-princes.
The organisation of justice in Andorra is uniform, consisting of Magistrates* Courts, the 
Court of Justice, the Higher Court of Justice, and the Constitutional Court (arts. 85/2; 87). 
Judicial power is vested in independent judges. The Higher Council of Justice functions as the 
organ that represents, directs, and administers the organisation of the judicial System, and 
ensures its independence (arts. 87, 89/2). The Constitutional Court, as the highest organ of 
justice in Andorra, decides upon the constitutionality of laws, executive regulations, 
institutional procedures, and international treaties and arbitrates in cases of conflict between 
constitutional organs (Art. 98/ a-d).
Andorra has not a very active foreign policy. Consular and ambassadorial representation is usually provided by 
France. The country is a member of, among others, the UN, UNESCO, and the Council of Europe.
600 Figures from 1995.
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The Operation of the Condominium
The determination of all three involved powers to adhere to the 1993 regulations and the
overwhelming acceptance of the constitution by the Andorrans has provided conditions in 
which a smooth operation of the condominium is possible without major problems. The 
longstanding tradition and success of the condominium further increases the stability of the 
current institutional set-up.
The Anglo-French Condominium in the New Hebrides
Located 1400 miles north-east of Sydney, the New Hebrides are a chain of more than sixty
/
islands in the South Pacific, stretching over 550 miles in north-south direction and occupying a 
total area of about 5,700 square miles. The main islands are Santo, Ambae, Malekula, Ambrym, 
Pentecost, Efate, and Tanna. The current population is about 174,000 people, most of them 
Melanesians. Official languages are English, French, and Bislama (Vanuatu pidgin), but about 
one hundred different native languages and dialects are spoken as well. Dominant religions are 
Catholic (mostly among the Francophone part of the population) and Anglican/Presbyterian 
(among the Anglophones). One so-called ‘cargo-cult’ exists, too. The main resources are 
agricultural, in particular, copra, beef, and cocoa. In addition, income is generated through the 
provision of ‘tax haven* services to international companies and tourism.
Historical Developments until 1887601
Archaeological evidence indicates that by 1300 BC the northern islands of the chain were 
settled by people from Melanesian islands to the west. Since then, successive waves of migrants 
have reached the islands. Around 1200 AD, a highly stratified society began to develop.
^  The most comprehensive historical account on the New Hebrides is James MacClancy's To Kill a Bird with Two 
Stones (Port-Vila, 1980). Good shorter pieces on New Hebridean history can be found in Edward Jacomb, France 
and England in the New Hebrides (Melbourne, 1914), C. B. Humphreys, The Southern New Hebrides (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1926), C. Brunsdon Fletcher, The Problem o f the South Pacific (London: Heinemann, 
1919), C. Harley Grattan, The South Pacific to 1900 (Ann Arbor The University of Michigan Press, 1963), John M. 
Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific (London: Australasian Publishing Co., 1948), Linden A. Mander, Some 
Dependent Peoples o f the South Pacific (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), Robert Aldrich, The French Presence in the South 
Pacific, 1842-1940 Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), Stephen Henningham, France and the South Pacific (Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1992), and Howard van Trease, Melanesian Politics -  Stael blong Vanuatu (Canterbury, NZ: 
University of Canterbury Press, 1997). The following historical sketch is based on these works.
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The islands were discovered by Spain in the 1560s, but more consistent European 
contact began only with the Portuguese Fernandez de Quiros in the early seventeenth century. 
Some sixty years later, the French navigator Louis-Antoine de Bougainville set foot on the 
island, followed by the Briton James Cook, who mapped the islands and named them New 
Hebrides.
Actual colonisation started with European missionaries and sandalwood traders from 
the 1840s onwards. Their impact on the indigenous people was only minimal and, in particular 
the early evangelisation attempts, were not very successful. A more significant effect was the 
return of thousands of Melanesian men and women who had worked on plantations in Fiji, New 
Caledonia, and Australia after 1860. New forms of political influence were exerted by, and on, 
the mainly Presbyterian missions and native competition with European colonists increased.
The Europeans who came to the islands were mostly French and British and they began 
to receive increased backing from their home governments against the indigenous population, 
but also against the respective other settler community. The presence of a rival group of 
colonists, more than threats from the native population, required both France and Britain, 
respectively, to intervene in the New Hebrides to protect the interests of planters and 
missionaries, commercial development, investments, land claims, and regular shipping routes.
By the 1870s, France had the stronger commercial interests in the New Hebrides, while 
Anglo-Australian concerns were predominantly about containing Catholic influence in the 
South Pacific and maintaining and enlarging their own political influence. Both France and 
Britain had to compete with Germany, which, after 1871, took an active interest in expanding 
into the South Pacific. Thus, demands for a take-over of the islands came from both settler 
communities, but neither Britain nor France were keen to act upon them.
Both countries, at the time, pursued a policy of minimum intervention in the Pacific and 
shied away from confrontation over the New Hebrides. Alarmed by the increasing take-over 
demands by Australia, the French government suggested an exchange of notes with Britain to
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achieve agreement about the status of the New Hebrides. Accordingly, the governments pledged 
to respect the independence of the island chain in 1878 and renewed this agreement in 1883.
The Period of the Joint Naval Commission, 1887-1906
From the beginning of the 1880s onwards, the situation in the South Pacific became more tense, 
not only between France and Britain, but also as a consequence of German advances. The 
annexation by Germany of the north-eastern comer of New Guinea in 1884 prompted the 
British government to reconsider its policy, and subsequently a stronger British presence in the 
region was assured through the take-over of south-eastern New Guinea in 1886, of the Gilbert 
and Ellice Islands in 1892, and of the Solomon Islands in 1893.
In the New Hebrides, British and French interests met and clashed at the same time. The 
islands were considered to be of vital strategic interest for, and by, Australia, which strongly 
objected to any foreign power extending its territorial and political influence in the region. On 
the other hand, French settlers claimed almost eighty-seven per cent of the islands' land and 
dominated the commercial sector. Thus, neither power could ignore the potential of a German 
take-over. Therefore, France and Britain set up a Joint Naval Commission in 1887. Its main 
purpose being the protection of the life and property of European settlers, the commission was 
the smallest common denominator upon which France and Britain could agree. Franco-British 
relations at the time were complicated by a number of issues, many of which were not at all 
associated with the New Hebrides, but rather with the respective geo-political positions of the 
two European powers. The Suez Canal question and the Somaliland boundary problem were 
factors that influenced the relationship just as much as the question of fishing rights off New 
Foundland and German threats against France over Morocco. A further confrontation over the 
New Hebrides, therefore, was not desired by either Britain or France.
Soon after the set-up of the Joint Naval Commission, however, it became clear that this 
arrangement, based on traditional gunboat policies, was by no means an adequate substitute for 
institutionalised government. While the operation of the commission did not satisfy either of the 
states, it also continued to prompt settlers’ demands for a more permanent engagement of their
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home governments. This, however, was not forthcoming beyond the point of placing the 
nationals of either state under the authority of the respective Pacific high commissioner, thus 
affording them a minimum of protection. However, the fundamental problem -  the impotence of 
the commission -  could not be solved. Not only were its mandate and powers limited On the 
basis of the Anglo-French understanding of joint minimum intervention, but above all it had no 
competence to arbitrate in conflicts between French and British settlers. An effort by the settlers 
in 1895 to set up a joint court to handle such cases was prohibited by the commission. The 
subsequent lack of co-operation from the colonists, but also an increasing lack of interest on the 
part of the two home governments characterised the climate in which the commission had to 
work for one and a half decades after it had been set up.
France and Britain changed their policies towards the New Hebrides after the turn of the 
century. Again, this was mostly prompted by German attempts to get a foothold on the islands, 
yet should also be seen in the context of the insufficiencies of the existing arrangements to settle 
land disputes, to maintain law and order, and to accommodate the conflicting interests of 
Presbyterian missionaries and their allies in Australia versus those of French settlers and their 
New Caledonian allies. Both settler communities increased the pressure on their respective 
governments towards a take-over of the islands.602 German traders had increasingly probed into 
the region since the late 1890s and it became increasingly evident that the preservation of the 
existing balance of powers required the establishment of a regular government. The first steps to 
achieve this were taken in 1901 and 1902, when first the French and then the British appointed 
resident commissioners and began to set up permanent administrative and judicial networks. 
Prompted by the Entente Cordiale declaration by France and Britain, which had made 
references to the New Hebrides demanding that a land commission be set up and that 
jurisdiction over the indigenous population be taken over without altering the political status 
quo,603 meetings of a Franco-British commission to discuss the whole problem of the New
602 Richard B. Dorman, personal communication 28 June 1998.
6°3 Cf. Grattan, The Southwest Pacific, pp. 402-403.
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Hebrides took place between 1904 and 1906. On 20 October 1906 a convention was signed 
between the two powers establishing the condominium over the New Hebrides.604
The Provisions of the Condominium, 1906-1980605
The convention was ratified on 9 January 1907 and soon afterwards steps were taken to 
implement it in the islands, coming into operation in December of the same year. According to 
Article I, the New Hebrides were to form a region of joint influence and government, in which 
French and British subjects were to enjoy equal rights. Each of the two powers was to retain the 
jurisdiction over its own subjects, and persons other than British or French subjects were to 
enjoy the same rights, and had, to choose within six months either one or the other of the legal 
systems. This provision, however, excluded the indigenous population, who were denied 
becoming citizens of either party, were granted almost no rights, and were governed by a few 
joint condominium authorities. Each power had to nominate a High Commissioner, who could 
delegate his powers to a Resident Commissioner and had a police force under his control. For 
certain purposes, these two police forces could be subjected to the joint direction of both High 
Commissioners or both Resident Commissioners.
According to the convention, only a few public services were to be undertaken in 
common, such as customs, postal services, public works, ports and harbours, buoys and 
lighthouses, and the finances of the joint condominium authorities. English and French money 
and bank notes were to be equal legal tenders.
Britain and France had to provide the expenses of their own administration, while the 
costs of the Joint Court and of the public services of the condominium were to be met from 
jointly imposed local taxes.
The Joint Naval Commission was not abandoned, but instead it was required to co­
operate with the condominium authorities. In cases of emergency it was allowed to act without
604 The price London had to pay to achieve this agreement with Paris on the New Hebrides was the abrogation of the 
London Declaration of 1847, thus giving France complete and undisputed sovereignty in the Leeward Islands of the 
Society group. Cf. Dodge, Islands and Empires, p. 179.
605 For the text, see “Convention on the New Hebrides”, British Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 3300 (1906).
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the joint request of the two authorities (Article VI). In the early years of the condominium, i.e., 
before the revisions of 1914, it became in practice an almost independent judicial authority to 
deal with native crimes and disputes, because the condominium authorities failed to codify laws 
to govern the indigenous population.606
In imposing this government rule on the indigenous populations, the resident 
commissioners were given authority over the tribal chiefs. They were to introduce regulations of 
a binding character for the tribes, while being obliged to respect native customs where these 
were not contrary to the maintenance of order and the ‘dictates of humanity’ (Article VIII).
The regulations for the set-up and operation of the Joint Court (Articles X to XXI) 
provided that one British, one French, and one judge nominated by the King of Spain607 were to 
constitute the court, assisted by a Dutch public prosecutor. In the jurisdiction of the court fell all 
land suits, all cases between natives and non-natives, all offences committed by natives against 
non-natives, and particular offences against the convention and the regulations imposed in 
accordance with it.
Provisions regarding land titles (XXII-XVII) were based on European legal concepts 
and formed the basis of a policy according to which all titles already registered in either 
Noumea or Suva were held sacrosanct, while any Melanesian custom law was disregarded.608 A 
further twenty-six Articles of the original convention regulated the recruitment of native 
labourers and the conditions of their employment. Neither condominium power was allowed to 
build fortifications in the islands or maintain penal institutions.609
Major revisions to the provisions of the 1906 convention were made in 1914. Four 
administrative districts with one British and one French administrative agent each were set up.
606 Mander, Some Dependent Peoples, p. 472.
607 As Spain had discovered the islands, the architects of the convention sought the appointment of a Spanish judge 
as a remedy against Anglo-French deadlock in the court. When Spain did not appoint a court president after the 
1930s, verdicts could only be reached if the remaining French and British judge agreed on a case. If they did not, the 
case was simply dismissed. Cf. Aldrich, France and the South Pacific since 1940, p. 197.
608 A detailed analysis of the importance of the land issue is Trease, The History. More briefly, George Woodcock,
“Two-Fellow Government”, History Today 25(1975)8, pp. 568-575.
319
The agents divided the administration of indigenous affairs among them, but retained exclusive 
jurisdiction over their own nationals. According to the new Article VIII, the laws governing the 
conduct of the native population were to be codified. Article XXI of the revised convention 
established so-called courts of summary jurisdiction in each of the administrative districts to 
relieve the joint court of smaller local cases. The authority of the joint court itself was 
strengthened as well. According to the original convention of 1906, each national court could 
modify the sentence imposed by the joint court on one of its nationals -  a regulation that 
rendered the judicial authority of the joint court in many cases useless. In 1914, the British and 
French governments also agreed that any reduction of sentences by national authorities could 
amount to a maximum of the average of suggested reductions from both of them.
Because France refused to agree to the British-inspired creation of a joint police force, 
each police commander continued to perform two functions simultaneously: that as a police 
officer of the condominium and that as a police officer within the jurisdiction of his respective 
national court.
As a result of the outbreak of the First World War, the modified convention was not 
ratified by the two states until 18 March 1922, and it took until 1923 before it was proclaimed in 
the New Hebrides.
Further minor adjustments occurred in 1927. The salaries of the members of the Joint 
Court were increased, the fines the court could impose were raised by two hundred per cent, 
restrictions of its judicial authority over land rights were lifted, and some measures were 
implemented to improve the sanitary system.
A major constitutional modification was undertaken in 1957, when the introduction of 
local councils ended the period of non-consultative administration in the New Hebrides.
Although some progress had been made compared to the original convention, the 
fundamental problems of this particular condominium set-up could not be rectified by any of
609 The latter provision was an explicit concession to Australian concerns about yet another French convict colony in
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these amendments and changes. Thus, the slowness of European settlement, the lack of support 
from the home governments for the condominium administration, and the predominance of 
French commercial interests in the islands continued to curtail developments.
The Operation of the Condominium
The workability of the specific institutional set-up of the condominium in the New Hebrides 
depended on three factors. First, the two powers had to be willing to respect the interests of the 
respective other and refrain from full annexation of the islands. Second, the established 
institutions had to be capable of maintaining an acceptable degree of law and order on all levels. 
And finally, no power could obtain a degree of either commercial or political dominance in the 
islands so that its position and interests were to the detriment of the respective other.
While the first of these conditions was fulfilled, problems existed with respect to the 
latter two. Two major difficulties arose because of the structures as they had been set up in the 
1906 convention and hampered its operation. One was the divergent policy goals of France and 
Britain in the islands, with the consequentially inadequate degree of co-operation. The other one 
was the initial neglect and subsequent polarisation of the indigenous population and their 
interests.
The main French interests in the New Hebrides were those of settlement and 
agriculture. The numerical dominance of French settlers and their ambitions as planters caused 
French economic interests to become far greater than any economic interests Britain (and 
Australia) might ever have had. Thus, while France’s goal was to transform the New Hebrides 
into a proper settlement colony, Anglo-Australian interests were primarily “to provide orderly 
administration to a territory of strategic interest to Australia,”610 and only secondarily religious 
and to an even smaller degree commercial.611 On the one hand, this divergence in interest 
accounted for the fact that both powers pursued different policies on the further development of
the South Pacific with all its repercussions for Australia. On the debate in and on Australia cf. Aldrich, The French 
Presence in the South Pacific, pp. 224-236.
610 Richard B. Dorman, personal communication 28 June 1998.
611 Aldrich, France and the South Pacific, p. 199.
the New Hebrides -  Britain seeking closer co-operation and increased powers of joint 
authorities at the expense of the two national administrations and France insisting on a 
maximum amount of independence of its bureaucracy. On the other hand, this divergence 
exacerbated the second problem that the condominium faced, namely the neglect and 
subsequent polarisation of the indigenous population. France, concerned with economic 
development and settlement, and ruling over a greater number of nationals with land claims and 
need for labour than Britain had a much greater interest in the hire of foreign labour and the 
employment of native Melanesians in the New Hebrides. The resultant mix of public and private 
French interests and the pre-occupation with an administration of economic interests, left 
‘native’ policy widely in the hands of the British who dominated the education612 and health 
care sector until the 1960s. Only then did the French government in Paris and its resident 
administration in the New Hebrides become aware of the fact that their neglect of indigenous 
interests had proved to be counter-productive and that the dissatisfaction of many native 
Melanesians was directed against France and the practice of the Joint Court to disregard 
customary claims to land by Melanesians.
A fierce battle over the loyalty of the indigenous population ensued between Britain and 
France from the late 1960s onwards. France, realising that the future of the condominium and its 
own role in the islands would largely depend upon the perceptions of an ever more unrestful 
native population, spent vast amounts of money on education and health care in attempts to 
outbid the British.613 As a consequence of their mutual suspicions and rivalries, the polarisation 
of the population into a Presbyterian and Anglophone part and a Catholic and Francophone 
became institutionalised and reached into the developing party-political sector of New 
Hebridean society in the early 1970s.
612 On the education system, R. A. S. Forster, “Vanuatu -  The End of an Episode of Schizophrenic Colonialism”, 
The Round Table 280 (1980), pp. 367-373.
613 On French and British efforts to create a favourable perception of themselves with the Melanesians in the New 
Hebrides see Ralph R. Premdas and Jeffrey S. Steeves, “Political and Constitutional Crisis in Vanuatu”, The Round 
Table 313 (1990), pp. 43-64, here p. 45. On spending figures in the early 1970s, Aldrich, France and the South 
Pacific since 1940, pp. 207-208.
322
By this time, however, Britain had firmly decided that it wanted to push forward the 
process of transition from condominium to New Hebridean independence, in line with its 
general policy of granting independence to its colonies in the South Pacific.614 Initially, this was 
met with great resistance from France.615 However, in the face of growing native nationalism616 
and the increasing financial burden of providing funds for the condominium and the national 
administration, Paris agreed to prepare for withdrawal.617
Elections to a Representative Assembly were held in 1975 and 1979. A constitution was 
drafted in 1978 and approved in 1979. In 1980 the New Hebrides became an independent state, 
the Republic of Vanuatu.
Comparative Summary
While the conditions that made the condominium status of Andorra a successful settlement of 
an international territorial dispute are few, those that made the operation of a similar 
institutional set-up in the New Hebrides impossible are manifold.
Historically, the inability of either of the parties warring over Andorra to obtain firm 
territorial control over the area, their eventual exhaustion, and the intervention of an outside 
power in the person of the King of Aragon led to the conclusion of the initial condominium 
treaty.
This in itself would not have been sufficient. The realisation on the part of the 
Andorrans that their survival as an independent territorial and political entity was subject to the 
guarantee of their rights by their powerful neighbours provided the internal conditions which 
mad a condominium settlement a desirable option for all parties involved. For the two co­
princes such a settlement meant that they retained considerable influence over a strategically 
important territory. For the Andorrans the condominium status had the consequence that the
614 Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands all became independent states in the 1970s.
615 French concerns related primarily to the consequences of a pullout from the New Hebrides for other French 
possessions in the South Pacific.
616 A short, but comprehensive account can be found in Aldrich, France and the South Pacific since 1940, pp. 215- 
218.
617 Personal communication from Sir Roger de Boulay.
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potential desire of either one of their neighbours to annex the territory under their exclusive 
sovereignty would be counter-balanced by a similar desire of the respective other so that a 
stable situation could develop that gave Andorra the security of a bilaterally protected existence.
The fact that Andorra is only a small territory with an equally small population 
facilitated the success of the arrangement. With one exception, there was no Andorran drive to 
end the condominium status and become an independent state by itself as the very dependence 
on resources and services by the neighbouring states would have rendered any Such move a 
grave mistake.
Table 20: Conditions Accounting for the Success of the Andorran Condominium
• In France
□ Failure to win a decisive military victory
□ General satisfaction with the arrangement
• In Spain
□ Failure to win a decisive military victory
□ General satisfaction with the arrangement
• In Andorra
□ Recognition of the beneficial arrangement in terms of its guarantees for the 
continued existence of the principality and the provision of essential services
□ Relatively strong national identity of Andorran citizens, firmly rooted in their 
political history as well
□ No competing claims of national belonging to either of the joint sovereigns
□ Democratisation of the condominium status
• International Context
□ Initially pressure from the King of Aragon on the disputants to come to a resolution
□ Otherwise, relative unimportance of Andorra in regional and international affairs
In contrast, the New Hebrides lacked most of the advantages of the Andorran situation 
and faced a number of additional problems instead. France and Britain were colonial rivals in 
the South Pacific with different political agendas in the New Hebrides. Moreover, the initial 
incentive for the set-up of the condominium, namely the threat of further German expansion 
into the South Pacific, continued to exist only during the first few years of the condominium’s 
existence.
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The lack of external pressure in itself, however, was not a sufficient reason for the 
failure, but it added to a variety of other factors. These were the geographical distance between 
the condominium and the two powers that shared it at ever increasing costs, the decreasing 
interest of Britain to maintain its commitment, and the growing resentfulness of the indigenous 
population against this colonial set-up. The failure to build a core of functioning joint 
institutions of government and to integrate all three communities into their operation prevented 
the creation of a necessary minimum of political consensus regarding the set-up was overall 
beneficial.
The colonial context in which the condominium had been created no longer existed in 
the 1970s, despite French claims to the contrary. Many other former colonies had been granted 
their independence and had successfully taken charge of their own destiny. Despite the 
problems that occurred in Vanuatu after its independence, the country has demonstrated that it 
could survive despite the legacy of religious, linguistic, and ethnic partition of its society and 
without external interference.
Table 21: Conditions Accounting for the Eventual Failure of the Condominium in the New 
Hebrides
• In France
□ Inability to maintain the condominium without British support
a Lack of interest and willingness to co-operate with the United Kingdom beyond the
absolute minimum
• In the United Kingdom
a Decreasing interest of Britain to maintain the condominium, which was costly and
did not continue to serve any purpose after the conditions that led to its creation had
fundamentally changed after 1945
□ Lack of interest and willingness to co-operate with France beyond the absolute
minimum
• In the New Hebrides
a Increasing cost of condominium administration
a Failure to establish a minimum of functioning joint institutions
a Growing resentment among the indigenous population about the condominium
arrangement and consequential rise of inter-ethnic tensions
• International Context
a Initial incentive for the condominium status did not continue to exist
□ General tendency of post-1945 decolonisation
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A Condominium-Style Settlement for Ethno-Territorial Cross-  
Border Conflicts?
The Institutional Framework of a Condominium-Style Settlement
The circumstances in ethnically mixed areas do not, except through coercion, allow for the
complete territorial separation of the ethnic groups in conflict so that a number of issues will 
remain that require co-operation between all the conflicting parties. In a democratic context, 
therefore, the condominium arrangement will need the approval not only of the two 
participating states, but also that of the ethnic groups that have to live with the agreed 
regulations on the ground. Employing condominium status as a settlement strategy for ethno- 
territorial cross-border conflicts also means that the ethnic groups involved will have to be 
given a sufficient amount of decision-making and veto power to ensure that they are able to 
determine their circumstances in the widest possible range of affairs, and at the same time are 
still able to resolve issues of common concern in the condominium territory without one of them 
being subjected to the majority rule of the other or both of them being dependent upon decisions 
made by the two states without the possibility of influencing such decisions of immediate 
concern to either one or both of them. In addition, it will be necessary to have in place 
international guarantees, within a regional or global context, as well as arbitration mechanisms 
with a certain enforcement power to ensure that disputes over certain decisions, regardless of 
the level on which they occur, can be handled in a way acceptable to all disputants, and to be 
sure that it will be possible to implement an arbitrated decision.
This has a number of implications for any attempt to apply a condiminium-style 
settlement to the solution of an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict. First, the concept of a 
condominium needs to be taken out of the traditional context of territorial settlements, i.e., 
conceiving of it as rule of two states over the same area. Second, if the idea of the condominium 
is no longer perceived strictly in terms of territorial rule, it can be redefined as the grotip- 
specific integration of parts of the population of an area into the polities of either of the two 
states, i.e., the operation of a non-territorial condominium, in which the major objective is not 
the administration of a disputed territory by two states simultaneously, but the separation of
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distinct ethnic groups through subjecting them to different jurisdictions. Third, the integration of 
the two ethnic groups into different state jurisdictions needs to take account of the arrangements 
and special conditions within the ethnically mixed area, i.e., group integration should be 
conducted in a confederational way by which the two groups retain sufficient independence 
from the integrating state to determine the relationship with their respective counter-part in the 
mixed area and in which they can determine the degree of integration into the kin-state. A fourth 
aspect that needs to be considered is the importance of free choice for every individual to which 
state’s jurisdiction he or she wants to be subjected, and safeguards need to be in place at the 
group and state level to prevent discrimination and ensure equal rights for all individuals 
regardless of what their ethnic origin and their choice of integration.618
The previous two case studies of actual condominiums have revealed two basic ways in 
which the crucial sovereignty question can be solved. One is the Andorran-style arrangement, 
which I will call ‘joint sovereignty’, as the two condominium powers jointly exercise the 
supreme authority of approving or dismissing decisions taken by territorial self-government 
bodies in the areas of their competence. The other model, as exemplified by the case of the New 
Hebrides, I call ‘divided sovereignty’. Here the two condominium powers have exclusive 
authority over their citizens with neither having the right to interfere in the respective other’s 
affairs.
While the two models do not exclude bilateral co-operation of the two states in matters 
related or unrelated to the disputed territory, and neither rule out the co-operation between each 
of the states and either of the ethnic groups, nor the possibility of a free choice of citizenship for 
the residents of the territory in question, the cases to which they can successfully be applied are 
rather distinct. The joint sovereignty model is useful when the territorial dispute is the more 
important one and when there is either no significant inter-ethnic conflict in the disputed 
teritony or when it can be resolved on the basis of establishing a system of unitary territorial
618 The first author to introduce the concept of a democratised condominium into the context of ethnic conflict 
management was Brendan O’Leary in Brendan O’Leary et al., Northern Ireland: Sharing Authority (London: 
Institute of Public Policy Research, 1993), pp. 20-22.
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self-government, probably along the lines of traditional consociationalism. As this has already 
been discussed at great length both in Chapter Two and in the case studies of South Tyrol and, 
bearing in mind the modifications, Northern Ireland, I shall instead turn to discussing the model 
of divided sovereignty in greater detail and explore possible modifications that would increase 
the likelihood of success should a settlement along such lines be intended.
The divided sovereignty model has greater potential of application to ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts with a component of severe inter-ethnic conflict, and especially when the 
ultimate goals of both ethnic groups are so fundamentally different that there are only limited 
possibilities of jointly executed territorial powers, such as in cases where, among other things, 
distinct notions of national belonging divide the two groups, yet where because of the territory’s 
ethno-demographic structure or for other reasons partition is not an option. For the proposed 
solution to work, there are two essential pre-conditions -  both host-state and kin-state agree to 
compromise their territorial claims, and the two ethnic groups are incentivised or pressurised to 
withdraw territorial claims at all. Once this has been achieved, it will be possible, in order to 
accommodate the conflicting claims of the groups, to endow each of them with the maximum 
possible level of autonomy, making them the sovereign over their future status as populations. 
The degree of self-government they achieve would then be reflected in their capacity to 
determine the level of integration into their respective kin-states, i.e., solving the question of 
national belonging on a non-teritorial basis. This approach fundamentally distinguishes the 
didvided sovereignty model from the joint sovereignty model. The latter means the devolution 
of power from the (joint) sovereign to a lower level of territorial government subsequent to the 
settlement of the inter-state territorial dispute. In a divided sovereignty arrangement, the former 
host-state has transferred its previously exclusive sovereignty onto the two ethnic groups 
separately, who subsequently decide upon the level of co-operation between them and, 
independent of each other, on the degree of power they ‘delegate back’ to their respective kin- 
states to reflect their desire of integration into the polities of their choice. This will allow for the 
possibility of asymmetric degrees of group integration into their respective kin-states. The basis
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of such an institutional arrangement would be the combination of territorial and non-territorial 
autonomy structures.
Territorial Autonomy
Under a territorial autonomy arrangement, the entire population of a certain territory is granted 
is granted a degree of self-government regardless of their ethnic group membership.
Territorial autonomy can be implemented to various degrees, from so-called 
administrative autonomy to full self-government. Administrative autonomy most commonly 
describes an arrangement of executive discretion within the framework of central legislation. In 
this case, the autonomous territory does not have its own legislature. Full self-government, on 
the other hand, would incorporate the right for the designated part of the territory and its 
population -  defined, for example, according to ethnic and/or historic criteria -  to elect their 
own legislature. It would endow them with the authority to take charge of all executive and 
administrative functions usually provided by central state institutions, except in such areas as 
foreign and defence policy. While various forms of administrative territorial autonomy can be 
found in connection with decentralised (or regionalised) forms of the institutional organisation 
of a state, such as in Italy, full self-government resembles more closely federal arrangements, 
such as in Germany. Regardless of the degree of autonomy granted to the specific territory, it 
must be ensured that none of the individuals living in that territory is limited, because of 
autonomy regulations, in his or her rights to full equality and political participation.
As a specific arrangement for only a limited number of parts of a state’s territory, Or 
even just one, territorial autonomy need not affect the general institutional organisation of a 
state. Depending upon the state’s ethnic composition, special autonomy status can be granted to 
several areas within a regionalised institutional framework, such as in Italy, or to only one, such 
as Corsica in France. However, it can also be a principal form of organising a polity according 




Non-territorial autonomy means that the autonomous unit is defined in ‘personal’ terms. For 
example, a particular (ethnic) group is granted autonomy rights and all its members can enjoy 
these rights, and must fulfil the respective obligations towards its group that come with them, 
regardless where they live in their host state.
Early implementations of non-territorial autonomy related primarily to cultural and/or 
religious affairs of distinct groups. In the Middle Ages and in the early modem era, some 
European rulers granted Jewish communities the right to administer their community affairs 
according to their own laws and traditions. Similarly, the Ottoman Empire had adopted the so- 
called millet system, according to which non-Muslim communities enjoyed some degree of 
religious and cultural autonomy. In this century, the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia guaranteed a certain degree of cultural, and in particular educational, autonomy to 
national minorities in their post-1919 constitutions. After regaining their independence, some of 
these provisions were re-enacted. Similarly, Hungarian legislation provides for the far-reaching 
protection of ethnic minorities based on non-territorial autonomy regulations. The 
consociational arrangement in South Tyrol also includes a form of cultural, non-territorial 
autonomy.
The concept has beert developed systematically in political science since the mid­
nineteenth century, especially in Austria.619 Later, in the early twentieth century it was taken up 
again by the Austro Marxists Renner and Bauer.620 Since World War II, it has played a 
significant role in consociational theory, which is primarily associated with the work of Arend 
Lijphart.621 Throughout the post-World War II and post-Cold War periods, constitutional
619 To my knowledge, the first comprehensive analysis in this context is Adolf Frischhof, Osterreich und die 
Biirgerschaften seines Bestandes (Vienna 1869). Frischhof develops the concept of personal autonomy (obviously 
deriving from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant) in the environment of the multi-national Austrian Empire as a tool 
to preserve the unity of the state without suppressing the cultural identities of its component peoples.
620 The most important writings are: Rudolf Springer (aka Karl Renner), Der Kampfder dsterreichischen Nationen 
um den Staat (Leipzig 1902); Karl Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf 
Osterreich (Leipzig 1918); Otto Bauer, Die osterreichische Revolution (Leipzig 1923); and Otto Bauer, Die 
Nationalitatenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Leipzig 1924).
621 Cf. above all, Arend Lijphart, The Politics o f Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands 
(University of California Press, 1968) and his Democracy in Plural Societies (Yale University Press, 1977).
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theorists622 and practitioners623 have seen non-territorial autonomy as an instrument to deal with 
the cultural dimension of ethnic conflict, that is with matters of education, language, and 
religion.
Despite this generally narrow conception of non-territorial autonomy, there is no need 
to conceive of it as confined to cultural and educational matters only. Especially in mixed areas 
with high levels of inter-ethnic tension, the delegation to the ethnic groups of competences 
outside these two areas might facilitate the easing of tensions simply because groups can 
administer their affairs more independently of one another and power differentials, real or 
perceived, will have a lesser impact compared to situations in which groups are forced (by 
external actors) to co-operate.
Combining Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy
Ideally, territorial autonomy benefits all inhabitants of a given territory by providing them with 
a decentralised form of self-government in which they all have a say. Given ethnic plurality in 
the area, territorial autonomy, if modified along consociational lines, such as in South Tyrol or 
Northern Ireland, can also ensure the satisfaction of the distinct ethnic group claims arising in 
the area. The closer examination of these two cases, however, has also indicated that for such an 
arrangement to Work a preparedness to co-operate and compromise is essential. In the scenario 
suggested here, conflicting claims of national belonging are unlikely to provide conditions 
conducive to co-operation and compromise within a joint territorial framework.
The shortcomings of territorial autonomy to accommodate such conflicting claims of 
national belonging can be overcome by combining it with non-territorial autonomy regulations. 
Territorial autonomy, on the other hand, would maintain its importance as a political 
arrangement to deal with matters of common concern, which, given that two groups essentially 
share the same territory, would continue to exist. As a specific institutional set-up, then, the 
combination of territorial and non-territorial autonomy has a twofold aim: it removes all critical
622 The most recent example is Arend Lijphart, ‘Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in 
Power Sharing Systems’ in Kymlicka, The Rights.
and potentially conflict-inciting issues from the joint political process while at the Same time 
allowing for the possibility of conducting common policies on matters that are not of a group- 
specific nature or where group interests coincide.
Three essential conditions for such a framework in which territorial and non-territorial 
autonomy institutions can co-exist are:
• the preparedness of all ethnic groups to grant the respective other(s) the same 
degree of non-territorial autonomy as they desire for themselves,
• the acceptance of such a framework as a mutually beneficial and conflict-preventing 
set-up,
• the willingness to make concessions and to settle for compromises in the process of 
negotiating, implementing, and operating joint institutions. •'
These conditions will normally not be present simultaneously from the outset; yet, 
given time in which institutions can prove their worth, it is likely that the populations concerned 
come to accept and appreciate such a settlement. The constitution of Belgium, for example, 
despite its extraordinary complexity has become accepted as a mutually beneficial institutional 
framework by all three ethnic groups -  Flemmings, Walloons, and Germans.
To extend non-territorial competences to matters beyond language, culture, and 
education, i.e., to increase the degree of group autonomy,624 would serve the following 
purposes: each ethnic group would achieve greater political control over its own fate; the 
limitation of traditional democratic principles owed to consociational techniques at the 
territorial level could be compensated at non-territorial level; the whole system would be less 
dependent upon group homogeneity and discipline; elite dominance of their respective groups, 
and the need for it to make the system work, could be minimised; intra-ethnic elite competition 
could exist at non-territorial level and would not endanger the functioning of the consociational 
model at territorial level; the possible dominance of one ethnic group Would have limited
623 Estonia’s and Hungary’s constitutions and specific minority legislation provide good examples.
624 This may include tax raising and collecting powers for the autonomous institutions of each group from within its 
own community to secure a higher degree of financial independence as compared to a situation in which central 
institutions at territorial or national level have exclusive tax authority and firnd non-territorial autonomy bodies 
through firnd allocation. The allocation of state grants would have to remain sources of income for both territorial and 
non-territorial autonomy institutions in the framework of decentralisation.
332
effects, and compromising critical issues would be necessary to a more iimited extent Only. 
Crucially such an arrangement would allow each ethnic group to satisfy its claim to national 
belonging by determining the degree of integration with its kin-state while simultaneously 
coming to an institutional accommodation of matters of common concern with the respective 
other group.
In Order to ensure the necessary level of inter-ethnic co-operation and compromise at 
territorial level a specific parliamentary election and voting system could be adopted.625 The 
Additional Member System (AMS) offers a good starting point for selecting an appropriate 
parliamentary election system. AMS is a combination of proportional representation and 
majority vote. Candidates are directly elected by a plurality system in each constituency, and a 
summation of all votes gained by a party nation-wide or in a specific region is then used to 
compensate for deviations in the number of directly elected candidates and the number of seats 
in proportion to the overall share in the vote. This way, disadvantages for parties that have high 
concentrations of their electorate in few constituencies can be avoided, as it is eventually the 
overall share in the nation-wide vote that determines the number of parliamentary seats 
gained.626 AMS can easily be qualified in two further ways. First, ethnic groups could be 
allocated a certain number of seats within the proportional representation system, especially 
when very small groups are involved that would normally not gain seats.627 The second way to 
qualify this system is by adopting a strategy suggested by Horowitz. Seats gained through the 
majority system could be made dependent upon a certain, pre-determined m in im um  amount of 
votes to be won from within each ethnic group (percentage threshold). This would encourage 
inter-ethnic co-operation before elections and would possibly provide for co-operative policies 
after elections through ensuring the success of candidates whose election programmes have the
625 The following examination of electoral systems is based on Lijphart, Arend, Electoral Systems and Party Systems 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 22-25 and 153-159; and on Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg 
Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 26-37.
626 This system has worked rather successfully in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949.
627 This would be the case when a group is either geographically disadvantaged in a way that it does not have a 
realistic chance to win a seat as a constituency majority, or is too small to gain a seat through the proportional 
representation system. For example, a parliament has 25 seats that are allocated by proportional representation. This
greatest appeal among all ethnic groups. Too high threshold criteria, however* run the danger of 
paralysing the electoral system by potentially not delivering successful candidates in sufficient 
numbers.
The traditional majority-based parliamentary voting system can be qualified by 
reserving for certain issues a voting system that requires not only an overall majority in 
parliament, but also a minimum amount of yes-votes from within each ethnic group, Or even 
party representing it, to pass a bill. Alternatively, a minimum of no-votes over all and/or from 
within at least one ethnic group, or party representing it, could be demanded to reject proposed 
legislation. This would increase the political influence, and improve the bargaining position, of 
the minority and encourage co-operation between the ethnic groups. In order to prevent the 
legislative system from being paralysed through such a qualified voting system, it is necessary 
to have a mediation and arbitration mechanism in place with agreed and guaranteed procedures 
to reach a compromise on critical issues, such as the budget.
The degree of self-government of each ethnic group would have to mirror the degree to 
which the groups have common and distinct interests. At the same time, the degree to which the 
groups are actually mixed in society from a territorial point of view (mixed or ethnically 
exclusive neighbourhoods) will put certain limits as to which powers can be devolved and 
which need to remain with central authorities. While mixed neighbourhoods, for example, 
would allow for separate educational institutions and tax laws, the delegation of policing powers 
would prove rather difficult under these circumstances. Considering that the existence of mixed 
neighbourhoods can be taken as an indicator of low levels of inter-ethnic conflict, the latter 
might be unnecessary and could be replaced by recruitment and staffing policies according to 
ethnic proportions.
In general, the areas in which territorial authority would be exercised jointly by both 
groups are limited, and would include normally non-controversial matters such as 
environmental protection, communications, and transport. The territorial budget could either be
would mean that a four per cent share in the vote is necessary to gain a seat. If the respective group makes up for only
334
funded through direct taxation or through the transfer of resources from the ethnic groups and 
the their respective kin-states.
Membership in each of the communities would be by a declaration accompanying 
registration for elections in which each person states to which jurisdiction he or she wants to be 
subjected. This should be independent of ethnic origin, and provisions for dual citizenship 
should be implemented. These declarations could at the same time be used to determine the 
necessary proportions of public sector employment in areas where powers are not or can not be 
devolved to the non-territorial group authorities.
The validation and implementation of such an arrangement should be by referendum 
and conditional upon simple majorities in each of the effected political entities, i.e., both ethnic 
groups and both states.
With all this in mind, any such settlement needs to be sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate future changes in the situation that led to its establishment, including changes in 
the attitudes of the parties involved. The institutional framework for this flexibility could find its 
expression, for example, in a standing commission composed of representatives of all four 
parties regularly assessing the operation of the settlement and any potential problems arising 
from it  As such, this kind of settlement is neither irreversible nor unchangeable.
The Potential Advantages of the Combination of Divided Sovereignty and Non- 
Territorial Separation of Ethnic Groups
There are a variety of significant advantages to a combination of divided sovereignty and non- 
territorial group separation.
First of all, each of the ethnic communities can live more independently of the other one 
and gains a greater say over its own development and future.
Second, potential inroads to the democratic principle that would occur in a 
consociational/joint sovereignty settlement, would continue to exist to a limited degree at the
three per cent of the electorate, it has hardly a chance to win a seat.
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territorial level in this model, too. However, they would be compensated at the non-territorial 
level and would be less significant as they would affect fewer issues.
Third, as a result of such a structure, the working of the entire political system is far less 
dependent upon elite co-operation, on elite control of their respective communities, and on the 
homogeneity and discipline of the two communities.
Fourth, the majority-minority dimension of the ethnic conflict becomes less salient
Fifth, the clear legislative, executive, and judicial separation of the two communities 
contributes, in the short term, to the de-escalation of inter-group tensions, and can, in the long 
term, facilitate a solution of the underlying fundamental conflict over national belonging.
Sixth, while the establishment of mediation and arbitration mechanisms provides 
necessary stability for the evolving political process, the arrangement as a whole, as it is able to 
address the fundamental grievances and fears of each community, can also give a sense of 
satisfactory permanence to both communities, ensuring that neither of them would feel 
threatened by future changes.
In relation to this, the seventh advantage is that allowing each community to administer 
its own relations with either of the two states involved, provides them with the opportunity to 
determine individually the degree of integration into their respective kin-states, including the 
level of participation in the relevant political and electoral processes. Thus, the territorial- 
constitutional dimension of the ethnic conflict can be effectively addressed alongside the inter- 
group aspects.
Eighth, the concurrent territorial dispute between the two states could be solved by 
according each of them sovereignty rights in relation to their kin-group resident on the territory 
in question.
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Table 22: The Potential Advantages of Combining Divided Sovereignty and Non-Territorial 
Separation
• Greater level of independence for each community
• Non-territorial level offers possibility of compensation for inroads to democratic 
principle at territorial level
• Dependence on elite co-operation decreases
• Majority-minority dimension less salient
• Likely de-escalation of inter-group tensions
• Stability of the evolving political process may establish a satisfactory sense of 
permanence among all groups
• Ability of each group to determine the level of integration with its kin-state
• Territorial dispute between the states involved can be resolved through the
condominium settlement
Obviously, such an institutional framework is not without problems either. Its stability 
crucially depends upon the willingness of all four parties to co-operate and compromise. Under 
the conditions of protracted ethnic conflict and fundamentally incompatible aspirations of 
national belonging, however, this type of settlement seems to be likely to provide a relatively 
stable environment in which important interests of all conflicting parties can be accommodated, 
in which remaining conflictual issues can be resolved peacefully through compromise and co­
operation, and in which pre-emptive solutions can be provided to tensions arising in the future 
over the implementation and operation of the agreement.
PART THREE 
ACHIEVING CONFLICT SETTLEMENTS AND 
MANAGING THEIR STABILITY
IX. Conditions Conducive to Conflict Settlement and Settlement
Stability
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At the opening of this study I described the conflicts I would be investigating as ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts, i.e., as conflicts over incompatible ethnic and territorial claims. This 
choice was informed by a number of considerations. European history to date has produced two 
almost wholly incompatible maps of the continent -  a political and an ethnic one, the border 
lines of which rarely coincide. The majority of ethnic conflicts in Europe were, and are, to some 
extent, results of boundary changes detaching groups of people from their (ethnic) nations and 
placing them under the sovereignty of an oftentimes adversarial host-state. This then introduces 
the external minority’s kin-state into the arena of potential conflict not only as patron of an 
oppressed kin-group, but also as a potential claimant to lost territory. The past and present of 
ethnic conflict in Europe, and arguably also its future, has thus largely been one of ethno- 
territorial cross-border conflict in which two states and two ethnic groups face each other.
Despite the multitude of such conflicts that have occurred in Europe, a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of their origins, evolution, and settlement does not exist. While I have not 
attempted to provide such a study, I have sought to contribute one important aspect to the 
understanding of this type of ethnic conflict -  the stability of their settlements. My approach has 
been specific: What are the conditions under which a particular settlement can be achieved and 
kept stable?
Ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts in four Western European territories, each of 
them providing a different solution, have been examined -  Alsace, the Saar, South Tyrol, and 
Northern Ireland. Two other case studies that I conducted as a part of this project were those of 
the condominia of Andorra and the New Hebrides/Vanuatu. They were distinguished from all 
other cases primarily by the predominance of the territorial conflict between two sovereign 
powers.628 Thus, they could be used to explore the concept of a condominium, and its necessary
628 The claim that in the case of Andorra the contestants were sovereign powers is disputable. Without going into too 
much detail, it is sufficient to say that in the thirteenth century and earlier no internationally enforceable concept of 
sovereignty existed and that the two conflict parties -  the Bishop of Urgell and the Counts of Foix -  enjoyed a 
sufficiently high degree of independence to conduct their own policies and sign binding agreements over the fate of 
Andorra that have been upheld until the present day.
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modifications, as an institutional arrangement for the settlement of ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts.
In this final chapter, I will address two further issues that are of great importance in the 
understanding of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts and their settlement. The first of these 
issues is to find out whether there are any conditions that, independent of the type of settlement 
eventually adopted, are indicative of the possibility of achieving a settlement for this particular 
type of conflict at a given point in its development. Second, based on the framework of 
variables developed towards the end of Part One, I will go beyond the question of how it was 
possible to settle these conflicts successfully, and will turn to the issue of how the respective 
settlements could and should be successfully maintained to the benefit of all parties.
Essential Criteria for the Settlement of Ethno-Territorial Cross- 
Border Conflicts
The analysis of stability criteria for specific solutions to the type of conflict under examination 
here is an important instrument for the management of conflict settlements and their stability. 
Yet, in order to provide a comprehensive account of conditions conducive to the settlement of 
ethno-territorial crtiss-border conflicts, the analysis must begin at a different level than that of 
case specific solutions and ask one even more general, yet equally crucial question:
• What are the essential criteria for the possibility to achieve a settlement of ethno- 
territorial cross-border conflicts independent of the type of solution eventually 
adopted?
After the study of several cases and the various failures and eventually successful 
approaches to conflict settlement it is possible to extract those conditions that, at a fairly general 
level, were present in all those cases where any type of settlement was achieved, independent of 
its long-term stability. The question here is not one of the feasibility of a particular solution, but 
one of the possibility of some form of settlement at all. The previous study of various conflict 
settlements and of the strategies to achieve them makes it reasonable to assume that' the 
conditions determining this possibility of conflict settlement can be found within the structures
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and relationships related to any of the following four levels -the host-state, the kin-state, the 
disputed territory, and the international context.
Conditions with regard to the Host-State
Looking at the instances of successful conflict settlement as examined in the case studies above, 
there appear to be two essential conditions at the level of the host-state without which the 
possibility of achieving a settlement would be too remote. The first of these conditions is the 
preparedness of the host-state to accommodate crucial interests of the external minority. In 
relation to Alsace, Germany (between 1871 and 1914) as well as France (after 1945) were 
prepared to respect ancient Alsatian traditions and customs and to establish conditions in which 
these could survive. In turn, the conflict was removed further from the possibility of a 
settlement whenever attempts were made to abolish these ancient rights, for example, in the mid 
and late 1920s and early 1930s. In South Tyrol, only after the Italian government conceded the 
South Tyrolese the right to take control over key aspects of the administrative and political 
process in the province could the conflict parties come to an agreement. This was this even 
more obviously the case in the Saar, where the French government accepted the result of the 
referendum on the proposed statute, which was a crucial step towards the eventual resolution of 
the Saar conflict. The preparedness to accommodate key interests of the external minority was 
also an essential condition for the possibility to achieve a conflict settlement in Northern 
Ireland. Both in 1973 and 1998, the negotiated settlements provided for consociational 
arrangements intending to protect the nationalist minority from further discrimination and 
deprivation and to give it a share in the exercise and control of power in Northern Ireland. In 
turn, the absence of a power-sharing component, and in fact the exclusion of both communities 
from the negotiation and operation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, was one of the causes why 
this agreement did not offer the possibility of a settlement.
The preparedness to accommodate minority interests is a necessary condition for any 
successful settlement process, but it is not a sufficient one. On the one hand, successive French
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governments during the inter-war period were prepared to make concessions on the religious 
statute and the confessional school system in Alsace (not significantly more or less than post­
war governments did), yet the situation remained unsettled. On the other hand, the cases of the 
Saar and of South Tyrol, and, to a lesser extent, of Northern Ireland, demonstrate that another 
essential condition for the possibility of coming to a settlement at the level of the host-state is 
the latter’s willingness to co-operate with the kin-state (where it and its external minority wish 
such an involvement), including the preparedness to address and negotiate territorial and 
sovereignty issues where this is necessary. Most obviously, this was the case in the Saar. Once 
the French government had accepted that no resolution of the conflict would be likely as long as 
Germany was excluded from negotiations, the settlement process moved along more quickly 
and eventually succeeded. While the predominance of the territorial aspect of the Saar conflict 
clearly necessitated this co-operation process, this was not the case in South Tyrol. There, kin- 
state involvement was the wish of the external minority and had its legal basis in the 1946 Paris 
Agreement between Italy and Austria. Primarily because of Italian reservations about granting 
Austria a substantive role in the settlement, the initial failure to produce concrete results from 
kin-state involvement led to the violent escalation of the conflict in 1961. The more constructive 
approach of both governments after 1961, in turn, resulted in the 1969 ‘Paket’ solution and 
operational calendar which were the basis of the subsequent settlement of the South Tyrol 
conflict. In Northern Ireland, the formal acknowledgement of an Irish dimension in the 
settlement process and its incorporation into both the Sunningdale and Good Friday Agreements 
were each time key to the possibility of achieving a settlement.
The presence or absence of these two necessary conditions -  preparedness to 
accommodate key interests of the external minority and willingness to co-operate with the kin- 
state -  is often a result of domestic and foreign policy considerations of the government in 
office. Foreign political considerations often evolve around regional and geopolitical alliances 
and the pressures that their members can exercise collectively or individually, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in relation to settlement conditions in the international context.
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Domestically, it is often the feared implications of concessions over one minority conflict for 
potential or actual others. This has been the case with Alsace during the inter-war period, when 
some French governments tried to abolish the concordat and the confessional school system 
assuming that making concessions in Alsace would trigger corresponding demands among other 
minorities, such as the Basques, Bretons, and Corsicans. Similar considerations influenced the 
course of action taken by post-1945 Italian governments who, parallel to the evolving South 
Tyrol conflict, also had to deal with similar situations in Sicily and the Val d’Aosta. Domestic 
constraints limiting a government’s ability to compromise may also result from a vulnerable 
electoral or parliamentary power base. Developments in the Northern Ireland conflict from the 
mid 1990s on are a case in point here, when the dependence of the government of John Major 
upon the parliamentary support of Unionist MPs grew.
Conditions with regard to the Kin-State
Concluding from the analysis of kin-state behaviour and its consequences, the key to the 
possibility of a settlement at the level of the kin-state is to balance the interests of the external 
minority and of the host-state in its approach to the conflict. To strike such a balance 
successfully is possible in either of two ways. One of them is the willingness of the kin-state to 
co-operate and reach compromises with both the host-state and the external minority over the 
two central issues in any ethno-territorial cross-border conflict -  minority rights and territory. 
Acting as a patron for its external minority, no settlement is likely to be achieved if the primary 
considerations of the kin-state are related to the instrumentalisation of the conflict for its own 
(territorial) gains. Germany’s inter-war Alsace policy towards France illustrates this clearly. In 
contrast, Austrian South Tyrol policy after 1946 and the Republic of Ireland’s approach to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland show that a constructive and flexible approach on part of the kin- 
state towards the issues of minority rights and territory can move the settlement process closer 
to a successful outcome. Alternatively, a policy of strict non-interference may be a necessary 
pre-condition to achieve a settlement, as the developments in Alsace after the end of the Second 
World War indicate. If neither the external minority nor its host-state deem the involvement of
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the kin-state necessary or desirable, strict non-interference will make a settlement of the conflict 
more likely.
Similar to the host-state, the kin-state’s ability to follow either of these two courses of 
action depends upon a variety of foreign and domestic policy considerations. They include 
domestic power balances and the influence of emigrant organisations from the disputed territory 
on the domestic side, and potential consequences for other external minorities and disputed 
territories at the level of foreign policy considerations. German policy vis-a-vis Alsace and the 
Saar demonstrates this very well. In the case of Alsace, a powerful lobby of emigrants exercised 
considerable influence on the foreign office to fund political and cultural activities in the inter- 
war period. This coincided with the policy of successive German governments to use the issue 
of Alsace to pressure France into concessions over the Germany’s eastern borders. With regard 
to the Saar conflict after 1945, Germany could not accept the permanent annexation of the area 
by France as it feared that this would jeopardise its position vis-a-vis the former eastern 
territories of the German Reich. An influential lobby of German politicians from within the 
government coalition and the opposition as well as of Saar emigrants and the delicate power 
balance in the Federal Council prevented the government of Chancellor Adenauer to make more 
substantial concessions to France.
Conditions with regard to the Disputed Territory
Similar to the conditions with regard to the host- and kin-state, a preparedness to compromise 
on part of the political actors in the disputed territory is a necessary condition to make a 
settlement of an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict possible. This preparedness to 
compromise and co-operate must extend to sufficiently large parts of both the external minority 
and the section of the host-nation sharing the disputed territory (wherever it is present in 
significant numbers) and it must occur on an inter-ethnic level as well as between the ethnic 
groups and the institutions of the host-state. All of the four major cases studied include 
examples to illustrate this point. In Alsace and Lorraine, the initial lack of willingness even to
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co-operate with German authorities considerably delayed important steps towards a settlement, 
such as the introduction of the German constitution to the Reichslartd. Once the population 
realised that co-operation could be beneficial and acted accordingly, several constitutional 
reforms brought a settlement closer, culminating in the quasi-federal status of Alsace and 
Lorraine in 1911. In the Saar, the acceptance by the French and Saar governments of the need 
for an inclusive political process and the recognition by the pro-German opposition that 
reunification would not only require majorities, but also concessions to the pro-French section 
of the population and a transitionary period with interim regulations equally contributed to the 
smooth and peaceful settlement of the conflict. In South Tyrol, to give another example, the 
preparedness of the German-speaking population to accept an internal settlement and ‘waive’ its 
right to self-determination made greater Italian concessions possible as well and led to the 
‘Paket’ solution of 1969. In Northern Ireland, increasing levels of co-operation between the two 
communities, or at least their elites, as well as between them and the British and Northern Irish 
authorities have had a significant impact on the possibility of achieving settlements in 1973 and 
1998, while decreasing co-operation and the dominance of hard-liners have prevented them in 
1975 and throughout the 1980s.
The presence of the willingness to compromise and co-operate often results from inside 
and outside incentives and pressures and/or from a weariness of the population in the disputed 
territory with an ongoing conflict. Well-balanced domestic, international, and/or intra- 
communal incentives and pressures, and the ability to deliver on them, can increase the 
willingness to compromise and co-operate, as the studies of South Tyrol and Northern Ireland 
have indicated. In addition Northern Ireland is a good example how conflict weariness increases 
the likelihood of a settlement as it puts pressure on political elites to compromise and makes 
popular support for a settlement more likely.
Conditions with regard to the International Context
All the previous case studies have illustrated the international context is an important factor in 
the process of settling ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts. The necessary condition for the
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possibility of a settlement is an international situation that, because of regional or geopolitical 
interest Structures, can incentivise or pressure the conflict parties to come to a settlement of their 
differences, rather than to encourage them to continue or escalate an ongoing conflict.
As such, considerations about international repercussions on particular policies often 
figure prominently in the process of formulating policies by all parties involved in the conflict. 
This is particularly obvious in the cases of the Saar and of Northern Ireland. Pressure from 
European partners and the United States on both France and Germany significantly sped up the 
process of coming to a settlement in an international climate that made the integration of West 
Germany into Nato and the evolving structures of the European Coal and Steel Community a 
matter of high priority. Similarly, pressure from the Clinton presidency, from the Irish- 
American community, and the international chairmanship of the talks process were major 
factors that increased the likelihood of achieving a settlement in Northern Ireland in 1998.
The Ripeness of an Ethno-Territorial Cross-Border Conflict for Settlement 
A summary of the discussion thus far shows that on each of the four levels of analysis -  host-
state, kin-state, disputed territory, and international context -  a clearly defined number of
conditions exist that are necessary to make a settlement of such a conflict possible. These
conditions are outlined in the table below.
Table 23: Necessary Conditions for the Possibility of Conflict Settlement
• In the host-state
□ Willingness to accommodate key interests of the external minority
□ Preparedness to co-operate and compromise with the kin-state, including over issues relating 
to territorial and sovereignty matters
• In the kin-state
□ Ability to balance interests of the external minority and of the host-state in its approach to 
the conflict
• In the disputed territory
□ Readiness to compromise and co-operate extending to the external minority and the host- 
nation and occurring on an inter-ethnic level as well as between the ethnic groups and the 
institutions of the host-state
• International Context
□ Incentives for and/or pressures on the conflict parties to come to a settlement of their 
differences, or at least a lack of incentives/pressures to continue the conflict
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It is important to note that, individually, these conditions are necessary to make the 
settlement of an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict possible, yet only in their entirety they are 
sufficient to do so. Their joint presence indicates that a conflict is ripe for a settlement, that is, 
that a window of opportunity exists for decision makers to achieve a settlement The 
simultaneous presence of these conditions does not say anything about whether this opportunity 
will be taken, what kind of settlement will be agreed, or whether an adopted settlement will be 
stable, it merely points to the fact that the strategies of the conflict parties towards the conflict 
are no longer incompatible. Once this has been recognised, and there is no guarantee that every 
such opportunity will be recognised, the overall success of the settlement process depends upon 
the flexibility, determination, and skill of those involved to design an institutional framework 
that fits the variety of contextual circumstances of their particular conflict situation so as to 
provide for opportunities to resolve differences with peaceful and democratic means.
The Stability of Conflict Settlements
The question how it is possible to preserve the stability of conflict settlements has not 
been explored frequently in the literature on ethnic conflict, and particularly in a European 
context. Criticising the “inadequate specification of consequences”, Horowitz emphasises that 
any policy applied in the resolution or management of ethnic conflicts has multiple desired and 
undesired consequences.629 One response to this could be to examine all possible policies in all 
potential circumstances and predict the outcomes of their pursuit. Yet, with a given set of model 
solutions based on actual case studies, it is also possible to look at policies and conditions as 
indicators of the stability of a particular settlement. This approach, then, can be of great use to 
policy makers. The actual cases of conflict settlement that are part of this study have illustrated 
that the specific conditions of each case required distinct solutions that provide a stable yet 
sufficiently flexible environment in which a political process relatively free of disruptive ethnic 
conflict can be conducted. In order to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to analyse 
the ‘success conditions’ of each of these model solutions. This is important in two ways. First, it
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is close to impossible that a satisfactory solution for an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict 
will be found by simply copying an institutional arrangement from a resolved conflict to an 
unsettled one, as no two conflicts are likely to be the same. By providing criteria for stability, it 
is possible to choose the closest model available for a conflict with similar conditions and then 
modify the institutional arrangements to fit the exact conditions, or to create conditions that fit 
the model solution, or, more likely, to combine both methods. Second, being aware of these 
criteria will make it possible to anticipate, and wherever possible prevent, the re-escalation of an 
already settled conflict. Close monitoring of these stability criteria and an institutional 
framework flexible enough to respond to changes are the two essential conditions in this 
context.
Achieving a settlement among the conflicting parties is an important milestone in the 
process of de-escalating ethno-territorial conflicts. Yet, to agree upon a settlement for a conflict 
does not mean to resolve it permanently. A settlement merely provides an institutional 
framework within which the parties hope to be able to accommodate their interests without 
violence. The negotiation process marks a qualitatively new stage in any such conflict inasmuch 
as the conflicting parties try to settle their differences by talking to, rather than by fighting 
against, each other. The beginning of the implementation process of any negotiated settlement 
presents a similar qualitative leap. The conflicting parties must now work with each other to set 
up and operate the institutional framework they agreed upon.
The nature of the settlement will have a significant impact on all the parties involved in 
the conflict from the point of agreement into their future, and it can potentially affect other state 
and non-state actors associated through geographic, economic, and/or political relations. 
Considerations about the future, therefore, will determine the negotiation strategy and objectives 
of each party and these will eventually be reflected in the structure of the institutional 
framework to be set up. On an abstract level, this is reflected in three categories, namely the 
stability, flexibility, and reversibility of any settlement. Stability concerns the capacity of the
62^ Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 570f.
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institutions to satisfy the demands made vis-a-vis them. Flexibility means the ability to 
accommodate new interests. Reversibility refers to whether or not, and how easily, it is possible 
to annul the negotiated settlement.
Initially, I suggested a number of factors which, based On a purely theoretical 
examination of the subject, had been grouped into three dimensions and were then used to guide 
the analysis of the particular cases. The six cases examined here enabled me not only to refine 
this typology, but also to add to it. Through this study, I have developed a paradigm that can be 
applied to any ethno-territorial cross-border conflict to determine which criteria need to be 
fulfilled for a specific settlement to be stable. By doing this, I avoid broad typologies of 
“conflict-regulating practices”, as developed by Nordlinger,630 or of “patterns of conflict 
management”, as suggested by Esman.631 Similar typologies have been suggested by McGarry 
and O’Leary and by Horowitz.632 These certainly have their place in the literature on ethnic 
conflict, but they can not answer two crucial questions:
1. Which conditions provide a settlement with stability?
2. How can a settlement’s potential breakdown be recognised early enough to prevent 
it?
The model solutions examined here can be roughly distinguished by how the issue of 
sovereignty has been addressed, whether it is sought to manage or eliminate differences, 
whether an internal, external, or permanently bilateral settlement has been negotiated, and how 
far, and how easily, it is reversible.
63® Nordlinger cites six successful conflict-regulating practices: stable governing coalition between political parties, 
principle of proportionality, mutual veto, purposive depoliticisation, compromises, and concessions. Cf. Eric A. 
Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International 
Affairs, 1972), pp. 21-31.
631 Esman distinguishes between coercive and consensual management policies and between two principle goals -  
homogenisation and ‘accept pluralism’. Methods of coercive homogenisation are genocide, expulsion, population 
transfer, and forced assimilation. Coercive pluralism manifests itself in exclusion or subordination. In contrast, 
induced assimilation would be the form of consensual homogenisation, while federalism, cultural pluralism, power 
sharing, ethnic coalitions, and reducing political salience are cited as examples of consensual pluralism. Cf. Milton J. 
Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 259.
632 McGarry and O’Leary, The Politics, pp. 1-40; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 601-680.
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The stability criteria associated with each of the model solutions can be found on four 
levels, acquiring varying prominence across the spectrum of solutions. These four levels are 
conditions in the host- and in the kin-state, and in the disputed territory, and the international 
context. Within the disputed area, it is three different levels of categories that need to be 
examined -  the inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relationships between the different sections of the 
population and the socio-political structure of the territory. As regards the inter-ethnic situation, 
the historical development of inter-ethnic relationships (in particular, the duration and intensity 
of the conflict, and its stakes) and their perception shape, to a significant extent, the 
opportunities for conflict settlement and subsequent settlement stability. Furthermore, not only 
is the level and nature of remaining conflict important, but also the number of problem issues 
overall. Co-operation between elites and groups, the political consensus among them, and the 
degree of competition between (ethnically defined) political parties are further important aspects 
that affect the stability of a settlement. Eventually, joint interests and existing cleavages need to 
be considered as well. With respect to the intra-ethnic situation, again, there is a historical 
dimension, but equally important are the level of political consensus over the ultimate goal 
within each ethnic group and the level of competition between political parties are the two 
crucial factors that influence the stability of the settlement.
In terms of the social-political structure of the formerly disputed territory, ethnic 
homogeneity, ethnic segmentation, and the numerical and power balance between the ethnic 
groups living there are issues that need to be considered as regards their impact on the stability 
of any model settlement.
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There are also a number of conditions within both the host- and kin-states that are 
significant for the stability of any settlement, including the historic development of their 
relationship and the policies of the host and kin-states towards the ethnic groups involved in the 
settlement process and towards each other are significant as well.
Finally, the international context of any settlement warrants attention as international 
factors, such as pressures on the parties involved in the conflict or regional and supra-regional 
integration processes, frequently have a bearing on how quickly and successfully a settlement 
can be brought about, or prevented, and be kept stable, or be undermined.
Table 25: General Overview of Stability Criteria






□  Historical development
□  Level and nature of conflict remaining
□  Number of problem issues
□  Degree of co-operation between elites
O  Degree of co-operation between ethnic groups
□  Political consensus between groups and elites
□  Joint interests
□  Cleavages
□  Competition between political groupings
• Intra-Ethnic Situation
□  Historical development
□  Level of political consensus over ultimate goal
□  Competition between political parties
• Social-Political Structure
□  Ethnic homogeneity of the territory
□  Ethnic Segmentation
□  Numerical balance between groups











•  Geopolitical Significance 
of the territory
• International integration of 
each state
•  Regional interest structures 
and alliances
• Pressures exercised upon 
the conflict parties
It will be possible to determine under which conditions an institutional framework is 
likely to be stable by relating these criteria to the five possible settlements of ethno-territorial 
conflict outlined earlier -  integration, as in the case of Alsace, secession/irredenta, as in the case 
of the Saar conflict, consociation, as in South Tyrol, consociation with permanent institutional 
involvement of the external minority’s kin-state, as in Northern Ireland, and a democratised 
condominium, as developed in the context of the studies of Andorra and the New Hebrides.
The stability of any solution adopted affects both the host and kin-state as well as the 
ethnic groups involved in the conflict in different ways. The stability of the settlement is also
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closely related to its flexibility and reversibility. The different ways in which this influence 
manifests itself are the degree to which the ethnic groups will be able to determine their own 
future, the ability of political actors to instrumentalise the conflict in party/group/state internal 
and external power struggles, the political stability of the two states and their governments, and 
potentially that of neighbouring states or an entire region. The ability of any of the parties to 
compromise, or their need to have certain key demands fulfilled, will depend upon how much 
control each of them will retain over their own affairs and over their ability to pursue 
independent policies in relation to core issues of the conflict. The stability of a settlement does 
not only depend upon the sincerity of each involved party to make the settlement work, but also 
on its structure, that is, whether it is internal, external, or bilateral, and on whether it seeks to 
manage or eliminate differences. In turn, ‘post-conflict’ policies will also depend upon the 




The essential criterion for integration to provide a stable solution to ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts is that significant majorities of both ethnic groups living in the territory in 
question are in favour of integration. As in the case of Alsace, this means that the external 
minority wants to be integrated into its host-state and that the host-state does not reject the idea 
of integrating another ethnic group. This also means that ethnic segmentation must be at a very 
low, and politically not relevant level, as is the case in today’s Alsace, where ethnic origin 
hardly plays any role in Alsatian identity. The population in the region sees itself as French and 
is accepted as French despite some regional particularities in terms of dialect, the preservation 
of the confessional school system, and of the Napoleonic concordat.
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Stability Criteria of an Integration
1
Historical Context • Tradition of integration, preferably non-forceful and with a record of mutual compromises.• Social and emotional ties between external minority and kin-state hardly any more present
•-3
1





Differences • Mostly eliminating, partly managing.
Reversibility • Normally not reversible.
Level and Nature of Conflict Remaining
• Below threshold of violence.
• Not about the principle of integration.
• Resolvable within the framework of the settlement




Degree of Co-operation between Elites • Must be high. Elites must not perceive themselves as representatives of distinct ethnic groups.
K?
Degree of Co-operation between Ethnic 




Political Consensus Groups/Elites • Must be high.
H
T3 Competition between Political Groupings • Possible given overall political consensus.33 ■ 
O..S Joint Interests
• Helpful. The number of group-specific interests should be minimal 
and decrease over time.Q
H Cleavages • Must be cross-cutting.
.a o Political 
Consensus over 
Ultimate Goal














Host-Nation • Significant majority in favour of integration.
io
U Competition between Political Parties
• Possible given overall political consensus regarding the desirability 
of integration.
■3.
Ethnic Homogeneity of Territory • Not necessary. Balanced ethnic mix of the territory, however, can lead to amalgamation of groups.
^ 1 Ethnic Segmentation • Possible at very low level in selected areas, e.g., folk and religious customs.
•g w Numerical Balance between Groups • Not necessary.






• Integration without force.
• Facilitating longer transition periods.
• Not perceiving remaining differences as threat
•  High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement including the acceptance of remaining 













te Internal Policies •  High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement












•  Pressures/incentives to settle the dispute.
• No pressures/incentives to re-escalate the conflict
• No destabilising external involvement.
Remaining aspects of conflict; such as about linguistic rights, are resolvable within the
framework of the settlement and through exclusively peaceful and democratic means and do not 
put into question the desirability of integration as such. In general, the number of contentious 
issues that can potentially be ethnicised is rather low, the degree of co-operation between 
regional and central elites as well as between Alsatians and French from other parts of the
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country is high. For some time now, regional elites have seen themselves as representing the 
entirety of the territory’s population and their interests, rather than only one particular, 
ethnically defined section, as was the case in the inter-war period. A regional loyalty, based on 
common regional interests, has helped the integration process. Cleavages that exist are based on 
categories of class, ideology, or religion and are not perceived in ethnic terms.
While the degree of integration can vary from case to case, the example of Alsace has 
shown that it is important that integration policies are not carried out with force, and that there 
exists a tradition of compromise over varying degrees of integration in different areas of society 
that would allow the group that is to be integrated to retain a number of features of its distinct 
identity, e.g., customary, linguistic, and religious aspects, for all of which successive post-war 
French governments have made allowances. These remaining cultural differences are not 
perceived as threatening and do therefore not necessitate forceful assimilation. Integration in 
Alsace is based on broad cross-party consensus with no major political party opposing it.
Concerning the relationship to Germany, there has been no interference in the 
integration process after 1945 and no territorial claims were made. On the other hand, 
historically evolved cross-border ties have not been severed; rather, they have contributed to the 
working of the integrationist settlement as they have enabled cultural contacts and exchanges 
without endangering the integration of Alsatians into French culture and society. While this 
generally requires that there is high cross-party consensus in the kin-state that keeps irredentist 
claims in check and ensures that changes in government do not affect the kin-state* s external 
minority policy, Franco-German reconciliation and the integration of Germany into European 
and transatlantic alliances have made this issue almost irrelevant, thus providing an international 
context in which the incentives to maintain the settlement were overwhelming and from which 
no destabilising influence originated.
In general, integration as a model solution for ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts is 
very unlikely to be based on formal agreements or treaties between the conflict parties. There 
may be, in a wider international framework, treaties between the two involved states regulating
the question of sovereignty. Internally, there might be specific institutional arrangements on a 
very limited number of issues, yet generally the formerly disputed territory is likely to be treated 
exactly the same as any other unit within the general unitary, regional, or federal structure of the 
host-state.
Once the process of integration has been completed, it is normally not reversible, except 
through a policy of deliberate dissimilation, similar to the one Nazi Germany carried out against 
the Jewish population in Germany after 1933. The very nature of integration will mean that 
within the course of one or two generations ethnic issues will cease to play a role in the public 
sphere, as is very obvious from the present situation in Alsace. This exponentially decreases the 
ability to instrumentalise them in internal or external power struggles to any great degree. The 
stability of the host-state and its government will therefore not depend upon this particular 
‘ethnic’ issue. With respect to the kin-state, this is generally true as well, provided that no major 
political party or other organisation pursues an irredentist agenda. Direct negative affects on 
regional stability are unlikely.
Consociation
As regards the traditional consociational arrangement, most of Lijphart’s assumptions 
about ‘favourable conditions for consociational democracy’ could apparently be verified in the 
study of South Tyrol.633 Overarching, i.e., territorial, loyalties, the number of political parties in 
each ethnic group, about equal size of the ethnic groups, and the existence of some cross-cutting 
cleavages with otherwise segmental isolation were all found in part either essential or helpful 
for the stability of the consociational settlement in South Tyrol.
633 Cf. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale University Press, 
1977), pp. 53-103.
Stability Criteria of a Consociation
1
Historical Context
• At least sporadic tradition of compromise and co-operation.
• Area as joint settlement rather than as colony.
• Social and emotional ties between external minority and kin-state still strong.
i© Sovereignty • Remains with host-state.u1 Structure • Internal, potentially bilateral in the process of getting there.
J Differences • Managing.
Reversibility • Reversible.
Level and Nature of Conflict Remaining
• Below threshold Of violence.
• Not about the principle of consociation.
• Resolvable within the framework of the settlement
§•a Number of Problem Issues • Must be overall small.1 Degree of Co-operation between Elites • Must be high. Helpful at bilateral level
U Degree of Co-operation between Ethnic Groups • Can be limited.
w Political Consensus Groups/Elites • Must be high-
faH I Competition between Political Groupings • Must be low, preferably two-party system.
€ Joint Interests • Necessary.




External Minority • Majority satisfied with internal settlement
a
3 I §W « Host-Nation • Majority satisfied with internal settlement and with the empowering of the external minority.
1©u
■is
Competition between Political Parties
• Must be low, preferably one catch-all party in each ethnic 














Ethnic Homogeneity of Territory • Not necessary.
Ethnic Segmentation
• Possible, and to some degree even desirable, in a limited 
number of clearly defined areas, e.g.; education, language, 
religion.
Numerical Balance between Groups • Should be about equal







• Willing to acknowledge and manage differences.
• Impartially mediating, and where necessary arbitrating, between the groups.
• Impartially administrating the achieved settlement
• High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement
External Policies
• Co-operation with kin-state on issues of mutual interest
• Honouring the degree of involvement granted to the kin-state in the settlement including the 
extent of the special relationship with its kin-group.
Internal Policies • High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement
External Policies
• Non-interference in the policies of implementing and operating the settlement beyond the degree 
determined in the agreement. No instrumentalisation of the external minority for irredentist or 











t • Pressures/incentives to settle the dispute.
• No pressures/incentives to re-escalate the conflict
• No destabilising external involvement.
The particularity of the conflict type examined here and illustrated in the case of South 
Tyrol, however, allows to define a number of more specific stability criteria and to discard 
others. The size of the territory, for example, and its direct and indirect internal and external 
effects discussed by Lijphart do not matter in the same way, as, by virtue of the nature of cross- 
border ethnic conflicts, the territory in dispute will be rather small in size and population.
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Similarly, the tradition of compromise emphasised by Lijphart is not as essential as the question 
of whether the territory is an area of joint settlement or colonisation The gradual weakening of 
the emotional ties between the external minority and its kin-state, in addition, can have a 
significant positive impact on the stability of the settlement as a whole.
The more specific criteria that were the source of stability for the South Tyrolese 
consociation can be determined as follows. Sovereignty remained unquestioned with Italy. All 
remaining issues of conflict were gradually resolved within the agreed institutional framework 
and without taking recourse to violence; and the institutions have proven flexible enough over 
the years to accommodate changes in the interest structures of the two ethnic groups in the 
province. None of the issues that occurred were about the essence of the settlement as all 
involved conflict parties accepted the consociational structure agreed in 1969 as the best 
possible solution. Overall, the number of issues with a strong ethnic component has remained 
very small. While the degree of co-operation between the ethnic groups has varied over time, 
but has generally increased, especially among the younger and urban sections of the population, 
that between their respective elites has always remained high. Gradually, a set of common 
territorial interests and an existing loyalty to the territory have developed and proven to be 
advantageous for the stability of the settlement.
In general, a majority within both ethnic groups has been satisfied with the nature of the 
internal settlement. The empowerment of the South Tyrolese has been acceptable to both the 
Italians in the province and the region and to the institutions of the Italian state. The 
segmentation between the groups in clearly defined areas, such as education, language, and 
religion, where community-specific rather than inter-communal issues are at stake, has been 
similarly accepted. A recent trend towards greater integration, especially in the education sector 
has not been embraced by all sections of both communities, but has not led to any tensions 
either. More importantly, the consociational arrangement in South Tyrol has provided a fair 
distribution of political power between the two groups.
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In its policy approach, Italy has been following a pluralistic course, demonstrating its 
willingness to acknowledge and manage differences rather than to suppress or eliminate them. 
State institutions have, where necessary, mediated between the ethnic groups, or played the role 
of an arbitrator. In the process of implementing the agreed settlement, Italy has been an 
impartial administrator, independent of the various governments in office during this lengthy 
process, which was possible because of the high level of cross-party consensus among the 
political parties in Rome with respect to the desirability of the success of the ‘Paket’ solution. 
Externally, co-operation with Austria has not been a problem.
Austria, on its part, has ensured a high overall level of cross-party consensus approving 
the settlement after it had already surrendered any territorial claims vis-a-vis Italy in the 1946 
Paris Agreement. Thus, the country has abstained from any policies aimed at destabilising the 
consociational settlement, but rather has contributed to its long-term stability. Austria’s 
accession to the European Union in 1995 has been the latest in a sequence of steps the country 
took towards closer integration with European institutions. The international context has thus 
generally been very favourable towards the preservation and stability of the consociational 
settlement in South Tyrol, even to the extent that a number of European regulations have been 
suspended in the province in order to avoid a destabilisation of the situation.
In principle, consociational settlements can be reversed and are therefore of a less 
permanent character. Apart from the degree to which all parties involved are committed to the 
preservation of the consociation, reversibility also depends upon the constitutional and other 
legislative safeguards of the consociational settlement. While the ethnic groups will depend 
upon each other in a consociational settlement, they nevertheless retain a certain amount of 
power to determine their own affairs and to prevent each other from imposing unacceptable 
living conditions on one another. This makes a consociation a much more attractive modus 
vivendi, yet at the same time, mutual dependence and the preservation of ethnic differences 
increase the possibility of new conflict being instrumentalised at various levels of the political 
process. This way, the political stability of the mixed territory and the host-state itself, as well as
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that of the territorial and national governments, becomes more dependent upon the satisfactory 
functioning of the consociation. To some extent, this improves the bargaining position of the 
minority. However, on the other hand, it also forces all the parties involved to be prepared to 
make compromises to accommodate core demands of the ethnic groups and the two states. 
Once the former conflicting parties have realised that a consociation is a mutually beneficial 
settlement, an almost paradoxical situation arises -  the mere possibility of reversibility makes a 
consociation more stable because the actors participating in it have a genuine interest in 
maintaining it, and thus in preventing potentially dangerous developments.
External Settlement: Secession
In contrast to integration and a traditional consociation, this form of settlement implies a change 
of sovereignty over the territory in question. Taking the case of the Saarland as an example, a 
secession is also likely to be regulated in a complex international and/or bilateral treaty 
involving the two states affected, either with or without their respective kin-groups as equal 
partners, and potentially other international actors. Ideally, as in the case of the Saarland, the 
change in sovereignty reverses only a recent similar event so that neither strong institutional ties 
with the host-state have grown, nor traditional ties with the kin-state been severed. Exceptions 
from this rule are possible, especially if secession is viewed as a widely acceptable and all 
around beneficial arrangement.
In the Saarland, the pro-German segment of the population clearly dominated the seceding 
territory demographically. Concluding from post-secession developments in the Saarland, such 
a settlement will be more stable if significant sections of the other ethnic group(s) living in the 
same territory do, at the very least, not object to the secession and ethnic segmentation is at low 
level with no ethnic dominance existing.
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Stability Criteria of a Secession
a
i
Historical Context • Only recent change in sovereignty.• Social and emotional ties between external minority and kin-state still strong.
Sovereignty • Is transferred to kin-state.
eU Structure • Bilateral: external.
! Differences • Mostly eliminating, partly managing.
Reversibility • Normally not reversible.
• Below threshold of violence.
Level and Nature of Conflict Remaining • Not about the principle of secession.
• Resolvable within the framework of the settlement
a
ta Number of Problem Issues • Must be overall smalL
1 Degree of Co-operation between Elites • Must be high.
Degree of Co-operation between Ethnic Groups • Must be high.
I Political Consensus Groups/Elites • Must be high.
1 1 Competition between Political Groupings • Possible given overall political consensus.
1 Joint Interests • Helpful.
D.
3 Cleavages • Must be cross-cutting.
2 o a Political Consensus over 
Ultimate Goal
External Minority • Majority in favour of secession.
a
a ■b 3  «d b  d Host-Nation • Significant section not objecting to secession.
Competition between Political Parties • Possible given overall political consensus regarding the desirability of secession.
o
U Ethnic Homogeneity of Territory • Necessary at high level.1II Ethnic Segmentation
• Possible at very low leveL The higher the remaining level of 
ethnic distinctiveness between the groups, the more likely will 
secession have to be combined with a new internal settlement
■Is to accommodate the rights and interests of the new minority.
5 03 
09
Numerical Balance between Groups • Must be in favour of group wishing to secede.
Power Balance between Groups • Should be such that hew* minority is satisfied with arrangements.
d M ® w3  (A
3  £  S *
Internal Policies
• Allowing for smooth process of secession.
• Ensuring safeguards for section of the host-nation remaining in the seceding territory.
• Providing options for resettlement and compensation.
• High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement, including the preparedness to participate 
in negotiations on an additional internal settlement for the formerly disputed territory.
External Policies • Co-operation with the kin-state to arrange for a smooth period of transition from (me sovereignty to another, including issues of compensation and resettlement
■M
i-i Internal Policies
•  High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement
•  Acceptance of the obligations deriving from the secession vis-i-vis the new territory and its 
population.
•  Providing, where necessary, special institutional arrangements to accommodate other ethnic 













•  Pressures/incentives to settle the dispute.
•  No pressures/incentives to re-escalate the conflict.
•  No destabilising external involvement
As was the case with the secession of the Saarland, it is important that aspects of 
conflict that remain after the secession either between the different sections of the population in 
the seceding territory, between the two states involved, or between them and parts of die 
population (one or more ethnic groups) must be resolvable within the framework of the 
settlement by democratic and non-violent means, which may include transitional arrangements
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or special additional settlements for the protection of a new minority, e.g., a consociational 
settlement within the disputed territory. In the case of the Saarland, it has contributed to the 
stability of the secessionist settlement that the number of contentious issues has been low and 
the degree of co-operation between the pro-German and pro-French sections of the population 
and their respective elites has been high. It is reasonable to assume that similar conditions in an 
ethnically more plural environment would likewise contribute to the stability of the settlement. 
By the same token, cleavages of a crosscutting nature, joint interests, and cross-communal 
territorial loyalty will help the stability of the secessionist solution, as they did in the case of the 
Saarland.
As regards state policies, to a large extent, the stability of the settlement will depend 
upon how smoothly the process of transition from one sovereignty to another is arranged -  a 
process that is in the responsibility of both states involved. France contributed to this process by 
ensuring that there were safeguards in place protecting the pro-French section of the population 
in the Saar after secession, while simultaneously providing options for resettlement In general 
resettlement and compensation (which can be jointly funded with the kin-state) for those who 
do not want to live in another state limit the potential for future conflict to arise. While it was 
not an issue in relation to the Saar conflict, it is generally necessary for the long-term stability of 
a secessionist settlement that the former host-state prevent the emergence of an irredentist 
movement and does itself not pursue any policies that are aimed at a ‘recovery* of the ‘lost* 
territory or could have otherwise destabilising consequences for the negotiated settlement. In the 
longer term, secession, as any other settlement, depends upon the commitment of all conflicting 
parties to honour the agreement once it is achieved -  and the Saarland and Franco-German 
relations are a good example how this can contribute to ensuring settlement stability. Therefore, 
a high and lasting cross-party consensus among the political parties of the (former) host-state is 
essential.
The kin-state, to which sovereignty over the contentious area is transferred, must not 
only ensure that the initial period of transition is smooth, as Germany did, but has also to accept
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the obligations deriving from the secessionist settlement vis-a-vis the new territory and its 
population. In this context, Germany and France negotiated some transitional arrangements 
before the Saar was fully integrated into the Federal Republic. More generally, in case of a 
secessionist settlement for an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict, it depends upon the ethnic 
composition of the seceding area, the degree and direction of the territorial interest structure, 
and the extent to which a territorial loyalty has already developed among all the ethnic groups 
living there, whether a secession will be combined with specific institutional arrangements for 
the seceding territory after its incorporation into the other state. These can range from granting it 
federal or regional status or involve autonomy arrangements to take account of specific 
ethnographic features, or, as has been indicated above, include a consociational arrangement.
Conditions in the international context need to be such that all the conflict parties see 
greater benefits from maintaining the secessionist settlement stable, rather than re-escalating an 
already solved conflict. Western European and Nato integration have provided such a context in 
the case of the Saar, as they facilitated Franco-German reconciliation and the emergence of a 
supra-national institutional structure in which borders became less and less important.
Normally, a secession is not reversible except in cases of conquest. This puts a number 
of limits on the ability of the ethnic groups involved to determine their own affairs. Specific 
post-secession territorial arrangements, e.g., autonomous or federal status of the seceding 
territory, can be put in place as a form of compensation. In general, the new host-state has to 
adopt policies to prevent potential conflicts on its new territory that could threaten either its own 
stability or that of the entire region. From that perspective, the irreversibility of a secessionist 
settlement requires the former host-state to prevent a politically influential irredentist movement 
from emerging, which, however, is more likely to play a part in the domestic power struggle of 
this state if a dissatisfied and articulate kin-group remains as a minority on the seceding territory 
and if a sufficiently well-placed and skilled lobby of emigrants from this territory can exercise 
influence on foreign policy making. Thus, irreversibility does not necessarily result in stability.
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Bilateral Settlements
Consociation with Permanent and Formal External Involvement
The relatively short period that has passed after the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement
and its so far incomplete implementation do not allow a conclusive assessment of the criteria
conducive to the stability of this type of settlement. However, based on the analysis of the
agreement, the previous failures of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, and the study of the
nature of the conflict, it is reasonable to assume that the long-term stability of the agreement
will crucially depend on the conditions summarised in the following overview. In the short
term, not all of these criteria need to be met simultaneously or to their full extent This will
mean that the agreement structures will be vulnerable to attacks for some time, and that there
will be a measure of uncertainty over the long-term success of the proposed settlement both of
which should not come as a surprise given the recent history of the Northern Ireland conflict.
The basic difference between this solution model and the one discussed above as a traditional 
consociation is that here there are formal institutionalised structures that guarantee the 
involvement of the kin-state in the actual operation of the settlement. For example, although the 
United Kingdom did not surrender its sovereignty over Northern Ireland in the Good Friday 
Agreement, it accepted a formal and permanent role to the Republic of Ireland in the political 
process of the province.
As Northern Ireland and its two communities are generally treated as one political unit, 
the settlement must, in the long term, have the capacity to accommodate all remaining 
conflictual issues by democratic and peaceful means. In the short term, it might be sufficient to 
reach compromise on some issues, while others are deferred. In order to provide the settlement 
with a high degree of stability, the number of contentious, ethnicised issues must decrease Over 
time. Since the institutional framework of this settlement is, internally, not essentially different 
from that of a traditional consociational arrangement, and thus makes the ethnic groups depend 
upon one another, the degree of elite co-operation must be high and the level of political 
consensus among both communities and their elites must also be sufficiently well developed.
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Stability Criteria of a Consociation with Permanent and Formal External Involvement
1
Historical Context • Area as joint settlement rather than colony.• Emotional ties between external minority and kin-state weakening..
31
1 Sovereignty • Remains with host-state.OU
■a
Structure • Bilateral: internal.
i Differences • Managing.
Reversibility • Reversible.
Level and Nature of Conflict Remaining
• Below threshold of violence.
• Not about the principle of this kind of consociational set-up.
• Resolvable within the framework of the settlement
flo33 Number of Problem Issues • Must be overall small.
1 Degree of Co-operation between Elites • Must be high. Helpful at bilateral level.
u Degree of Co-operation between Ethnic Groups • Can be limited.
1
Political Consensus Groups/Elites • Must be high.
3
1 Competition between Political Groupings • Must be low, preferably two-party system.H
3 Joint Interests • Necessary.
Cleavages • Some cross-cutting cleavages helpful, e.g., ideological or class.
xj Political












n Consensus over 
Ultimate Goal Host-Nation
• Majority satisfied with internal settlement with the 
empowering of the external minority, and not resisting the 
cross-border dimension.
•3a©U Competition between Political Parties
• Must be low, preferably one catch-all party in each ethnic 
group with a basis broad enough to prevent die rise of radical 
splinter groups.













• Possible, and to some degree even desirable, in a limited 
number of clearly defined areas, e.g.; education, language, 
religion.
Numerical Balance between Groups • Should be about equal.
Cfl





• Willing to acknowledge and manage differences.
• Impartially mediating, and where necessary arbitrating, between groups at territorial level.
• Willing to co-operate with kin-state in 'internal' affairs.
• High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement
< 3 3 External Policies • Co-operation with kin-state within the agreed institutional framework.• Ensuring joint policy-making and implementing in the appropriate areas.













• Co-operation with host-state and both ethnic groups within the (two) institutional firamework(s) 
provided by the settlement. No instrumentalisation of the external minority fen irredentist or 











t • Pressures/incentives to settle the dispute.
• No pressures/incentives to re-escalate the conflict.
• No destabilising external involvement
Both propositions appear difficult to accomplish with a view to the development of the conflict 
over the past thirty years. Elite co-operation in particular is always likely to be under pressure 
from radical sections within each community as long as the intra-communal party systems 
remain fractured. Functioning elite co-operation, however, will be key to the possibility of a
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limited degree of inter-group co-operation. The further development and recognition of cross- 
cutting cleavages, for example, in relation to class and ideology might also prove conducive to 
increased settlement stability.
For the future of the Good Friday Agreement it will be essential that some degree of 
political consensus is generated among both communities that encompasses the institutional 
framework of the settlement. That is, the majority of the nationalist community must eventually 
be content with the internal settlement and the degree of cross-border co-operation included, 
while a majority within the Unionist community must not reject this same cross-border 
dimension as undue external interference. While there is room for segmental isolation in a small 
number of clearly defined areas, all tendencies towards domination by one group must be 
avoided. Political power between both communities must be visibly well balanced. A small 
number of political parties in each community or the clear dominance of one to two parties with 
generally similar agendas will bring more stability to the whole system, because group interests 
will be represented in a more homogeneous way and the flexibility of political leaders to 
compromise will increase. In the short term, it might be sufficient to maintain a sufficiently 
broad coalition of pro-agreement parties and politicians, provided that they can assert their 
influence over significant sections of their respective communities, a condition that was 
crucially missing from the Sunningdale process.
As regards British Northern Ireland policies, there will need to be a continued 
willingness to acknowledge and manage differences within the pluralistic structure of 
institutions provided by the Good Friday Agreement. The United Kingdom must continue to 
take a mediating, and where necessary arbitrating, position between the two communities and 
act impartially in the process of implementing and operating the settlement. Such a policy and 
an active preparedness to co-operate with the Republic of Ireland, i.e., to accept; joint 
responsibility for the making and implementing decisions in clearly defined areas, must be 
carried by a broad cross-party consensus.
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The Republic of Ireland, as any other kin-state in a similar situation, must ensure a 
similarly high degree of cross-party consensus and needs to be prepared to co-operate with the 
British government and both communities in Northern Ireland within the institutional 
frameworks provided by the jointly agreed settlement.
The complexity of the Northern Irish situation will continue to require, at least in the 
short and medium term, international involvement to a considerable extent, ensuring the full 
implementation and subsequently the operation of the Good Friday Agreement. To that extent, 
Northern Ireland is a special case of this type of settlement for ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts. Yet even where this direct involvement is not necessary, the conditions in the 
international context must be of such a nature that the cost-benefit ratio for all parties is in 
favour of working for the preservation of the settlement, thus ensuring its long-term stability.
The permanent institutional involvement of the kin-state into the operation of the 
settlement decreases the degree to which this kind of consociational settlement is in general 
reversible, as it introduces a further layer of safeguards against the unilateral ending of the 
arrangements. On the other hand, however, the kin-state is rendered more vulnerable to the 
‘conflict’ becoming a permanent issue in its domestic political process. From this perspective, 
the kin-states political stability becomes more dependent upon the satisfactory operation of the 
consociational settlement adopted in the formerly disputed territory. This way, the kin-state 
becomes genuinely interested in permanently resolving the conflict. This, in turn, increases the 
stability of the adopted settlement, and thus decreases the likelihood of its reversal. A similar 
effect results from the fact that both ethnic groups now have their respective mother countries 
permanently ‘on board* to safeguard their interests. Any change in this situation would be to the 
disadvantage of at least one of them directly, and indirectly to both of them, as the failure of the 
settlement would likely lead to a re-escalation of the conflict, which could then prompt the two 
states to move towards joint sovereignty. To some extent, therefore, the complexity of the 
mechanisms at work in a consociation with permanent external involvement decreases the
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likelihood of it being reversed as its success is essentially an interest shared by all former 
conflict parties.
A Democratised Condominium
Similar to the discussion of the criteria conducive to the stability of a consociational settlement 
with permanent and formal external involvement, the following are only reasonable 
assumptions based on the study of factors that influence ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts 
in general and of two condominia in particular. With no democratised condominium thus far 
applied as a solution to this type of conflict, these conditions could not be tested in practice. 
Even though the following analysis is speculative, it contributes to the overall purpose of this 
study in that it provides a framework of likely conditions that would be necessary for the 
successful implementation and long-term stability of a democratised condominium as settlement 
for the particular type of conflict under examination. These conditions are summarised in the 
following overview.
Of all the different types of conflict settlement analysed, a condominium-style 
arrangement along the lines proposed here is certainly the most unusual, but handled properly it 
has the same likelihood of success as all the others. The devolution of sovereignty to the ethnic 
groups and their independent decision on the degree of integration with their respective kin- 
states are the two primary characteristics of this kind of settlement. A condominium is 
nevertheless in essence a bilateral arrangement. It seeks to manage differences, yet, through the 
use of mechanisms of non-territorial autonomy, it partly also eliminates them, or at least makes 
them less important. As all other settlement types, the stability of a condominium depends upon 
the absence of violence, and on the remaining conflict issues being few and resolvable within 
the institutional framework established. The degree of inter-ethnic elite co-operation needs to be 
high at the territorial level. The same holds true for the necessary political consensus among 
both elites and ethnic groups about the desirability of the condominium solution. The existence 
of joint interests is certainly helpful as is the institutional independence of the two groups from 
one another.
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Stability Criteria of a Democratised Condominium
§
Historical Context • limited tradition of compromise helpful.• Both ethnic groups should have maintained ties with their respective kin-nations/kin-states.
td
i Sovereignty
• Devolved to the ethnic groups involved in the settlement process. From them powers can be 
reassigned to their respective kin-states.
u Structure • Bilateral.
1 Differences • Mostly managing, partly eliminating.
O Reversibility • Reversible.
Level and Nature of Conflict Remaining
• Below threshold of violence.
• Not about the principle of condominium status for the disputed 
territory.
• Resolvable within the framework of the settlement.
Number of Problem Issues • Must be overall small at territorial level.
i
CO
Degree of Co-operation between Elites • Must be high at territorial level.• Not necessary at non-territorial level. Helpful at bilateral level.
Degree of Co-operation between Ethnic Groups • Can be extremely limited at territorial level.• Not necessary at non-territorial level.
W
bw •
Political Consensus Groups/Elites • Must be high at territorial level.• Not necessary at non-territorial level.






Joint Interests • Helpful.
Cleavages
• No cross-cutting cleavages necessary.
• The more segmentally independent both communities are, the 
easier is their institutional separation from one another and the 
possibility of asymmetric (re-) integration into their respective 
kin-states.a
i u*3 a Political
External Minority
• Majority satisfied with condominium settlement and with the 
degree of group sovereignty over its relationships with the kin- 




• Majority satisfied with condominium settlement and with the 
degree of incorporation in the host-state.
• Not resisting the non-territorial arrangements.
Competition between Political Parties • Possible given overall political consensus regarding the desirability of a condominium status.
3
Ethnic Homogeneity of Territory • Not necessary.
■a gs i Ethnic Segmentation • Necessary at high level.
3g Numerical Balance between Groups • Not necessary.
o09 Power Balance between Groups • Necessary at territorial level as far as areas of joint competence are concerned.
1■**1
Internal Policies of the 
Host-State
• Pluralistic.
• Willing to co-operate with kin-state.
• Willing to devolve sovereignty to the ethnic groups individually.
• High cross-party consensus in approval of settlementO JL
isa External Policies of the Host-State
• Co-operation with kin-state on issues of common interest
• Ensuring smooth operation of the complex system of devolved sovereignty. Accepting the non- 
territorial organisation of the formerly disputed territory. Accepting the role of the other state as 
a partner in the condominium.
a a
a  5  s  «»
Internal Policies of the 
Kin-State • High cross-party consensus in approval of settlement











t • Pressures/incentives to settle the dispute.
• No pressures/incentives to re-escalate the conflict
• No destabilising external involvement.
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With respect to the intra-ethnic situation, majorities within both ethnic groups need to 
be satisfied with the institutional arrangements that are made. Competition between political 
parties within each group is possible, provided that there is an overall consensus between parties 
in each group that the preservation of the condominium status is desirable.
It is not necessary that the disputed territory be ethnically homogeneous or that the two 
groups live in compact settlement areas, although the latter could be, to some extent, helpful. 
Political power between them must be distributed evenly at territorial level as far as the areas of 
joint decision-making are concerned.
On an internal level, the former host-state must pursue a pluralistic minority policy and 
be willing to co-operate with the kin-state. It must be prepared to devolve sovereignty to the 
ethnic groups in the territory individually and to accept the degree to which they both wish to be 
integrated with their respective kin-states. A high degree of cross-party consensus is necessary 
to ensure a continuity of this policy over time. Externally, the former host-state must pursue 
policies that express its commitment to ensure a smooth operation of the complex system of 
devolved sovereignty, e.g. it must accept the non-territorial organisation of the formerly 
disputed territory and the role of the kin-state as a partner in the operation of the condominium.
As for the kin-state, a high internal cross-party consensus over the desirability of the 
specific settlement adopted is essential to ensure its stability. Externally, co-operation with the 
former host-state within the institutional framework provided by the settlement is necessary, and 
it must refrain from instrumentalising its kin-group in the formerly disputed territory for 
irredentist or otherwise destabilising policy agendas.
Similar to all the other model solutions examined, conditions in the international 
context will have an effect on the stability of a settlement of this type. In order to contribute to 
its stability, pressures and incentives originating in the international environment must be 
directed at the preservation, rather than the destruction of the settlement and no external party " 
should aim at the destabilisation of the democratised condominium.
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As far as the reversibility of a condominium-style settlement of this kind is. concerned, 
matters are rather complex. In principle, it is reversible, or more precisely, it is possible to 
destroy it. What is unclear, however, is what the consequences of such a destruction would be, 
i.e., what status the territory would have after the suspension of the condominium. Much here 
depends upon the grounds for the collapse of the institutional framework. If renewed ethnic 
conflict is the reason, it is likely that, similar to a consociation with permanent and formal 
external involvement, the two states would adopt a joint sovereignty approach and thus limit the 
degree to which the ethnic groups would be masters of their own fate. This obvious 
disadvantage is likely to increase the preparedness of the ethnic groups to work for the stable 
operation of the condominium. If one of the states unilaterally withdraws support for the 
settlement, the situation is different. If the remaining agreement parties remain committed to the 
settlement, it would be most likely that the kin-group of the withdrawing state assumes the role 
of the ‘condominium partner’. Obviously, there would be disadvantages to such a ‘crippled’ 
condominium, but given sufficient flexibility, a modified institutional framework would be still 
be operable along similar lines. The most dangerous constellation of reversibility is a 
simultaneous withdrawal of support by one of the states and its kin-group, i.e., the renewing of 
both the ethnic and the territorial conflicts. The likely consequences of such a development 
(inter-state armed conflict, violent ethnic conflict, and/or proxy ethnic warfare) can not be in the 
interest of either of the potential conflict parties. Even in a democratic context, this does not 
make such a development impossible, but it makes it rather unlikely.
X. Conclusion
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Over the past two decades, the study of ethnic conflicts has become a popular subject among 
social scientists, and a number of excellent single and comparative case studies have been 
produced. Yet, missing thus far, and in particular for the European context, has been an analysis 
not only of ethnic conflicts and conflict management policies, but also of settlements and the 
conditions of their lasting stability. By undertaking such a study, drawing on five European and 
one extra-European conflict, my aim was to begin to fill this gap.
My analysis is distinguished from others in the field in two ways. The first is its 
methodology. I began with an initial theoretical exploration of the variety of factors influencing 
the development and settlement of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts provided the 
framework of the subsequent study of each individual case. Thus refined through the application 
to these cases, this framework enabled me reliably to determine the conditions that must be 
fulfilled to provide lasting stability to a negotiated settlement. The second distinguishing feature 
is that this set of stability criteria creates a paradigm that has relevance as an analytical tool 
beyond the case studies conducted in this project. It can be used to design case-specific 
solutions to actual ethnic conflicts and it can serve as an instrument to recognise instabilities in, 
and potential breakdowns of, existing settlements sufficiently early to respond to them 
constructively and to avoid a re-escalation of an already settled conflict.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the case studies I conducted. First, it is 
not possible to determine a single unique and optimal model for the solution of ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts. In the end, what matters is not whether a settlement is internal, external, 
or bilateral, whether it seeks to eliminate or to manage differences, or whether it is easily 
reversible or not. What is of the most critical importance is that the particular institutional 
design of the adopted solution fits the needs of the conflict parties. Only if their identities, 
interests, and needs can be accommodated to a degree that is high enough such that is it possible 
to generate the commitment among them to implement and sustain a negotiated settlement. 
Second, the stability of all these model solutions draws from and depends upon the same set of
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criteria, and it is the concrete circumstances of each individual conflict that determines their 
content and thus whether a particular solution can be stable or not.
The paradigm of the analytical framework developed here can thus be used for the stiidy 
of ethnic conflicts and their settlements elsewhere in the world. Given the particular type of 
conflict for which it was developed -  ethno-territorial cross-border conflict -  this framework 
should prove applicable in the study of, and development of solutions for, ethnic conflicts in 
Central and Eastern Europe, for example, of the conflicts in Kosovo, Moldova, Chechnya, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagomo Karabakh.
As such, this study fulfils two purposes -  to provide an analysis of ethno-territorial 
cross-border conflicts in Western Europe and to develop a concrete tool that can be easily 
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